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Abstract
The thesis explores how public controversies over agricultural biotechnology have been 
sought to be mitigated through procedures of public involvement in policy making in three 
different European countries (Denmark, the UK, and Germany).
The thesis surveys social research on the reasons for public discontent over GM food, and 
identifies and discusses a certain set o f ideas on how to deal with technological controver­
sies, summarised under the heading of public participation and inclusion. It is argued that 
the ideals of public participation are increasingly propagated as a means to mediate in risk 
controversies.
With inspiration from autopoietic systems theory and Cultural Theory, the social structural 
roots of controversies about technologies considered to be risky are identified and theo­
retically analysed. The controversies are argued to be rooted in tensions in functionally dif­
ferentiated modem societies, between dependency on expert knowledge, which is by nature 
socially and thematically exclusionary, and ideals about socially and thematically inclusion­
ary democratic forms of governance.
On this background three (functionally equivalent but institutionally diverse) procedures 
that aimed to bridge such tensions by means of public involvement are compared in order 
to investigate how ‘the public* is operationalised in participatory procedures, and what ef­
fects different operationalisations have on the outcomes of the procedures.
The three cases analysed are a Danish ‘consensus conference’ and the work of an ethics 
committee, a large-scale public debate experiment in Britain called ‘GM Nation?’ and a 
German corporatist, round-table dialogue called ‘Diskurs Grüne Gentechnik*.
The three cases are compared with regard to how they seek 1) to achieve resonance in their 
respective socio-political environments, 2) to regulate principles of inclusion in and exclu­
sion from the procedures and 3) to establish scientific competence in their outputs.
The thesis concludes that although the procedures investigated concern the same material 
topic, can be considered sociologically equivalent in regard to the functions they seek to 
fulfil, and to a considerable degree draw inspiration from similar intellectual sources, their 
actual institutional embodiments vary significantly as do their effects. This variation is as­
cribed in part to the location of the procedures in different political cultures, but also to 
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Introduction
Over the past 30 years or so, the world has witnessed a number of scientific discoveries 
and technological innovations in biology, biotechnology and genetically based medicine 
which, it would appear, could substantially alter both food production and healthcare in 
technical as well as social terms. For those promoting these various technologies, the de­
velopments hold the potential for a better world, whilst for the sceptics they hold Faustian 
dangers. These diverging evaluations of ‘the same* technologies have provided the material 
for an apparently endless social controversy.1 One should of course be careful when mak­
ing such sweeping statements, but it seems justified to say that in both food production 
and medicine scientific progress and technological innovation is no longer unambiguously 
equated with social progress.
Parallel to, and in part as a consequence of, controversies over a number of science-based 
technologies and their ecological and social impacts, a changed configuration of interaction 
between what may in a short formula be termed ‘science and society’ can be observed. In 
short, the social prestige o f science has declined, as has the possibility for science as an in­
stitution to effectively abdicate responsibility for the technological application of new 
knowledge. Consequently a withdrawal or decline of public trust in expert institutions is 
often diagnosed. In this thesis these observed developments will be explored as the prod­
uct of a principled tension between, on the one hand, the dependency of modem societies 
in a wide range of areas on scientific knowledge and science-based expertise (which by na­
ture is highly exclusionary both thematically and socially) and, on the other hand, the norma­
tive expectation that collective choices should be a matter for democratic procedures and 
deliberations (which are meant to be broadly inclusionary thematically as well as socially).
The thesis starts from the assumption that these developments and controversies, some of 
which will be conceptually clarified and empirically fleshed out in the work, pose several 
interesting sociological puzzles. As such, biotechnology provides an interesting focus for 
studying the interaction between science, technology and democracy, as well as the tension 
(certain) technological developments create in social relations. This thesis sets out to ex­
plore some o f these issues.
More specifically, I take two observations as my starting points. The first is that reflections 
on how to manage social controversies sparked by technological dynamics in ways that are 
both competent and legitimate have fostered a series of claims -  a particular discourse, or 
semantic -  that controversies can (and preferably should) be mitigated through participa­
tive and deliberative procedures, which some observers claim could potentially render
11 put ‘the same’ in quotation marks to indicate from the outset that a central assumption underpinning the 
thesis is that substantial parts o f  the controversies consist in defining and delimiting what the technologies 
and their effects actually are, and contestants therefore cannot necessarily be assumed to observe and debate 
‘the same’ thing.
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technological choices more democratically accountable and socially competent. In short, 
such procedures are claimed to produce legitimacy. The second observation is that these 
participatory and deliberative discourses have -  in different contexts -  initiated, facilitated 
or developed in symbiosis with a differentiation of specialized modes of communication 
and the formation of organisational forums aimed at mitigating technological controversies 
in which ‘public involvement’ in one form or another constitutes an important mode of 
operation and figures prominently in self-descriptions of the organisations in question. It is 
these observed developments I wish to explore further.
One technological field where many of the issues I wish to investigate are particularly pro­
nounced is the agricultural application of modem biotechnology.2 Here one can observe a 
communicative intermingling of cognitive, socio-economic and moral elements, which, on 
the one hand, make the issues extremely intricate and opaque and, on the other hand, tend 
to polarise them. In particular, this appears to entail confrontation between a dominant 
fraction o f scientific experts and economic operators, who are predominantly positive to­
wards the new technologies and a majority o f the populations (and social movement or­
ganisations), at least in Western Europe, who are predominantly negative. Therefore, I have 
chosen the social management o f genetically modified organisms (GMOs) as the empirical 
field o f investigation. However, I will argue that a number o f the social mechanisms to be 
discussed in the thesis are equally applicable to other technological fields and that, ideally, 
their exploration can contribute to a more general sociological understanding o f the nature 
and dynamics o f modem societies. The study of technological controversies therefore in­
vites a consideration of the fundamental structures of modem societies, just as such con­
troversies can only be rendered fully comprehensible via an analysis that takes these struc­
tures into consideration. Therefore, I will seek to link these the specific inquiries to more 
general discussions in sociological theory.
The kind o f controversies I investigate are, as indicated above, characterised by a combina­
tion of cognitive uncertainties regarding the physical properties of the technologies in ques­
tion, uncertainties regarding their socio-economic impacts and what for lack o f a better 
term can be called moral uncertainties, i.e. a lack of commonly shared normative evaluatory 
yard-sticks underpinning collective decision making. This means that in such controversies 
a number o f  perspectives confront one another both in and outside of the public sphere. It 
is the dynamics of these clashes, which are of interest here. A further result o f  this is a 
change in the demands on politics and political institutions as general addressees o f prob­
lems that cannot be solved or settled elsewhere in modem societies. Just as the social pres­
tige and internal workings of science are put under pressure by such controversies, so are 
political institutions. One general thrust of this development has been an increase in de-
2 By m odem  biotechnology I mean, following Bauer and Gaskell,'. . .  processes, products and services that 
have been developed on the basis of interventions at the level of the gene’ (Bauer and Gaskell 2002a: 3).
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mands for ‘more democracy*, for more participation, deliberation, dialogue and inclusion in 
the politics o f science and technology. This is perhaps particularly pronounced on the theo­
retical and rhetorical levels, but there are also empirical indications of a certain evolution in 
the interaction between politics, science and ‘the public*, which can be described as the es­
tablishment o f contexts where different modes of communication pertaining to technology 
are confronted with each other in ways that involve the participation of a greater number 
and scope o f  actors than have usually been included in science and technology policy mak­
ing.
The demands for increased participation and deliberation have found a certain resonance in 
the social sciences, where they are increasingly discussed in normative, theoretical and em­
pirical terms — sometimes, however, in a manner which makes it difficult to distinguish be­
tween analysis and advocacy.3 It is my perception that such discourses — I will provisionally 
call them participatory or deliberative postulates — have received significant (and increasing) 
attention in theoretical terms, but less work has investigated the empirical effects of these 
postulates. A central ambition o f the thesis will therefore be to suggest a sociological ap­
proach to the study of actual processes of ‘public involvement* with regard to technological 
controversies — their thematic and social composition, their internal dynamics and their ef­
fects on the governance of technologies.4 A more long-term ambition is to contribute to a 
sociologically qualified discussion o f  what the most important social factors are for delib­
eration, that is which conditions optimise the chance that the normative claims entailed in 
the advocacy for more participation and deliberation can actually be redeemed.
In order to pursue these aims the investigation will consist o f three central components: 1) 
An attempt to spell out the essence of the participatory/deliberative postulates entering 
into processes of public involvement in technological controversies as a particular mode of 
communication. 2) The development of a sociological-theoretical perspective that take a 
certain distance from these postulates, and which can inform and direct the empirical in­
vestigations o f such procedures (i.e. without being biased towards the participatory ideals). 
3) A detailed empirical study and comparison of a number o f such processes, in order to 
explore the diversity of ways in which the participatory/deliberative modes of communica­
tion are ‘operationalised’ and what effects they actually have in their respective policy con­
texts.
3 The discourses on participation and deliberation have of course been around for a long time, bu t it is not 
until more recently they have gained prominence in regard to science and technology, which has traditionally 
been considered the exclusive domain o f  experts.
4 When 1 say a sociokgcal approach, this entails a daim that the system reference of the investigation must be 
sodety as such, and not just the political processes allegedly central to these controversies, nor the effects on 
individual concerns and anxieties. This means that an adequate interpretation of the controversies must seek 




The topic to be explored more specifically is how £the public1 is actually brought into being 
communicatively, what assumptions and confrontations go into what can be termed the 
‘operationalisation* of the public and public concerns -  and what effects this has for the 
dynamics and effects of such procedures. The research question guiding the diesis can thus 
be formulated as:
How art public involvement events organised to effect on the communicative dynamic in GM biotechnology 
policy arenas?
More specifically, how do conceptions of ‘the public*, their concerns and their role in policy-making mediate 
the effects of public controversy on policy formation in this area?
The underlying assumption here is that in various procedures of public involvement, as­
sumptions are made and discursive framings are propagated about:
• (the nature of) ‘the public*
• the issues at stake in the controversies
• the distribution of competences among different actors in die policy arenas
• which inputs into policy-making from ‘the public* are relevant (or legitimate)
and that the configuration o f these framings differs in various embodiments o f mediating 
procedures. An aim will therefore be to investigate how these dimensions are configured in 
specific cases and what challenges different configurations pose for the use o f procedures 
of public involvement in actual policy-making processes.
The empirical part of the study consists of three case studies and their comparison. This 
shall serve to explicate similarities and differences in how the public has been operational­
ised in different settings and what effects these operationalisations have had. In combina­
tion with theoretical analysis this scrutiny of specific processes will hopefully provide an 
increased understanding o f the possibilities and limitations in participatory and deliberative 
forms o f policy making in the science and technology domain.
Before launching into this empirical analysis I draw from existing research and theoretical 
discussions:
•  an understanding of the structural features of public concerns over biotechnology 
and the dynamic o f the controversies in the field, as well as an outline of the regula­
tor)" issues involved in the social management of agricultural biotechnology,
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•  central elements of the perceived need for increased participation and deliberation 
in technology assessment as well as the normative principles enbedded in these 
calls, and
• a general theoretical framework for interpreting and analysing the dynamics of con­
troversies about science and technology in modem societies with a particular em­
phasis on risks.
Arguably, contemporary calls for more participation and deliberation in science and tech­
nology policy-making are part of a transnational trend. This observation applies independ­
ently o f whether they are considered as part of a discourse on ‘the démocratisation of de­
mocracy’ (Giddens) or more instrumentally as a means to manage social controversy. As 
will be shown, there are certainly recurring discursive elements across the cases to be dis­
cussed. This indicates a significant mutual observation between the organisations carrying 
out science and technology policy making (and between their ‘accompanying’ academic ob­
servers) in different national contexts as well as an emerging interest among supranational 
organisations, notably the EU, in such processes. However, most of the practical experi­
ences (and experiments) with these new modes o f policy-making are clearly embedded in 
national, if not sub-national, contexts. Therefore, the cases investigated here are located in 
and address national political institutions.
The three cases selected for examination are the following; 1) A Danish consensus confer­
ence, the central trait of which is the assessments o f a panel of lay people deliberating with 
a panel of experts, as well as an initiative to instigate political and public debate about ethi­
cal principles guiding the regulation o f  biotechnology. 2) A large-scale British public debate 
arrangement combined with scientific and economic inquires performed in a public mode. 
3) A German ‘round-table dialogue process’ among major stakeholders initiated by the 
German government, which was given a deliberative format and also undertaken as a pub­
lic event.
The research design is based on two premises. The first is that the procedures selected for 
analysis can -  despite a number of differences -  be considered as instances o f the same 
class o f  social phenomena. They are all specially differentiated forms of communication 
about a technology considered risky with the aim of mitigating controversy by means of 
expanded social and thematic inclusion. As such, they are confronted with similar substan­
tive issues and to a large extent draw inspiration for their operationalisation from the same 
participatory and discursive semantics. However, they exhibit substantial differences in 
their social, temporal and substantive configurations. Following from this, the second 
premise is that a theoretical framework must be devised which can at the same time render 
the cases comparable and allow for the description and analysis of their similarities and dif­
ferences. To anticipate the investigations a little, the developed framework focuses on the
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social, temporal and substantive dimensions of how the procedures operationalise the need 
to a) communicate the acceptability by ‘the public’ of various risks to decision makers, b) to 
establish trust-generating mechanism that will ensure a legitimate delegation o f competence 
from ‘the public’ to decision-makers and c) to devise mechanisms to mediate perceptual 
and interpretive differences pertaining to the technolog)'.
The main focus will be on exploring the dynamic o f these alternative modes for more in­
clusive policy advice and formulation, as well as those challenges to the success of the pro­
cedures that can be observed — in principle independently o f their national contexts.
However, some of the differences between the observed procedures are clearly ascribable 
to their different national origins. Although the inquiry is not meant to be a cross-national 
comparison sincto sensu5 these differences must o f course be taken into consideration as 
contextual variables when exploring the cases.
The cases exhibit a significant path-dependency and cannot be adequately assessed in isola­
tion. This has certain consequences for the way the case studies are conducted. Firstly, in 
order to be able to assess the kind o f impacts the procedures might or might not have in 
the policy arenas, an account of these contexts are necessary. Secondly, the reconstruction 
of their respective contexts is a task that goes beyond the scope of a single thesis and will 
need to be based in part on the observations of other scholars.
The cases will be described and analysed individually. Subsequently they will be compared 
along selected dimensions, pointing out how the cases can be seen as different solutions to 
common challenges to such procedures. The dimensions o f comparison will be derived in 
part from the case studies themselves, in part from the normative discussions on participa­
tion and deliberation. As will be discussed in more detail, the comparative dimensions run 
under the headings of ‘constructing representativeness’, ‘constructing competence’ and 
‘links to policy making’.
Structure of the thesis
In order to guide the reader through the text, the remainder of this introduction otters a 
brief, motivated overview of the structure of the thesis.
C hapter I: Approaching the em pirical field
The first chapter aims at achieving an initial understanding of the controversial ‘landscape’ 
in which the new forms o f policy making mean to intervene. This will be pursued through 
the review of two, partly separate, bodies of literature, which, to put it a little crudely, focus




on the ‘social’ and the ‘substantive* dimensions o f the societal appropriation of biotechnol­
ogy-
Of course no one controversy is entirely invariant across time and national context. None­
theless, the social scientific observations made on this topic have established certain com­
mon traits and developed certain ways of observing the nature and dynamic of technologi­
cal controversies, which I consider a necessary background for understanding the commu­
nicative dynamic of the cases to be investigated. The chapter constitutes a review o f the 
most important approaches and the insights gained. I shall attempt, firstly, to identify 
common features of the social dynamic and structure o f the controversies over (especially 
agricultural) biotechnology, how these have developed historically and how the social scien­
tific observation of technological controversies has ‘co-evolved* with diverging assessments 
between different social groups. Central to this discussion is the ‘public perception’ para­
digm and the criticisms that have followed in its wake. The basic question here is what ‘the 
public’ is ‘concerned’ about, as well as how these concerns are structured and manifested, 
what their determinants are and how they vary temporally and spatially. Furthermore, I 
shall introduce into the discussion some reflections on the rationality of such concerns, and 
the potential functions and effects o f popular opposition to technological change.
Secondly, I present a brief introduction to the social regulation of biotechnology. By ‘social’ 
regulation I mean that the focus is not on the technicalities o f regulation but on the under- 
lying principles and concerns involved as well as its institutional embedding, primarily in 
Europe. The section will serve to describe the temporal evolvement of regulatory regimes 
of agricultural biotechnology as a background for the case studies and the context in which 
the policy making modes to be discussed are situated.
Chapter II: New discourses on science and technology policy
The second chapter looks at the body of literature advocating and analysing new participa­
tory and deliberative forms of science and technology policy-making. I briefly discuss how 
participatory and deliberative modes of policy making distinguish themselves from more 
‘traditional’ modes. I then go on to tease out the normative, analytical and empirical ele­
ments in the discourses on participatory and deliberative approaches to the management of 
risky technologies in a general mode. Although the writings to be discussed are arguably 
part of a shared discursive trend, they are in my opinion best understood as a conglomerate 
of discourses, which intermingle in the discussions. I will present this view with reference 
to particular writers often quoted in the social scientific debates on these issues. Here I see 
three different nuances, which seem worth discussing separately, as they have slightly dif­
ferent aims and emphases.
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Firstly, there is a body of literature which is primarily concerned with changes in knowledge 
production and knowledge validation by means of an extended social inclusion (cue: Mode 
2, socially robust knowledge).
Secondly, there is a perspective which focuses on the particular value o f lay knowledge and 
its introduction into the various regulatory loci.
Thirdly, a broadly Habermasian approach, labelled deliberative democracy will be explored, 
which is primarily concerned with rationality-gains from deliberation, i.e. the value of estab­
lishing fair and competent forums for the exchange of arguments.
These different literatures are primarily diagnostic and/or prescriptive. In order to get an 
initial empirical hold on some o f the issues set out for discussion here, in a next step I go 
on to discuss approaches to Technology Assessment (TA) and how these (normative) so­
cial analytical approaches have developed in symbiosis with attempts to establish participa­
tory forms of technology assessment (PTA).
C hapter III: The roots o f technological controversies — the sociology o f  risk
In the third chapter the level of sociological abstraction is somewhat raised, as I attempt to 
establish an analytical framework to guide the case studies. In order to do so I seek to lo­
cate technological controversies analytically in the structural context o f modem societies. 
To this end I draw upon the systems theoretical framework of Niklas Luhmann, which will 
serve three purposes. Firstly, it will serve as a meta-theoretical framework providing as­
sumptions about the social world.6 Secondly, it provides some basic assumptions about the 
structural features of modem societies. These will, on the one hand, be used to locate the 
roots o f  contemporary controversies over technologies in a functionally differentiated soci­
ety inevitably producing different kinds of risk. O n the other hand, it will be used to predict 
some o f  the expected difficulties for participatory and deliberative procedures, which in 
this framework must be considered as structurally grounded rather than accidental. Thirdly, 
the systems theoretical framework will be used to develop some conceptual tools and dis­
tinctions to sharpen the observations of the empirical material. Here, I have in mind a 
genuinely sociological understanding of ‘risk’ and ‘trust’, which are otherwise often reduced 
to their, respectively, physical and psychological components.
However, it can be argued that the Luhmannian theory is strong in providing explanations 
o f the structural roots of a number of challenges modem societies create for themselves, 
and that it provides a sophisticated vocabulary to discuss these challenges. Yet the ap­
proach is perhaps less well-equipped to register and analyse variation within modem socie­
6 Within this I consider communication as the fundamental unit o f  analysis, the distinction between system 
and environment as constitutive for organised social complexity, the distinction between first and second 
order observation, the autopoiesis and operational closedness o f  social systems, a distinction o f  social, sub­
stantive and temporal elements o f  all communication etc.
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ties. Therefore, the systems theoretical framework will be complemented with other theo­
retical tools. Central here is the concept ofpublic sphere, which does not have strict systems 
theoretical parallels. However, its compatibility with the systems theoretical framework will 
be discussed, as will insights drawn from the ‘Cultural Theory’ approach to risk analysis.
Chapter IV: Methodology and selection of cases
As a bridge between the theoretical reflections and the case studies the fourth chapter 
serves three purposes. It develops an operationalistion of the theoretical reflections, which 
hopefully serve to simultaneously render the cases comparable and facilitate the description 
and analysis o f their differences, it presents some methodological reflections on how the 
material is compiled and analysed, and finally it accounts for the selection of the cases.
Chapters V, VI and VII: Case studies
Chapters V, VI and VII include the bulk of the empirical investigation o f the thesis as each 
describes and analyses one case. The case studies focus on establishing what I call the op­
erationalisation of the public in different procedures as well as assessing their effects on the 
configuration o f  their respective policy arenas. The three cases are, as mentioned, based on 
material from Denmark, the United Kingdom and Germany. This means that in addition to 
being ‘direct’ products of the application o f deliberative and participatory procedures to 
technological controversies, they must be seen as products of particular policy contexts 
which must be taken into consideration. O f central interest is how the cases are configured 
on the dimensions outlined in the operationalisation, and what challenges the procedures 
are confronted with compared to their self-prescribed tasks. On the one hand the cases are 
characterised and analysed according to the same conceptual scheme, on the other each 
case is taken as an occasion to highlight a specific type o f challenge to such participatory 
and deliberative procedures*
The Danish case focuses on two procedures. Firstly, an attempt to develop general ethical 
evaluation criteria to guide, or at least influence, paths of biotechnological development. 
This attempt at ‘institutionalised ethics’ developed in two parallel processes, a bureaucrati­
sation of ethics and a feeding of ‘ethical principles’ into a public debate, which was claimed 
to be important, but was not coupled in any formal way with decision-making procedures 
or institutions. Secondly, the Danish case discusses the format of ‘consensus conferences’, 
which have become a well-established methodology for public participation in Denmark 
and have attracted significant international attention. The basic principle is that ‘informed’ 
lay people deliberate in cooperation with experts to apply the ‘moral competencies’ of the 
public to the cognitive competences of experts. Here, sensitivity to the configuration of 
expert input, as well as coupling to the centres o f decision making are critically examined. 
Particularly pronounced in the Danish case is what I call the ‘problem of resonance’.
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The British case revolves around a procedure named ‘GM Nation?’, which was carried out 
by the British Government in the summer of 2003. The format of the debate was new in 
the British context, and it will be argued that the aims were both unclear and controversial. 
Therefore, particular attention will be given to the organisation of the process. The process 
was ‘all-inclusive’ in the sense that no one was excluded from participating (in one specific 
phase o f  the process). This meant that the process had a considerable element o f lay in­
volvement. There was also extensive use of expertise, as a scientific workgroup was formed 
especially for the procedure. However, there was no direct lay-expert interaction. As such 
the case illustrates some o f the transmission problems such procedures encounter, both 
between different social groups and different ‘perspectives’ on the same material topic, as 
well as between the elements of the procedure and the surrounding society, notably the 
political system. The all-inclusive approach meant that the process was exposed to accusa­
tions o f self-selection bias. Therefore, here what I call the ‘problem of inclusion’ is particu­
larly pronounced.
The German case, finally, focuses on a more corporatist approach to mediation in techno­
logical controversies. The case centres on a round table discussion initiated by the Gov­
ernment and including a wide circle of stakeholder organisations called ‘Diskurs Grime 
Gentechnik’. This process had a stronger coupling with the centre of the political system 
than the other cases. It also had participatory elements in terms of process and output con­
trol, but raises issues about representation of the interests of ‘the public’ via organisations. 
A further issue that this case highlights is the problem o f strategic behaviour in procedures 
that are intended to be discursive. There was a tendency for conflict to be reiterated rather 
than mitigated in the procedure examined, which is why I take the German case as an op­
portunity to discuss what I call the ‘problem of mediation’.
C hapter V III: Comparative perspectives
Although the procedures investigated in the case studies are rather different in a number of 
respects, the eighth chapter will attempt to compare them along three dimensions. These 
dimensions are derived from the case studies as ‘challenges’ to such procedures, which arc 
labelled, respectively, construction o f representativeness, construction o f competence and 
links to policy-making. Although each of these problems is arguably particularly pro­
nounced in one of the cases, I argue that they represent issues all such procedures must 
confront. The aim of the chapter is to map and explain the different selections made in the 
individual procedures on each o f the dimensions and what effects these differences had on 
the use o f  the procedures in their respective contexts.
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Conclusion
In the final chapter I summarise what I believe has been learned through the investigation, 
discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the chosen approach to the material and the results 





The Anatomy of a Technological Controversy
The general aim o f the thesis is a sociological investigation o f allegedly new and ‘alternative’ 
modes of science and technology policy-making, which addresses the tension between, on 
the one hand, normative expectations of democratic inclusion and, on the other, the neces­
sity o f a high level of expertise that by nature is highly exclusive in a deliberative and par­
ticipatory manner. It seems beyond doubt that the arguments in favour of, and experiments 
with, more inclusive forms of policy-making have emerged due to the fact that the intro­
duction of new technologies have become contested and the object of social controversies 
in a way that seems more intense than earlier experiences. Biotechnology is perhaps one of 
the most obvious examples of this phenomenon. I therefore assume -  albeit without un­
dertaking extensive comparisons with other technological domains -  that the controversies 
over modem biotechnology are useful for studying processes of heightened conflict poten­
tial from new technologies.7 The aim of this chapter, however, is to gain a preliminary un­
derstanding of the ‘anatomy’ of the controversies over modem biotechnology.
No-one today is likely to disagree with the general statement that modem biotechnology is 
controversial. There is little consensus, however, on the subject of just what exactly these 
controversies consist, nor o f why they seem to be so persistent. Here, therefore, the task 
will be to look at how these controversies have been observed and interpreted sociologi­
cally. Furthermore, the chapter will describe some of the regulatory challenges modem bio­
technology poses and -  in broad terms — how they have been dealt with, in order to situate 
the processes to be studied in the context of their intervention.
The social appropriation o f biotechnology has been the object of a varied body o f  social 
research. Obviously, this cannot all be reviewed and discussed here. The aim o f the chapter 
will therefore be to introduce some o f the themes, approaches and empirical results which 
seem most important for the investigative task at hand. The chapter will provide at least 
some elements of an understanding o f a) what the controversies are ‘about’, b) how they 
have unfolded and c) how this has been made the object of social scientific discussion and 
observations. In doing so, I shall start off with a few conceptual clarifications, following 
which I move on to a discussion of some of the existing literature central to the topics at 
hand.
7 As such, the investigation should to some extent be generalisable beyond the biotechnology domain to 
other areas where cognitive, socio-economic and normative uncertainties intermingle. The discussion o f the 
gcneralisability of the findings will, however, be postponed to the condudingpart o f the thesis.
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Controversy and Biotechnology as Objects of Sociological 
Investigation
When discussing controversies over biotechnology it is useful to clarify what exactly is un­
derstood both by controversy and by biotechnology. The first task were will therefore be to ap­
proach how these are constituted as objects of sociological inquiry.
As will be discussed further in Chapter III, this thesis takes a communication-based ap­
proach to social analysis. In such an approach it can be argued in a general manner that con- 
trwersies are present when ‘objections’ are communicated. If one assumes that modern so­
cieties tend by default to be innovation-friendly, i.e. if nothing else speaks against them, 
technological innovations are allowed and generally accepted and encouraged (provided 
they do not entail unacceptable, foreseeable physical risks to human beings or the envi­
ronment, or clearly disregard die existing normative order). Technological controversies can 
be said to be present when objections to the introduction of new technologies arc commu­
nicated — for whatever reason. This is of course a very general definition of controversy, 
and it is clearly the case that not all types of objections, nor all objectors, have the same 
effect or trenchancy on the shaping of technological trajectories or regulatory frameworks. 
Hence, controversies must be specified in substantive, social and temporal aspects in order 
to be analysed adequately. It is also evident that the developments in modem biotechnol­
ogy are contested in a number o f social contexts, in a number of ways and for a number of 
reasons. Hence, one cannot talk about a controversy in the singular, even if the perspective 
is delimited to agricultural applications, which is the primary focus of this thesis. Further­
more, ‘the controversies’ are often diffuse (i.e. they lack a clear and generally shared sub­
stantive focus), and the cases to be investigated are different responses to different contro­
versies in different settings. Nonetheless, as I shall show in the following, it is possible to 
identify certain recurring themes which have been investigated and discussed in the social 
research motivated by the lingering controversies. This will inevitably entail a simplification 
of some of the matters at stake, but should be read as an attempt to get a handle on the 
complexity involved by focusing on some aspects rather than others. The selection of is­
sues to be reviewed is therefore guided by the research question and looks primarily at a) 
how ‘the public’ as a central part in the controversies have been constructed and investi­
gated in social research and b) how biotechnology has at the same time been made the ob­
ject o f regulation and challenged regulator}1 practices.
The social scientific observation o f technological controversies is not necessarily a neutral 
activity. This raises two issues which require attention in this context. First, as always when 
doing social research, the categories through which the controversies are observed are both 
enabling and limiting in terms o f what can be analysed. This is a problem that cannot be 
by-passed but must be reflected upon when selecting the research strategy. Therefore, at 
the outset it seems worth considering, consecutively, a number of perspectives present in
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the literature, partly to get a relatively ‘thick’ description of the issues at hand, and partly in 
order to contrast these and make an informed decision on which is more useful for the in­
vestigative task. This initial broad view is also motivated by the second point to be consid­
ered, namely that the controversies over biotechnology have to some extent co-evolved 
with the different social scientific observations and analyses o f them. Observations, con­
cepts and analyses have fed back into the controversies, and social scientific observers have 
often deliberately intervened in the controversies on the basis of their research. This is par­
ticularly evident in experiments with public participation. Therefore, attention to the tem­
poralities not only of the controversies, but their observation by social researchers is neces­
sary. Basically, to understand the controversies it is an advantage to know how social scien­
tific observations have accompanied them practically from their outset.
Just as what I call technological controversies are viewed in different ways, so is their mate­
rial object, that is biotechnology. The approach o f the thesis is non-technology determinis­
tic, as it is assumed that the communication about biotechnology is not determined by 
characteristics o f the physical properties of the technologies. Even where it can be argued 
that the material characteristics of the technologies in question seem to profoundly influ­
ence the social responses to them, this will always be ‘mediated* through communication, 
which to some extent is ‘free’ to choose its frames and distinctions. The material substrate 
of modem biotechnology can, following Bauer and Gaskell, be understood broadly as “ ... 
processes, products and services that have been developed on the basis of interventions at 
the level of the gene.” (Bauer and Gaskell 2002a: 3). Such interventions and their implica­
tions are, however, observed with very different distinctions and purposes in different parts 
of society. Therefore, as will be seen throughout the thesis, the labelling and naming of the 
technology is itself a central element and means in the controversies. This is obvious when 
anti-GMO activists use labels such as ‘FrankenFood’ to stigmatise the latter, but it also 
takes on more subtle forms. For instance, in the light of lingering controversy, labels have 
gradually been modified by the proponents of the technologies in order to convey more 
positive images. When the technology was in its incipient phases the scientific community 
spoke of ‘genetic manipulation’. This was gradually replaced by ‘genetic engineering’ or 
‘gene technology’, which again has given way to ‘biotechnology’ and ‘the life sciences’ 
(Bauer, Durant and Gaskell 1998: 217). Even ‘life sciences’ as an overarching category is 
now progressively being abandoned in order to symbolically insulate publicly more accept­
able applications in the medical domain from associations with the less publicly acceptable 
agricultural applications (Grabner et. al. 2002:15). The issue here is clearly not a more pre­
cise use of the language describing the material artefacts or the fact that something funda­
mentally different is being named, but a strategy that a less ‘offensive* naming will improve 
popular acceptance.
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However, changing semantic labellings are not only a means to achieve acceptance of the 
new technologies. More fundamentally, the discursive and definitional struggles are also co­
determining responsibility for the effects of the technology. In an abstract sense one can 
say that biotechnology touches upon the distinction between nature and culture, and that 
this is in fact at the heart of many of the controversies, even if this is not always explicitly 
recognised by the contestants. The border between nature and culture is characterised by 
and characterises the limits of (moral) responsibility — at least in what one could call a 
modem conception of nature (Latour 1993). Nature abides by laws that do not fall within 
the scope o f human actions — hence, we are not responsible for its outcomes. As technical 
capacities allow us to manipulate still more elements of nature, still more natural processes 
are moved into the domain o f possible human intervention, they become encultured, and 
hence turn into objects of our responsibility — moral, as well as economic, legal and politi­
cal. This responsibility, however, must be perceived as a product of social negotiations over 
meaning and norms. In this perspective it becomes clear that different interest-positions tty 
to use the fluid status o f the nature/culture-distinction strategically in the discursive con­
flicts to make their framing of the issue dominant.8
There are different and competing interpretations of whether modem biotech nology 
should be understood as (just) a series of better and more precise breeding techniques, or a 
radically new way of intervening in nature with potential synergistic, and adverse effects. It 
can be argued that humans have deliberately altered plants and animals through selective 
breeding more or less as long as there has been agriculture. Crop plants and husbandry 
animals are not ‘natural’ and many species could not survive without human intervention 
and nurturing. Proponents of biotechnolog}7 argue that genetic engineering is just a small 
step forward on a long path that will allow us to refine the methods and precision of breed­
ing, and that ethical objectives are misplaced, as there is no reason why GM technologies 
should be any more objectionable than other attempts at targeted breeding. This is in effect 
an attempt to symbolically normalise biotechnology by comparing it to something familiar. 
Opponents, on die other hand, argue that intervening on the genetic level and possibly 
transgressing species boundaries is something qualitatively different and may entail risks of 
a ‘different kind’ and thus pose ethical issues that need clarification in advance of its accep­
tance as it will profoundly influence healthcare and food production. Therefore, ‘special’ 
attention and precaution is required.
It has been observed that in these controversies the ‘context dictates the rhetoric’ (Bauer 
1995: 10), in the sense that for purposes of fund-raising for research, ‘novelty’ and ‘revolu-
8 As argued amongst others by Lau: "Grob vereinfacht beabsichtigt ein Teil der Akteuren, einen gesellscbajtüch-technischen 
Sachverhalt — nie etna die Treiset~img gen technisch manipulierter Pflanzen -  umciidefinieren in einen natürlichen oder natur- 
konformen Sachverhalt. Gelingt dies, so hat grrnächst einmal das Problem seine soziale Sprengkraft verloren. Der andere Teil 
der Konfliktakieure iersucht das Phänomen im Bereich gesellschaftlicher Kompetenz gjr belassen, indem er es entsprechend kausal 
^ordnet” (Lau 1999: 299).
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tion’ are invoked by the proponents of biotechnology, whereas to prevent restriction by 
regulation and public controversy, continuity with older, well known processes is under­
lined (Jasanoff 1995). In short, scientists have to sell ‘revolution’ to get financing and ‘evo­
lution’ to get public acceptance (Hasse and Gill 1994).
Between proponents and critics, the ‘newness’ or ‘naturalness’ of various processes and 
products in biotechnology seem to be a continuing point of contention unresolvable with 
reference to scientific knowledge or data alone. It is influenced instead by different actors' 
‘problem-horizons’.
However, as little as these issues can be settled within purely scientific boundaries, neither 
can the controversies be resolved with reference to sociological observation. Therefore, no 
attempt will be undertaken to assess if, and under what circumstances, one viewpoint is 
more ‘justified’ than another or according to what standard or by the use of what distinc­
tions this could possibly be achieved. Rather than ‘intervening’ in the issues, the thesis 
therefore retreats to an epistemological position of second order observation, assuming 
that it is beneficial to observe the observers and investigate how various images are invoked for 
certain purposes and what communicative dynamic this initiates. Arguably, for a sociologi­
cal observer it is less fruitful to ask to what extent the controversies are ‘really’ grounded in 
the material characteristics o f the technologies and to what extent they are ‘social artefacts’ 
grounded in interest maintenance. From a disciplinary standpoint in sociology one can 
‘only’ analyse how they are communicated, what arguments are brought into the controver­
sies, and which manage to manifest themselves in which contexts — perhaps indirectly con­
tributing to societal self-reflection.9
9 Although the material substance o f many o f  the controversial aspects can be traced back to specific discov­
eries in molecular biology and their subsequent technological application in a number o f domains, the poten­
tial for social conflict over biotechnology did not emerge with the advent o f  genetic engineering. Rather, it 
seems biotechnology emerged on the horizon o f  societal attention at a time when a certain sensibility towards 
(adverse) ecological and social effects o f large technological programmes, notably nuclear power, had been 
developed by substantial parts o f Western European publics, accompanied by organisational resources 
formed to express concerns politically. Although there is no doubt that valuable lessons could be drawn from 
closer comparisons between controversies over nuclear power and biotechnology in a number o f  respects 
(see e.g- Bauer 1995), this will not be pursued in any systematic manner in this thesis. It will, however, be al­
luded to when it seems important to certain understand aspects o f the cases. At least two aspects o f  the con­
troversies over nuclear power seem especially important in this context in many countries they challenged a 
technocratic hegemony, which had formulated science and technology policy on a rather exclusionary basis at 
least since World War II. In doing so they not only created the counter-expert figure, they also demonstrated 
to broader segments o f  the public that scientific policy advice is neither necessarily as cognitively well 
founded as it claims nor free o f interest. Scientific expertise proved to be a resource in social controversies 
and not merely a neutral arbiter based on certified knowledge Secondly, new ways of mobilising and organis­
ing political activity were learned and in some cases proved quite influential. Due to public opposition nuclear 
power proved significantly less successful in Western Europe than expected by its promoters in its incipient 
phases. This led (some) proponents of biotechnology to pay attention to public acceptance issues from the 
outset, which has influenced some of the accompanying social research.
25
iiy tM M iü iü iàü im m n T itifm jitiÉ iliti
Social Research in a Polarized Controversy
For many of the actors involved in the controversies, in particular the promoters and regu­
lators o f the new biotechnologies, the persistency and force of the controversies were con­
sidered with some surprise and incomprehension, as their nature for many experts seemed 
diffuse and without basis in ‘reality’ (Hasse and Gill 1994). Employing William Ogbum’s 
classic concept (1966), the cultural lag following the introduction of this new technology was 
apparently impossible to ‘close’, as the issues involved are perpetually reframed and 
(re)politicised, making it difficult for societal institutions to ‘normalise’ the use o f the tech­
nology. As the controversies are diffuse and have no single locus, it is perhaps more correct 
to say that they consist of not one but many lags.
This continuing controversy has inspired social scientific research on different topics re­
lated to the social appropriation o f  biotechnology. This research, of course, stems from 
different existing research traditions and does not make up a coherent body o f work. It is 
to some extent shaped by the desire to create relevant knowledge for various policy-making 
objectives or to lend support or legitimacy to certain positions in the controversies. Some 
of the research therefore seems to be driven by extra-scientific motives. As the controver­
sies tend to be rather polarised, some of the research clearly exhibits ‘sympathies’ driving it 
to focus on certain aspects of the controversies rather than others. This does not necessar­
ily mean that the quality of the research is compromised, but it does demonstrate that sev­
eral stories can be told about the controversies.
In the following I shall look at central findings from three research fields. The first is public 
(risk) perception studies (i.e. attempts to establish what public concerns are ‘about’ and 
how they are structured.) The second pertains to observations of the dynamic o f the con­
troversies, which obviously are symbiotic with, but not necessarily identical to, the content 
of ‘public concerns’.10 Third, I shall trace some of the general principles of the policy re­
sponses to the controversies as they are manifest in the regulation of biotechnology.
One characteristic of the controversies over agricultural biotechnology noted by many ob­
servers is that despite the fact that they cover multifarious topics, they have a fundamen­
tally polarised character.11 It seems that the organised actors involved in what Bauer and 
Gaskell call the ‘biotechnology movement’ (meaning all the involved actors, promoters and 
sceptics alike, giving the field its dynamic (Bauer and Gaskell 2002b)) tend to or are forced 
to ‘choose sides’ and therefore process all information, be it political, economic, scientific,
10 This is so for two reasons: First, organised actors (companies, research organisations, regulators, NGOs, 
the media etc.) contribute to the creation o f  public concerns and wishes just as much as the Tepresent’ them. 
Secondly, because the actors in the controversies operate within existing structures that do not (always) allow 
public concerns to be manifested in unmediated w ays.
11 See Bauer and GaskeE 2002b for a conceptual model o f  the polarising dynamic o f  the controversies.
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ethical or regulatory, through a meta-programme of ‘for or against*. This means that com­
munication in any of these modes on the programmatic level is superimposed with prefer­
ences or commitments towards biotechnology of either a supportive or a sceptical inclina­
tion. This is visible in some of the social research into the controversies as well, where it 
finds expression in the selection and formulation o f research problems, e.g. whether con­
troversies are framed as ‘acceptance problems’ (predominantly technology supportive) or 
‘legitimacy or democracy problems’ (predominantly technology sceptical).
One distinction, which is often applied in the debates (and the social research observing 
these), is that between lay people and experts. This distinction does not coincide socially or 
thematically with ‘for or against* positions. Nonetheless, since the controversies are often 
seen as scepticism towards new technologies by the public, which is almost by definition 
‘lay’, and low confidence in the regulators and promoters, who often have some kind of 
scientific credentials and operate on the basis of scientific knowledge, the two distinctions 
at times tend to overlap or conflate. This has led to a significant interest in public (risk) 
perceptions in explaining the (persistence of the) controversies. To some extent this re­
search has been informed by a research programme initiated before biotechnology became 
seriously contested in the public domain, and which is concerned with technological risks 
in general. However, as this approach has been quite influential on subsequent research, I 
shall briefly introduce it.
This programme initially took over ‘the experts” interpretations of risk, and thus shaped 
much of the understanding of the controversies. There can be little doubt that most of the 
initial social research on risk, especially lay responses to risk, was initiated primarily to un­
derstand why lay people did not perceive risk in the same way as experts — or at least why 
they paid what was considered to be insufficient attention to expert knowledge and rec­
ommendations -  and how this could potentially be changed. The problem was double- 
edged. On the one hand, it had repercussions for the acceptance of new technologies, 
which were dreaded and resisted in what many expert observers considered irrational ways. 
On the other risky behaviour and activities like unhealthy diets, smoking, neglect to use 
seatbelts in cars etc. continued in spite o f expert knowledge recommending against them.
This research was informed by what has critically been termed a ‘cognitive deficit model’ 
(Irwin and Wynne 1996). Its basic characteristic is an assumption that expert (scientific) 
knowledge on risks and the causal mechanisms causing these provide a rational baseline in 
the determinations, interpretation and prevention of risks — and therefore ought to guide 
the evaluation o f their acceptability. The model’s major object of investigation was then 
how and why lay-people’s conception, attention and evaluation of risk deviated from this 
knowledge base. The fundamental conceptual distinction was one between the (scientifi­
cally or rationally established) ‘objective’ risk and the ‘subjective* risk perceived by lay peo­
ple. The premise was that scientists were rational in their approach to risk and deviations 
from the expert perception of risk were to be considered somehow deficient, either in
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terms of receiving information or acting rationally in accordance with the received informa­
tion (Hansen et al. 2003). Within this research tradition investigations were developed on 
how communications to lay people may best be made in order to align their views with 
those o f experts — what is known as risk communication (NRC 1989).
Initial research in this tradition had a strong cognitive focus. For instance, investigations 
into lay understandings of probabilistic logic seemed to indicate ‘flaws’ in the ways lay peo­
ple dealt with expert information (Slovic, Fischhoff, & Lichtenstein 1982). Over time, 
however, several of the initial assumptions of this approach have been modified.12 This is 
due to several factors. One important factor was the recognition that experts do not them­
selves work according to ideal scientific standards, often have hidden normative assump­
tions built in to their assessments, and make estimates that are not underpinned by system­
atic research (Slovic, Fischhoff, & Lichtenstein 1982; Wynne 1996). However, another and 
perhaps more interesting finding in this psychometric paradigm was the acknowledgement of 
the ‘multidimensionality’ of risk perceptions. Where scientists, especially when acting as 
experts providing advice, estimate risks, they usually work according to one-dimensional 
scales, for instance (estimated) mortality rates, level o f intoxication, costs, etc., and thus it 
was found that lay cognition took more dimensions into consideration. As a result the psy­
chometric paradigm moved to a more ‘symmetrical’ research strategy were lay perceptions 
where no longer understood as deviations from a singular rational reservoir o f knowledge, 
but rather as phenomena with their own logic, worthy of investigation in their own right. It 
then became clear that many different aspects or characteristics of risks are decisive for 
how laypeople perceive risks. Slovic shows how factors like uncertainty, ‘dread’, catastro­
phic potential, controllability, equity and risk to future generations all influence what is per­
ceived to be risky and/or acceptable by laypeople (Slovic 1999). It was furthermore ac­
knowledged that where technical risk assessment considers risk and benefits independently 
of each other, this is not the case in lay risk perception.
The psychometric paradigm is perhaps the most elaborate framework that has informed 
empirical investigation into risk perceptions. However, it is basically a psychological ap­
proach to risk perception. This means that research in this tradition normally works with 
models o f cognition and influential factors that are independent of or only marginally in­
fluenced by the social, cultural and political context in which technological risks arc situ­
ated. In short, public reactions were explained almost exclusively with reference to the 
characteristics o f the risks. This provoked criticism from sociological quarters, mainly fo­
cussing on the fact that perceptions o f risk cannot be adequately understood without taking
12 “Diese Entwicklung kann kur^ als sukzessiver Abschied vom Glauben an eine überlegene Nationalität des quantitativen 
ingenieuntissenscbaftäcben Risk-Assessment gegenüber der Risikobewertung von Laien und verstärkte Berücksichtigung des 
gesellschaftlichen Kontextes der Konstruktion von Risikobewertungengekennzeichnet werden ” (Hennen 1994: 466).
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into account the social, political and cultural context in which the risks are generated (e.g. 
Otway 1992; Wynne 1992, Douglas 1992). It was atgued that risk is not something that is 
passively received by lay people, but rather actively constructed and interpreted as part of 
everyday life practices.
The psychometric paradigm brings us some way towards an understanding of why GM 
food is viewed with scepticism among the public. GM food fills many of the categories 
identified as leading to a heightened risk awareness. GM food is novel, not well under­
stood, man made, personal experience is difficult to obtain and so far benefits are per­
ceived to fall almost exclusively on the producers. However, the approach lacks a way to 
conceptualise that people respond not only to the characteristics of the risks in question, 
but also to the context in which these are produced, managed, distributed and accounted 
for.13
Biotechnology and the Public in Surveys and Qualitative Research
In Europe a central source o f knowledge about public attitudes to biotechnology are the 
EuroBarometer surveys, which have been carried out at regular intervals since the early 
1990s. The surveys are one o f the primary sources of quantitative data in the research field 
of public perceptions, and are probably also the source that draws the greatest attention in 
policy arenas. Although the EuroBarometer share some of the methodology and social on­
tological assumptions of psychometric research, it has significantly expanded its field of 
interest to include evaluation of social actors as well.14
A central task o f the EuroBarometer surveys has been to monitor the support for or accep­
tance o f biotechnology. Debates over nuclear power had already shown that the introduc­
tion o f what was initially believed an uncontroversial ‘technology of the future’ was signifi­
cantly influenced by acceptance problems and public controversy. Therefore, attempts to 
gather social intelligence about the reception of biotechnology as another strategic technol-
13 An additional issue, sometimes brought out in the present day social scientific discussions about risk per­
ception, is that although the distinction between objective physical risks and perceived subjective risk largely 
have been abandoned by social researchers, it still implicitly or explicitly informs the worldview and behav­
iour o f technology promoters and regulators (Wynne 2001a, 2001b, Marris et al. 2001), perhaps because it 
offers a model to interpret the conflicts, which places the roots of many o f  the difficulties these organisations 
experience with the lay public, rather than with their own practices. This is an example o f  the effect men­
tioned earlier that there is a certain interaction between the biotechnology controversies and the social scien­
tific observations o f  these.
14 It is no t the purpose o f this thesis to measure the extent o f  public resistance to or acceptance o f  biotech­
nology as such. However, in order to investigate if and how public scepticism can be articulated and made 
relevant for policy making in new ways, it is preferable to have an understanding of the anatomy o f  the con­
cerns o f the public (as well as how such survey results are articulated and interpreted in the relevant policy 
arenas). What is o f  interest here is therefore not the individual distributions or the research methodologies 
involved, but the results that are feeding into the debates about how the controversies can and should be 
addressed. It can furthermore be argued that surveys construct a particular image both of the issues at stake 
and ‘the public’, which has been quite influential.
29
ogy has followed it practically from the outset of its development. The surveys monitor a 
number of variables pertaining to scientific literacy, awareness of and attitudes towards the 
different applications o f biotechnology and assessments o f actors and social institutions 
involved with the technologies.
Support or acceptance o f technology is not a ‘natural’ or one-dimensional scale, and it is 
not a simple task to measure it reliably. In the EuroBarometers two strategies have been 
followed. One is a comparison of biotechnology with other technologies, another is a dif­
ferentiation between different applications o f biotechnology. As the measurements are re­
peated at regular intervals all over Europe, temporal dimensions and cross national com­
parisons can be added to the pictures o f public support.
When compared with seven different technologies (solar energy, computer and information 
technology, telecommunications, space exploration, the Internet), a generic concept of bio­
technology/ genetic engineering consistently scored second lowest on the question of 
whether these technologies would improve or decrease quality o f life over the next 20 years 
(across all European countries in 2002).15 Nuclear power consistently scored the lowest. 
Biotechnology consistently fell within the scores of technological optimism during the 
1990s but increased somewhat between 1999 and 2002. The surveys lead analysts to con­
clude that the European populations can by no means be characterised as technophobic, 
nor are their assessments of technology driven by a general risk aversion (Gaskell et al.
2003: 11). I Iowever, the less positive images of biotechnology compared to other tech­
nologies demonstrate that it may well be more prone to become an object of controversy 
than other technologies (with the exception o f nuclear power).
The comparatively lower technological optimism in regard to biotechnology and genetic 
engineering as generic categories covers the fact that different applications of the ability to 
intervene on the genetic level are perceived differently among the European populations. 
The EuroBarometer surveys show as a consistent pattern that medical applications receive 
higher support rates than agricultural applications. This has led to a commonly used dis­
tinction between ‘red’ and ‘green’ applications. When asked whether various applications 
were considered useful fo r society, risky for society, morally acceptable and whether they should be 
encouraged, GM crops and especially GM food received consistently lower approval rates 
than applications in the medical domain.16
15 ‘Biotechnology* and ‘genetic engineering* were presented in a split ballot sample. Genetic engineering was 
generally rated lower than biotechnology. This is interpreted to indicate that 'biotechnology’ and ‘genetic en­
gineering’ mean different things to the European public (Gaskell et al. 2003: 9), which underlines the impor­
tance o f the struggles over semantic labels.
16 The approval rates obviously vary across different European countries. However, as the ‘structure’ of con­
cerns appear to be similar it does not seem important to discuss the numerical differences here.
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One interesting result o f the analysis of the data is that when the answers to the four indi­
cators of approval mentioned above are dichotomised they can theoretically form sixteen 
different combinations- However in reality the respondents that can be labelled as ‘de­
cided’, i.e. those that did not answer ‘don’t know’ to one or more o f the questions (approx 
50%), primarily cluster around three positions, which the EuroBarometer analysts label 
‘Supporters’, ‘Risk Tolerant Supportsers’ and ‘Opponents’. The ‘Supporters’ are those that 
see the technologies as useful, who are not very concerned about the risks and who have 
no moral objections. They think that applications should be encouraged. The ‘Risk Toler­
ant Supporters’ are those that see the technologies as useful but risky and have no moral 
objections. Hence, they are willing to encourage the technologies (presumably given that 
risks are contained). Finally, the ‘Opponents’ are those that find the applications both risky 
and morally objectionable and hence do not encourage them. In regard to GM crops and 
food the number of opponents increased between 1996 and 1999 and did not change in 
2002 (Gaskell et al. 2003: 16). For GM crops approximately 30% belong to the ‘Oppo­
nents’ category, whilst for GM food applications approximately 50% do. Analysts have 
concluded that where support for medical applications has increased, support for GM 
crops and especially GM food shows no sign of changing. However, the large rates of 
‘don’t know’ responses can be interpreted as a signal of significant ambivalence in the face 
o f many of these technologies.
A topic which has received quite a bit of attention is the determinants of acceptance and 
support for biotechnology. Traditional socio-economic variables like age, gender and level 
o f  education play some role, but are able to explain only a minor part of the variation in 
acceptance and support. The relation between knowledge and acceptance, a question inher­
ited from psychometric research, has been the notable object of some investigation. The 
EuroBarometer includes a section that probes into scientific literacy by asking ‘knowledge 
questions’. There seems to be only a weak correlation between knowledge and acceptance 
(ibid: 19). By now, and contrary to the assumptions of the deficit model, it counts as a well- 
established finding that there is no uni-linear relationship between text-book knowledge of 
biotechnology and acceptance of the various applications. This is true both when the unit 
o f analysis is individuals and when it is aggregated to country level (more ‘knowledgeable’ 
populations do not exhibit higher approval rates). Instead the EuroBarometer analysts con­
struct a measurement of engagement nith biotechnology which is not constructed only on the 
basis of scientific literacy but also on the reported and intended behaviour of the respon­
dents, for instance whether they have discussed biotechnology with anybody, if they would 
watch a TV programme about it etc. This leads to results indicating that those that are 
most engaged with biotechnolog)7 tend to see more use for it, to find it morally acceptable 
and to encourage it. However, there seems to be no influence of engagement on the per­
ception of riskiness. This leads the analysts to conclude that:
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“The 'knowledge deficit model’ of the public in relation to science and technology gives some indica­
tion of the bases ofpositive and negative attitudes, but certainly does not tell the whole story. It is too 
sin/plistic to attribute opposition to science merely to a lack of knowledge and to suggest that a dose of 
scientific information uill cure people's scepticism. ’’(Gaskell et al. 2003: 27)
Hence, knowledge o f and engagement with biotechnology, thus understood, makes it more 
likely that a position is taken. However, there is no uni-linear relationship between knowl- 
edge/engagement and acceptance and support.
Obviously, support or scepticism is not determined solely by the characteristics of the 
technologies, or by understanding the science involved. Evaluations of the social institu­
tions responsible for the management o f the technologies and the behaviour o f the actors 
in the arena are also central. The EuroBarometer approaches the issue of trust and confi­
dence by asking the respondents two types o f questions, which they take to be proxies for 
social trust. The first concerns who the respondents believe are ‘doing a good job for soci­
ety’ in the biotechnology area, and the second who they would ‘trust to tell the truth’ about 
biotechnology. Apart from the peculiarity that there seem to be significant differences in 
the scores on the two indicators (‘doing a good job’ and being ‘trusted to tell the truth’ ap­
parently do not carry the came connotations) the most significant and persistent finding on 
these trust questions is that consumer associations and environmental organizations are the 
actors that score the highest, whereas national governments, regulatory agencies and indus­
try score the lowest (Gaskell et al. 2003: 32-33). As such, it seems that those actors ex­
pected to have tire most knowledge and competence are the ones that command the least 
public confidence. The EuroBarometer has no explanation for this, but below I shall dis­
cuss suggestions from qualitative research that indicates that this is not necessarily an indi­
cation that the public is misguided by a symbiosis of sensationalist médias and ideological 
social movements, as is often suggested by the promoters of the technologies. Rather, it 
can be interpreted as a desire for access to multiple sources of information, which will al­
low people to balance different perspectives (Marris et al. 2001).
In a more sophisticated modeling of the 1999 EuroBarometer data, analysts found two new 
points of interest for the current investigation. When they analysed the relationship be­
tween an index o f what they call trust in the food-chain (Government, industry, retailers), 
risk perception, a measure of technological optimism, engagement with biotechnology (all 
independent variables) and support for GM food (dependent variable) it was found that 
country dummy variables are significant in only three cases (Spain, Italy and Finland). The 
authors take this as an indication that Europeans represent biotechnology in shared terms, 
such as trust, risk etc. (Gaskell et.al. 2001: 74). Hence, apart from the three country excep­
tions, the mechanisms determining support for GM food is similar in different national 
contexts in Europe, even if the relative weight of the factors differs. As such, it can be ar­
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gued that the controversies are ‘similar’ not just in the sense that they are about the same 
material objects, but also in that they are manifestations of similar public concerns.
Characteristically, in most research on acceptance it seems to be assumed as an implicit 
baseline that technologies should be accepted, and so it is deviation from this expectation 
that needs to be explained. At least most of the analytical effort devoted to the Euro- 
Barometer data goes into describing and analysing the sceptics and their motives, whereas 
characteristics and motives of the supporters receive less attention. For instance, the au­
thors contrast two groups as having quite different motives or ways of opposing biotech­
nology, indicated as 1)106’ (traditional) and ‘green’ (modem) opponents. The “ ‘blue’ tradi­
tionalist group tends to be older, less educated, less concerned about the risk, less knowl­
edgeable, inclined towards the right o f the political spectrum, more religious, materialist 
rather than postmaterialist in outlook and living in rural rather than urban settings.”17 (Gas- 
kell et. al. 2001: 75). The ‘blue’ argument is described as having no external references, it is 
closed around its own values, and is hence described as ‘Faustian’. The modern ‘green’ op­
ponents, described as ‘Frankensteinian’ are more occupied with risks than ‘morality*. This 
group is described as unassociated with any particular social groups and its modality is con­
ditioned by the state of knowledge, rather than the inherent undesirability of interfering 
with nature. Notably, no similar analyses are performed for the respondents expressing 
support for GMOs, they appear to command significantly less interest as research objects.
The EuroBarometer surveys have been an influential source of information on the public 
perceptions of biotechnology in Europe. As such they have in a sense also structured what 
is known and communicated about ‘the public’ in a number of contexts. However, survey 
research is but one way of gaining access to the concerns of the public, and a number of 
qualitative studies (especially focus groups) have been undertaken to support, expand and 
modify the pictures emerging from survey research. This body o f research cannot for obvi­
ous reasons be discussed in detail here, but some of the insights gained and puzzles raised 
are worth mentioning. This I will do by discussing the results of a few studies which I be­
lieve to cover many of the important issues.
Some of the more interpretive studies ‘confirm’ certain insights gained from the Euro- 
Barometer studies. In comparative qualitative studies it has for instance been found that 
perceptions of GMOs and accompanying concerns are largely similar across European 
countries (Wagner et al. 2001: 81, similar conclusions in Marris et al. 2001). This was found 
to be true independently of the history and intensity of public controversy at the time of 
investigation (Marris et al. 2001: 46)
17 As compared to the ‘greens'.
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A further result that connects well with the EuroBarometer analysis -  and also points to 
the limitations of the survey approach to public perceptions — is that 'risk5 does not seem to 
capture public concerns particularly well. Wagner et al. observe that risk is not a concept 
that figures prominently in the discourses of the participants in their focus groups, espe­
cially not in its probabilistic form (Wagner et. al. 2001: 85). Instead, worries that are not 
necessarily well articulated pertain to non-predictable future events. These can be 'an­
chored5 by, for example, food scandals or the Chernobyl accident, as a symbol of experts5 
ignorance and fallibility' that has led to mishaps in the past As such, people tend to take 
(long term) uncertainty as a given rather than the failure of science as such or o f expert insti­
tutions. Uncertainty is understood to be a fundamental fact o f life (Marris et al. 2001: 59)
Marris et al. (2001), in what is probably the most penetrating qualitative study of public 
perceptions of GMOs to date, draw upon data from five European countries to present a 
confrontation of their focus group results with what they describe as a number of myths 
about public perceptions prevalent among stakeholders in the policy arenas (regulators, sci­
entists, industrialists, NGOs etc). They argue that these myths arc mostly misconceptions, 
which means that some attempts to mitigate public concerns actually cause their prolifera­
tion. Mams et al. also argue that the categories of risk versus benefits do not effectively 
capture the roots of the controversies. Instead they argue that public perceptions should be 
understood as being about uncertainties versus needs. As such, some of the qualitative re­
search also aims to 'dignify5 public concerns in a context where opposition is often equated 
with ignorance and irrationality. This is done by showing that it might well be that many 
people do not base their evaluation of for example GM food on extensive knowledge of 
the technicalities, but rather on doubts about the need for the products and ability to man­
age the accompanying uncertainties. As such, their concerns are not intellectually vacuous 
and emotional as often suggested, but sensible and rational from the perspective of their 
everyday life experiences. These concerns can be interpreted as quite reasonable, because 
they are built on experiences with the past behaviour o f institutions, rather than on defi­
cient lay perceptions of scientific knowledge.
A shared result of many qualitative studies is that in public perceptions there is not neces­
sarily any clear separation between risk, ethics and politics, as is often suggested (or implic­
itly assumed) by promoters and regulators. Hence, what many people are concerned about 
are not GMOs as technological artifacts, but rather about the institutional context in which 
they are developed, evaluated and promoted (Marris et al. 2001: 47). People hesitant about 
GMOs are not risk averse perse. However, they are not convinced that the uncertainties, 
which are felt to be inherent in all the science and technology' that penetrates everyday life, 
are justified by the reasons and motives behind G MO promotion. People do not, as some 
stakeholders think, demand zero-risk in order to find biotechnology acceptable. What they 
object to, according to Marris et al., are the ‘institutional denials5 o f existing uncertainties, 34
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and the suggestion that science can adequately predict and control uncertainties, which are 
believed to be an inherent fact of life:
“This public experience of expert institutions as denying uncertainty seemed to be a major cause of 
public skepticism towards regulatory bodies, not the inevitable expert inability — typically ncognicyd 
by the focus gmup participants — to create grtv risk or total certainty. Rather than gyro risk, what 
people demanded was a more realistic and humble assessment of risk by regulatory authorities and 
GMO producers, which acknowledged uncertainty and real life conditions, ” (Marris et al. 2001:
60)
Therefore, the motives behind introducing the technology and the willingness to admit un­
certainties and mistakes are likely to be more important for public trust and acceptance 
than assurances that no risks exist
In addition to this, for many people GM food is not perceived as a response to any ‘real’ 
need. The investigations by Wagner et al. indicate that people bring value-orientations to 
decisions about their food that go beyond risk assessments and nutritional characteristics, 
and that GM food is seen not only as artificial, but in a sense also as ‘anti-cultural’. Food 
and meals have symbolic meanings that contribute to a sense of identity. On this view, for 
example, GM food is seen as deprived of such characteristics: “Taste is not negotiable ex­
actly because local foods and their tastes grew out of a long tradition of cooking that can­
not be bettered by industrial means” (Wagner et al. 2001: 89). I Icnce, the . .style of pre­
paring food becomes a shorthand for identity, for sensing oneself as belonging to a cultural 
group, a feeling that goes far beyond any considerations of nutritional value, WTO trading 
rules, or practicalities in industrial food production.” (ibid).
The qualitative studies hence indicate ambivalence in the evaluation of GMOs, which is diffi­
cult to establish in survey research. Furthermore, according to Marris et al. the concerns 
based on such ambivalence are very difficult to address adequately within the existing regu­
latory framework and culture with its strong emphasis on science based risk assessment, as 
the latter aim to exclude ambivalence and ‘deny’ the kind of uncertainty' that cannot be 
controlled. As such, much of the qualitative research indicates that public hesitation over 
GMOs rests on a sense of lack of agency and no perceived need, rather than (just) the 
physical characteristics of the technology.1®
The qualitative research hence indicates that concerns about GMOs are intimately inter­
woven with a number of other concerns, some of which are related to the role, use and ac- 18
18 This is what W agner et al. summarise in a metaphor of a runaway train;
. .fuelled by industrial science, aitbout control signals along the tracks, leading to the silent diffusion of genetic applications into 
et'etyday life. The public is a group of mere bystanders who cannot participate in the decision-making, consumers who cannot react 
to tins technological innovation by informed choices, politicians who at best struggle to adapt regulation to the present state and 
handle it uith restrictions when the train has already passed rise station, and etincists who attempt to set morally defined bounda­
ries. Tf)e technological imperative promoted by industry seems to be mrwixlmingfy strong' (Wagner et al. 2001: 83).
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countability of science, and some with other issues altogether. As such, the technology be­
comes, to some extent, symbolic of a number of developments in modem life, which are 
often (perhaps simultaneously) sources o f both satisfaction and anxiety. This is why the 
qualitative studies indicate that for many people there is no clear-cut case for or against 
biotechnology, but a matter of substantial ambivalence.
However, what emerges clearly from the qualitative queries into public concerns is the im­
age that public concerns seem to follow different logics to the innovative and regulatory 
contexts that GMOs are developed and evaluated in. This is perhaps why there is a poten­
tial for perpetual controversy, which is difficult to accommodate either by increased com- 
municational efforts or a compromise o f interests, in short by the kind of policy measures 
conventionally used in the science and technology domain.
In seeking the roots of the controversies Marris et al. (2001) aim to show that popular con­
cerns are not necessarily as irrational and emotional as some GM promoters make them 
out to be. Furthermore, they also try to show that some of the misconceptions feeding the 
debates are held by the stakeholders, who allegedly wrongly perceive what ‘the public’ is 
actually concerned about. They discuss this through the exposition of what they call ten 
stakeholder ‘myths’, which they challenge as misreadings of what is really at stake for the 
public (summarised in the following table).
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M yths Challenges to m yths
1 The primordial cause of the problem 
is that lay people are ignorant about 
scientific facts
Opposition is not related to ‘text book’ knowledge. Lay 
people bring different sorts o f knowledge into their evalua­
tions, mostly about social institutions etc.
2 People are either ‘for’ or 'against’ 
GMOs
People are mostly ambivalent and willing to trade off risks 
and benefits — or rather uncertainties and needs -  if they see 
a reason to do so consisting of ‘social’ rather than economic 
benefits.
3 Consumers accept medical GMOs but 
refuse GMOs used in food and agri­
culture
Ibis assumption is too simplistic. It is not the medical char­
acteristics of applications that accounts for higher accep­
tance, but the institutional configuration of need, control 
and surveillance.
4 European consumers are behaving 
selfishly towards the poor in the Third 
World
Europeans would like to help the Third World, but are 
sceptical that this will be achieved with the current owner­
ship and control in biotechnology.
5 Consumers want labelling in order to 
exercise their freedom of choice
Market mechanisms are considered only one (insufficient) 
way to be able to ‘signal’ their wishes to technological inno­
vations. Just as or more important than the fact that genetic 
modification has been carried out, is information on ir/jy it 
was done.
6 The public thinks -  wrongly — that 
GMOs are unnatural
Use of other agricultural technologies (herbicides, pesticides, 
growth hormones) is also seen as ‘unnatural’. GMOs are 
seen as one more (deplorable) step in the industrialisation of 
food production. This does not mean that all previous steps 
are seen as desirable or ‘natural’.
7 It’s the fault o f the BSE crisis: since 
then, citizens no longer trust regula­
tory institutions
BSE is often used as anchor point, but is seen as something 
‘normal’ or an inevitable outcome of agricultural practice 
and regulatory behaviour, not as something exceptional.
8 The public demands “zero risk’’ -  and 
this is not reasonable
People arc well aware that modem life entails risk. They are 
concerned about the accountability of the institutions in 
charge of risk management and according to whose princi­
ples they operate.
9 Public opposition to GMOs is due to 
“other” ethical or political factors
The public often docs not perceive matters o f physical risks 
as separate or separable from ‘ethical’ or political considera­
tions.
10 The public is a malleable victim of 
distorting sensationalist media
Members of the public are not a tabub rasa and arc able to 
balance different sources o f  information.
(Compiled from Marris et al. 20Ü1)
On this background Marris et al. argue that “the possible solutions to the crisis surrounding 
GM agriculture and foods in Europe lie in substantially changed policy commitments as 
practice, rather than only (as is often conventionally implied) in “modes of risk communi­
cation” and “form of representation”” (ibid: 91).
Marris et al. have in my opinion uncovered an important element in understanding the 
roots of the controversies over GMOs with their argument that these do not spring from 
the fact the public are ignorant about GMOs and ideologically prejudiced against promot­
ers and regulators, but that a number of policy actors seem to operate with overtly simplis­
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tic or flawed conceptions of the public. This is a sophisticated type o f social scientific criti­
cism, showing that both business interests and regulators are at odds with the public they 
are either meant to, respectively, make their money from or protect. However, two provi­
sos seem to be required here. Tublic perceptions’ are to some extent artifacts o f social re­
search (re)constructions of (perhaps latent) dynamics underlying the controversies. These 
perceptions do not equal ‘the controversies’ as they unfold in a number of contexts. It is 
not until they are articulated beyond surveys and focus group research that they will have 
effects in the policy arenas. These effects are by no means certain to mirror ‘public percep­
tions’ directly as they will inevitably be filtered through a number of institutions. Secondly, 
Marris et al. to some extent ‘invert’ the deficit model, as they argue that commercial and 
regulatory organisations ought to align their modes of operations more closely with those 
of public perceptions. However, they only ask in a superficial manner why the stakeholders 
they investigated operate the way they do. They merely point out that their practices are 
problematic and perhaps aggravate controversy rather than mitigate it. As I shall argue in 
the following, a change of institutional practices may not be easy to achieve, as these prac­
tices are intimately connected to structural features o f functionally differentiated modern 
societies. In Chapter III I shall examine the risk concept more closely with regard to its re­
lation to social theory. There I will argue that it is more fruitful for sociological analysis to 
understand risk controversies as a matter of different modes o f observations, rather than 
asenbing ‘deficiencies’ of one sort or another either on ‘die public’ or on other actors. Here 
I limit the discussion to some preliminary observations on why the risk frame is dominant 
or perhaps even hegemonic in the debates over genetic engineering, even though much 
research indicates that the public does not really perceive of the issues in such terms.
'Risk as Proxy' and the Evolution o f B iotechnology Regulation
Modem, liberal societies have developed (on) the normative assumption that there is (and 
should be) a private domain where entrepreneurial activity is allowed without interference 
from the state, as long as its activities do not impose direct physical risks or unwarranted 
inconvenience on others, thereby preventing them from pursuing their activities likewise 
(van den Daele 1993, Saretzki 2000). A central precondition of this principle is that gains 
and losses befall the persons and groups taking the risk. This assumption has obviously be­
come obsolete in many respects in the light o f present day technologies, which can be 
characterised exactly by the fact that their risks and benefits often do not (necessarily) coin­
cide socially or temporally (Luhmann 1991, BonB 1995). The emerging acknowledgement 
of this problem, however, has not (yet) led to the development of general solutions in 
terms o f consensually accepted social mechanisms for managing risks, as indicated, for in­
stance, by discussions on the ‘Risk Society’, and by the difficulties in operationalising the 
‘precautionary principle’ (Stirling 1999, Majone 2003).
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In order to prevent too many of the risks and dangers falling on others, the regulation of 
technolog)7 is considered a legitimate and necessary task for the state and has been consid­
ered so for quite some time (van den Daele 1993). Hence, nowadays practically all techno­
logical activities are regulated at some level. Nonetheless, the basic pnnciple generally re­
mains in force that something must be proven to pose physical dangers to others for it to 
be prohibited prospectively. According to modem constitutions innovation cannot nor­
mally be arrested on the grounds that it could have potentially adverse social effects for 
certain groups (e.g. loss of income, unemployment) or that it conflicts with culturally 
dominant or ‘desirable’ ways o f life (family farming, small scale production). If such effects 
are subsequently observed, they are most likely compensated in other ways as technical 
structures and artifacts, once they are implemented, are very difficult to reverse (cars being 
a classic example).
Obviously there are all sorts of exceptions from and restrictive interpretations of this liberal 
principle where potential innovations are perceived to contradict widely shared social val­
ues or legally codified norms (obvious examples: human cloning, and (at least in Europe) 
the spread of hand guns). More interestingly for the present purpose, interpretations may 
also vary temporally and spatially: The freedom to innovate and market GMOs is for in­
stance clearly interpreted differently in the EU and in the US, just as the GMO regulation 
has evolved over time, partly as a response to controversy (Levidow and Marris 2001). 
However, it seems that within the regulation of agricultural biotechnology too the basic 
principle holds that if something does not pose any physical harm to human health or the 
environment, then it should be allowed — even if it is considered ‘unnatural’, undesirable or 
unnecessary by some substantial part, and perhaps the majority of a population. Innova­
tions do not require justification through consensually agreed desirability or needs (Saretzki 
2000: 43). The social mechanism foreseen to regulate or accommodate such cultural or so­
cial objections is the market, as it is assumed that if innovations are at odds with cultural 
values they will not survive on the market. To the extent that risks are seen as causally iden­
tifiable, adverse physical effects, science remains the social institution responsible for their 
evaluation.
As such, there are ‘ideological’ as well as ingrown institutional routines that explain why the 
risk frame remains a pivotal point in the controversies (as well as clear interests on die side 
of dominant actors). Therefore, questions of risk often seem to function as proxy for a 
number of concerns and objections, which are not strictly or exclusively risk related, but 
are more easily politicised if they can be associated discursively to physical risks or uncer­
tainties (lack of knowledge/predictability7) of one kind or another.
However, it is obvious that the biotechnological domain is one o f the areas where the lib­
eral principle of freedom of innovation is challenged and its limits tested in controversial 
manners. One indication of this is that modem biotechnology was the first major techno­
logical programme that, from the outset, saw a shift from a ‘retrospective’ to a ‘prospective’
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approach to regulation, i.e. a shift from prevention of known and observed adverse effects 
to precaution against hypothetical risks (Gill 1998). This was connected to the then emerg­
ing environmental consciousness and an acknowledgement that precaution is preferable to 
cure. Retrospective prevention is based on actual experiences o f adverse effects of activities 
where an identification of causation is applied ex post Prospective precaution, on the other 
hand, takes place ex ante from hypotheses about what could possibly go wrong, but where 
no experiences provide data for assessments because the effect to prevent has not oc­
curred. This makes the horizon o f potential effects much wider, as it is necessary to search 
not only for causes of observed effects, but guard against effects whose causal paths are 
(perhaps) only hypothetical (ibid).19 This raises significant cognitive challenges, as potential 
damage must be assessed. However, it also poses normative challenges as how such poten­
tial effects should be evaluated (and if the time horizon is long then also whether changes 
of values can be expected to emerge that will change the basis o f assessment must also be 
pondered).
As effects are unknown, ‘traditional’ environmental regulatory principles that regulate the 
distinction between what is legal and illegal on the basis o f limit values (which are to some 
extent fictitious)20 21, i.e. in principle independently of whether damages occur, become obso­
lete:
“Da man also die Gentechnologie nicht gleich verbieten oder nur bereits bekannte Risiken berück- 
sichten wollte, sondern eine prospektive Vorsorgestrategie gewählt hat, muss das bisher iibäche Ver­
fahren des \als obül hier sowohl aus kognitiven nie aus normativen Gründen versagen. Das bedeutet 
sgigleich auch, dass die rechtlich bisher iibäche Abschichtung epischen vorsorgepßchtigen Gefahren 
und ~u i>emach lässigen dem, weil ausgesprochen un wahrscheinUchem Restrisiko inkonsistent nird.
Denn bei dieser Abschichtung nird unterstellt, dass das Risiko prinzipiell bekannt und — nach der 
Formel von Schadensunfang und Eintrittswahrscheinächkeit — berechenbar ist. Davon kann abet' 
bei einer Öffnung des Erwartnngsborizpnts und bei neuen Technologien, mit denen man nur unge­
nügenden Efahmngen gesammelt hat, gerade nicht mehr ausgegangen werden.” (G ill 1998: 32-33)
This opening of normative questions through the emergence o f new risks Ís one of the rea­
sons that biotechnology has proven so controversial. Historically, it can be observed that it 
was precisely the communication of hypothetical risks that initiated the regulatory concern 
with biotechnology and contributed to its controversial trajectory. Struggles over the man­
agement o f biotechnology originate before public concerns were an important issue (or at
19 Which leads to the 'warning paradox*. We do not know if precaution is required, and if attention is paid to 
warnings, u’e might never know if they were required o r n o t
20 ‘Fictitious’ in the sense that they legally regulate something based on scientific procedures that are conven­
tions rather than established facts or fully understood causal mechanisms: “Mit ihrer Verankerung in Verwal­
tungsvorschriften wird aber die Fiktion durchgp setzt, als ob Emissionen oder Immissionen unterhalb der 
Grenzw’erte ungefährlich seien. Mit der Konstruktion dieses zweifachen ‘als ob* wird Ungewissheit in verwal­
tungspraktisch handhabbare Gewissheit überführt” (Gill 1998: 32).
21 See previous footnote.
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least clearly before public perceptions were measured). Hence, public concerns were not 
the initial cause of the controversies, even if it can be argued that today they are a signifi­
cant reason for their continuance. Initially, the controversies were played out in more spe­
cialised ‘publics’, notably the scientific community. They then gradually spread out to other 
domains of society, as will be briefly recounted in the remainder o f this chapter.
At the start of what was later to be considered a biotechnological revolution, when trans- 
genetic research was in its infancy, concerns expressed were exclusively about physical 
risks, and manifested themselves as Svhistle blowing’ within the scientific community'. After 
the first in litro transfer of a gene across species was undertaken in 1973, concerns emerged 
that such work could produce risks that were not well understood. In what is now often 
mentioned as the first attempt by the scientific community to setf-impose restrictions on its 
activities, a temporary moratorium on trans-genetic research was agreed upon, until an in­
ternational conference could discuss the potential dangers to laboratory workers and the 
environment in die case of escaped organisms. Eight months later in 1974 the now re­
nowned Asilomar conference was held, where the scientific community involved in this 
research came to the conclusion that initial fears were largely unfounded (Gottweis 1998). 
The scientific community appreciated that there was great potential in this research field, 
but that this could only be realised if some controls were put in place to prevent mishaps 
and to ensure the legitimacy of the research. It was hence at the request of the scientific 
community' that the American National Institutes of Health (Nil I) in 1976 issued guide­
lines for trans-genetic research. The NIH guidelines were subsequently adopted more or 
less directly by most European countries, and in the initial phases interpretation and over­
sight was left to the scientific community itself (Torgcrsen et ah 2002: 29-31).
As such, biotechnology was from its very inception associated with potential risks and 
regulation prospectively organised, as it was not known what damages could be expected — 
but experiences from other domains and theoretical conjectures indicated that precaution 
was required. Although the scientific mainstream gradually moved towards considering the 
risks entailed as manageable and as not posing problems qualitatively different from other 
research or principally different from other technologies, dissenting voices within the mo­
lecular biological community persisted. As technological applications gradually emerged, 
concerns were also raised from neighboring scientific fields such as ecology and medicine. 
Here, the focus was on the suspected synergistic effects o f trans-genetic organisms released 
into the environment and consumed by humans. The internal scientific controversies 
gradually polarised along the pro/ contra lines and as such contributed to the emerging 
public concerns.
"... (I)n the struggles orer biotechnology, scientific expertise of two different kinds was deployed, ei­
ther denying the possibility of hazards or emphasising uncertainty and risks. This contributed to the 
bewildering array of laypeople and politicians who demanded *impartial’ expertisefrom the science,
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sincefor most of them it was inconceivable that there was more than one version of *objective ’ truth. 
Ultimately, this would contribute to the erosion of trust in scientific advice. ” (Torgersen et al.
2002: 40)
These internal scientific community discussions about cognitive uncertainties and the man­
ageability of complex processes thus gradually spilled into other societal domains such as 
politics, economics, law and the media where the polarising effects were often reiterated in 
new ways. The fact that the controversies can ‘travel’ in different communicative domains 
is of course part their dynamic, and makes it difficult to capture them, as they will never 
adhere to just one argumentative logic. In the following chapters I shall attempt to dig 
deeper into what that means with the help o f sociological theory. Before moving on I will 
briefly describe some aspects of the regulatory challenges arising from the introduction of 
biotechnolog}' and the issuing controversies.
In a recent review of public debates about and regulation of the biotechnology in Europe, 
Torgersen et al. (2002) claim that the history o f biotechnology appears “... at first glance, 
an odd and almost impenetrable jungle o f rhetoric and facts, policies and interests, oppor­
tunities and risks, wishes and fears, attitudes and world views.. (ibid: 24). It is not possi­
ble to convey a full discussion of this in a few pages, especially since diese show significant 
variation across national contexts in substantive, social and temporal terms. Some general 
issues are however worth introducing as a prelude to the theoretical discussion to follow.
In the US, the scientific community, who initiated the concerns about trans-genetic re­
search, largely managed to close down the debates by assuring the public that further re­
search and safety guidelines rendered the risks manageable. The appropriation o f (agricul­
tural) biotechnology has therefore proven relatively uncontroversial in that country. In 
Europe, the debates proliferated and the introduction of the technolog}' followed a very 
different trajectory'.
If one assumes that regulation of technolog}' should serve two functions, namely preven­
tion of accidents and adverse effects as well as the creation and maintenance of public ac­
ceptance (Hasse and Gill 1994: 265), then the second function has clearly failed in several 
European countries. Gradually, especially environmental organisations began to perceive 
biotechnology as replete with risks as well as morally charged. Therefore, it could also be 
used as a vehicle to politicise broader aspects of the techno-scientific development of mod­
ern societies. Parallel to the discussions about whether significant risks existed or not, the 
expectations o f potential technological applications of this new research domain grew fast. 
Biotechnology was announced as the new ‘technolog}' of the future’, possibly even more 
revolutionär}' than ICT. Therefore, the political systems in the countries with the most ad­
vanced knowledge bases began a dual process o f working to ensure safety and public ac­
ceptance as well as to promote scientific research and technological development. Al-
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though regulation was shaped differently in different European countries, in general it in­
volved a development where self-governance by scientific communities was replaced by 
larger political involvement and oversight (Torgersen et al. 2002). In this process the scien­
tific communities, and increasingly industry interests, sought to restrict this involvement to 
strict risk based evaluations, whereas opponents increasingly brought in demands of socio­
economic and ethical assessments along with demands for more protection against risks to 
human health and the environment.
As some sceptics believed that genetic engineering inherently entailed qualitatively new 
processes they argued that a precondition for its acceptance should be that it could be 
proved these entailed no risks. This was rejected by the promoters as an illogical stand­
point, as the non-existence of something could not be proved, and new technologies al­
ways entailed a potential for surprises. Contentions therefore often centred on whether the 
potential for ‘surprises’, especially adverse effects, were significantly greater for genetic en­
gineering than for other (agricultural) technologies.
In the issuing policy formation a number o f principles had to be established with regard to 
what types of regulations were necessary and desirable. On a basic level, one can differenti­
ate between horizontal and vertical approaches to GM regulation. In some countries a 
horizontal approach was opted for, where all applications of GMOs were regulated within 
the same legal framework spanning different sectors. In other cases vertical approaches 
were adapted, where biotechnology was incorporated into existing sector-based regulation 
depending on the type of application. Whether implicitly or explicitly within these decisions 
lie the political and regulatory perceptions — often outcomes of definitional struggles in the 
respective policy arenas — of whether genetic engineering is something qualitatively new or 
whether it should be seen as just the refinement of existing technologies. A horizontal ap­
proach with specific ‘gene-laws’ indicates that genetic engineering is given a special status, 
and obviously invites more politicisation than if the regulation spreads over a number of 
existing regulations with no distinct locus.
Another general distinction pertaining more to the substance of regulation, which in my 
opinion captures (some of) these issues quite well, has been suggested byjasanoff (1995). 
She distinguishes between regulator}' approaches based on products, process and pro­
gramme. Regulation based on products is in principle indifferent to whether genetic engi­
neering has been applied or not, as the object of regulation is the characteristics of the 
product that emerges. In this approach GM food, for example, should only be treated dif­
ferently from other foodstuff if it has different nutritional characteristics. In a process 
based regulatory regime, the process by which products are produced become the object of 
regulation. Hence, GM food is considered special independently of whether its nutritional
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characteristics are different from conventional food exactly because it is produced using 
genetic engineering. In a programmatic regulatory approach, a whole technological regime 
as such is taken into consideration and concerns beyond technical characteristics such as 
socio-economic impacts are observed when applications are assessed.
The categories of product, process and programme based regulation are of course idealisa­
tions. However, Jasanoff argues that, roughly speaking, the US primarily ascribes to a 
product-based approach, whilst before EU harmonisation the UK opted for a process 
based approach to GMOs, whereas Germany experienced a more programmatic debate 
about the wider perspectives and consequences of genetic engineering flowing into regula­
tory initiatives.22 Depending on what regulator)' style is opted for, different issues become 
the proper objects o f regulation and the role o f science vis-à-vis other types of compe­
tences differs. N ot only were different regulator)' approaches chosen in different European 
countries, but different social configurations of the policy arenas could be observed. 
Toigersen et al. distinguish four different configurations shaping regulation (as well as 
where they were ‘typical’), namely: 1) exclusive or elite decision-making (France/UK), 2) 
co-optation (NL/Sweden, to some extent Germany), 3) public participation (Denmark) and 
4) delegation to the European level (mostly southern countries). (Torgersen et al. 2002: 42).
The fact that the political systems often assumed a dual role as promoter/supporter and 
regulator of biotechnology has according to some observers contributed to a decline in 
public trust in the willingness o f regulators to ensure adequate risk protection. “Obviously, 
governments thought that biotechnology was something worth developing and they sup­
ported it with alacrity. Yet they also styled themselves as impartial regulators of what many 
perceived to be a risky endeavour. This ambiguity later proved to be one of the sources of 
public distrust.” (ibid: 23).
While many of the initial controversies were played out separately in different national con­
text throughout the 1980s, the EC also developed an interest in biotechnology as an area of
— To take an example: I f  one observes the recent debates in the EU about the labelling of GM food through 
these concepts, traits from all the three modes can be found in the controversies. The promoters o f  GMOs 
clearly favour a product-based regulatory regime. This entails that labelling is only required when there are 
measurable differences in the physio-sanitary characteristics o f products compared to conventional ones.
They have argued that labelling of products that are ‘substantially equivalent’ in terms o f nutritional character­
istics would be unfairly stigmatised by carrying labels. The opponents o f genetic engineering would like to 
base regulation on programmatic aspects o f  the technology and also required are labelling o f products where 
GMOs were used in the process, even if they were no t traceable in the end products, e.g. meat from livestock 
fed on fodder containing GMOs. This way, they argued, consumers can make an informed choice not only 
about whether or not they want to eat GMOs, but also whether or no t they wish to support this technological 
trajectory in general. The regulatory paradigm that has been adapted by the EU can be described as process- 
based. Labelling requirements are determined by the use o f genetic engineering somewhere in production. 
However, only food with actual measurable traces o f  GMOs must be labelled and no socio-economic criteria 
were admitted into approval procedures, which are envisioned in principle to be strictly risk based.
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potential economic growth, which needed nurturing and ‘protection’ from the kind of con­
flicts that had marred nuclear power in a number of European countries.
In 1990 the EC issued a directive (90/220) on the contained use and deliberate release of 
GMOs, which intended to harmonise regulation across Europe. This was meant as a proac­
tive move to regulate a number of activities, which were still only in their infancy, but were 
believed to become important in the following years, such as GM crops. The directive took 
a ‘horizontal approach’ and was as such process-based. However, although socio-economic 
and ethical concerns had become still more central in the concerns expressed in the public 
debates about biotechnology in the agricultural domain in several national contexts, these 
did not find their way into regulatory principles on the European level. Instead, public con­
cerns were responded to by stressing the management o f uncertainty and adapting a pre­
cautionary approach:23
“The directives were definitely not enacted on the basis of proven risksfrom the methods of genetic en­
gineering; rather; the rationale was to use discretion until more experience was gained and regulation 
could be relaxed. By emphasising uncertainty, this regulatory solution tried to force together two ap­
parently incongruent approaches to risk assessment, namely one that built on scientific eiidence ex 
post, and one that built on scenarios of hypothetical risks ex ante. ” (Torgersen et al. 2002: 49)24
The adaptation of a common European framework not only created problems internation­
ally, it did not seem to fulfil its purpose internally in the EU. In part because the previously 
existing national regulatory regimes were not entirely adapted to it and different interpreta­
tions emerged in the implementation which carried on the different ‘policy styles’ men­
tioned above (Togersen et al. 2002: 60), and partly because it did not succeed in closing off 
the controversies, but actually multiplied the number o f places where decisions could be 
contested (Dreyer and Gill 2000). It did however change the policy arenas, and in the pe­
riod following its issue calmed the controversies to the initial advantage of the promoters.
During the 1980s both promoters and opponents of the technology had organised them­
selves in the national policy arenas. Among the opponents environmental movements were 
especially active in the public spheres, arguing that genetic engineering was inherently risky, 
that it entailed uncertainties that could not be managed and that it represented an undesir­
able socio-technical trajectory.
23 In part of course because policy makers perceived public concerns as being primarily about physical risks, 
but also because this was the most convenient way to regulate according to existing (technocratic) routines.
24 This response to public concerns, where one could argue that risk and uncertainty are used as proxies for 
wider socio-economic, cultural and ethical concerns (i.e. if  concerns o f whatever character were expressed, 
reference to risk assessment is made and approval procedures are perhaps made tighter), was later to bring 
the EU into conflict with the US. Here a central bone o f contention was whether regulation was or should be 
based on ‘sound science’, i.e. that restrictions on genetic engineering could only be imposed where there was 
evidence that risks to human health or the environment existed, or whether as-yet-unproven suspicions (hy­
pothetical risks) should be seen as legitimate reasons to withhold the use o f GMOs. This later proved to be a 
central issue in a looming trade war between the EU and the US, which impinged significantly on the behav­
iour o f the EU institutions (Levidow 2001, Levidow and Marris 2001).
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However, when regulation was transferred to the EU level, opponents generally needed 
more time to re-organise their activities in Brussels than the industry actors, who had con­
siderably more economic resources available. Therefore, most observers agree, the pro­
moters of biotechnology had more success in influencing European regulation during the 
first half o f the 1990s. At this time many of the controversies o f the 1980s disappeared 
from the policy arenas and many actors considered the most important issues as settled. It 
was believed by many that ‘the cultural lag’ had been closed.
This picture, however, changed radically when the first commercial GM products arrived 
large scale in Europe in 1996.25 The introduction of crops from herbicide tolerant soy, 
however, was accompanied by the public perception that its owner Monsanto (a large agro­
chemical corporation) was trying to muscle its products onto the European markets against 
the will of consumers (Lassen et al. 2002, Dreyer and Gill 2000). Furthermore, this was 
preceded by a few months by the announcement by the British authorities of a connection 
between BSE (mad cow disease) and the human variant of Creutzfeldt-Jakob’s Disease, 
which had eroded much of the confidence in food safety" assurances by experts. Hence, 
consumer safety and freedom of choice was placed high on the public agenda. Opponents 
of biotechnology managed to create a symbolic link between BSE and GMOs by arguing 
that they were both instances of modem, industrialized agricultural practices and economic 
cynicism in the food industry. Hence, it was not impossible that similar adverse health ef­
fects could emerge from GM food, even if experts could not at that time establish such 
effects.
This reopening of the GM controversies and renewed public mobilisation after a period of 
calm had a number o f effects, among others that issues of consumer safety moved to the 
centre of public attention and environmental organisations were joined by consumer or­
ganisations in the campaign against GMOs. During this process the boundaries between 
cognitive discussions about the safety of GMOs and broader socio-economic, cultural and 
ethical issues were more or less erased from public debates (Marris et al. 2001). However, 
in policy discourses, where public acceptance was increasingly acknowledged as //fo? obstacle 
inhibiting the full potential o f biotechnology", public concerns — to the extent that they 
could not be responded to by means o f risk regulation — were increasingly perceived of as 
‘ethical’ (Levidow and Carr 1997). Such ‘ethical’ concerns were on the one hand thematised 
as something distinct from risk issues in order to downplay the value judgements inherently 
entailed in risk assessments, and, on the other hand, responded to by a professionalisation 
of ethical competences in advisory groups etc. (Wynne 2001b).
25 Before this, a genetically modified tomato paste had been introduced in the UK without attracting much 
attention although it was labelled as ‘genetically modified’.
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Due to a number o f alleged uncertainties and persistent public controversy, five EU mem­
ber states pushed through a moratorium of further product approvals for both the deliber­
ate release and the marketing of GMOs. Despite the fact that the responsible EU scientific 
committees would not sustain the assessments motivating the moratorium, it was extended 
in 1999 pending the approval of three new directives on the deliberate release of GMOs, 
and the labelling and traceability of GM material as well as liability. These directives proved 
politically very difficult to negotiate and the moratorium stayed in effect until May 2004 
when approvals were slowly resumed. The moratorium had no legal base in the EU treaties 
and was ardently criticised by some scientists, the industry and the US, who considered it 
primarily as a technical trade barrier. Nonetheless, it was upheld for six years, as it did not 
seem politically desirable to lift it in the light of public controversies.26 During the process 
the ability o f scientific knowledge to manage risks, the appropriate use of science and ex­
pertise vis-à-vis politics and the legitimacy and independence of science from industry was 
the object of multifarious public controversies.
In joining the fight for tighter safety approvals consumer organisations also made freedom 
o f choice for consumers an essential requirement of acceptance. Therefore, labelling be­
came a central bone of contention in the renewed controversies. Promoters argued that this 
would stigmatise GM food unnecessarily, as they required safety approvals anyway. How­
ever, as the public unpopularity of biotechnology appeared to persist, the industry hesi­
tantly caved in to this demand. In the shaping of the renewed EU directives labelling was 
made a central principle in the introduction of GM products in Europe.
By most observers this was an indication that the GM sceptics had managed to maintain 
animosity against agricultural biotechnology7 among the European publics and exert signifi­
cant influence on regulation. However, the focus on labelling as a response to public con­
cerns and controversies also signals an important conditioning of the publics’ access to in­
fluence technological trajectories. The emergence of an additional frame of the public em­
phasising ‘consumer’ rather than ‘citizens’ aspects meant that evaluations of biotechnology 
have to some extent been transferred from a domain of collective deliberation to a ‘priva­
tised’ domain where individual consumer preferences are decisive. Some observers pose 
this as a democratic problem, as what they perceive to be a matter of collective choices has 
been privatised, and technological development is to a still lesser degree held accountable 
by democratic institutions. The partial transfer of regulator)7 mechanisms to the market also 
meant that new lines o f controversy opened up, namely over who should carry the costs o f 
separation between GM and non-GM food. This is manifested for instance in struggles
26 Notably, the five countries that instigated the moratorium (Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, Luxemburg) 
were also the ones with the lowest support rates in the EuroBarometer surveys (Gaskell et al. 2003). Although 
a direct causal relation demands more investigation, this does seem to indicate a sensitivity to public opinion, 
possibly mediated through survey research.
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over threshold values for the adventitious presence of GM material in non-GM crops and 
food from pollen-drift and contamination in the production chain.27
In this chapter I have tried to establish in a general manner the contours of the controver­
sies over (agricultural) biotechnology by discussing a number of issues relating to their so­
cial, substantial and temporal dimensions. O f course, what I term ‘the controversies’ is a 
conglomerate of sometimes very loosely connected communicative processes, and not a 
coherent whole. The totality of this cannot be adequately traced or summarised in these 
lew pages. I hope, however, that this descriptive introduction to the material subject of the 
thesis will provide the reader with a better understanding of the object of the theoretical 
discussions to be taken up in the following chapters. In the next chapter the task will be to 
discuss different diagnoses of and suggested remedies for the challenges posed by the in­
termingling of cognitive, cultural or ethical and socio-economic elements in such contro­
versies.
27 The lower the values set for acceptable contamination, the higher the costs o f  enforcing separation. The 
GM sceptics argue that it should be the producers o f GM  crops that should carry these costs, the promoters 
that if there is a market for non-GM crops, this will be established in the willingness to pay a price premium 
for non-GM crops. As will be expounded during the case studies, this is one o f  the areas where differing 
problem framings dash in ways that can neither be kept within the bounds o f scientific problem solving, nor 
settled by the market w ithout regulatory intervention that must necessarily be based on normative standards 
o f  some kind.
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Chapter II
New Discourses of Public Involvement
The kind of controversies over biotechnology outlined in the first chapter have, along with 
others controversies over the management of technological risk and the general steering of 
technological trajectories, led to countless observations that something has changed and is 
changing in the relationship between science, technology and wider society. This is often 
accompanied by observations and diagnoses of heightened and altered problem-awareness 
among innovators, regulators and citizens alike. As a consequence, processes of social 
learning are claimed to take place, and advocated by observers from different quarters.
This, I contend, has had some impact on how modem societies observe and respond to 
technological controversies as shall be explored in the following.
Some of these observations can be summarised as analyses of and pleas for increased pub­
lic involvement in the governance of science and technology with the aim of establishing 
‘better1 decision-making thorough procedures that could democratise technology, mitigate 
controversy and (re)create public trust in expertise. These observations I initially called par­
ticipatory and deliberative ‘postulates’. Such ideas have increasingly gained the attention of 
policy-makers confused by the declining popular acceptance and legitimacy of a number of 
science based technological innovations and activities, as well as what is often seen ob­
served as an unchecked proliferation of technological risks. Discourses on participation and 
deliberation do not represent a unitary or coherent theoretical or methodological set of ap­
proaches, they are rather a spectrum of ideas on how to manage the interface between sci­
entific and technological dynamics and the rest of society.28 These participatory and delib­
erative postulates often combine an analysis and diagnosis of controversies with advocacy 
for new and allegedly more democratic ways of doing things. They descriptively argue that 
changes have occurred in the way modem societies produce and manage both knowledge 
and risk in relation to technological dynamics, which necessitates new forms of public en­
gagement in order to ensure legitimacy and public trust. Normatively, they argue that such 
procedures are desirable as a means of expanding democracy into domains where it has so 
far had less trenchancy. Although demands for increased public involvement often encoun-
28 This evaluation -  and from the perspective of constructing a research framework; challenge -  is shared by 
the, to my knowledge, most comprehensive, comparative study of participatory technology assessment to 
date (joss and Bellucci 2002):
“The issues of both participation anâ TA  art conceptually anti practically so far-reaching that it proves rather difficult to consider 
them on the basis of just one kind of theory. In fact, looking at the rich literature on TA  and pT A , it is dear that a range of 
different schools of thought -  including system analysis, policy sdence, democratic theory, sociology o f scientific knowledge, commu­
nication theory -  can claim to hate substantially contributed to the development in thisfield, even i f  they have arrived at contra­
dictory claims. Therefore, a theoreticalframework should consider, as far as possible, various schools of thought concurrently” 
(Bellucci et al. 2002: \1).
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ter significant institutional resistance (Wynne 2001b), academic observers and many practi­
tioners tend to perceive them with a sort o f "fatalistic optimism’: There is no alternative to 
transparency and dialogue between ‘science’ and ‘the public’ (e.g. Durant 1999).29
The aim of this chapter will be to explain important strands of these diagnoses and norma­
tive claims, which, following my assumptions, have inspired attempts to operationalise 
public involvement and provided central elements of organisations’ self-descriptions of 
such procedures.
In the following I shall seek to unfold different thematic focal points in the discussion on 
public participation and deliberation. This should serve, in the first instance, to clarify cen­
tral elements of what I will call the intellectual underpinnings o f calls for and experiments 
with new modes of addressing technological controversies. Despite differences in origin 
between some o f the ideas and discourses to be discussed in the following, their common 
denominator is that they suggest that social integration in the face o f technological contro­
versies can — and hence ought to — be (re)established and maintained by means of ex­
panded inclusion in some form or another. It is argued that substantial rationality and social 
justice can be mutually strengthened through a proceduralisation of technological contro­
versies that broadens the scope o f perspectives and interests considered. Such calls for in­
clusion place emphasis either on persons or groups (increased participation) or on ‘stand­
point perspectives’ or arguments (increased deliberation) although this distinction is more 
analytical than is important at the operational level, as persons/groups and arguments are 
usually perceived as closely connected in social reality.
Challenges to the Technocratic M odel -  The Emergence o f  
Technology A ssessm ent
Although it is rarely spelled out in detail what exactly it is that these alleged new forms o f 
public engagement distinguish themselves from, this can be reconstructed from the atgu- 
ments as an ideal-typical ‘traditional’ approach of discretionary, technocratie policy making. 
‘Traditionally’, in that at least in the period since the Second World War until the rise of the 
environmental problématique on the public agenda, policy making in the science and tech­
nology domain has allegedly been dominated by technocratic elites and based on mostly 
uncontested assumptions about the nature o f scientific knowledge, technological dynamics 
and a value consensus in regard to these.50 Among the assumptions were that scientific and
29 Formulated slightly differently, but essentially arguing the same point: “Z// einer diskursiven Klärung von durch 
Wissenschaft und Technik aufgeworfenen Fragen des “gemeinsamen Guten" scheint es inpost-traditionaien Gesellschaften keine 
(demokratische) Alternative ergeben. ” (Hennen 1997; 197).
30 In some respects this o f  course gpes back a lot further. In the present context the dating of the beginning 
o f  the alleged dominance o f  technocratic forms o f  governance is o f  less interest. However, the Second World 
War in some respects catalysed a transformation o f  knowledge production and management that laid the 
ground for what is now claimed to change (e.g. Gibbons 1999).
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technological progress was equated with social or human progress, and that scientific 
knowledge was rationally superior to other ways of ordering experiences and guiding ac­
tion. The possession of rationally certified, and hence superior, knowledge was socially as­
cribed to scientists (or people with science-based qualifications), who in effect held the 
monopoly on managing and regulating science and technology to the benefit of all of soci­
ety. As scientific and technological knowledge is highly esoteric, it was perceived more or 
less as a matter of course that it should and could be governed only by competent expert 
communities, which were self-recruiting and self-policing. Hence, lay people (ordinary citi­
zens) were effectively excluded from active participation in such policy-making. Expert 
communities (public or private depending on the domain) would normally set goals, dis­
tribute resources and define what was to be perceived as dangerous or undesirable for the 
broader population.31
It was of course recognised in principle that the setting of goals was a political and norma­
tive task, which needed democratic legitimacy. This was ensured through the formal at­
tachment o f regulatory and policy-making bodies to representative institutions, where 
technocratic elites were perceived to function as neutral advisors to politicians, who in the 
final instance were in control. However, due to the complicated and technical nature of the 
issues, in most instances expert bodies had significant discretionary power at the opera­
tional level. Sometimes this is described as an implicit contract between science and society': 
in return for granting science significant autonomy and providing it with resources, society 
would in return receive beneficial technological innovations and the preconditions for eco­
nomic growth.32
With the advent of ecological crises and technological controversies a number of the as­
sumptions underpinning this traditional model of science and technology governance have 
proven problematic and fallen into disrepute.33 Many reasons and processes have been sug­
gested as to why and how this has happened, but it is difficult to make out any general 
convergence of the sociological diagnoses. Therefore, modifications and alternatives are 
being suggested and debated on different fronts. The various calls and suggestions for par­
31 This is obviously highly simplified, as research on different national configurations o f the use o f expertise 
indicates (e.g. Jananoff 1995, Renn 1995). As a contrast to the arguments in favour o f increased public in­
volvement, however, this kind of generalised image is often invoked.
32 Consider for instance the widely quoted aigument by Gibbons published in Nature claiming that “ ... there 
has been a social contract between science and society, an arrangement built on trust which sets out the ex­
pectations of the one held by the other, and which — in principle — includes appropriate sanctions if these 
expectations are not met.” (Gibbons 1999: c81). And a little later “A new social contract is now required. 
This cannot be achieved merely by patching up the existing framework. A fresh approach -  virtually a com­
plete ‘rethinking’ of science’s relationship with the rest of society — is needed.” (ibid).
33 “Die Vorstellung eines determinierten Zusammenhangs von technischem und gesellschaftlichem Fortschritt -  mit der letztlich 
eine Depoätisierung technologischer Fragen verbunden ¡rar— ist mr dem Hintergrund ubiquitärer Risiko- und Folgendebatten, 
nie auch der allgemein gestellten Forderung nach poÜäscher Gestaltung des technischen U’ändels auch von den nissenscbaftlicih 
teebniseben Eliten kaum noch aufrecht̂ j/erhalten.” (Hennen 1997: 193).
ticipatory and deliberative procedures can be seen as one indication o f this. These calls are 
not emerging from a single source or a coherent mode of observation, as it will be shown 
in the following. However, before I present a classificatory scheme to order some o f these 
new ideas and go on to discuss some of their underlying assumptions, 1 would like to insert 
a brief description of how technology assessment (TA) has evolved since the 1970ties and 
been institutionalised as a set of policy tools to mitigate adverse social and ecological con­
sequences of technological dynamics. Although the arguments in favour of increased public 
participation and deliberation of course go way beyond the conceptual debates on TA, 
these debates can be seen as symptomatic o f some of the larger institutional challenges 
posed to modem societies by technological dynamics and the proliferation of risks.
In part as a consequence of an emerging recognition that an unchecked technological dy­
namic had adverse social and ecological effects, but also more generally that science and its 
technological applications posed increasingly complex demands on political systems, cogni­
tive resources were increasingly built up in political systems across the western world. The 
guiding idea was to advise political decision makers on the impact of technologies on soci­
ety, as a number of experiences had made it clear that the adverse impacts of technology — 
unwanted side-effects of what were otherwise seen as desirable developments — should 
preferably be dealt with prospectively and proactively rather than reactively. This led to dis­
cussions of how to establish reliable technology assessments. Initially, the main trend was 
to expertise democracy by equipping decision-makers more systematically with certified expert 
knowledge. This development is epitomised by the creation in 1972 of the US congres­
sional Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), which was subsequently copied in differ­
ent forms in a number of Western countries. The initial work o f the OTA and more gener­
ally the methodological discussions on TA were characterised by great optimism with re­
gard to the ability to mitigate adverse effects through a higher content of scientific knowl­
edge in political decision-making. With an intellectual inheritance going back to Ogburn’s 
cultural-lag thesis, TA activities were perceived to be expert endeavours, which consisted 
primarily in forecasting autonomous technological dynamics and ‘preparing other sectors 
of society through proactive measures, thereby mitigating the effects of emerging tech­
nologies. Eventually, in light of the difficulties incurred in predicting technological trajecto­
ries with sufficient precision as well as a growing recognition that this kind of TA presup­
posed a value consensus, which was not present in modem societies, expectations of the 
efficacy o f expert-TA declined and a search for methodologies better equipped to deal with 
differences in risk perception and acceptance as well as broader value diversity was initi­
ated.34 Some strands o f the TA community continued to see the endeavour as a rational,
34 This is o f  course a very compact description o f  a number o f discursive and institutional developments, 
which cannot be recounted here. For more detailed accounts see among others Grunwald (2002) and Ropohl 
(1996).
scientific discipline, whose goal it was to deliver objective knowledge to political decision 
makers (as epitomized in the proverb ‘speaking truth to power’), and enlighten the public 
on the technologies ever more pervasive in their everyday life. Others increasingly saw the 
task of TA to provide more holistic assessments of technological options, which could as­
sist the broader polity in making collective choices. In this task certified and objective sci­
entific knowledge of course played a central role, but it was increasingly acknowledged that 
many of the challenges modem society faced were of a ‘trans-scientific’ and value-laden 
character that could not be settled by scientific procedures alone, nor left to the discretion 
o f a technocracy without democratic legitimacy. A development was envisioned where not 
only allegedly value neutral technical and economic aspects were to be assessed in more or 
less exact manners, but the perspectives of those ‘affected* (stakeholders and citizens) were 
to be made integral to the assessments. This initiated the search for more participatory' 
types of technology assessment (PTA), which would serve to democratise expertise.
The Intellectual Underpinnings of Participatory Technology 
Assessm ent
According to Webler and Renn (1995) one can basically distinguish between two types of 
arguments in favour of PTA procedures and increased public involvement in general: nor­
mative-ethical, and functional-analytical (see also Rowe and Frewer 2000). Normative ap­
proaches see participation and deliberation as desirable in themselves as they ideally facili­
tate collective reflection and empower the citizenry iis-à-ins technological dynamics, 
whereas the functional approaches are mostly concerned with the beneficial effects on so­
ciety’s ability' to function without creating too many ecological or social externalities. In the 
first perspective technological controversies are ‘disturbing* because they are the expression 
o f concerns, fears and disagreements about how technologies affecting individuals or 
groups should be managed, whilst in the second they are disturbing because they are per­
ceived to lower the functioning of and integration between the various subsystems of soci­
ety and the capacity to innovate. In a functional perspective public involvement is seen to 
fulfil ‘therapeutic’ functions, such as helping (reestablish and maintain public confidence in 
the social institutions in charge of managing technology. I will argue, however, that in re­
cent years a third strand of argumentation in favour of participatory procedures has 
emerged, which, to some extent, combines normative and functional considerations, but 
also opens up new perspectives. In these arguments the quality and validation of knowl­
edge is made central. This triad o f arguments is of course more analytical than empirical in 
the sense that such arguments often overlap. For instance, it is hardly possible to argue in 
favour of participatory' procedures from a purely normative standpoint if it cannot be sub­
stantiated that it will at least potentially be able to produce beneficial outputs in terms of 
efficiency and decision rationality'. Neither can serious claims be made (at least not publicly) 
for procedures o f public involvement, which will only serve ‘therapeutic* purposes in terms
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of public acceptance if this takes the form of outright paternalistic manipulation of public 
opinion. I shall first explore these different arguments in the light o f a classification sug­
gested by Luigi Pellizzoni that indicates in some detail how the different types o f argu­
ments overlap. Subsequently I shall spell out in more detail some o f the central intellectual 
elements and assumptions in the debates on PTA and increased public involvement in a 
wider sense.
According to Pellizzoni the discussions on PTA bring together intellectual traditions, prob­
lematics and modes of observation from at least three intellectual fields, which overlap in 
the contemporary discussions on PTA (Pellizoni 2003a). He also suggests a model to illus­
trate this that I find quite informative. Pellizioni claims that the debates on PTA feed on 
contributions from philosophy and the sociology of science, from social and political the­
ory and from political science discussions on governance. These disciplines contribute, re­
spectively, their perspectives on cognitive uncertainties (ignorance and indeterminacy), 
value incommensurability and complexity o f governance. All of these overlap, but they also 
point out different challenges to PTA procedures and institutions. As this idea captures a 
number of issues to be addressed in the case studies, I shall expand somewhat on it.
According to Pellizzoni many contemporary technological controversies are grounded in 
and characterised by what he and others term ‘radical uncertainty’, which challenges tradi­
tional conceptions o f scientific knowledge production, democracy and policy making. 
Radical uncertainty characterises “situations where not only the means but also the goals 
and structure of a problem are ill-defined” (Pellizzoni 2003b: 328). Radical uncertainty typi­
cally features in what have been termed ‘intractable controversies’ (Schon and Rein 1994), 
where different problem framings among the contestants mean that disagreements are 
practically unresolvable by means of argumentation or by recourse to empirical evidence, as 
“the parties in dispute tend to emphasize different facts, or give diem different interpreta­
tions, so that each party seeks to confute the empirical evidence adduced by the others. 
There is no consensus either on the relevant knowledge or on the principles at stake. Facts 
and values overlap.” (Pellizioni 2003b: 328). If one perceives PTA as “at the same time a 
new way of doing science and of democratically managing public matters” (Pellizzoni 
2003a: 203), then radical uncertainty raises a number of challenges.
From the perspective o f a constructionist sociology of science, the recognition that the dis­
tinction between facts and values is blurred in light of cognitive uncertainties potentially 
undermines the use o f  scientific knowledge as a commonly shared resource in technologi­
cal controversies. It sharpens the ambivalence surrounding the use o f scientific expertise in 
modern societies. O n the one hand, modem societies make themselves increasingly de­
pendent upon sophisticated science-based knowledge in countless contexts yet, on the 
other, confidence that science and scientific expertise can and will deliver the kind of com­
petence required in impartial and disinterested ways is in decline. This makes scientific ex­
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pertise’s role in PTA precarious, as it becomes difficult to discern when experts act as neu­
tral providers of cognitive resources and when they are better perceived as serving partisan 
interests.
From the perspective of social and political theory, PTA is often perceived as embodying 
the ideas and ideals of deliberative democracy, just as deliberative ideas are brought in to 
help ‘operationalise’ a perceived need for more dialogue. The deliberative ideals attempt to 
establish a normative alternative or complement to representative institutions by making 
the use of reasoned argument central to policy making. Central to deliberative ideals is that 
collective decisions should be reached only after an exchange of arguments that are non­
exclusive both thematically and socially, i.e. all those affected by decisions should have the 
opportunity" to contribute and no relevant viewpoints should be left unconsidered. As shall 
be discussed further below, many of the ideas about deliberative democracy are connected 
with the writings o f Habermas. For Habermas these ideals originate in a theory" of commu­
nicative rationality, which basically embodies a ‘unity of reason’ assumption, i.e. that cogni­
tive, normative and expressive/aesthetic disagreements can all in principle be settled 
through argumentation. Distortions in such ‘public* communication are primarily perceived 
as products of unequal distributions of resources and access to participation, which are (at 
least in principle) contingent. However, as Pellizzoni notes, many of the present techno­
logical controversies involving radical uncertainty appear to be characterised by incom­
mensurability, which means that conflicting interests are often superimposed with fundamen­
tally diverging value structures and worldviews (Pellizzoni 2003a: 208-09). Basically, this 
indicates that objectivity is positional (ibid: 210) and the idea of a ‘unity of reason* proves 
to be an assumption that does not adequately mirror empirical reality. If such incom­
mensurable worldviews are at the root o f technological controversies, it is not feasible to 
expect that they may be settled through argumentation even under ideal circumstances.35 
Nonetheless, deliberative ideals appear to be informing much o f the search for more inclu­
sive forms of policy-making in the science and technology domain (Elam and Bertilsson 
2003).
From the perspective of political science and the debates on governance, PTA is primarily 
looked upon as a means to manage complexity. In policy circles it is increasingly recognised 
that modem societies have become so complex that traditional hierarchical means of gov­
erning are no longer adequate. In domains such as risk regulation where market solutions 
are not tenable (either for cognitive or normative reasons) a growing delegation of regula­
tion to more or less self-governed networks can be observed. PTA can be seen as one em­
35 In such instances bargaining may be preferable also in a normative perspective, as it is more respectful o f 
difference in some circumstances. The recourse to bargaining can signal respect of the adversary, where de­
liberation in case o f incommensurability runs the risk of signalling a deficit o f  rationality to adversaries one 
does not agree with (Pellizzoni 2003a: 209). Bargaining or other non-argumentative means to settle disagree­
ments can also be considered rational, i.e. supported by reasons, if it can be shown that no discursive consen­
sus is possible due to incommensurable worldviews.
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bodiment of this trend, where different stakeholders in technological controversies are en­
couraged to cooperate in working out shared problem definitions and reaching solutions 
without the direct intervention o f central political institutions (governments and parlia­
ments), whose function is transformed into that of the ‘meta-regulator*, monitoring and 
supervising self-regulator)7 processes (e.g. Willke 1996)* In such cooperative forms a bal­
ance must be found between stakeholders’ strategic behaviour and the willingness to con­
sider general interests (Pellizzoni 2003a: 212). This perspective hints at two challenges for 
PTA. One is that network governance is a process based on cooperation between organisa­
tional actors, which potentially undermines democratic accountability, as the channels for 
manifesting popular discontent with performance of the involved organisations become 
fluid or unclear. Unclear accountability structures make maintenance of trust difficult. In 
addition to this, radical uncertainty7 can make it difficult for stakeholders to identify how 
their interests can best be pursued, and cooperative arrangements may be threatened by 
disintegration into (erratic) strategic behaviour (ibid.)
Pellizzoni argues that the discussions on PTA can be seen as a conglomerate o f perspec­
tives (of which the three I have just presented are the most important) and that the rise of 
‘radical uncertainty* poses challenges for all o f these. However, Pellizzoni also argues that 
the different perspectives contain pairs o f overlapping problématiques, which account for 
the mutual inspiration found between them in the discussions on PTA. For the sociology7 
of science and the analysis of governance, the question of how to deal with the problem of 
positional differences (how to foster cooperation between mutually incongruent problem 
definitions and worldviews) is an area o f common interest. For the deliberative democracy- 
perspective and the analysis of governance the challenge of fostering processes of collective 
learning provides another area o f shared interest. Finally, the sociology of science and de­
liberative democracy faces a common challenge in establishing when and how the knowl­
edge o f different groups and organisations should be considered as equal and equally im­
portant and when some can legitimately claim superiority7, that is what weight should be 
given to arguments and viewpoints of, respectively, lay people, stakeholders and scientists 
in what circumstances.
The overlaps between the different sources o f the debates on PTA and their internal ten­
sions due to challenges from radical uncertainty are illustrated in the following figure.
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In my opinion this provides a useful overview of the different problem complexes and 
their interaction from which the calls for public participation and deliberation on the regu­
lation of science and technology spring, as well as some of the challenges such procedures 
are faced with. In the following I shall go into more depth on some of the arguments and 
concepts drawn upon and developed in the debates about such procedures, and look at 
how their protagonists foresee them in practice.
N ew  M odes o f Knowledge Production -  and the Role of 'the 
Public'
As mentioned above, a significant motive behind the calls for increased public involvement 
with science and technolog}' policy making rests on the diagnosis that due to evolving 
problems with risks, scientific knowledge production and policy advice are undergoing sig-
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nificant transformations both in terms of cognitive content and social organisation.36 Some 
of these diagnoses and claims shall be introduced in more detail here. In the literature in­
spiring many of the calls for and analyses o f participatory procedures, two strands of argu­
ments can be made out. Both are occupied with the relationship between the production 
and validation o f  knowledge and the regulation of technology, but place different emphases 
on social configurations. The first set of arguments is concerned with the general transfor­
mation o f scientific knowledge production in western societies, which has entailed new 
quality measures and social mechanisms to ensure the quality of knowledge. This allegedly 
impinges on the use of knowledge in the social regulation of controversial technologies in 
important ways. The second set of arguments is more concerned with ‘other’ forms of 
knowledge, partly how and why they are different from scientific knowledge, and partly 
how these are worthy, and could and should be incorporated into decision-making (i.e. they 
are considered not as a residual category o f imperfectly understood scientific knowledge, 
but as a creative and valuable resource in their own right).
I shall first discuss two concepts suggesting a transformation in the production and valida­
tion of knowledge, which have been quite influential in recent discussions. The first is 
called post-normal science, and the second Mode2 knowledge production. Each highlight slightly 
different aspects o f alleged changed configurations in the science/society interface.
Some o f the claims put forward by the authors arc fairly bold:
'Whereas science was preciously understood as steadily advancing in the certainty of our knowledge 
and control of the natural world, now science is seen as coping nith many uncertainties in policy is­
sues of risk and the environment. In response, new styles of scientific activity are being developed. The 
reductionist, analytical worldmew which divides systems into ever smaller elements, studied ky ever 
more esoteric specialism, is bang replaced by a systemic\ synthetic and humanistic approach. The old 
dichotomies of facts and values, and of knowledge and ignorance, are being transcended. ”
(Funtowicz & Ravetz 1993: 739).
So far, the empirical substantiation of these claims must be considered as sparse (e.g. 
Weingart 1997). However, there are three reasons why I think they are worth discussing in 
some detail in this context. 1) Biotechnology is one of die areas in which the authors of 
these arguments claim a particular validity for their observations; 2) This way of thinking 
informs at least some of the initiatives o f participatory procedures to be investigated; 3)
36 The management o f  technological risks is not the only factor driving these alleged changes. For instance 
the commercialisation o f  research is also a significant trait Here, however, I focus on the effects arising from 
the management o f  risk and uncertainty
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The ideas and concepts seem to be increasingly embraced by policy makers and promoters 
of technology.37
According to Funtowicz and Ravetz, the concept of post-normal science is an attempt to 
devise an extended quality measure for scientific policy advice in conditions where “facts 
are uncertain, values in dispute, stakes high and decisions urgent” (Funtowicz & Ravetz 
1993: 744). In such situations the quality of knowledge cannot be evaluated according to 
usual scientific standards. The quality o f knowledge becomes a pragmatic relation where 
many aspects (environmental, social, ethical) must be taken into consideration in order to 
evaluate whether knowledge is adequate in a given situation.
The concept o f post-normal science is part of a larger classification of expertise. Funtowicz 
and Ravetz use two attributes to describe situations where expertise is required for policy 
making: system uncertainties and decision stakes. System uncertainties have to do with the 
ability to understand, predict and manage a complex reality beyond scientific laboratories, 
while decision stakes have to do with “the various costs, benefits, and value commitments 
that are involved in the issues through the various stakeholders” (Funtowicz & Ravetz 
1993: 744). The attributes are heuristics used both to classify various problems requiring 
expert knowledge or scientific advice, and to differentiate between three different types of 
knowledge-producing activities aimed at providing such policy advice: applied science, ex­
pert consultancy and post-normal science. Where both attributes are relatively low, applied 
science is an adequate tool to solve problems, but as either one or both attributes increases 
there is a move from applied science towards expert consultancy and then to post-normal 
science. This is illustrated graphically in the following way:
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37 For instance, the concepts o f ‘extented peer review’ and ‘socially robust knowledge’ introduced in these 
writings are both present in the EU Commission’s White Paper on ‘Democratising expertise*, which advo­
cates a substantial revision o f the use o f  expert advice in policy-making on the EU level and its associated 
mechanisms o f accountability (Liberatore 2001).
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The authors also employ the category o f ‘core science’ in opposition to post-normal sci­
ence. ‘Core science* refers to traditional academic ‘puzzle solving* for the sake of establish­
ing (new) knowledge of the workings o f nature without external ends. One can say that it is 
purely ‘curiosity driven*. According to Funtowicz and Ravetz, this normal science work is 
carried out on well-dehned sets of problems and is evaluated in closed communities o f 
practitioners who have the exclusive esoteric expertise to establish measures of quality.
This type of science has, according to the authors, been successful to the extent that it has 
excluded other types of knowledge in societal decision making. However, the success was 
established by ignoring uncertainty in both knowledge and values, and their explanation of 
the emergence of post normal science is that: “Now that the polity issues of risk and the 
environment present the most urgent problems for science, uncertainty and quality are 
moving in from the periphery, ... , of scientific methodology, to become the central inte­
grating concepts.” (Funtowicz & Ravetz 1993: 742). The theories and methodologies of 
‘core science* are used in applied science in order to solve practical, (not epistemological) 
problems on a level where both uncertainties and value-issues can be managed on a rou­
tine, technical level, i.e. when knowledge is required to solve a given problem that is man­
ageable and uncontroversial. Hence they call applied science ‘mission oriented’ (Funtowicz 
& Ravetz 1993: 740). Professional consultancy entails problems with both higher degrees 
of complexity and higher decision stakes, for instance the incorporation of error costs into 
decisions, or the readiness to deal with surprises. In addition to mastering scientific tools, 
professional consultancy requires experience and another type o f analytical skills. These 
skills are often put at the disposal of a client, and Funtowicz and Ravetz hence label this 
type o f activity as ‘client-serving*. (Funtowicz & Ravetz 1993: 740). The activity o f post­
normal science is labelled as ‘issue-driven’, since it consists neither of practical assignments 
nor advanced problem-solving for clients, but rather o f the urgent issues facing communi­
ties or societies as such.
Paradigmatic examples of problems that belong in the domain o f post-normal science arc 
environmental problems like ozone depletion or the greenhouse effect, but other more ‘lo­
calised’ environmental problems, like the storage of nuclear waste or the release of GMOs, 
also belong in this category of problems.
The label post-normal science is derived from a discussion of Kuhn’s concept of normal 
science as puzzle solving, the central suggestion of this discussion being such puzzle solv­
ing is no longer adequate for facing the risk problems which “have to a large extent been 
created by the practice of normal, puzzle-solving science and technology.” (Funtowicz & 
Ravetz 1992: 268). The basic suggestion is, hence, that a new type of problems with struc­
tural features that make traditional problem solving inadequate have emerged. A basic 
problem in situations where system uncertainties are high and values are disputed is that 
scientific knowledge and advice Ís never uncontroversial. Scientific knowledge and facts can
60
never resolve policy conflicts, but they are likely to act as a resource that can be drawn 
upon in such conflicts.
Problems inducing post-normal science are therefore problems where the established 
sources of knowledge cannot deliver solutions that are satisfactory to all stakeholders. For 
this reason, the stakeholders must occupy a more prominent place in the evaluation and 
quality assurance o f knowledge rather than just being passive recipients of the outcomes of 
scientific inquiry and disputes. Funtowicz and Ravetz hence claim that post normal science 
is characterised by an ‘extented peer review* potentially including all stakeholders in the is­
sue and “comprising a dialogue among all the stakeholders in a problem, regardless o f their 
formal qualifications or affiliations’* (Funtowicz & Ravetz 1992: 254). In addition, what the 
authors label as ‘extended facts’ need to be taken into consideration in making decisions. 
‘Extended facts’ means data and knowledge that is not necessarily gathered according to 
scientific practices, and includes anecdotal evidence and ‘community generated statistics’ 
(ibid). This in turn can facilitate a ‘démocratisation of science’, “not in the sense in the 
sense of turning over the research labs to untrained persons, but rather bringing this rele­
vant part of science into the public debate along with all the other issues affecting our soci­
ety.” (ibid).
Just like ‘normal science’, post-normal science has ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ (ibid: 269). 
However, where normal science is shielded from external influences in the sense that it de­
fines what relevant problems to investigate are and only peers are considered as able to 
judge the value of a disciplinary contribution, post-normal science is characterised by the 
fact that when traditional science cannot deliver adequate solutions to pressing problems, 
‘outsiders’ are involved both in setting the research agenda and evaluating the outcomes.
Funtowicz and Ravetz are not entirely explicit about when their analysis is diagnostic and 
when it is prescriptive. Nor is it clear how this type of post-normal science can be or is in­
stitutionally anchored. However, it is exactly this kind of more interactive form of knowl­
edge that the pleas for increased public involvement often aim to embody.
The authors are, however, keen on stressing that post-normal science is indeed a type of 
science and not ‘merely politics or public participation’ -  it is a form of problem solving 
that is appropriate to the needs of the present (Funtowicz & Ravetz 1993: 750). They go on 
to claim that the “extension o f the peer community is .. .not merely an ethical or political 
act; it can positively enrich the processes of scientific investigation.” (ibid: 753). In this 
sense it is meant to constitute a to complement academic and applied science and profes­
sional consultancy, not substituting them. However, it seems unclear exactly by what means 
of communicative mechanisms or organisational frameworks these processes are meant to 
take place, let alone whether they will in fact deliver solutions that are more satisfying to all 
stakeholders and will mitigate controversy. This will in part be explored in the case studies, 
which arguably fulfil at least som of these characteristics.
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In tvvo books and a number of articles, Nowotny, Scott, Gibbons and colleagues present an 
argument not too dissimilar from Funtowicz and Ravetz in which they claim a fundamental 
change in (scientific) knowledge production in contemporary society. (Gibbons et ah 1994; 
Gibbons 1999; Nowotny 2000; Nowotny et al. 2001; Nowotny 2001). They summarise a 
broad range o f tendencies in the phrase Mode 2 science or Mode 2 knowledge production, which 
aims to describe something new and different as compared to traditional, disciplinary scien­
tific activity, termed Mode 1. The main thrust of the argument is based on the claim that an 
increasing contextuaHsation of knowledge production is taking place. This contextualisation in 
turn induces changes in quality measures and institutional arrangements surrounding the 
production o f knowledge, but is also claimed to affect the ‘epistemological core’ o f scien­
tific activity (e.g. Gibbons 1999: c82). Unfortunately, the authors do not present a clear 
definition of what Mode 2 is, presumably because the concept is meant to cover a whole 
range o f phenomena. In their 1994 book The New Production of Knowledge (Gibbons et 
al. 1994) the authors claim that Mode 2 is . .transdisciplinary. It is characterised by a con­
stant flow back and forth between the fundamental and the applied, between the theoreti­
cal and the practical.. it is .. characterised by a shift away from the search for funda­
mental principles towards modes of inquiry oriented towards contextualised results.” (ibid: 
19). It is not entirely clear to what extent Mode 2 will replace traditional scientific activity, 
or whether the two can coexist, but the authors seems to imply that even traditional knowl­
edge producing institutions, notably universities, cannot avoid being affected in their social 
organisation by the changes, even if impact varies from field to field. At one point it is 
claimed tha t “Mode 1 knowledge production lives on.” (Nowotny et al. 2001: 54). At an­
other place it is suggested that Mode 1 will disappear into Mode 2 (Gibbons et al. 1994: 
154).
In their 2001 book, they extend their argument to the claim that the transition to Mode 2 
science is part o f a larger societal transformation to a Mode 2 society. Mode 2 society is char­
acterised by a move “beyond the categorizations of modernity into discrete domains such 
as politics, culture, the market — and, o f course, science and society; and, consequently, that 
under Mode 2 conditions, science and society have become transgressive arenas, co- 
mingling and subject to the same co-evolutionary trends.” (Nowotny et al. 2001: 4). These 
are rather bold claims and cannot be discussed at length here. However, what I find inter­
esting and relevant for my research is their discussion of the ‘social accountability7’ and ‘so­
cially robust knowledge’, recurring themes in their writings. That knowledge is socially ro­
bust means that it fulfils requirements other than the standard ‘truth’ or ‘objectivity7’ de­
mands o f traditional disciplinary research. Knowledge has to be valid, that is applicable, in 
situations where social, political and ethical issues are at stake and dependent upon the ap­
plication o f knowledge. In a short formula they present this as a historical shift in the sense 
that for most o f its history science as an institution has been ‘speaking to society’ and pro­
viding knowledge — even dominating our ways of knowing to a monopolistic degree
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(Nowotny et al.: 50-51) -  but now society ‘speaks back to science’. According to the pro­
ponents of the Mode 2 concept, this ‘speaking back’ does not only consist in demands for 
the profitability of research, but also in demands of a broader social character. Hence they 
claim that ‘science moves into the agord (ibid: chap. 13).
The agora is adopted from its Greek meaning of a public space in a city state that is “popu­
lated by a diversity o f individuals who combine the roles o f ‘citizen’ and ‘consumer’, while 
at the institutional level typically markets and politics set the rules within which this cease­
less process o f negotiation and re-negotiation takes place” (Ibid: 206). “Although the agora 
is a structured space, it is wrong to attempt to subdivide it again into sectors like markets, 
politics or media. ... As a public space, the agora is shaped by the interaction of its ac­
tors/agents. Some are more visible, easier to identify and recognize and more powerful that 
others. But the agora is also a space in which different perspectives are brought together, 
ultimately creating different visions, values and options.” (ibid: 209-10).
A further reason for paying attention to these discussions is that also these authors claim 
that the processes they describe have special validity for newer problem fields such as envi­
ronmental protection, information technologies and biotechnology. Especially in biotech­
nology, research seems to an increasing degree to take place in ‘contexts of application’ 
where the knowledge production is an iterative process between what is technically possi­
ble and what is theoretically understood (and socially viable), rather than a linear process 
moving from basic theoretical insights to the ability to purposively manipulate entities in 
order to produce manageable technologies. Therefore the authors claim that biotechnology 
is particularly in need of processes o f socially robust knowledge production and especially 
pertinent to various forms of popular influence. Hence, the field of biotechnolog}' should 
be a good place to study whether some of these claims can be empirically substantiated. 
Furthermore, one of the conclusions the authors draw is that “ (i)f expertise is becoming 
socially widely distributed and transgressive, trust becomes an even more scarce and pre­
cious resource” (Nowotny et al.: 261), which is very much in line with what this thesis in­
tends to investigate.
The writings on Mode 2 are not empirically well-substantiated, and it is in my opinion 
therefore difficult to distinguish between ‘diagnoses’ of current occurrences and trends, and 
normative prescriptions. Nor, I will argue, is it clear from their writing how the processes 
of social quality assessment they envision are turned into concrete practice.38 Nonetheless, 
this kind of thinking is often referred to in the discussions of increased public involvement.
38 To the extent they claim that they are describing already existing social processes, they provide very few 
specific examples and no operational guidance as to what criteria should be fulfilled before a ‘mode 2 verdict’ 
is justified.
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A slightly different perspective underpinning the calls for increased involvement o f the 
public, also preoccupied with the quality of knowledge underpinning policy making and 
risk management, concerns the status o f  lay knowledge as compared to formalised scien­
tific knowledge and the interaction between the two types o f knowledge. An influential 
proponent o f  this approach is Brian Wynne, on whose writings I will base the discussion 
(similar arguments can be found in Fischer 2000, Sclove 1995).
Reoccurring themes in the writings o f  Wynne are critiques of, on the one hand, the reliance 
of policy making and risk managing institutions on scientific knowledge in ways that in re­
ality denies o r excludes uncertainties inherent in all knowledge production and, on the 
other, the tendencies of these same institutions to misread the concerns of the public, 
which underlie a number of technological controversies (cf. the discussion in Chapter I). 
These misperceptions of the public mean that lay persons’ valuable knowledge is excluded 
from policy-making and risk assessments. This ‘scientification’ o f issues that in reality7 have 
significant normative and political components in turn aggravates controversies and causes 
mistrust in authorities and experts to proliferate rather mitigate.
In a number o f  publications Wynne has offset his argument in newer, constructionist stud­
ies in the sociology of science, advancing that the use of scientific knowledge by policy­
making institutions must be seen as a particular cultural form, which is often at odds with 
the cultural forms o f the people and communities into which such institutions intervene 
and are meant to protect -  yet the institutions do not realise this. According to Wynne 
technological controversies should not be seen as expressions o f confrontation between a 
{the) superior type of rationality and irrational fears, which consists of either distorted or 
poorly understood scientific knowledge of, for example, physical risks. Hence, when ‘ob­
jective’ scientific risk assessments are pitted against the ‘risk perceptions’ o f lay people and 
controversy arise, this, according to Wynne, does not just entail some battle o f scientific 
objectivity against ‘ways of life’, but should be considered as “cultural responses, to a cul­
tural form of intervention” (Wynne 1996: 67).39 It is the product o f different ways o f re­
sponding to uncertainties inherent in many aspects of social regulation, for instance o f 
GMOs.
“Whereas $ de nee typically responds to this diversity ofproblem-situations by attempting materially to 
reorganise the problem-setting into uniform, quasi-laboratory versions, and then applying standard­
ised andprecisely defined solutions\ ordinary lay knowledge usually eschews this moral stance or epis­
39 Wynne’s major empirical case is a study o f interaction between Cumbrian sheep farmers and scientific offi­
cials following the radioactive fall-out from Chernobyl. His interpretation is that this was basically a cultural 
conflict where the scientist’s scientific approach was unable to incorporate the local knowledge of the farmers 
on local geographical features and sheep husbandry. “Thefarmers assumed predictability to be intrinsically unreliable 
as an assumption, and therefore valued adaptability andflexibility, as a key part of their cultural identity and practical knowl­
edge. The scientific experts ignored or misunderstood the multidimensional complexity o f tins lay public's problem-domain, and 
thus made different assumptions about its controllability. In other words, the two knowledge-cultures expressed different assump­
tions about agency and control, and there were both empirical and normative dimensions to this." (Wynne 1996: 67).
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temology of control Instead it negotiates the probkm-definition at the same time as it negotiates the 
solution. ” (Wynne 1993: 326)
Wynne argues that scientific and science based institutions in charge of, again for instance, 
risk assessments of GMOs operate on and actively maintain assumptions that their knowl­
edge can effectively control and manage the uncertainties inherent in the technologies they 
seek to govern, and that they are at the same time unreflective about their interventions in 
social contexts beyond the validity o f laboratory knowledge. In the eyes of many members 
of the public — in light of their everyday life and historical experiences -  this does not seem 
credible. It is to the institutional aspects of risk management that lay people or ‘the public’ 
often respond in controversies, as much as the immediate cognitive context of risk assess­
ment. Therefore, Wynne argues, lay knowledge should not be understood as a somehow 
deficient version of scientific knowledge, but as a creative source of knowledge in its own 
right, which often entails valuable insights and experiences, especially about the ‘body lan­
guage’ of institutions.
“ƒ have attempted to argue, against predominant assumptions, that 'modem' science exhibits much 
less reflexive capacity to problematic its own founding commitments than is supposed.\ A t the same 
time... I have suggested that 'traditionalist* lay public enjoy a much greater capacity for such rejlex- 
itity in relation to science than is usually recognised. Scientific knowledge deployed in public invaria­
bly involves normative commitments and interventions which are part and parcel of the scientific dis­
course. Itfrequently incorporates and is shaped by implicit models of user-situations or social prac­
tices whose correspondence or not nith the empirical situations affects its validity and public legiti­
macy. Research and experience have shown that science is not well able to recognise and problematic 
these framing social assumptions, which can turn into prescriptions as the knowledge is deployed in 
practice. ’’(Wynne 1992: 334)
Wynne’s diagnosis is that much public scepticism, alienation and mistrust springs from the 
fact that authorities 1) despite plenty of historical experience will not acknowledge that un­
foreseen and unforeseeable events may occur, and 2) authorities have no answers to the 
questions about how to tackle such surprises should they arise (the BSE case being an ob­
vious example) (Wynne 2001a).
This leads the author to warn against what he sees as a tendency of institutions towards 
addressing, say, the controversies over GMOs as split into separate elements, one pertain­
ing to risk, of which the ‘real’ assessment can legitimately only belong in the hands of scien­
tific expertise, whereas lay people can legitimately be involved only as ‘moral compasses’ to 
consider deontological issues beyond the scientific domain. This denies lay people the pos­
sibility to bring their knowledge and experience to bear on central elements of their con­
cerns, namely the institutional handling of uncertainty7.
Just as Wynne argues that an institutionalised distinction between risk and ethics is unten­
able, so he claims that a strict distinction between experts and lay people is not tenable. So­
ciologists need to consider “the fluidity7, porosity7 and cons true ted ness of the boundaries
established between them” (Wynne 1996: 62), which to some extent can be seen as in line 
with the claims about post-normal science and Mode 2 knowledge production.40 Further­
more, his perspective makes it both instrumentally and normatively desirable that the pub­
lic be substantially involved in technology policy.
“In seeking the basis of more legitimate, less alienatingforms ofpublic knoniedge, and stable au­
thority out ofpresent conditions ofincoherence and disorientations, new constitutional norms of valid 
knowledge may be articulated,\ Necessary and legitimate involvement of Icy publics in this process nill 
also automatically involve them in negotiations, direct or indirect, of the intellectual contents of those 
new uniitrsals. ” (Wynne 1996: 78)
As such, the involvement of lay perspectives in policy formation is believed to help in 
countering the overtly reductionistic worldviews of technical expertise, which have alleg­
edly caused many o f  the risk problems modem societies are struggling with. It can also 
serve to facilitate dialogues that prevent the development of myths among decision-makers 
and regulators as analysed by Marris et al. (2001), and contribute substantive rationality to 
concrete problem solving for policy making bodies and risk assessors.
Although Wynne himself is rarely explicit about exactly how the envisioned forms o f social 
and institutional learning he is calling for could or should be organised on an operational 
level,41 the protagonists of such procedures often refer to Wynne and his colleagues to jus­
tify the necessity o f more public involvement, perhaps especially when arguing that lay 
people are in fact qualified to be actively engaged in complex technological matters and can 
provide important contributions and perspectives.
As the approaches reviewed in this section show, the diagnoses o f a changed tocus o f and 
social conditions for scientific knowledge production and use in policy-making are often 
paired with advocacy for a more ‘democratic’ governance of science and technology. None­
theless, these perspectives are not always particularly explicit on how their ideas and rec­
ommendations can be turned into concrete practices. However, in much of this advocacy 
an affinity to the ideas and procedural forms associated with deliberative democracy can be 
observed and diagnoses of the need for new modes of managing risk and uncertainties are
40 Although ^ must be noted that Wynne is not making a claim about a radical change in the social configura­
tion. Instead, he advocates a constructionist epistemology.
41 Sometimes Wynne expresses what appears to be astonishment that institutions do not simply learn from 
reading sociological analyses: ‘'This point about public responses and their supposed object has been made before, both about 
the nuclear issue and more generally, but it seems to be a difficult insight to digest especially in poliy circles. There has been 
twenty years or more o f research demolishing the self-destructivefallacy of tloe ‘objective risk versus perceived risk ' characterisation 
of the nuclear public conflict issues, which was assumed to describe Ox deep and irreconcilable gulf between institutionalised scien­
tific vies andpublic liens o f the issue. Yet despite this apparentfalsification, and despite repeated lip-service to its obsolescence, the 
same basic construction o f the public and its waps of reasoning ‘about risk can be seen to bate survived to shape dominantfram­
ing of tlx current controversies over GM crops andfood.” (Wynne 2001: 54).
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often combined with deliberative elements.42 This, I believe, is done in two ways. On the 
one hand the theory of deliberative democracy is used to give a philosophical basis to 
claims of mis-recognised rationality among non-experts as well as the exclusion of their 
values, which deserve greater attention for democratic reasons. On the other hand it is util­
ised to devise and assess the actual procedures through which such increased involvement 
of the public is meant to take place. In order to clarify this, I shall therefore try to explicate 
how this line o f thinking has also inspired the development of PTA procedures.
Participatory Technology Assessm ent as Deliberative Democracy
The emerging interest in (reshaping science and technology policy-making along more par­
ticipatory and discursive lines is clearly both a pragmatic and normatively grounded re­
sponse to the proliferation of a number of technological controversies. Public controver­
sies and debate on technology can of course be seen as an informal type of constantly on­
going technology assessment, where aims and means are exposed to collective deliberation. 
However, compared to this, organised TA, and especially PTA, can be interpreted as at­
tempts to formalise, institutionalise and from some perspectives also to domesticate con­
troversies over technologies as they are played out in the public sphere (Hennen 1994, 
1997).43 At least two purposes are aimed at in doing so. One is to qualify4 *7 the debates by 
structuring them and introducing scientific knowledge into them in a more systematic 
manner than can be achieved in ordinary debates in the public sphere. Another is to create 
organisational forms that will link public articulations o f concerns more directly to deci­
sion-making institutions in a proactive manner.
Some perspectives on PTA mimic a normative ideal of the public sphere by arguing for 
‘mini-public spheres’ based on the regulative standards underlying deliberative ideals of 
public debate (e.g. Drekke and Eriksen 1999). Therefore, I will first spell out some central 
traits of these ideals, and then consider how they are adapted to fit PTA procedures.
The public sphere as a normative concept has its roots deep in political philosophy. I low- 
ever, for contemporary discussions it seems that the concept was reinvigorated with the 
seminal work of Habermas Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit (1990 [1961]), where the concept 
was reconstructed from historical developments into a regulator}' ideal for public will for-
4- Elam and Bertilsson (2003) suggest that this may have to do with the fact that deliberative democratic ide­
als to some extent ‘mirror’ an idealised image o f  the scientific ethos, with its emphasis on reasoned argument
and openness to perpetual self-examination and collegial criticism. As such, deliberative procedures are per­
haps more acceptable to scientist met with expectations of more ‘responsiveness’, than other democratic 
models. Scientists feel more confident with that type of deliberation than with more adversarial forms o f pol­
icy formation. They are to some extent privileged in discursive arenas as they in a sense already operate in a 
cognitive and argumentative mode. Hence, in some respects the calls for more public involvement with sci­
ence tends to make politics more like science, rather than politicise science.
4J “Die unorganisierte offenttiefx Kontrorerse soil in mien die RationaUtatschancen erimbenden orgamsierten Diskurs iiforfnhrt 
werden. ’’(Ilcnnen 1997: 197, references ommitted).
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mation in the modem age. This idealised public sphere has ever since been central in the 
writings o f Habermas and has also been taken up by most theorists of deliberative democ­
racy as its locus. A centra] tenet here is that public deliberation serves to support democ­
ratic collective will formation, which goes beyond the mere aggregation of preference as 
envisioned in pluralist models o f democracy. The ideal does not reflect the empirical reality 
of contemporary mass mediated politics, but it goes some way in embodying certain ele­
ments o f the self-understanding of modem democracies. These ideals are for instance con­
stitutionally embodied in the freedom o f speech, a free press etc., and some observers note 
that modem societies are ideologically disposed to continually expand the possibilities for 
participation and deliberation (for a not uncritical review of this tendency in relation to 
technology see Bora 1999). In the Habermasian conception the public sphere is, further­
more, equipped with the function of serving as a connecting link between the life world of 
the citizens and the functional subsystems o f society (Habermas 1992). As such, communi­
cation in the public sphere is carried out by citizens who step out of their private sphere to 
debate matters o f  common interest with each other, with the purpose of exploring and 
forming a ‘public opinion’. This public opinion is something other than the aggregated 
preferences measured in opinion surveys, as it is characterised as being the product o f col­
lective deliberation, i.e. the use o f ‘public reason’. It is assumed that (under ideal circum­
stances) the arguing and exercise of reason in public will lead, on the one hand, to the for­
mation o f a collective will and identity, which can set goals for a community and, on the 
other, to more rational solutions to shared problems, as all viewpoints and interests are ex­
plored openly.
If a public sphere is to fulfil such purposes it must, according to Bernhard Peters, possess 
three basic characteristics: 1) equality and reciprocity, 2) openness and adequate capacity 
and 3) a discursive structure (Peters 1994: 46). Equality and reciprocity mean that in princi­
ple all citizens should have equal possibilities of bringing themes and argument into the 
public debate, they must be willing to listen to the arguments o f others and respond with 
arguments. Openness and adequate capacity refer to the principle that all themes may be 
made the object o f public debate and that all themes put on the public agenda must be 
dealt with adequately. Which themes are suitable for public debate cannot be decided a pri­
ori. This must be decided in the course o f public deliberation. In this way the public sphere 
can be sensitive to themes that the political or administrative systems alone may not per­
ceive and can hence contribute to identifying problems. Finally, a discursive structure 
means that public deliberation must be based on arguments supported by good reasons. 
They cannot be based on status, power, intimidation or manipulation. In turn, this also 
means that only arguments aiming at the common good can be used in public. The defence 
of private interests is illegitimate in public deliberation (unless, o f course, it is argued that 
private interests are facilitating the common good).
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Deliberation in the public sphere is furthermore characterised by being ‘lay communica­
tion’. It must take place in language, which is accessible and comprehensible to all compe­
tent citizens. It can draw support from expert knowledge, but when experts appear in the 
public sphere they must communicate in non-esoteric ways comprehensible to non-experts.
An important element in the deliberative democratic model is that the outcomes of the col­
lective deliberation, which takes place in an unstructured and unorganised manner, is sub­
sequently fed into decision making in more formalised forums. Thus, it will be able to in­
fluence the operations o f the functional subsystems o f society. It is not clear by what 
means such influence takes place (ibid: 48), but it is assumed that the political system is to 
some extent sensitive to the opinions expressed in the public sphere, and that the political 
system in turn can steer or at least condition the operations of other systems.
It is not difficult to see that existing public debates rarely live up to these ideals in the full 
sense. They are exposed to asymmetries with regard to visibility, influence and knowledge 
(ibid: 52). However, nor are the ideals completely without counterparts in reality, as they 
reflect at least a conception of how public debate ought to function, which can be alluded to 
in the debate itself and serve as a self-correcting function.
From a public sphere perspective technological controversies can be considered as ongoing 
collective deliberations about how technology ought to be managed (Henncn 1994). This 
of course invites considerations of the quality of such debates and their ability to influence 
technological trajectories and regulatory principles and practices in general (Bcchmann 
1997). This is a challenging task and the aim here is to explore and explicate how such ide­
als have been appropriated and adapted in the search for technology assessment tools ca­
pable of mitigating such controversies.
When broader sociological and theoretical considerations occur in the discussions on par­
ticipatory and deliberative procedures in the science and technology domain, references are 
often made to Habermas, and such procedures can be understood as attempts to transform 
the Habcrmasian idealised speech situation and the workings o f an idealised public sphere 
into real communicative processes in order to formalise and rationalise technological con­
troversies (see e.g. the volume edited by FCoberle et al. 1997).
The Habermasian inspiration is for instance strong in a much quoted book edited by Renn 
et. al. (1995). They define public participation as “ ... forums for exchange that are organ­
ised for the purpose of facilitating communication between government, citizens, stake­
holders and interest groups, and businesses regarding a specific decision or problem.” (ibid: 
2). To call such procedures discursive implies “equality among the participants, peer review 
as a means for verifying understandings (i.e. holding knowledge claims up to public scru­
tiny), and an orientation towards resolving conflicts in consensual rather than adversarial 
ways.” (ibid: 3). This summarises important elements of the discourses on PTA well.
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As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, there are very few purely normative or 
purely functional arguments in favour o f increased public involvement Nonetheless, there 
is perhaps a certain tendency within normative arguments in favour of increased participa­
tion and deliberation to consider broader inclusion as desirable in itself, because ‘more’ 
democracy is per se better than "less’ democracy. As such, calls for increased participation 
and deliberation in the technological domain are part o f a general participatory semantic 
characterizing modem societies (Bora 1999: Chap 1). However, as the point of PTA is to 
do away with technocratic dominance in the governance of science and technology, but 
obviously not to neglect the cognitive contributions o f scientists, such procedures can be 
seen as exposed to a tension between competence and fairness. According to Renn et al. 
the Habermasian theoretical programme can be used to devise PTA procedures that fulfil 
the requirements for both competence and fairness, as it is founded on an intrinsic relation 
between rationality and social justice. Given appropriate organisational forms, inclusion is 
assumed to lead at the same time to ‘better* (i.e. more comprehensively rational) and more 
just (i.e. considering the interests of all concerned) solutions to (decision) problems.
From the perspective of deliberative democracy discursive procedures are primarily seen as 
a means to explicate value differences and explore where common ground can be found 
without neglecting empirical knowledge. In the Habermasian version this often entails 
communicative processes working from concrete problems towards abstract and general 
principles that can be commonly accepted, in other versions by searching for and specify­
ing ‘local solutions’ acceptable to the affected and involved parties (Pellezzoni 2003a, 
2003b). Central here is the assumed ability of deliberation to bring out (hidden) value as­
sumptions in what is otherwise seen as neutral expert knowledge and expose such norma­
tive assumptions to collective evaluations.
Another central argument in favour such procedures is their alleged ability to rationalise 
technological controversies.
“Aîehr oder mnig deutlich uird mit dem Rekurs anfden Diskttrsbegriff aber anch ein Anspmcb 
formnliert, der bis her eherimplisjt im Zttsammenhang mitpartisÿpativen l 'etfahwi der Technik- 
folgen-Abscbat^tng erhoben mtrde: Diegesellschaftliche Ameinandersetegmg iiber Technik soil “ra­
tional” gestalt et, Kontroversen fiber Technik solkn “versachlicht” b îv. ibre Interessenhaftigkeit ent- 
kleidet werden. l  'on einer “diskursiven ” T A  emartet man im ldealfall die Efgjelnng von Konsens 
in bishernmstrittenen Fragen ditrch VerpJIichtnng derBeteiligten auf “argumentative”, “sachlicbe” 
Aitseinandersetymg. ”. (Hennen 1994: 455)
In short, justification by means o f reasoned argument is meant to substitute professional 
status or political power as descisive for decision-making. This rationalisation is assumed to 
stem from a communicative rationality7, where not only cognitive (technical) but also nor­
mative and expressive/aesthetic viewpoints can be considered. As mentioned, the norma­
tive ideals of the public sphere are often mimicked in the set up o f such procedures. This
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of course poses some challenges and as will become clear from the case studies the ideals 
can be embodied and operationalised in quite different manners.
While the ideal public sphere is ‘unlimited’ in both social, substantive and temporal terms, 
meaning that everybody is allowed to participate, everything can be made an object of de­
liberation and deliberation can in principle go on indefinitely, TA procedures as organised 
discourses are obviously limited and situated in all three dimensions. Before procedures 
even get going decisions must be made about how participation is to be regulated, the top­
ics to be included and excluded from consideration, and the time frame of the deliberation. 
In the social dimension this of course primarily raises issues about who is suitable to repre­
sent whom, in the substantive dimension about what the relevant issues and knowledge to 
be considered are and in the temporal dimension when deliberation can be terminated and 
decisions made (see for example the volume edited by Joss and Bellucci (2002) on the mul­
titude of ‘design choices’ to be made in organising PTA procedures).
So far I have tried to illustrate what I see as two distinct (but not mutually exclusive) 
strands o f thought underpinning the arguments in favour of the development of PTA pro­
cedures. The first strand can be said primarily to focus on how increased participation and 
deliberation can allegedly improve the management of risk and uncertainties in ways that 
will find public acceptance. The second focuses more on how to expand political inclusion 
in order to improve the social rationality guiding technological development by seeking a 
consensual value base for collective decisions. However, among policy makers and TA 
practitioners more pragmatic considerations also come into play, which, though obviously 
not devoid of normative content, tend to be driven by more functional and instrumental 
considerations. This is more or less identical to the third problem complex in Pellizzoni’s 
model and has to do with managing complexity. Although the difterent aspects are inter­
woven, the focus in the more instrumental approaches does not put as much emphasis on 
‘democratising technology’ as on mitigating conflicts and creating public acceptance. As 
such, it can actually be seen as compatible with more elitist conceptions of democracy (We- 
blerand Renn 1995: 23).
From a sociological perspective it can be argued that technological controversies and ‘resis­
tance’ to new technologies should not necessarily be considered dysfunctional as they can 
potentially induce social and institutional learning as well as influence technological trajec­
tories in desirable ways (Bauer 1995). Nevertheless, such controversies are mostly seen as 
undesirable by the institutions and organisations introducing and regulating technologies, as 
they tend (at least in the short run) to create rather than do away with complexity.
From this more pragmatic perspective the purpose of technology assessment in general and 
PTA in particular is to mitigate such controversies. Therefore, PTA is perceived to serve a 
dual function. On the one hand, it serves as an early warning system identifying in advance
7 1
potential controversial aspects of technological trends in the making,44 On the other hand, 
it creates forums that can facilitate dialogue between citizens and decision-makers and 
regulators with the aim of informing the latter and regaining or maintaining the trust of the 
former. As such, PTA procedures can be seen as instruments for gathering ‘social intelli­
gence’ and displaying competence. From this perspective the cognitive monopoly of scien­
tific expertise is not (necessarily) questioned as in some o f the other perspectives discussed 
above, but it is acknowledged that expert excellence is not in itself sufficient to maintain 
public confidence and hence acceptance o f new technologies. In such pragmatic arguments 
the point is often made that more dialogical interactions between experts/regulators is a 
necessary condition for (re)establishing public trusty although it is rarely explained what is 
understood by ‘trust’ apart from the absence o f controversy.
These alleged effects are of course recognised by the more normatively oriented propo­
nents of PTA (and undoubtedly used to promote such procedures). However, more ‘de­
mocratically minded’ writers warn that if PTA is organised primarily or solely for ‘therapeu­
tic’ purposes, i.e. in the hope of creating acceptance for decisions either already made or to 
be made elsewhere, then such procedures may in reality lead to disappointments and disil­
lusionment among the participants and the wider public. This may in fact prove counter­
productive (e.g. Wynne 2001a).
Organisational Aspects of Participatory Technology Assessm ent 
Procedures
When it comes to putting ideas into practices — what I have termed the ‘operationalisation’ 
of the public — a broad spectrum of organisational forms have been suggested and experi­
mented with. A central distinction in application is one between ‘public’ and ‘stakeholder’ 
PTAs (Bellucci et al. 2002, Pellizzoni 2003a). Tublic’ PTAs are procedures where the in­
volvement of ‘unorganised’ lay citizens without any immediate interests in the technology is 
central in order to probe into their perspectives, values and evaluations. These are then 
(ideally) fed into decision-making. Such lay people are most often considered eligible for 
participation as members or representatives o f ‘the public’, i.e. as political subjects. Al­
though authors such as Wynne argue that lay people often possess cognitive knowledge, 
perhaps o f a ‘localised’ nature, that can in itself be valuable for decision-making, the par­
ticipation o f citizens is usually considered as important because of their ‘normative compe­
tence’. ‘Stakeholder’ PTAs, on the other hand, primarily involve organised actors who are 
brought together in an attempt to make them deliberate, that is to collectively explore a 
given issue in order to provide ‘rational’ solutions, rather than just to bargain. The entitle-
44 An example of this is the multitude o f social scientific research programmes launched with focus a on 
nano-technology in several European countries and at the EU level. These are often framed as an attempt to 
avoid the kind o f ‘stigmatisation1 biotechnology has experience by proactively assessing potential social im­
pacts and stimulating public debate — on a set o f technologies that practically do not yet exist.
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ment to participate in stakeholder PTA procedures can be based on a number of qualities, 
such as representation of citizens' concerns, economic interest, (special) cognitive compe­
tences, particular exposure to the consequences of decision-making etc., which are gener­
ally considered as links to ‘civil society'. Pellizzoni (2003a) describes some of the differ­
ences between the two types o f PTA and discusses some of the challenges they face that 
may render them vulnerable to criticism. These, however, take different forms in the two 
types of PTA.
As lay people being asked to deal with complex technological matters will usually need 
some kind of expert information, the framing of both the problems to be evaluated and the 
knowledge to be applied is obviously important. There is, in short, a danger of selective 
information or outright manipulation of lay people by experts.
It is clearly important for both the democratic and ‘therapeutic' effects of PTA procedures 
that the products of lay people’s deliberations are ensured some kind of impact on deci­
sion-making centres, whether lay people are made active participants in decisions (as in 
some more local controversies) or expected to act as policy advisors.
The fact that public involvement is often argued as a means to remedy deficiencies in exist­
ing representative democratic institutions does not mean that they can avoid the issue o f 
how to establish representativity. In procedures with lay involvement it is necessary to de­
cide what the relevant constituency actually is -  an issue, which is often central to the con­
troversy to be addressed. Furthermore, this also depends on the specific understanding o f 
the purpose of participation. Are participants to be selected “as representatives for others 
with similar characteristics, interests and values or as citizens who, whilst reflecting on their 
own values and experiences, are also open to the possibility of transformation in light of 
their reflections and deliberations with other participants?" (Smith and Wales 2000: 57 
(quoted from Pellizzoni 2003a)).
For stakeholder PTAs other issues arise. Here the risk of manipulation by experts is less 
pronounced as stakeholders often command cognitive resources and are aware of the con­
flicting problem framings at stake. However, questions arise as to whether there are (suffi­
ciently strong) organised interest groups to maintain the interests and argue from the per­
spective of all the groups whose interests and viewpoints should legitimately be considered 
in the given case (including vulnerable groups without the capacity to organise, e.g. people 
with illnesses, future generations etc.). Complementary to this is the question o f whether 
organisations develop oligarchic tendencies, where they seek to maintain the interests of 
the organisation rather than the interests o f the members. In organisational terms this also 
raises issues about whether participants have sufficiently strong contacts with and com­
mand over their constituencies to make outcomes of deliberation acceptable to members 
and constituencies. The latter may not have followed the learning processes aimed at in the 
PTAs, which raises the question o f whether the legitimatory effects expected from PTAs 
will in fact ‘trickle downwards*.
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In order to achieve the expected gains of (social) rationality and creativity from deliberation 
a certain willingness to ‘virtualise’ viewpoints and interests is required of the participants. 
Stakeholder PTAs are therefore faced with the dilemma that the closer the procedures are 
to important decision-making, the greater the tendency for strategic rather than discursive 
behaviour, and PTAs will be difficult to differentiate from corporatist bargaining.
Pellizzoni summarises the main characteristics o f the two types o f  PTA and their respective 
central challenges in the following table:
Type of PTA Type o f legitima­
tion
Major issues Emerging tension Consequences of 
uncertainty
Public PTA normative compe­
tence (values)
political citizenship














finte rest, knowl- 
edge)
civil citizenship
visibility o f posi­
tions










Source: Pellizzoni 2003a: 202
A further distinction central in the operationalisation of PTA procedures is whether they 
are problem-induced or technology-induced. In problem-induced TAs the starting point is the ob­
servation of a societal or environmental problem, which (may) gives rise to a search for 
technical solutions. In technology-induced TAs the starting point is usually the emergence 
of a new technology or application, whose effects and/or acceptability are then assessed. 
There appears to be a (normative) preference in the theoretical writings on TA for prob­
lem-induced approaches, as they in principle allow for the assessment o f a wider spectrum 
of possible solutions to a given societal need. However, in practice TA procedures are al­
most exclusively technology-induced. This is so partly because o f ‘cognitive economy’. 
Considering a number of equivalent solutions in economic, social, technical and ethical 
terms is often not feasible, especially if competing technological paradigms are at different 
stages of development. O r it can partly be seen as a structural feature o f the role of tech­
nology assessment in liberal societies. TAs are meant to mitigate the adverse effects of 
echnological developments, but there is often little political support to establish a broad 
political) steering of research and innovation. Therefore, there is rarely an interest in ques- 
ioning all the dispositions inherent in a given technological paradigm by evaluating (all of 
ts) potential functional equivalents.
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Just as the social configuration and the substantive framing of the topics to be covered in 
PTAs can vary significantly, so can the temporal location’ of PTA procedures along a 
technological trajectory. In the conceptual discussions on TA and PTA the CoIIingridge 
dilemma features as a prominent temporal problem (e.g. Ropohl 1996: 231). The dilemma 
explicates that in the early phase when a technological paradigm can be significantly influ­
enced, little is known about its physical and social impacts, but at later stages when more 
knowledge and experience is available, things are proportionately more difficult to change 
because of invested resources and implemented solutions. This is o f course recognised by 
the proponents o f PTA and it is argued that ‘the public’ should be involved in and encour­
aged to deliberate technological innovation as soon as possible. This, however, may not be 
a stage where issues are controversial and it may be difficult to activate and mobilise people 
in a meaningful way. This is of course closely related to social and substantive dimensions, 
and a tendency can be seen for stakeholder procedures to be more prominent in later 
stages where the problem-contexts are more structured and interest positions are marked 
more clearly. Public PTAs seem more adequate for selecting a value base when faced with 
the choice between different potential technological trajectories.
This chapter has introduced a series of analytical and normative modes of observation, 
which have in recent years been suggested as solutions to technological controversies, in­
cluding those raised by the new biotechnologies. I contend that these discourses o f partici­
pation and deliberation have influenced the modes of operation o f the institutions and or­
ganisations responsible for dealing with technological controversies. Subsequently, I shall 
use the discussions o f this chapter to devise a framework for analysing and comparing my 
cases as empirical manifestations o f such procedures. However, prior to addressing the 
empirical work, I shall attempt in the next chapter to dig deeper into the sociological theo­





Theoretical Explorations of Risk, Trust and 
Participation in a Functionally Differentiated 
Society
If one assumes that the kinds of controversies over new technologies and the various ways 
to confront such controversies discussed in the previous chapters are not incidental occur­
rences in modem society, then a sociological inquiry must ask how they arc related to and 
grounded in more general features of society. This thesis is based on the assumption that 
its object of investigation -  institutional responses to technological controversies that opt 
for increased public involvement -  are contingent on a number of factors but are not ran­
dom occurrences. It is assumed that such processes are grounded in and conditioned by 
certain significant traits of modem society. The purpose of this chapter is to explore and 
discuss what these features are and how sociological theorising can be utilised to explore 
the empirical phenomena.
The chapter will therefore entail an excursion into more abstract theorising, which should 
serve several purposes. It will specify the research problem of the thesis through a certain 
strand of development in general sociological theory and a specific understanding of the 
structure and dynamics of modern society. It will discuss the ontological and epistemologi­
cal assumptions underpinning this theorising, which will in turn inform the empirical analy­
ses. Furthermore, it will seek to develop a deeper understanding of concepts that are seen 
as central in contemporary technological controversies, such as risk, trust, protest, and par­
ticipation, by linking them to the more general theoretical framework. This will allow me to 
develop a theoretically grounded ‘guide’ for the empirical investigation.
When opting for an approach like the one suggested here, where the empirical study is 
based on theoretical reflections on the structures and dynamics of modem society in gen­
eral, one is of course faced with the problem of how to choose between the host of com­
peting theoretical approaches available from contemporary discussions in social theory. As 
there is no generally acknowledged meta-criteria for choosing between theories, it will, to 
some extent, inevitably be guided by the researcher’s interest, existing knowledge and pref­
erences. This is the case here, and in the following I shall explore in particular the systerns 
theory of Niklas Luhmann and its relevance for my topic/5 45
45 As such, the thesis will also serve as an exploration of the feasibility of applying this theoretical paradigm in 
this particular field o f empirical research, where it — to my knowledge -  has not, so far been widely applied 
(see, however, Bora 1999 for one notable exception).
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Luhmann’s theory and the work it has inspired is in my opinion one o f the most sophisti­
cated and challenging attempts to develop a general framework of contemporary sociologi­
cal theory. As such, it presents some quite general observations on what I perceive to be 
central features of modem societies. It has a conceptual innovativeness, which I believe 
leads to some valuable insights. These obserrations, I believe, can also be useful when try­
ing to interpret how controversies over technology are played out. It is furthermore my 
assumption that the Luhmannian framework, which has no normative commitment to the 
participatory and deliberative postulates to be investigated, can be particularly helpful in 
identifying some of the challenges with which such procedures are faced. The framework 
has the advantage of explicitly approaching some of the issues central to the topic at hand 
from a genuinely sociological perspective. For example, die management of risk and uncer­
tainty, the creation and maintenance o f trustful social relations and the role o f ‘protest’ in 
the social appropriation of technology.
In the wake o f large-scale technological catastrophes and the rise o f the environmental 
problématique sociology has slowly taken up the theme of ‘risk’. First within special soci­
ologies like environmental sociology and sociology o f science and technology, but at least 
since Ulrich Beck coined the term ‘risk society’ (Beck 1986), the risk-thematic has been im­
ported more seriously into debates on general social theory. This has resulted in a plethora 
of conceptual discussions and empirical studies. However, I am inclined to follow Japp 
(1996) in arguing that substantial parts of this work more or less uncritically assume the 
natural scientific concept of risk (Risk = probability of harm x  extent of potential adverse 
effects), and thus investigate how exposure to such physical risks influences social relations, 
organisations and institutions. On closer inspection it seems there are only two genuinely 
sociological paradigms o f risk research, that is approaches where not only the social effects 
of technological risks but the active social construction and management of risks and their 
links to different forms of social organisation, is the object o f theorising. These are systems 
theory and Cultural Theory (ibid). These two paradigms spring from quite different intel­
lectual sources, but they do have aspects in common, as will be shown in the following, 
although the primary focus will be on the systems theoretical approach.
The choice to focus primarily on Luhmann’s theory does not mean, however, that I believe 
that this paradigm can necessarily deliver all the concepts and distinctions necessary for a 
thorough empirical investigation of the kind I wish to undertake. There are clearly areas 
where the theory seems too general to be applicable to specific empirical investigations 
(Schimank 2003b), Therefore, I will draw- also on theoretical concepts and elements origi­
nating in other research traditions where necessary, although maintaining the aim is letting 
systems theory function as a master frame or ‘orienting strategy’ (Wagner and Berger 1985)
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for the theoretical reflections, as well as letting it provide the central ontological46 and epis­
temological assumptions that guide the analysis of the case studies.
Choosing one specific theoretical framework to inform or underpin the study means that a 
certain amount of effort must go into introducing this framework and discussing its central 
elements. Ideally, where and how this framework deviates significantly from competing 
frameworks theorising ‘the same’ topics should also be analysed and discussed.47 However, 
the ambition here is not to engage in any more systematic comparison o f  theoretical ap­
proaches, nor is the following intended to be a comprehensive exegesis o f Luhmann (or a 
particularly critical one for that matter). The aim is simply a brief introduction to the basic 
elements and assumptions of autopoietic systems theory, which will enable me to apply 
aspects of the theory to interpret and analyse my cases. Therefore, I will only introduce and 
discuss aspects of the theory that I believe to be necessary to render its application intelli- 
gible, following which I shall focus on some more specific concepts and applications rele­
vant for my research problem. However, since I cannot assume that all readers with an in­
terest in the empirical topics of the thesis are familiar with the works o f Luhmann, I have 
chosen to give a short introduction to the fundamentals of the theory. Readers familiar 
with systems theory may find it convenient to skip this section.
Introducing a theory as complex as Luhmann’s autopoietic systems theory is no easy task. 
The approach has been developed over some 30 years (Luhmann 1997: Einleitung) and has 
nothing remotely resembling a linear structure. It has generated significant interest, com­
mentary and criticism in circles well beyond theoretical sociology, which indicates that mul­
tifarious focus points are possible. My approach will be to start by introducing some of the 
theory’s fundamental concepts and assumptions (which are indeed very abstract), and then 
proceed to explain how these are applied in a generalised description o f  the structure and 
dynamics of modem societies. I will then move on to discuss some more specific traits and 
dynamics of interest to the study of technological controversies and how they can be the- 
matised and specified through a systems theoretical mode o f observation.
46 In principle Luhmann abstains from making ontological claims, and his theory builds exdusively on epis­
temological assumptions, notably the approach o f second order observation. However, where they do not 
treat topics of the foundations o f social theory, it is difficult not to ascribe a certain ontological reality to 
many o f  Luhmann’s concepts and distinctions, such as the existence o f interaction, organisations and func­
tional systems, society as the totality o f communication etc. However, the question o f  whether Luhmann in 
fact introduces an unrecognised ‘systems-ontology’ need not occupy me here. For such criticisms see e.g. Joas 
(1992: 306-326) and Habermas (1985:426-36).
47 The objects of theorising are o f course reconstructed through a particular mode o f  observation in different 
theories. Therefore, the way topics of investigation are understood and delineated does not correspond com­
pletely across different analytical frameworks.
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In a very general way, Luhmann’s theory can be perceived as based on three theoretical 
complexes, loosely coupled to, respectively, the social, substantive48 and temporal dimen­
sions o f sociological analysis. In the social dimension, communication is the defining char­
acteristic of society and the sociological observation of society. According to Luhmann,
‘the social’ is communication. Communication is what distinguishes society from both its 
physical and psychical environment, and communicative events are the constitutive ele­
ments on which social analysis must be grounded. In the substantive dimension the theory 
of functional differentiation or polycontextuality is used to explore what Luhmann per­
ceives as the defining characteristic of m odem society. Basically, the central structural traits 
and dynamics o f modem society stem from the fact that a number of different and distinct 
domains, operating according to different logics, have been established. This creates prob­
lems o f  mutual integration and handling o f  different sorts o f externalities. Finally, in the 
temporal dimension, the emergence o f this polycontextural society is described as an evolu­
tionary process, the product o f a long historical development, which has not and cannot be 
planned or ‘steered’ intentionally.
Starling Point(s)
The three main sources of Luhmann’s inspiration are usually said to be Talcot Parsons’ 
structural functionalism, the phenomenology o f Edmund Husserl and the adaptations in 
biology o f developments in general systems analysis. It is in particular from the last o f these 
intellectual sources that Luhmann draws his preference for observation through binary dis­
tinctions, which is fundamental in his thinking. The most important binary distinction is 
that between a system and its environment. Although Luhmann attempts to exclude onto­
logical problems completely from his writings and work through the concept o f observa­
tion through distinctions, his axiomatic assumption is that systems exist: “Es gibt systems” 
(Luhmann 1984: 31). This is specified into the founding assumption of the theoretical pro­
gramme — it makes sense and is feasible to analyse ‘the social’ in terms of communicating 
systems.49 The assumption that social systems exist is complemented with a number o f
48 In German Luhmann speaks o f a ‘Sachdimension’. In the Engjish translation o f  e.g. the first o f  Luhmann’s 
central theoretical works Sosfak System , 1984 (Social Systems, 1995) this becomes ‘the object dimension’.
This, in my opinion, has too a objectivistic tone, and does not correspond well with the contructionist as­
sumptions underpinning the theoretical programme. Therefore, 1 prefer to speak o f a ‘substantive dimension’. 
The general point o f  the tri-partition is that all communications have a social (who?), a substantive {what?) and 
a temporal {when?) dimension.
49 Luhmann emphatically avoids answering the ontological question o f  what ‘the social’ as such is. This posi­
tion is taken on the basis o f  an epistemological consideration that ontological propositions must necessarily 
be tied to observations from a specific viewpoint, with the help of distinctions that always have a 'blind spot’. 
There is no viewfrom nowhere. Therefore, sociological observation is only one possible way to describe o r the- 
matise the social, and as such it cannot claim a privileged status. The task o f  sociological theory should, there­
fore, not be to produce ontology, but to perform second order observations, to observe of how observations 
are made. This means to observe and describe how society observes and describes itself. In this sense 
Luhmann’s position is radically constructionist, as he claims that there is no reaching behind the observations 
to an undistorted reality. This, by implication, also means that Luhmann cannot claim a privileged position
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other assumptions and concepts around which the theory is constructed. Social systems are 
by definition systems operating on the basis of communication, i.c. the processing of mean­
ing. These social systems are furthermore claimed to operate in an autopoictic and self- 
referential way. That social systems are autopoietic means that they are themselves produc­
ing the elements, the communicative events, upon which they continually renew their proc­
essing in a recursive manner. The fact that social systems are self-referential means that 
they can observe themselves and make themselves and their relations to their environment 
the object of their own processing.
Social systems are characterised by having to constantly distinguish themselves from their 
environment (Luhmann 1984: 25-29). They must at any time be able to specify what be­
longs to the system and what to the environment. This is necessary because the world as 
such is infinitely complex, and no system can manage that kind of complexity without los­
ing its identity. Hence, if a system is unable to reduce its own complexity to a level below 
that o f its environment by constantly selecting what it considers relevant, internally as well 
as externally, then it ceases to exist.
In the understanding o f how social systems maintain themselves, luhmann has made the 
concept of autopoiesis central. That a system is autopoietic means that it creates, by itself, the 
elements of which it is built in a recursive manner. An operation by any system takes its 
previous operations as a point of departure. In this way autopoiesis means that systems are 
operationally ‘closed’, they cannot ‘import’ elements from their environment. It does not 
mean, however, that systems are causally closed, that they cannot be influenced by events in 
their environment. However, the events of the environment are always brought into the 
operations of a system via its own observations of the environment in a selective manner. 
This means di at events are always observed by means of the distinctions a system has at its 
disposal. It ‘sees’ the world according to its own idiosyncratic cntcria, not necessarily as the 
world (or other systems) ‘really’ arc in any essential sense. As such, autopoietic systems 
construct not only themselves, they also ‘construct’ their environment through their own 
distinctions, and in a sense ‘re-create’ the environment within the system, although this re­
construction will typically have a rather limited bandwidth compared to all the phenomena 
in the world that could potentially be observed.
Observation, First and Second Order
The observations of social systems are performed through binary' distinctions or ‘forms’ 
with two sides. Observing through a binary' distinction means that one asenbes the object
for his own approach within sociology, other descriptions can in principle lie equally adequate. The criterion 
according to which the adequacy or success of a theoretical programme can be assessed is, according to 
Luhmann, its ability to reduce complexity (a criterion, which in a somewhat tautological or sclf-im plica to ry man­
ner is taken from other parts o f the theory as a general tclos of all social systems) and the ability to manage 
self-reference, as a sociological theory with global ambitions inevitably will appear as object to itself.
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of observation to one side o f a form. This form also has another side, which is always proc­
essed in the observation, even when it is not ‘marked’. These forms shaping observations 
can basically be o f two types. Either they are shaped around an object or around a concept 
(Luhmann 1991: 24). The observation o f an object specifies the object in distinction to the 
rest of the world, e.g. in the form apple/not-apple. O f greater analytical import are con­
cepts (Begriffe), which are distinctions where one side is only meaningful in relation to the 
other side (e.g. hot/cold). Without such distinctions the world would be form-less. How­
ever, such distinctions enable observation through exclusion, they always have a ‘blind 
spot’, as it is impossible to observe a certain distinction and at the same time thematise the 
contingency o f that distinction, i.e. that other distinctions could be selected as well. Operat­
ing with a certain distinction allows a system to make the observations possible within that 
distinction and nothing else. N or is it possible when observing with any given distinction, 
for the system to know what this distinction does not allow it to observe. You cannot see, 
what you cannot see!
It is, however, possible to observe in different ways, and Luhmann distinguishes between 
first and second order observations (ibid: 23-24). First order observations are observations 
of ‘something*, while second order observations are observations of observations. Second 
order observations have the capacity to see the blind spot o f a first order observation, 
which a first order observation cannot itself see. This does not mean that second order ob­
servations are ‘superior’ in any substantial sense, as they themselves have (other) blind 
spots. A central task for sociological analysis is, for Luhmann, to observe how (other) sys­
tems observe both themselves and their environment (sociology itself being an observing 
system exposed to the same limitations o f observations).
The fundamental distinction for social systems is the distinction between system and envi­
ronment. This must always be maintained if the system is to be maintained. When a system 
has reached a certain level o f complexity it can also thematise the maintenance of this dis­
tinction. In doing so a ‘re-entry’ o f the distinction between system and environment occurs 
on the system-side o f the distinction. This enables a system to establish complex relations 
both with itself and its environment. Systems then become self-referential, they can ob­
serve their own states and make those states the basis of new observations o f themselves 
and their environment. In this sense systems do not work causally but recursively. And as 
recursive processes are contingent, such systems are not deterministic or predictable, al­
though in some cases highly stable patterns of operations (modes of observations and se­
lections) develop.
A central tenet of Luhmann’s theory, derived from these considerations, is that a social sys­
tem can only observe its environment with the distinctions it has at its disposal. As any so­
cial system only has a limited repertoire o f distinctions at its disposal, there will inevitably 
be many things in its environment that it cannot observe, and therefore cannot know, at
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least not while it observes. Complex systems develop reflexive and self-monitoring capaci­
ties, and can sequentially shift between different levels and modes o f observation.
Society as System s of Communication
A further significant and perhaps counter-intuitive premise of Luhmanrfs theory is the in­
sistence that social systems and Society* (the totality of all communication) consist solely of 
communications. Thereby the theory is deliberately distinguished from theoretical pro­
grammes based on other premises, for example that societies consist of physical infrastruc­
ture and/or human beings that act intentionally. Luhmann chooses to make communica­
tion the constitutive element of the social, as communication is always social, whereas 
physical objects and human acts are not. This, he claims, gives sociology a well defined ob­
ject of investigation.
This focus on communication has the effect that Luhmann makes meaning the basic con­
cept for sociology, since meaning is the medium in which communication is performed. 
Basically, meaning is a prerequisite for communication to take place (Luhmann 1990). 
Luhmann has undertaken extensive analyses of communication and meaning at the con­
ceptual level that cannot be recounted here. But it must be noted that he uses the concepts 
in a very specific way, quite differently from the hermeneutic tradition where meaning is 
conceived as intersubjectively shared. Communication is abstractely conceptualised as a 
three-sided selection of information, message and understanding, and meaning is defined as 
a surplus of possibilities.50 This means that in communicative processes selections must be 
made in each operation, which constantly fixes communication at one of many possibilities, 
and thereby reduces complexity.
As such, meaning is a way of expressing complexity and communication a way of managing 
complexity. Not all the possibilities referred to in any given meaning can be realized, that is, 
made the object o f the next communicative selection (at the same time — sequentially more 
possibilities can o f  course be processed). Communicated meaning constantly forces the 
system to make selections; to actualise one possibility rather than multiple and equally pos­
sible others (but o f course not always equally likely). This means that ‘the social’ is consti­
tuted as contingent; due to the ‘double contingency’ o f all social activity the selections that 
will be made next cannot be predetermined.51
50 “Das Phänomen Sinn erschient in (kr Form eines Überschusses von Verweisung» auf weitere Möglichkeiten des Eriebens 
und Handelns, ” (1984: 93)
51 'Double contingency’ being a theme Luhmann took from Parsons. This is seen as the dynamic and non­
determinism arising from the fact that Alter and Ego are both free to act, but also dependent on each others 
acts. In Luhmann the issue is transposed from action theory to communication, Alter and Ego are always free 
to choose what they communicate, but communication must proceed on the basis o f communicative contri­
butions that are already available to be comprehensive.
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Communication is for Luhmann not an act. Actions is, rather, something that is deter­
mined in communication. A meaningful communication opens possibilities (Anschluss- 
môglichkeiten) for further communication. However, it also forces determination, as sys­
tems cannot continue their autopoiesis from an undetermined state. To ascribe a given 
communicative event the status o f  an action and ascribe it to an actor is a way to reduce 
complexity, to determine communication within a more limited horizon.
This compulsion for selection (Selektionszwang) causes social systems and society to de­
velop certain structural properties. Structures limit contingency, create expectations as to 
what directions communication will take and limit the possibilities o f  surprises. This en­
ables systems to maintain more complex communicative processes because expectations 
pre-structure communication. As long as no surprises arise, the structures are perceived as 
solid and are thereby reproduced — which is not to say that they cannot be altered. Com­
munication can always move in unexpected directions — and yet in a number o f contexts it 
appears to be highly stable in the sense that expectations are mostly fulfilled.
From the phenomenological tradition Luhmann takes the problem of ‘intersubjectivity’, the 
question of how the observations of individual minds can be ‘attuned’ to each other, in 
short how Ve* (two individuals or a community) can live in ‘the same’ world and coordi­
nate attention and actions. Luhmann proposes a rather radical solution to this question by 
excluding individual minds from society, ascribing psychic systems to the environment of 
social systems. According to Luhmann there are two types of fundamentally different sys­
tems that operate in the medium of meaning; psychic and social systems. The two types of 
systems both process meaning, they observe through the distinction between actuality and 
potentiality (Luhmann 1991: 26), but they are operatively closed off from each other, as 
consciousness and communication are located at two different levels of reality. However, 
psychic and social systems, in Luhmann’s words, ‘interpenetrate’, which means that they 
put complexity (and the ability to manage complexity) at each other’s disposal, and as such 
they cannot exist without each other. However, no psychic system can determine commu­
nication (because o f the double contingency) and no matter what is being communicated 
the activities o f individual minds are never wholly determined by their communicative envi­
ronment. Social systems and individual minds influence each other — they are causally con­
nected -  but they do not determine each other, they are operationally distinct in separate 
autopoietic processes. This solution to the problem o f intersubjectivity is an important mo­
tive in Luhmann’s opting for a sociological theory-structure based on communication 
rather than on human intentionality or agency. This does not mean that ‘human beings’ do 
not intervene in and influence society. The theory instead sees a level of social reality that is 
distinct from — but has co-evolved with — psychic systems. These are complicated episte­
mological issues, all the details o f which cannot possibly be explored here. The important 
point to bring to the analysis o f specific empirical phenomena is that systems theory claims
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that what has effects in social reality is what is communicated. To illustrate, concerns in 
individual minds that are not brought into ‘social existence’, i.e. not articulated, have no 
communicative existence and hence can have no effects on social systems. What is impor­
tant to explore in relation to my cases is therefore what links or entry points are established 
(or not established!) between ‘concerns’ o f members of the public and the forums where 
technology is shaped and regulated.
To sum up the argument so fan in autopoietic systems theory social systems are constituted 
by communication. All communication is social and no social system operates ‘outside’ 
communication. As such, the borders of ‘society’ are drawn by communication, ‘society’ is 
the totality o f communication. This renders a radically different and more abstract image o f 
society than those based on political or spatial borders. This has certain epistemological 
advantages, but also comes at a cost, to which I shall return later. However, not all com­
munications and not all social systems are alike.
Interaction, Organisations, Functional Systems
Luhmann basically distinguishes between three types of social systems in modem societies; 
interaction systems, organisations and functional systems. Interaction systems are charac­
terised by volatile and unstructured communication between persons in each other’s pres­
ence (Luhmann 1997: 812-15). There are in all societal contexts norms and codes for how 
interactions ‘begin’, ‘unfold’ and ‘end’, and these can be very different (compare communi­
cation in a lecture theatre, a bar and a hospital). Such interactions entail expectations 
among the participants and severe breaches are sanctioned. Some o f  these expectations are 
intertwined with organisational and functional contexts, but the ineractional level always 
retains a certain level of autonomy. Therefore, interaction systems are never wholly deter­
mined by ‘contextual’ features.
Organisations are social systems with two defining characteristics; their autopoiesis oper­
ates via ‘decisions’ and participation is regulated by membership rules, which ascribe roles 
and role expectations to members. That organisations operate through decisions means 
that there may be a lot of interaction and communication among the members (and with 
non-members), but only decision communications define the organisation in relation to its 
environment and allow its operations to ‘continue’. Membership rules regulates what per­
sons belong to an organisation and which persons do not. Nor all members necessarily ‘be­
long* in the same way, they are ascribed roles that form expectations as to their behaviour 
(teachers and students can all belong to a university, but are expected to do different 
things). However, when a person belongs to an organisation it is not the Svhole human be­
ing’ that belongs, but only a section of their behaviour that is regulated through the mem­
bership. Multiple memberships are obviously the rule rather than the exception (one can be 
a university student as well as a political party member and a footballer).
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Finally, Luhmann operates with a concept o f  functional subsystems, which all maintain 
specific functions for society as a whole. Whereas organisations are characterised by the 
ability to operate in ‘intentional’ ways, that is to make plans and pursue strategies (and ob­
serve if they reach their goals), functional systems work in non-intentional ways and unfold 
their autopoiesis most often in non-linguistic, formalised communications. This communi­
cation is specialised in relation to the tasks they fulfil for society in general, and is charac­
terised by a combination of universality and exclusivity. A functional system, is so to speak, 
‘responsible’ for all the communication within its domain, but only within its specific do­
main. Functional systems cannot replace or carry out tasks for one another.
In addition to these three fundamental classes of social systems, Luhmann, in his later writ­
ings, adds a fourth category, that of ‘protest movements’ or social movements. These can­
not be adequately theorised with the tri-partition o f interaction, organisation and functional 
systems, as they neither presuppose actual co-presence, nor is membership regulated (you 
‘belong’ if you sympathise). They can have organisational characteristics, but according to 
Luhmann this does not really catch the essence of their societal role and effects. Protest 
movements are clearly not functional systems either, as they have no well-specified code 
that allows them to maintain functions for the rest o f society. Instead they seek to criticise 
‘society* as if they were themselves outside o f society. They seek to influence the responsi­
ble, without wishing to take over responsibility themselves.52
It is a central assumption of systems theory that the three kinds o f social systems are struc­
turally coupled, they put complexity at each other’s disposal, but they are at the same time 
operationally autonomous. They are conditioned but not determined by each other.
Evolution and Societal D ifferentiation
Luhmann’s theory is explicitly evolutionary. He claims that in the modem era a historical 
transformation from hierarchical-stratified to functionally-differentiated societies has taken 
place, and that functional differentiation or ‘poly-contextuality’ is now the dominant form- 
principle of modem societies. Earlier societies consisted of many ‘identical’ units, which 
worked in similar ways, parallel but independent of each other. Thes units were self- 
supplying with the elements they required for their reproduction, both materially and ideo­
logically (farms, villages etc). Societies were ordered hierarchically, with a monarch or the
52 This does not mean that protest movements do not serve any function for modern societies. According to 
Luhmann they help relieve a 'deficit o f  reflection’ that emerges as a result o f  the mutual intransparency be- 
tween the different function al Subsystems: “M it diesen besonderen Merkmalen ¡eistet die protestierende Reflexion etwas, 
was sonst nirgends gleistet nird. Sei greift Themen auf, die keines der Funktionssysteme, weder die Politik noch die Wirtschaft, 
weder die Religion noch das Ertfehungsu esen, weder die Wissenschaft noch das Recht als eigne erkennen würde. Sie stellt sich 
quer gu dem, was auf Grund eines Primates funktionaler Differenzierung innerhalb der Funktionssysteme and Selbstbeschrei- 
bungn anfaUt. Sie ist auch nicht darauf angeniesen, daß diese Gesellschaft irgendwo repräsentative und verbindlich beschrieben 
werden kann. Sie kompensiert deudicbe Reflexionsdefizite der modernen Gesellschaß— nicht dadurch, daß sie es besser, macht; 
wohl aber dadurch, daß sie es anders macht.*’ (Luhmann 1991: 153).
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like at the top of society, ruling and representing it in its entirely. Functional differentiation, 
on the other hand, means that different societal tasks are delegated to specialised subsys­
tems, which serve specific needs for all o f society. Every subsystem takes over a certain 
function of the social totality, which enables them to deliver still more specialised perform­
ances. ;
Images and concepts o f societal differentiation have been a major part of sociological theo­
rising since the discipline’s conception. In all the classics one finds descriptions of general 
tendencies towards differentiation and the following problems o f social integration (see 
Schimank 1996 for an introduction and overview). However, it can be argued that the the­
ory of differentiation finds its most radical formulation in Luhmann. Here it takes on the 
character o f a general description o f modernity, which is not tied to any specific national 
context. Historical specificities and institutional arrangements may vary, but Luhmann is 
more interested in the general traits common to modem societies rather than the peculiari­
ties (Schimank 2003b). To take one prominent example: science everywhere is in principle 
loosened from religious worldviews and need only consider ‘fact-’ or ‘truth-problems’, not 
questions of faith, justice etc. This has enabled substantial progress (especially) in the 
knowledge o f physical phenomena. But it has also meant that questions pertaining to ‘the 
good life’ have been excluded from scientific consideration (van den Daele 1987: 405-409). 
As such, it is a specialisation, which is at the same time a curtailment of the domain of va­
lidity of scientific propositions. In the same way a legal system has developed which can 
only judge whether actions are legal or illegal, not whether they are profitable, loving or 
popular. According to Luhmann this means that the legal system has become positive and 
therefore uncoupled from more informal moral feelings. The same types of developments 
can be noted for a number of other functional domains.
How many and which subsystems have developed is for Luhmann an empirical question, 
not — as for Parsons — an analytical one. The central functional subsystems of modem soci­
ety (following Luhmann 1986) are the economic system, the legal system, science, the po­
litical system, religion and education. These subsystems all maintain central and indispensa­
ble functions for modem societies: the economy allocates resources, the legal system makes 
normative decisions and stabilises the normative order, the political system makes collec­
tively binding decisions, science produces truths, religion delivers a cosmology and the 
educational system distributes career opportunities.
This differentiation has occurred through a long historical process. According to Luhmann 
there is no plan or intention behind this process, nor is it causally determined. There is a 
good deal o f contingency in societal development, and modem societies are the result of 
many small steps o f trial and error that have led to a relatively stable order (Luhmann 1997: 
Chapter 3.1). Luhmann refers to a neo-darwinistic understanding of evolution as a process 
o f three elements; variation, selection and retention (ibid: 416,425). Since there is no causal 
determination, that is no evolutionary step necessarily leads to the next, it is not possible to
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predict what future developments society will undergo (except that Luhmann seems to 
think that further differentiation and evolution is inevitable (Schimank 1996: 181-84, Joas 
1992: 336)). Due to the immense complexity of these inter-systemic relations and their 
polycontextuality, it is not possible to steer the development o f ‘society’ as such, or even 
just sections o f it, in any meaningful sense o f the word.53
Codes and Programmes
The differentiated subsystems are characterised by high but limited performance. This 
means that they are developed to handle high complexity within clearly delimited domains. 
One o f the ways this is managed is through the development o f symbolically generalised 
media. These are special binary codes, which have a functional relation to the tasks the sub­
systems perform. The meaning of the codes is well defined and relatively immutable. This 
gives the systems a temporal advantage in the handling of complexity. For instance, the 
economic system works with the code paid/not paid, which establishes well-defined expec­
tations as to what payment involves. In any given economic transaction one does not have 
to define what payment means, only whether it takes place or not. Symbolically generalised 
media reduce complexity, since the systems only need to consider a specific code and can 
ignore everything that does not relate to this code: everything else can be relegated to the 
environment. This allows essential communication to take place faster. For instance, in 
Luhmann’s interpretation scientific communication need only consider whether a theory or 
proposition is true (or verified), not whether it is just, beautiful or profitable.54 The legal 
system, correspondingly, need only to decide whether an act is in conflict with the law or 
not, not whether it is true or paid for — and not even if it is morally acceptable. Parallel to 
the development o f these codes more specific ‘programmes’ are established. The pro­
grammes designate how the code-valu es are ascribed in specific instances. In science, theo­
ries are programmes that help decide which communicative events are to be considered 
‘true’ and hence the basis o f further communication, and which are false and thereby unin­
teresting. In the legal system laws are the programmes, in the economic system prices.
According to Luhmann these differentiated subsystems have all achieved a state of opera­
tive closure. This means that their internal communication only relates to and can only re­
late to itself. Scientific communication can only deal with questions of truth and is more or 
less incapable o f communication in other codes or on themes. However, these are compli­
cated issues, because while the systems are operationally closed off from each other, they 
are also mutually dependent on each other’s performances. There are relationships o f both 
independency and interdependency (Willke 1987:4). One could say that autonomy and de­
53 Because o f this, Luhmann has been criticised for too pessimistic an assessment o f the possibility o f  per­
forming any kind o f  (political) steering in m odem societies (e.g. Scharpf 1987).
54 An image very different from those drawn by the authors of post normal o r mode 2 science as recounted in 
the last chapter.
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pendency are two distinct dimensions in the relationship o f the functional systems to their 
environment (Schimank 1996: 166). The functional systems are autonomous in the sense 
that they themselves decide what communicative events are to be selected for further proc­
essing and in what way they are to be processed, but at the same time this processing is de­
pendent upon the presence of certain conditions ensured by the presence o f other systems 
and human consciousness. On the one hand, the systems can only work in their own code, 
on the other hand a “minimum of common relevant environmental conditions” must be 
ensured (Willke 1987:4). Scientific communication is autonomous in that it only takes 
place in relation to existing science, which is developed in the medium truth. On the other 
hand it is dependent upon the allocation o f resources, that research is not prohibited, the 
presence o f trained scientists and so on, just as other systems depend on the production o f 
scientific knowledge.
The functional systems are clearly not only dependent upon each other’s performance but 
also on organisations. All functional systems are underpinned by organisations, but where 
the functional systems are defined by their codes and can only operate on the basis of 
these, the contrary is the case for organisations. They may be primarily affiliated with one 
functional system, for example research organisations with the scientific system, courts 
with the legal system and political parties with the political system. However, an organisa­
tion cannot allow itself to be blind to other codes as functional systems are. In the systems 
theoretical approach there can be no ‘intersystemic codes’ or de-differentiation between 
codes. However, this does not mean that organisations cannot, indeed they must, alternate 
between different systemic codes and references, just as interactions and individuals can 
move freely between functional domains.
This extremely brief and simplified introduction to the abstract fundamentals o f autopoi- 
etic systems theory cannot of course do justice to the complexity o f  the theory. In the fol­
lowing I shall expand on some aspects o f it, whilst at the same time narrowing in on the 
m ost pertinent issues for the current topic. This will take place with two purposes in mind, 
namely to explore what implications this theoretical programme has for the issues being 
investigated in the thesis (i.e. how can controversies over biotechnology be interpreted 
within this theoretical framework and what can it tell us about the conditions for establish­
ing increased ‘public involvement’) and how some of these basic assumptions and modes 
o f  observation can be turned into pertinent questions to ask of empirical material (what to 
‘look for’ in the cases when observations are grounded in this theoretical paradigm). What 
can a systems theoretical approach tell us about the way in which modem societies deal 
with risky technologies? As a starting point, how ‘technology’ and ‘risk’ are understood 
within this paradigm must be specified.
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Systems Theory and T ech nology
When studying the interaction between a specific strand of technological innovation and 
the rest of society, it may seem odd to take as a point o f departure a theory that deliberately 
claims that society exists of communication alone. This means that what is normally under­
stood by technology, the material substance and installations, which enable and shape hu­
man actions, is relegated to the environment o f society.55 The society, or parts of it, can 
then observe and communicate about technology, but most of what is considered technol­
ogy in common language is external to society. There is no ‘technological system’ parallel to 
the scientific system or economic system that maintains well defined functional tasks, just 
as there is no well specified code for technology. N or is it sufficient to understand technol­
ogy as the opposite of nature (as something artificial) (Luhmann 1997: 519) or as opposed 
to humanity (as something alienating) (ibid: 521), if one wants to analyse the relationship 
between technology and society.
Instead Luhmann suggests we understand technology as ‘functioning simplification’ (funk- 
tionerende Simplifikation, ibid: 524) or ‘causal simplification’ (Japp 1998: 228). This entails 
considering technology as one side o f  a distinction between causal simplification and causal 
complexity. Technology (that works) reduces complexity for an observer.56 When technol­
ogy works a number of things in the environment can be ignored, because the things that 
are focused on can be controlled and do not provoke surprises. The world is less complex 
and attention can be directed elsewhere. In this sense technology becomes structuring and 
coordinating for action: “Wasfunktioniert, dasfunktiomert....Dariiber braucht man kein 'Einver­
ständnis mehr %tt e r f eien. Technik erspart auch, soweit sie Abläufe koordiniert; die stets schlierige und 
konßktträchtige Koordination menschlichen Handelns.” (Luhmann 1997; 518).
Technology should, according to Luhmann, be considered as a product of society’s co­
evolution with its physical environment, which at the same time creates dependency and 
freedom for society. In this regard co-evolution means that “...die Gesellschaft sich selbst in einer 
nicht rational vorausgeplanten Weise von der Technik abhängig macht, indem sie sich auf sie einläßt.” 
(Luhmann 1997; 523). Technology is not just a means by which society adjusts to its envi­
ronment.57 How technology should be formed and observed is decided Svithin’ society. 
However, this does not happen completely at the will o f social systems as they need to ob­
serve the material causalities of the environment. Co-evolution means that society and en-
55 As such the approach is very different from what can be considered the dominant paradigm in science and 
technology studies — Actor-Network Theory (ANT) — which seeks to break down any epistemological or 
ontological distinctions between society and nature and to explore how the two are intimately interwoven (see 
e.g. Latour 1993). I cannot explore the differences between systems theory and ANT here.
56 “Die maßgebende Unterscheidung die die Form 4Technik ” bestimmt, ist nun die fischen  kontrollierbaren und unkontrol­
lierbaren Sachverhalten. Extrem abstrakt formuliert, geht es also um gelingende Reduktion von Komplexität. Es mag im übri­
gen geschehen, was wilt die Technik liefert die beabsichtigten Ergebnisse.” (Luhmann 1997: 525).
57 “Technik ermöglicht keine immer bessere Anpassung der Gesellschaft an ihre Umweh, wie sie ist. Sie dient mit der Vermeh­
rung von Optionsmöglichkeiten derEntfaltung der Eigendynamik des Gesellschaftssystems.” (Luhmann 1997: 523)
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vironment have a common history. That is why previous technological decisions can be 
extremely difficult to change without causing great upheaval in large parts of society (sec 
for instance van den Daele 1993).58 Therefore, technological decisions txrcomc o f central 
interest to the political system, which is where collectively binding decisions are made ac­
cording to the self-description of modem society.
This is indeed a very abstract definition of how technolog)' is to he understood, and there 
are obviously numerous alternative and more specific conceptualisations of technolog)' in 
the sociological literature. The strength, however, of this conceptualisation is that it makes 
it clear that, for a sociological observation, there is no materially immanent criteria to tell us 
when a technology is Vorking* or working satisfactorily. To decide whether a technology 
can be considered as working in a satisfactory way, that is whether it can reduce causal 
complexity to a level that excludes surprises, or whether its workings (including surprises) 
should be considered acceptable, is a matter of observation. 'Ibis observation depends on 
who observes, and through what distinctions the observation uses. The sociological analy­
sis of technology — and technological controversies -  must then focus on how society and 
its parts observe any given technology, whether conceived of as functioning or non­
functioning, and on what criteria this evaluation is based. It seems obvious that there arc a 
number of different and often conflicting perspectives on biotechnology, from a systems 
theoretical point of view none of these are inherently right or superior, but they all contrib­
ute to societal communication about technology -  and some achieve more resonance than 
others. The observer-dependency in the assessment of technology' is also central to the sys­
tems theoretical analysis of risk as a social phenomenon, which as a mode of observation is 
o f increasing importance for the dynamics of modem societies.
R isk and Danger
For Luhmann the concept of a risk society does not have an iconic status as, for instance, in 
the writings of Ulrich Beck (Beck 1986) for whom the management of risk becomes the 
characteristic trait o f modem society. But the increased prominence of risk discourses indi­
cates that risk has become a significant mode of societal self-observation and description, 
that individuals and organisations have become aware that virtually all decision-making is in 
some sense risky. Now what does this mean?
The basic problématique is that individuals, organisations, and society at large must cope with 
an unknown future in the present. It is necessary to make decisions with imperfect knowl­
edge in the present and live with the consequences in the future -  even if things do not 
turn out as expected (Luhmann 1991:2-3). In a sense this has always been the case. I low-
58 An obvious example: it was contingent (and evolution ary/incremental) that modem societies ‘chose’ to rely 
heavily on private cars. However, now that cars are central to modem life, it is extremely dif6cult to change 
that reliance, even when all major cities are seriously congested and the environment is rapidly degrading as a 
consequence.
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ever, in contemporary societies the potential scope o f action has grown tremendously as a 
result o f increased knowledge, the removal o f the normative barriers of tradition, and tech­
nological progress. This leads to a growth in contingency (you can do this, but also some­
thing else), which requires decisions and, at the same time, an increased awareness o f this 
contingency. Due to the modem, disenchanted worldview presupposing that events are 
linked causally and an increasing reflexive capacity, it becomes clear that many undesirable 
states o f affairs must be attributed to past decisions, not to ‘God’, ‘Destiny’ or pure arbi­
trariness. We have learned that decisions often have other or additional consequences than 
those expected (‘side-effects’). In an abstract sense the management of risk therefore does 
not simply require better objective knowledge, but has to do with the way observations and 
selections are ordered temporally. What may in the present seem an acceptable risk may in 
the future entail consequences that were not even considered in the risk assessment. O r it 
may not. Any decision can in retrospect be considered as reckless or excessively cautious 
depending on what has happened. And both are in a sense risky. In the one case, one must 
live with damages and losses; in the other, opportunities that could have been realized were 
missed (Luhmann 1991: 29). But since the future is unknown, decisions must be made 
more or less blindly. In Luhmann’s jargon this is formulated in the image that recursively 
operating systems move “backwards into the future” (Luhmann 1991:43). All experiences 
are past experiences, but they guide the choices for future actions.59
This, o f course, means that all actions concerning an abstract consideration are risky. The 
problem regarding the management o f technology is that more knowledge creates more 
contingency, rather than more safety. Therefore, it is to be expected that more knowledge 
also creates more risk awareness, rather than less. This does not mean that damage is not 
better prevented through better knowledge, but since multiple decisions about prevention 
are available, they become risky in an abstract or second order sense as well. In this sense 
risk as a social phenomenon has a self-reproducing effect —it becomes reflexive (Luhmann 
1991: 39).
Thus, no action can be risk free — or given the way that modem societies are structured, 
risk-taking is inevitable. The question is therefore what risks should be taken and which 
avoided as well as how this can be decided collectively. One o f the things Luhmann’s per­
spective makes clear is that even when something goes wrong (unanticipated/unwanted 
consequences), decisions may well have been right in terms of the existing knowledge, in­
formation and prevailing criteria of rationality. However, this is a situation that is difficult 
to accept and hence it is often necessary, ex-post, to find reasons for mishaps and prefera­
bly to place guilt (Bond 1995), even if this means focussing on certain causal relationships 
and whilst ignoring others (some of which are perhaps not even observed, known or un­
derstood).
59 As is illustrated nicely in the saying that generals are always preparing for and fighting the last war.
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When modem societies to a growing extent consider the future as risky, this is understood 
in terms o f the distinction (or ‘form’) likely/unlikely. The future appears as open but de­
mands definition, a reduction o f contingency. The future can thus be interpreted in the 
present in the form likely/unlikely’, but it cannot appear as a likelihood:
“Mit der Form des Risikos nutif man . . .  gerade die Unbestimmtheit der Zukunft, jaglächsam die 
eigene Unwissenheit aus, um die Gegenwart o f Formen bringen, die durch künftigen Gegenwar­
ten bestätigt oderauch widerlegt werden können. Die Zukunft; die ja  nur auf die eine oder andere, 
jedenfalls aber nur auf eine bestimmte Weise Gegenwart werden kann, wird in einefiktive Form ge­
bracht, die als solche nie eintrejfen wird, nämlich die Form wahrscheinlich f  unwahrscheinlich. ” 
(Luhmann 1991: 80-81)
To communicate about something in the form of probability is then a way to manage un­
certainties in the sense that what is unknown is changed into a form that allows further op­
erations to take place.
What I consider to be the primary value o f Luhmann’s conceptualisation is that it makes 
very clear in theoretical terms why risks o f various kinds tend to induce a social dynamic. 
This dynamic is not determined by the physical characteristics o f the risks in question, but 
is due to ‘society-internal’ communication. The dynamic induced by decisions derives from 
the fact that in a differentiated society, decisions are not made in one place or according to 
the same logic. Decisions are made in different subsystems and organisations, each operat­
ing according to their own logic. This means that what in one context appears as an accept­
able risk — or perhaps not as a risk at all — may in other contexts seem very dangerous. This 
is particularly clearly stated in Luhmann’s conceptualisation of risk as a form with two 
sides: Risk and danger.
Initially, one might consider the intuitive opposite of risky to be ‘safe’. But since safety as 
such can never exist, it will only be an empty opposition to risk — something that can be 
aspired to, but never achieved. Instead, Luhmann proposes contrasting risk with danger 
(Luhmann 1991: 30). Risk is, then, always the result of decisions, whereas danger denotes 
events in the social environment to which one is (involuntarily) exposed. In Luhmann’s 
theory, this links the risk/danger-distinction to the system/environment-distinction, in the 
sense that whereas risk is contingent (dependent on systems operations or decisions), dan­
ger is a quality of the environment that the system needs to cope with, but over which it 
has no (direct) influence.60
60 Wolfgang Bonii has expanded on the distinction between risk and danger and claims that it is also neces­
sary to talk about second order dangers. These dangers are the incremental result o f a number o f risky deci­
sions, but add up to a danger scenario where it is no longer possible to causally establish who is actually re­
sponsible for the problems. Hence, the risky activities of individual actors are transformed into societal dan­
gers that no longer allow decisions as such (Bonii 1995).
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Risky behaviour is therefore thought to provoke social conflict, as what, for some, are deci­
sions (acceptable risks) made according to the decision maker’s knowledge, criteria of ra­
tionality and normative standards, are experienced by others as dangers over which they 
have no control, but which may still have consequences for them. This often leads to a 
situation where those making decisions and those potentially affected by them have very 
different interpretations of both the ‘objective’ facts at stake and the criteria o f acceptabil­
ity. There are two major reasons why those who are affected by decisions will often evalu­
ate them differently from those who decide: 1) they are not under pressure to make deci­
sions, and 2) they are unlikely to benefit in the same way from whatever is decided as those 
making the decisions (Luhmann 1991: 77). Therefore it is to expected that “... sich unter- 
schiedäche Formen sozialer Solidarität entniekeln je  nach dem, ob die Zukunft unter dem Aspekt von 
Risiko oder unter dem Aspekt von Gefahr wahrgenommen nirdS (Luhmann 1991:112).61
A distinctive characteristic of Luhmann’s theorising is that it views specific problems from 
the perspective o f ‘functional equivalents’. However, from his discussion on risk it be­
comes clear that the conflicts raised by the production o f physical risk have, in a sense, a 
structure different from other social conflicts, and cannot therefore be handled by the 
standard repertoires evolved by the existing functional systems. Basically, risk problems 
cannot be ascribed to one functional system (or a specific type o f organisation in particu­
lar). As a social problem, risk emerges everywhere, and decisions must be made on the basis 
of incomplete knowledge about their consequences. For instance, physical risks from tech­
nologies cannot be adequately dealt with in either the economic or the legal systems, be­
cause probabilities of physical risks run counter to their internal logic. The economic sys­
tem is furnished to handle the scarcity o f  goods, not the distribution of ‘bads’, as Ulrich 
Beck puts i t  To the extent that technological innovations produce physical risks as by­
products, these must be externalised as economic costs. This raises the problem that no 
proper market exists for, for instance, environmental values. Neither can nature or human 
health be considered normatively qualified as commodities.
The legal system also has difficulties with handling physical risks adequately without en­
tirely blocking innovation and economic activity — which would go against the ideal of the 
liberal social order the legal system is programmed to uphold. This is due to the fact that 
the judicial system is based on ‘norms’ that must be sanctioned whether damage is pro­
voked or not. Only what is illegal can be punished, but when the future is unknown it is 
difficult (indeed impossible) to know which innovations might produce unwanted results. 
However, innovations cannot be rationally forbidden, if it is unclear whether damages 
might occur or not. The basic issue is that whereas the breaking of norms can only be sanc­
tioned subsequent to their violation, risks need to be dealt with prospectively, through
61 Here cultural theory argues the opposite. It is the form o f solidarity that influences what types o f risk and 
uncertainties are selected for attention (Douglas 1992, Rayner 1992). See below.
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planning and precaution. One can, of course, make individuals and corporations liable for 
their actions and products as under liability law, as seen especially in the US. Yet from the 
perspective of normative regulation this is somewhat paradoxical, as sanctions are then 
made dependent on the occurrence or non-occurrence of adverse effects o f activities legal 
at the time they are performed (Luhmann 1991). Authorities cannot (rationally) both allow 
the release of GMOs into the environment under certain specified conditions and then 
subsequently prosecute unforeseen events where actors have adhered to the conditions laid 
out for such releases.
The systems theoretical way of conceptualisation of risk therefore invites observations on 
how the uncertainties involved in decision-making (in principle in all domains, but perhaps 
in particular with regard to technologies entailing physical risks) can be and are ‘shifted* 
between the different functional domains via structural couplings. For instance, the legal 
system operates within limit values, which the scientific system is responsible for determin­
ing, not the legal system itself. The legal system can make selections on the basis of 
whether limit values are adequately observed, not whether actual damages occur. This 
means that if damages occur when limit values are observed, this will lead to revisions of 
the limit values (through scientific investigation), and not to a shift from legal to illegal (i.e. 
learning rather than sanctions). Likewise, the scientific system can shift the responsibility of 
whether a given strand of research should be pursued or not to the political system, and 
thus does not need to occupy itself with the question o f whether or not the application of 
knowledge finds acceptance in its environment (Bora 1999: chapter 2.3). In the ‘ideal* situa­
tion, i.e. in the self-descriptions o f the functional systems, structural couplings like these 
should be relatively tight, so that as many uncertainties as possible can be absorbed through 
the performance of mutual interpenetration of the systems (German: Leistungsbeziehun- 
gen, ibid). Many of the issues leading to controversies over risks can be understood as in­
sufficient ‘programming’ between the different functional systems, where structural cou­
plings are (too) loose and the systems concerned cannot absorb sufficient uncertainty for 
each other.62,63
In my opinion there are two things that can be learned from Luhmann’s analysis of risk, 
which are often conceptually less clear in other sociological writings on the subject. First, 
there is no position in society from which risks can be considered in the ‘right* way. Multi- 623
62 "Die Politik etwa ist oft nicht mehr in der Lage, über die A  hgeptabilität der Technik ~u entscheiden und dies in Gesetsform 
bringen; die Wissenschcft uird von inncrnissenschaftücher Kritik darauf aufmerksam gemacht, daß ihre Kausalmodelle
einfach waren, daß sie es im Folie von Tecbnikentwickiungen mit eigensinnigen Verläufen tun hat; Gren^verte werden als 
“politische" Grenzwerte verstanden; Protestbewegungen formieren sich, die mit “semantischer Politik " dafür sorgen, daß da The­
ma “Risiken der Technik ” nicht von der Tagesordnung verschwindet; die Wirtschaft weigert sich, allein die Haftungför mögliche 
Schäden in unbegrenzter Höhe gu übernehmen, wenn die Technik insgesamt fü r  gesellschaftlichßrderungswürdiggehalten wird.” 
(Bora 1999: 83).
63 This process, where the functional systems mutually absorb uncertainties on behalf o f each other, is the 
equivalent o f  what Ulrich Beet, from a different theoretical starting point, and with dearly normative inten­
tions, describes as ‘organised irresponsibility’ (Beck 1988).
95
r i l f M i l É
pie perspectives on the same object-matter are inevitable in a poly-contextual society. The 
distinction between decision-makers and those affected elegantly demonstrates why this is 
very likely to induce social controversy. Second, since risk is about making decisions with 
incomplete knowledge, there can never (or very rarely) be a risk free-decision. But risks can 
be transformed from one form to another, and this becomes particularly clear in a con­
structivist perspective that does not privilege physical risks over ‘social* risks. For instance, 
the risks o f releasing GMOs into the environment can be transformed into the political and 
economic risks o f handling a moratorium or perhaps a trade dispute, as is clear at the time 
of writing in the controversy between the EU and the US. Whether such a risk transforma­
tion is preferable again depends on the mode of observation. However, it can be argued 
that where the systems theoretical framework is strong in pointing out the challenges from 
increased risk awareness in modem societies, it has less to say about how variations are ac­
tually dealt with.
Risk C ultures -  System s Theory and Cultural Theory
As mentioned at the beginning o f this chapter, there are competing and complementary 
perspectives to the systems theoretical paradigm in the sociology of risk, which has also 
provided interesting insights relevant to this work. However, in terms of theorising risk as a 
genuinely sociological phenomenon, there is arguably only one other paradigm after sys­
tems theory. This is the cultural theoretical programme initiated by Mary Douglas and de­
veloped by a number o f researchers.64 This programme has quite different roots from sys­
tems theory, but nonetheless the two programmes have certain points in common. On an 
abstract level, both are contructionist and structural (cf. Renn 1992), they argue that the 
observation and management of risk is selective and that this selectivity is related to social 
structures. “Cultural theory argues that risks are defined, perceived, and managed according 
to principles that inhere in particular forms of social organization.*’ (Rayner 1992: 84) and 
in the following I shall explore how Cultural Theory may complement the systems theo­
retical approach to risk.65
I have argued that risk taking in general is unavoidable in modem society. When available 
knowledge does not allow the prediction o f all consequences, a decision-maker is in princi­
ple faced with a principally ‘symmetrical’ situation of either taking a risk (and eventually
64 In addition to researchers explicitly laying claims to working within the cultural theoretical paradigm I also 
assign the work of, for instance, Brian Wynne and colleagues to this approach. Wynne himself admits a 
strong resemblance between his approach and the cultural theoretical programme, although he claims not to 
share all its assumptions (Wynne 1992: 291). Many o f the ideas mentioned here are shared by researchers 
taking a ‘cultural approach’ to risk, even if they do not share the more structuralist assumptions of cultural 
theory.
65 It can be argued that the systems theoretical paradigm is more self-reflexive fit emerges as an object o f ob­
servation for itself), than the cultural theoretical paradigm. Cultural Theory is not observed by itself as either 
hierarchical, individualist, egalitarian or fatalistic.
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absorbing the consequences) or abstaining and living with the knowledge of a lost oppor­
tunity. In order to be able to make a decision (which is not seen as wholly arbitrary) some 
kind of asymmetry must be present, some preference for one selection radier than another. 
The mechanism facilitating such a selection bias can in general be labelled ‘culture’ (Japp 
1996: 109). The systems theoretical framework, however, can only predict that such cul­
tures must be available for decision-makers, not what they may be. Here, according to Japp, 
systems theory can profitably be extended using perspectives from Cultural Theory. The 
cultural theoretical paradigm claims to be able to explain and classify different risk cultures 
according to only two variables, ‘grid’ and ‘group’. Grid pertains to the social rigidity of the 
organisation (how regulated are social interactions?) and Group to die level of solidarity 
within organisations (how open or closed are organisations to members joining or leaving?) 





(no externally imposed 
restrictions on choice)
Source: Schwarz and Thompson 1992: 9
This paradigm delivers a parsimonious typology, which I believe to be quite useful for ex­
ploring some of the incommensurabilities often observed in technological controversies,
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and which seem compatible with the systems theoretical approach. Systems theoretically 
the cultures can be described as expectations of expectations (Erwartungserwartung) that 
are ‘typical in certain kinds of organisations (they are located at the level of organisations, 
where decision are made, not at the level of the functional systems). They are, so to speak, 
patterns o f self-description that allow organisations to maintain certain modes of observa­
tions as stable over time.
Cultures can be understood as ‘ideologies’, Svorld-views’ or ‘biases’ that develop asymme­
tries or preferences, and which enable organisations to select what is relevant information 
in a given situation, and what is irrelevant, that is what should be considered non­
information. When it comes to managing risks, biases therefore allow organisations to 
make decisions in situations of incomplete knowledge, to absorb uncertainty into their op­
erations and to form expectations about both themselves and their environment. The 
whole point of Cultural Theory is that organisations do this in different ways, according to 
which culture is dominant.
“Sie [cultures] liefern die kulturellen Gründefür Zurechnungen auf Motivation und Erfolgserwar­
tungen, die in Verbindung mit Wertbindung und Verantwortungsübernahme Bedingungen fü r Ri- 
sikobereitschaß beziehungsweise RJsikoaversion je  relative spezifizieren. Kulturelle Muster sind 
Kommunikationsspeicher für Asymmetrien, die, ohne aufwendige Informationsverarbeitung, die eine 
identische und allgemeingültige Objektwelt wraussetzt, abgerrfen’werden können. Als solche sind 
sie eingebaut in ways of life. ” (Japp 1996: 121)
Cultural Theory has been advanced as an alternative framework to the psychometric ap­
proach discussed in chapter I for understanding the risk perceptions of individuals. How­
ever, I will argue that its main strength lies in its analysis of organisations. As such the cul­
tures can be seen as ‘typical’ for different types of organisations. Ideal typically the hierar­
chical culture is found in bureaucracies (government agencies, armies etc), the individualist 
culture in market actors (business firms) and the egalitarian culture in social movements, 
although this is somewhat stylised. Organisations based on particular cultures develop dis­
tinct expectations o f ‘appropriate’ behaviour and typical asymmetries for observing them­
selves and their environment. In doing so they draw upon fundamental social forms 
(Vergesellschaftungsformen): coercion (hierarchy), exchange (individualism), solidarity7 
(egalitarianism) and marginality (fatalism) (ibid: 110-10). Some o f the most characteristic 
patterns o f biases for the three major cultures are listed in the following table.66
66 Among cultural theorists ‘fatalism’ is often considered a residual culture, and is included in the framework 
for logical rather than empirical reasons. It can describe the attitudes of marginalised individuals, but it does 
not have any empirical counterparts at the organisational level. Marginalised individuals tend not to organise, 
and it is difficult to maintain an organisation on a fatalist cultural basis. Hence, ‘marginalists’ seldom exhibit 
political activity, although they can be understood as a ‘silent majority’ (Rayner 1992: 89-90).
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H ierarchy Individualism Egalitarianism
Cultural ‘Central- 
bias’






















Maintenance of stock (be­
cause of inherent fragility)
Concept o f fairness Equality before the law Equality of opportunity Equality o f outcome
Dominant temporal 
perspective
Balancing short and 
long term
Short term Long term













Adapted from Japp 1996: 122-24
The grid/group typology was originally developed in an anthropological context of pre­
modem, segmented societies, and it therefore seems pertinent to ask to what extent the 
model is adequate for the description o f modem, functionally differentiated societies (Gill 
2003: 33-34), It does not seem reasonable to expect that such a close linkage between social 
structure and ideologies as suggested by cultural theory is possible, as the structural features 
o f modem societies cannot be exhaustively described by just these two (or any two) vari­
ables without ignoring too much complexity. I do think, however, that this framework can 
be useful when observing many contemporary controversies over technologies as (at least 
partly) grounded in diverging framings not just of the technologies in question, but also of 
the surrounding institutions, some of which can be ascribed to diverging cosmologies.67 It 
must however be kept in mind that these descriptions are ideal typical. In some cultural 
theoretical work one can observe a tendency to confuse the ideal typical typology with ‘real 
types’ (Gill 2003: 35). I propose to apply the Cultural Theoretical model exclusively as an 
ideal typical classification, which can be used to explore and make sense of the empirical 
material. It is not expected that these cultural biases will necessarily be found empirically in
67 Hence the problem o f  incommensurability expounded by PeUizoni (2003a) (see Chapter II)-
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such distinct forms, but I assume that the cultures developed in the grid/group typology 
will represent some o f the major differences between central ‘types’ of actors in techno­
logical controversies, albeit in various composite forms. Therefore, the cultural theoretical 
framework can help us to understand why some organisations are willing and able to ab­
sorb some uncertainties and not others, as well as why they are willing to take the responsi­
bility for some decisions and not others.
The Cultural Theoretical perspective also directs out attention to the fact that the kind o f 
procedures being studied — which are meant to mitigate technological controversies — must 
devise ways not only to operate with a spectrum o f functional codes, but also to mediate 
between the different cultural modes of observation on technological choices. This is espe­
cially so if such procedures are to facilitate the creation o f trustful relations between actors 
with diverging worldviews.
Trust as a Sociological Phenom enon
It is often claimed or hoped that more trustful social relationships will be the product of 
increased public involvement in controversial technological domains. It is my impression, 
however, that what is actually entailed by the concept o f trust is not always clearly defined. 
Often, empirical investigations rely on what I consider as too individualistic (psychologi­
cal/psychometric) a concept of trust, perhaps because empirical research on ‘trust’ is often 
carried out as survey research. However, I believe that a systems theoretically inspired ap­
proach can provide important additions to more individualistic approaches. I will therefore 
devote a section to exploring the treatment of this topic more closely within the present 
theoretical approach.
During the 1990s trust was increasingly found on the social scientific agenda in relation to a 
number of contexts. In the study of technological controversies the idea of a trust deficit 
gradually replaced the perceived knowledge deficit as one of the explanations o f perpetual 
controversy. However, although the word (rust is quite mundane, it is by no means self- 
evident what it actually means in sociological terms.68 This has sparked a growing interest in 
understanding both on the theoretical and on the empirical level how trust can be under­
stood and how it operates. However, as early as 1968, long before the concept of trust be­
came topical in sociology, Luhmann published a book on trust understood as a mechanism 
that reduces social complexity, which in my opinion is still relevant for contemporary dis­
cussions.
One o f the major merits of Luhmann’s early discussion on trust was to make it clear that 
trust is not a phenomenon belonging to traditional, pre-modem societies. Trust is not lim­
ited to close relationships based on personal knowledge and shared values. It is not, as one
68 As such the shift from a ‘knowledge deficit’ to a 'trust deficit’ seems to express a certain epistemological 
embarrassment -  we don’t know what causes public unease, so we call it lack o f trust
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might think, a characteristic of Gemeinschaft rather than Gesellschaft. On the contrary, the 
need for trust as a mechanism to deal with the uncertainties and complexities of modem 
society is growing, rather than diminishing.69 It is
"... nicht erwarten, dass das F'ortschreiten dertechnisch-uissenschaftücben Zitilisation die Er­
eignisse unter Kontrolle bringen und Vertrauen als sozialen Mechanismus durch Sachbeherrschung 
ersetzen und so erübrigen werde. Eher wird man damit rechnen müssen, dass Vertrauen mehr und 
mehr in Anspruch genommen werden muss, damit technisch erzeugte Komplexität der Zukunft er­
tragen werden kann. ” (Luhmann 2000 [1968]: 20)
It can also be argued that different, and more differentiated, types o f trust are required in 
modem societies. As Piotr Sztompka argues, “there are some unique features of contempo­
rary societies that give particular salience to the problematics of trust.” (Sztompka 1999:
11). The most central of these features is, according to Sztompka and clearly inspired by 
Luhmann, that modem society is to an increasing degree marked by purposeful action, and 
the future depends to an increasing degree on decisions made today. This is certainly the 
case with regard to technological choices, which means that: “the common people have to 
trust all those who are involved in “representative activities” acting “on their behalf’ in the 
domain of government, economy, technology, science.” (Sztompka 1999:12). Sztompka 
goes on to argue that: “Large segments of the contemporary social world have become 
opaque for their members... Trust becomes an indispensable strategy to deal with the 
opaqueness of our social environment.” (Sztompka 1999:13). In Luhmann this is general­
ised to a solution to the problem of social complexity: "Sie (trust) stärkt die Gegenwart in ihrem 
Potential, Komplexität erfassen und zji reduzieren; sie stärkt die Bestände gegenüber den Ereignissen
und ermöglicht es daher, mit größerer Komplexität in Bezug auf Ereignisse zu leben und zu 
handeln” (Luhmann 2000: 18, emphasis in original). But how can Trust* be understood as a 
social mechanism, and can such considerations be made relevant for more empirical analy­
ses? This I shall discuss in the following with reference to Sztompka and Luhmann.
First, Sztompka argues that trust can only refer to human relations or capacities, and not to 
natural events. This is due to the fact that trust is only necessary because others have the 
freedom to act differently from what we expect. For Luhmann, this is not only the reason 
for which trust is necessary, but also a prerequisite for trust to be formed. Personal trust 
presupposes that individuals possess freedom of action, since it can only be vested in 
someone who is believed to be in control of his or her own actions. It would make no 
sense to trust someone who is either completely predictable or completely random in their 
behaviour. We could say that a trustworthy person must have a personality. This is in a 
sense also the case for trust in systems. Systems must be contingent, but not completely 
random, in their operations, in order to both require and to achieve trust.
69 A point also argued by Giddens (1991) -  with, I believe, some unacknowledged inspiration from Luhmann.
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Sztompka goes on to differentiate between confidence and trust, and claims that confi­
dence is due to an external attribution (one can be confident about something in a passive 
way and disappointment can be ascribed to agents other than oneself), whereas trust is an 
internal attribution (one chooses to trust someone or something and disappointments are 
ascribed to ones own excessive trustfulness) (Sztompka 1999: 24-25). As I see it, this is 
parallel to Luhmann’s claim that a certain familiarity (Vertrautheit) with the world is neces­
sary for expectations and trust to be formed in the first place. These preliminary considera­
tions lead Sztompka to define trust in the following way: Trust is a bet about the future contin­
gent actions of others. (Sztompka 1999: 25). This definition explicates the two main compo­
nents o f trust: a belief about the actions o f someone and a commitment. It only makes 
sense to talk about trust if the trustee can potentially act in different ways, and trust is only 
relevant if something is at stake. The parallel to this in Luhmann’s work is what he terms 
risky ‘pre-performance’ (riskanten Vorleistung) (Luhmann 2000: 27), which is established 
through an exaggeration of the available information. Things are assumed for which there 
is no evidence available. Hence, trust consists o f both knowledge and non-knowledge, and 
will always, in the final analysis, be ‘unfoundable’ (unbegriindbar) (Luhmann 2000: 31).
Sztompka also defines a symmetric ‘opposite’ to trust, ¿fcjtrust, which he defines as a nega­
tive bet (the anticipation that someone will behave in a certain way, which is negative in 
one’s own perspective). Luhmann emphasises this distinction in that he claims that trust is 
something which can be chosen. Hence, there must be alternatives to choose from, other­
wise there would be no choice. The obvious alternative is distrust, which in an abstract 
sense forms a functional equivalent to trust. Distrust can also reduce complexity for a sys­
tem in relation to its environment. However, it drastically reduces the capacity to act, be­
cause more information is required for someone who distrusts. Distrust also offers fewer 
opportunities for learning and therefore does not allow for the same degree of social com­
plexity to arise (Luhmann 2000: 93-94).
The relationship between trust and distrust is, according to Luhmann, regulated through 
thresholds, which are artificial discontinuities that allow for a multitude of experiences to 
be evaluated in relation to a single difference. It is not easy to say when trust is transformed 
into distrust, but someone who is trusted usually has a certain ‘credit’, which, when used 
up, suddenly becomes distrust, even if the event triggering the transformation is not appar­
ently all important. Since Luhmann has little specific to say about such thresholds, apart 
from the fact that they exist, it must be assumed that this will be an obvious subject for 
empirical investigation in specific cases.70 With regard to thresholds, trust and distrust are 
asymmetrical, since trust is more easily turned into distrust than the other way around. Ac­
cording to Luhmann, this is due to the fact that trust is not codified to the same extent as
70 With regard to die current study it also raises the question of how what may be considered a general un­
easiness with technological development is linked to the acceptance o f  specific products and trust in specific 
regulatory agpncies etc.
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other mechanisms for the reduction of complexity, like money, truth or justice (Luhmann 
2000: 118). It is also difficult to see how such a codification would occur, or what it could 
look like. A further reason for the asymmetry between trust and distrust is that trust in 
principle requires a build-up phase with many indications that a person or organisation is 
actually trustworthy. One proof does not necessarily justify trust. However, just one in­
stance of misconduct can justify the withdrawal of trust, its transformation into distrust.
Trust cannot be extended unconditionally, and mechanisms are needed which allow for 
trust to be withdrawn when expectations are not fulfilled. This will, according to Luhmann, 
seldom be based on thorough assessments of whether trust is justifiable or not, since the 
world is too complex for that; instead, it will depend on continuously monitored symbolic 
indicators (Luhmann 2000: 36-37). In this sense, the establishing o f  trust is dependent 
upon situations that are easy to interpret, and even more so on possibilities of communica­
tion. This can be seen in the discussions on how to manage the risks of biotechnology. The 
public does not ‘trust’ the producers and promoters of genetically engineered food. Hence, 
certain control mechanisms must be installed (if GM food is to be developed). However, 
since what is supposed to be controlled is beyond the sensory and cognitive capacity of lay 
people, other symbolic signal mechanisms are also required. This is typically achieved 
through the institutional independency, or the mechanisms of public accountability of con­
trolling agencies. What is noteworthy here is the reduction of complexity and ‘internali­
sation’ in social systems of the problem of trust. Most people do not understand GM food 
in its physical/technical sense (and they know this), yet they are convinced that they have a 
fairly good sense o f the credibility of institutions. The physical complexities of biological 
processes are shifted to the social dimension, where a ‘generalised’ trust is upheld through 
‘strategic’ distrust (control and surveillance mechanisms) at specific points.
Sztompka differentiates analytically between three types o f commitments that the ‘bef in­
volved in trusting can consist of: anticipatory, responsive and evocative trust. Anticipatory 
trust means that one expects that others will behave in a certain way, which in the case o f 
trust will be in one’s interest (and in the case of distrust will be to one’s disadvantage), 
whether they are aware of the trust vested in them or not. In addition to such expectations, 
responsive trust entails an expectation that others are responsive to the trust shown them. 
For instance, people will take good care o f things lent to them and so forth. Evocative trust 
furthermore entails the expectation that others will reciprocate the trust vested in them, 
they will return favours, and in time eventually emotional bonds will result from showing 
trust.
Sztompka also emphasises the close relation between trust and risk, in the sense that show­
ing trust is equivalent to ‘bracketing out’ a risk; it is a way of absorbing the uncertainties o f 
future events. If one chooses to believe the experts claiming that GM  food is safe, then one 
no longer needs worry about this, and can direct attention towards other issues (provided 
there are no other reasons to object to GM food). However, this indicates a paradoxical
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situation, since showing trust is in itself a risky operation. Hence, it can be argued that: 
“Trust copes with one type o f risk by trading it for another type of risk.” (Sztompka 1999: 
32). Luhmann describes this as a process whereby ‘outer’ (system-external) uncertainties are 
transformed into ‘inner’ uncertainties, which are easier for the system to manage and ab­
sorb (Luhmann 2000).
Trust can be vested in different types of actors or systems. Sztompka differentiates be­
tween five different targets o f trust: persons, social roles, social groups, procedures and 
technological systems (Sztompka 1999: 41-44). It seems to be stating the obvious by saying 
that one can place trust in persons, whether known personally or through the mass media. 
However, one can also trust persons qua their social roles. For instance, doctors, judges, 
policemen and the like are all expected to behave in trustworthy ways as a function of their 
role, separately from their personality.71 It is also possible to assign trust or distrust on the 
basis o f group membership, even if one does not know the members personally. Obvi­
ously, all sorts o f stereotypes are involved here. Procedural trust is not vested directly in 
actors, but rather in action systems or institutions, for instance trust in the independence 
and fairness of courts, or trust in scientific procedures as the best way to achieve valid 
knowledge. One can also place trust in technological systems. This is often done without 
reflection and issues of trust only arise when things do not go as expected (when causal 
simplification breaks down). I lowever, it is important to note that the trust placed in tech­
nological systems or ‘expert systems’ is not tied to technological artefacts, but relies on 
trust in the competence and good will o f the actors operating or producing the technologi­
cal systems. As such then, what seems to be trust in technological systems (which may be 
more based on familiarity or habit) will entail normative expectations concerning the peo­
ple operating them. This is why it is important to find the element that is ‘responsible’ 
when something goes wrong, even if this entails causal simplifications unwarranted by the 
events (BonB 1995: 35).
As touched upon previously, in addition to the primary7 targets of trust, one can also speak 
of secondary7 targets of trust or agencies ensuring the reliability o f primary trust. The prime 
example in this context is trust in experts claiming that primary targets of trust, technologi­
cal systems, are trustworthy. Sztompka talks about ‘pyramids of trust’ (Sztompka 1999: 47), 
and these are often dependent on various agencies of accountability, that is some sort of 
control mechanism such as the right of public assess to administrative decisions or scien­
tific peer review. These must in turn be trustworthy in order to fulfil their functions — and 
in this sense trust becomes reflexive. Here, Luhmann points to another peculiar asymmetry 
between trust and distrust. Trust and distrust are also asymmetrical in the sense that the 
systems, in which trust and mistrust are vested, see them differently. When somebody 
trusts you, you can perceive this to be a result of you being trustworthy. However, the op­
71 And when some do not live up to expectations, distrust may afflict whole professional groups.
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posite is not likely to be the case. If  somebody distrusts you, it is more likely that you will 
interpret this as the result of misinterpretations or insufficient communication. Neither 
persons nor systems are likely to see themselves as untrustworthy. However, when trust 
becomes reflexive, persons and systems are able to reflect upon the observation that others 
do not trust in them. Scientists can wonder why it is that their expertise and advice are not 
trusted by lay people. But even if communication is required in order for trust to be ex­
tended, trust as such cannot be directly communicated. If a person or an organisation ex­
plicitly claims to be trustworthy, this is likely to have the opposite effect. Instead, “(njersich 
Vertrauen erwerben mil, muss am sosgalen Leben teilnehmen und in derLage sein,fremde Erwartungen 
in die eigene SelbstdarsteUung ein^tibauen” (Luhmann 2000: 80)
Sztompka notes that the various types of trust are not mutually independent. There are in­
teractions between personal and positional trust, and furthermore there appears to be a 
spillover effect between different social institutions. This is, as discussed earlier, clearly 
demonstrated in the effect of the BSE scandal on the confidence expressed in other ex­
perts making claims about the safety of GMOs (Gaskell et al. 2001:77).
The types of expectations involved in trust relationships vary according to context. 
Sztompka also discusses three analytically distinct types of expectations involved in ‘bets’ 
of trust: instrumental, axiological and fiduciary, each of which are progressively more de­
manding on the trustee. Instrumental trust involves expectations o f regularity of conduct, 
reasonableness and efficiency. Axiological trust entails responses such as kindness or civil­
ity, truthfulness or authentic behaviour and fair or just treatment Fiduciary trust is still 
more demanding, as it entails disinterestedness, representative actions (actions on the be­
half of others) and generosity. In a sense this classification describes something that is in­
creasingly demanding on the trustee. However, it is important to realise that “(expectations 
involved in trust are congruent or incongruent with the nature of objects toward which 
trust is directed. Specific expectations fit to specific objects, and do not fit to others,” 
(Sztompka 1999: 55). In the present theoretical context I take this to mean that the expec­
tations involved in various formations of trust follow the functional differentiation of soci­
ety. This means that a general formula of trust takes the form of ‘A trusts B to do X’ 
(Sztompka 1999: 55). Different expectations are directed towards family-members, bank 
advisors and scientists, that is they are role-specific and institution-specific. This, as I see it, 
is an important reason why cognitive investigations of trust-building mechanisms cannot 
provide adequate explanations of why some experts are trusted whilst others are not, with­
out endowing the investigation with a historical and socio-structural index.72
In relation to technological controversies trust is primarily discussed as ‘public trust’, the 
trust of a (mostly unspecified) public towards the organisations innovating and regulating 7
7- Being a scientist and applying ‘scientific methods' does not in itself command trust in contemporary society • 
because scientists and scientific organisations have in some instances proven unreliable or incompetent. «ô1* ***/>-.
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new technologies (and rarely their trust in ‘the public’ although this perspective can be said 
to be relevant in some of my cases). Here trust is usually equated with ‘acceptance’. How­
ever, the (somewhat elaborate) conceptual considerations undertaken here — which aim at 
locating trust not in individual minds, but in social organisation — explicate at least two 
points of interest to the current investigation.
Although trust is usually give a positive valorisation (trust is preferable to distrust) one 
should be careful in assuming that trust is always desirable, partly because there are clear 
instances where knowledge (control) is preferable for all. However, the asymmetries in­
volved in relationships of trust also mean that where trustfulness is practically always pref­
erable for the trustee, it is only preferable for the trusting party if the trust granted is ‘justi­
fied’. So public trust is preferable for a regulatory agency independently of whether or not 
it really controls the issues at hand (it avoids complexities), whereas this is not the case for 
the public. A further asymmetry between trust and distrust is that trust is usually not com­
municated unless a reciprocal relationship is sought Trust can, so to speak, operate without 
being articulated. This is not so for distrust, which is usually only effective when articu­
lated. Therefore, the problem o f public trust is usually only communicated about when 
trust is absent — although of course a number of organisations have reflexively become 
aware that trustworthiness must be established prospectively rather than retrospectively. In 
the case studies these considerations will be used to explore in more detail how relation­
ships of trust are configured differently in the different contexts the cases span. Here I shall 
attempt to pursue a little further in theoretical terms how the other element in public trust 
can be understood within the systems theoretical paradigm, namely that of ‘the public’.
The Public as a Com m unication System
The purpose o f  this investigation is to explore how different pleas for more ‘public in­
volvement’ in the management o f technological risks have resulted in the devising o f spe­
cialised, ‘deliberative’ procedures, how such procedures are shaped, and what effects they 
have. It is therefore necessary to reflect a little on how a concept o f ‘the public’ can be un­
derstood within the theoretical framework suggested in this chapter.73 However, it should 
be kept in mind that one assumption underpinning the investigation is that ‘the public* is 
not a well-defined sociological entity, but a phenomenon that is actively constructed. 
Therefore, what is sought here is not an exhaustive definition o f ‘the public’ on the basis of
73 The word ’public’ has several meanings depending on what is considered its ‘opposite’. Three of the most 
important are: Public as opposed to secretive. This means that something is transparent and open to scrutiny 
by all. Secondly, public can be opposed to private, meaning something which is o f  collective concern. It is in 
this meaning that the Habermasian concept o f  a reasoning public is conceived. Thirdly, public can be under­
stood as ‘Publikum’, as the object of the decrees o f  authorities or the audience o f  mass-mediated messages. 
All three meanings (and possibly more) tend to intermingle in the debates on public involvement, which can 
then take on multiple meanings.
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the theoretical considerations, but some reflections on how ‘the public’ and its various op­
erationalisations can be approached as an object of research.
On the conceptual level social scientific research is confronted with the fact that although 
‘the public’ if often referred to in a number of contexts, there is no unanimous understand­
ing of what it actually is. As argued by Neidhardt:
“iff modem democracies the publicplays an important role -  but nobody seems to know exatily 
what the public is. Although this phenomenon has beenfrequently and emphatically refected on since 
the beginning of the 'Enlightenment, it has not ceased to be a rather mysterious phenomenon. Within 
the rhetorics of modernity the public and, even more so, its apparent output, namely public opinion \ 
function mainly as afiction -  afiction which refers to some kind of volonté général, reminding us of 
the elementary semantics of democracy; and that means that this is afiction which is not only pucç 
cjing, but also dignified. ” (Neidhardt 1993: 339)
‘The public’ understood as the public sphere (Öffentlichkeit) does not play a central role in 
Luhmann’s theorising. In particular, Luhmann does not endow it with the normative func­
tion it is given by Habermas, for whom the public sphere is a communicative structure 
linking a non-systemic lifeworld to the organisations and functional subsystems, and as 
such is given the task of articulating a collective will that should condition the operations o f 
the latter. This is the understanding usually implied in the discourses on public involvement 
with technology. However, I will argue that systems theoretical considerations may be use­
ful when approaching processes by which a public is actively constituted. It is possible to 
ask by what distinctions ‘the public’ is observed by organisations that observe the public as 
part of their (relevant) environment.
In systems theory the concept o f the public is closely related to the workings of the mass 
media as a functional subsystem o f modem societies. The role of the mass media is formu­
lated rather abstractly by Luhmann. It ‘directs the self-observation o f the societal system* 
(Luhmann 1996b: 173). However, instead of seeing the mass media as the institutional and 
organisational locus of the process of forming a (consensual) collective will, Luhmann sug­
gests that the mass media serves to produce communicative ‘irritations’ that synchronise 
the attention of the various societal systems (as well as that of individuals). As Luhmann 
argues at the beginning of his book on the mass media system, practically everything we 
know about society and the world, we know from the mass media (ibid: 9). The mass me­
dia produce knowledge that is available to everyone who wants it, and, which is neither 
specifically cognitive (i.e. directed at the kind of learning going on in the scientific system), 
nor normative (i.e. directed at the maintenance of norms ensured by the legal system) (ibid: 
175). One could say that the mass media serves a memory function for society by selecting 
what is ‘memorable’ (information, news that deserves to be communicated and perhaps re- 
actualised) and what can be forgotten (non-information, old news). All complex systems 
have specific memory' functions, but the mass media serves to maintain a certain level of 
shared references across different societal domains. As such, the mass media have specific
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selection criteria (news/not-news), which are not necessarily congruent with the opera­
tional modes of other systems but which they are often forced to react to.
However, ‘the public* (German: Öffentlichkeit) is not equated with the communication of 
the mass media system. It is instead defined as the society-internal environment o f social 
systems.74 In this formulation ‘the public* acquires the status o f a system internal construct 
(rather than a social entity). Systems see themselves as being observed by ‘someone* in their 
environment, reflects this (makes it a theme of internal communication) and in some in­
stances modifies its own operations according to what it believes will reduce complexity in 
relation to this environment (without, o f  course, abandoning the distinction between the 
system and its environment). In this understanding, ‘the public* is not a social entity, that is 
something which can be observed as such, nor is it a functional system, or even an organi­
sation. In principle it is ‘free-floating’ communication that resonates across various societal 
contexts and is observed in different ways from within the various systems making up soci­
ety. This resonance is usually carried (and often amplified) by the mass media and is avail­
able to everyone, but can also be more specialised in its ‘issue-* or ‘sub-publics ’ (e.g. ‘the 
scientific community’, ‘the NGO community* or ‘the business world’). O f course some sys­
tems are more sensitive to the themes resonating in ‘the public’ and communicated in the 
mass media. From the political system it is observed as ‘public opinion’, something the po­
litical system must by nature be sensitive to, probe into and often ‘respond* to. “Obnwbl\ ja  
weil die Öffentlichkeit politisch nicht entscheiden kann, sondern genissermaßen außerhalb der Grenzen des 
Systems der Politik liegt, mrd sie in der Politik politisch benutzt und ins System hineinkopiertP 
(Luhmann 1996b: 187-88). Other societal systems are less sensitive in their operations to 
the themes resonating in the public, for instance science or the legal system, although or­
ganisations, operating on the basis of their codes, may observe themes from the public and 
let their decisions be influenced by them to varying degrees. Scientific communication is 
extremely unlikely to change on the code (true or false) or programmatic (theories used to 
formulate hypotheses and interpret data) levels as a result of public opposition articulated 
in the mass media. However, research organisations may choose to abandon certain re­
search areas and take up others that are more likely to win public approval, or be pressured 
to investigate certain topics more thoroughly than they otherwise would.
Being the object o f public attention will typically have consequences for the operations o f a 
system.
i(Wenn das System... reflektiert; daß es von außen beobachtet wird, ohne daß schon feststünde, wie 
und durch wen, begrifft es sich selbst als beobachtbar im Medium der Öffentlichkeit Das kann, 
muß aber nicht, %?tr Orientierung an generalisierbaren (öffentlich vertretbaren) Gesichtspunkten flih-
74 "... als gesellschaßsinteme Umweh der gesellschaftlichen Teilsysteme, also aller Interaktionen und Organisationen, aber auch 
der gesellschaftliche» Funktionsystem und der socialen Beilegungen " (Luhmann 1996b: 184-5).
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ren. Funktional äquivalente Strategien sind solche der Gehdmhaltung oder solche der Heuchelei. 
(Luhmann 1996b: 185)
When systems of whatever kind are confronted with the attention o f the public, they will 
typically be constrained to respond in one way or another in order to limit the resonance 
that may be created as a result, and which may make the environment even more complex 
to operate in. As such, a system can attempt to reduce the complexity of its environment 
by communicating that what it is doing is in the ‘public interest* (perhaps by attempting to 
‘re-frame’ an issue), it can attempt to make its activities invisible to the environment or it 
can become hypocritical, i.e. communicate that it is doing something other than it in fact is.
In this approach ‘the public’ or ‘public opinion’ is understood as something observed from 
within systems as being located in the environment but with relevance for the operations of 
the system. This ‘something* is neither an interaction system (which would require co­
presence), an organisation (which would require membership regulation and ‘decision- 
making*, but membership is not regulated and the public does not make decisions) or a 
functional system (‘the public’ does not operate according to a well-defined code, it can 
only reflect the workings and effects of the codes of other systems). This approach is com­
patible with the more conventional understanding of the public as a mixture of actor- and 
audience-elements (Bora 1999: 72), where actor-roles are characterised by possessing a 
‘voice-option’ and audience only an ‘exit-option’ in Hirshman’s classical terms. Most of the 
time individuals and organisations form part of the audience (or are not paying any atten­
tion) and sometimes they participate actively in contributing to public communication. Ac­
cording to systems theory the chances of achieving resonance for one’s contributions vary 
significantly in different systemic contexts, although it does not spell out exactly how. It is 
unspecific about which factors are decisive for whether public communication is likely to 
be observed as relevant within the modes o f observation in particular contexts. This is the 
object of more specialised theorising and empirical knowledge.
If the public does not equate with the mass media system neither is it exhausted in the 
phenomenon of protest or social movements. Protest actors (organisations or movements) 
are clearly important contributors to communication in ‘the public sphere’ or the mass me­
dia, which some organisations see as their relevant ‘public’ environment. Protest move­
ments and the mass media system clearly operate in a symbiotic fashion, as movements of­
ten deliver the kind of communication that have significant news-value according to the 
selection criteria o f mass media organisations (surprises, visually spectacular events, con­
flicts, scandals, moralisation etc.) and are often dependent on doing so in order to survive 
in the media market (Eder 1996a). Social movements, however, are not ‘the public’, they 
address the public in the hope and expectation that their framing o f events will ‘resonate’ 
or create additional communication, perhaps across different societal sectors, and exert
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pressure on those ‘responsible*.75 Against this conceptual background, how may we then 
interpret the call for increased involvement o f ‘the public’ and the procedures seeking to 
operationalise such involvement?
Public Participation Postulates Revisited
In approaching this question I shall draw inspiration from Alfons Bora (1999), who has 
undertaken a thorough, Luhmann-inspired discussion o f the functions and effects o f  the 
increased influence o f participatory semantics in relation to technology.
With the transformation to a functionally differentiated society, where the production and 
distribution o f  practically all social products are maintained via functional systems (and 
their central organisations), questions concerning the inclusion and exclusion o f individuals 
from these systems become central. Who belongs in which systems (and how) must be de­
cided. The overall trend is one o f all-inclusion, in empirical as well as normative observa­
tions. In principle, no one should be excluded from enjoying the benefits of the central 
functional systems of modem societies. Historically, this is expressed by gradually increas­
ing inclusion in practically all domains: expansion of the franchise, increased access to edu­
cation, equality before the law, freedom for research, freedom to trade, freedom to publi­
cise and so forth. As argued in short by Bora: “Inklusion istin dieser Hinsicbtfiir modem Gesell- 
scbafien der normative Standard, Exklusion ist dagegen regelmàjüg gesondert legitimationsbedmfti£
(Bora 1999: 11). At the same time the systems developed sophisticated internal structures 
defining and distributing roles for the inclusion of individuals. That everyone becomes sub­
ject to the rule o f law does not mean that everyone gets to be a judge or a lawyer, just as 
the franchise for all does not mean that everyone gets to participate in all political deci­
sions. N or do freedom to do scientific research entitle everyone to have research funded or 
published. There are important intra-systemical and -organisational procedures that regu­
late more specific issues of inclusion and exclusion. However, Bora also notes a more ex­
pansive understanding o f social inclusion understood as active participation, which runs under 
labels such as ‘public’, ‘citizens’ or ‘affected’ particpation (ibid: 11). This entails a move­
ment o f  individuals (and in some instances organisations) from an audience to an actor 
role. Bora ascribes these demands for increased involvement in a wide spectrum of con­
texts primarily to the increasing complexity o f modem societies:
75 If we take as an example the much debated ‘Brent Spar affair’, where Shell was forced to change its plans 
about dumping an oilrig at high sea, Greenpeace may be the initiator o f  the debacle, but Greenpeace cannot 
be said to  be ‘the public’ (or represent the public for that matter). However, Greenpeace brought the plans of 
Shell to the attention o f  the public in a manner that resonated forcefully. The ‘place’ in which this resonance 
is expressed is o f  course primarily mass mediated communication, but the mass media ‘is’ not the public ei­
ther. Resonance is only achieved because the mass media outlets manage to attract and maintain the interest 
o f  an audience. And it is with reference to this resonating audience that Greenpeace could ‘pressure’ Shell 
into changing its plans — Shell began to see itself as observed by its environment in a way that inhibited its 
mode o f  operation (profit making in the long run).
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“A h  Ursachenßir diesen Trend zfi mehr oder erwâterter Participation werden vor allem die stei­
gende Komplexität moderner Gesellschaften, die Steuenmgsprobleme nach sich zieht und deswegen 
kooperative Tormen politischen Handelns nahe legt, sonie schwindende Akzeptanz staatlichen 
Handelns ausgemacht**. (ibid: 12, footnote omitted)
In what Bora calls consensual theories of social integration, among which he counts theo­
ries of deliberative democracy, in particular in its Habermasian version, increased participa­
tion (the inclusion o f individuals) is more or less equated with increased social integration.76 
In Habermas
... hängt gesellschaftliche Integration letztlich von lebensweltächer Selbstbehauptung ab, aho davon, 
ob es gelingt, soviel lebensweltliche Nationalität (Sittlichkeit) gegenüber medienvermittelten System - 
imperative, Tendenzen der Verrechtlichung und damit schließäch der Kolonisierung derLebensweä 
Z/t behaupten, daß der Zugang zyt den kbensweltächen Strukturen ßir die Geseüschaftsmiiglieder 
selbst nicht verschüttet nird (Bora 1999: 45)
Therefore
., müsse der Expertenäskurs mit der demokratischen Meinungs- und Wiüensbildung rückge­
koppelt werden, wenn man nicht Gefahr laufen wolle, die Problemwahmehumungen der Experten 
gegen äe Bürgerin Form eines „legitimaäonsgefährdenden Systempatemalismus” einfach nur durch- 
zytsetzyn. ” (ibid: 51)
Although not all participation semantics refer to the sophisticated theoretical reasoning 
found in Habermas, Bora believes that Habermas’ writings represent a fairly adequate re­
construction (and legitimation) of the demands for increased public involvement in a num­
ber of societal domains. Bora adds, however, that in a number of domains where various 
types of public involvement and participation have actually been organized, this has not 
necessarily led to the kind of absorption o f protest and strengthened legitimacy of govern­
ance envisioned by the protagonists of such procedures. Discontentment with procedures 
often continues or is aggravated in such instances, and ‘immunising* effects in the systems 
and organisations confronted with public demands for involvement can sometimes be ob­
served, as they see themselves confronted with what they consider an inappropriate politi­
cisation of their operations. In the deliberative democracy framework these immunizing 
effects can only be observed as pathologies arising either from an inadequate or insufficient 
(unfair) implementation of deliberative procedures, or as a (alienating) lack of responsive­
76 “Ahgeradezu klassisch kam  in der Soziologe äe Vorsteüunggelten, nach der soziale Integration einen me immer näher z»  
definierenden Zustand der Einheit darsleät, in mlchem äe Teile ä s geseüschaftlicben Ganzen zusammengefaßt sind. Wenn und 
soweit Gesellschaften integriert sind, heißt das, nehmen ihre Element an der Einheit ä s Ganzen teil, ja  sie bilden sie durch ihre 
Verbindung überhaupt erst. Einheit entsteht aho nur über eine Beteiligung ässen, was in der betreffenän Theorie ah Element 
ä r  Gesellschaft behanält nird. Im Hinblick auflnätiduen beäutet dos dann:gesellschaftliche Integration nird über äe E in­
bindung von Personen in soziale Prozesse, mit anderen Worten über ihn Teilnahme ßiitsprachemöglichkeit) bzyv. Teilhabe an 
Kommunikationen (Mögüchkeit, über äe Regln der Teilnahme mit zu entscheiden) erzeugt; Partizipation stellt dann eine not- 
wenäge l ''oraussetzjmg gesellschaftlicher Integration dar: Vm g kehrt laßt sich daraus ä r  Schluß ableiten, Diffennzallgemein 
und soziale Differenzierung im besonänn seien peräfinitionem mit Desintegration gleichzusetzen. ’’(Bora 1999: 38-39).
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ness o f the functional systems and organisations to the expectations and requirements of 
the life-world as explicated through collective deliberation.
As an alternative to this Bora suggests, with reference to Luhmann, that we may see the 
inclusion of individuals in society and social integration as two separate phenomena which 
need not necessarily be related.77 In this approach, inclusion designates a mode of observa­
tion o f  individuals within social systems, whereas social integration has to do with the struc­
tural couplings between the various subsystems of society. In systems theoretical terms in­
clusion has to do with how psychic and social systems interpenetrate and integration with the 
production and maintenance o f structural couplings that enable social systems, that consti­
tute one another’s environment, to place performances at each other’s disposal in produc­
tive ways.78 As these are two distinct phenomena, says Bora, it cannot be expected as a mat­
ter o f principle that an increased observation of the form "person’ in social systems neces­
sarily leads to an increased ability for social systems to create (productive) resonance 
amongst themselves.
Inclusion — as the observation o f persons in social systems — can mean a number o f things. 
As mentioned above, in principle all persons are included in the major functional systems 
of modem society. However, they are so in differentiated ways, which are largely regulated 
through membership in organisations. This theoretical approach conceives o f ‘public par­
ticipation’ as a particular mode o f inclusion (Inklus ions modus) (ibid: Chapter 2.2). If  one 
understands the concept of the public (Öffentlichkeit) as a mixture of actor and audience 
elements, the ‘default inclusion’ o f most individuals in functional systems is as the ‘audi­
ence’ in one form or another (subjects to the rule of law, voters, lay people observing scien­
tists, non-owners of most property etc.). In this perspective the semantics of participation 
thus entails claims that (certain) individuals and organisations should be ‘moved’ from an 
audience to an actor role, be equipped with ‘voice-options’ rather than just ‘exit-options’. 
O f course ‘the public’ cannot be included in organisational contexts as a macro-actor. 
Therefore, it is necessary for the organisations that are interested in inputs from ‘the public’ 
to find ways through which contributions from various issue-publics can be communicated 
and thereby be made observable in the communication o f functional subsystems and or­
ganizations. The non-localised resonance o f  public opinion is expected to be ‘embodied’ by 
specific individuals or organisations with whom dialogic interaction can be established, and
77 “Inklusion ist nach diesem Verständnis ein spezifischer Modus der Beobachtung von Menschen in sozialen Systemen, der 
nicht in der W'eise unmittelbare mit gesellschaftlicher Integration in Zusammenhanggebracht werden kann, nie die Konsenstbeo- 
rie vorschlägt” (Bora 1999: 58).
78 Inklusion, das kann als allgemeine Funktionsbestimmung nun festgehedien werden, bezeichnet eine spezifische Fotm
der Beobachtung von Menschen in Kommunikationssystemen, nämlich ¿de A r t und Weise, in der Menschen in 
Kommunikationszusammenhängen als "Personen” behandelt werden. Inklusion..., bedeutet dann, daß ein autopoietisches psy­
chisches System, das a i f  der Basis von Bewußtsein operiert, seine Eigenkomplexität Auft>au sozialer System r Verfü­
gung stellt. ” (Bora 1999: 64).
I
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to that end specialised communicative and organisational contexts are (arguably increas­
ingly) evolving.
In Bora’s conceptualisation there is an intimate relationship between the calls for increased 
involvement of the public and the emergence of risk issues in modem societies (ibid: 77). 
As discussed above the risk thematic in the systems theoretical approach is observed 
through the distinctions between risk and danger, which in the social dimension is tied to 
the distinction between decision-makers and those affected by decisions. The inclusion o f a 
wider circle of people in decision-making forums thus in a sense serves to reconfigure the 
decision-maker/affected distinction with the purpose to absorb protesty if not to do away 
with it.79
As argued above, the uncertainties entailed in decision-making can to some extent be off­
loaded between the different functional systems through structural couplings. However, 
when this does not work in ways that convince ‘the public’ (which sees itself as exposed to 
dangers), protest is likely to emerge. And many an organisation (in politics, science or the 
economy) has experienced that such protest can at times resonate quite significantly in the 
public sphere, often leading to demands o f ‘responsible behavior’ among those in charge. 
Those protesting are rarely willing or able to take over responsibility completely (this role is 
reserved for the opposition within the political system) — however, at times it seems prom­
ising to consult them, exactly to absorb some of the protest potential. This can be seen as 
an important functional (rather than normative) reason behind the increased interest in 
public involvement (cf. Chapter II) and the differentiation of intermediating organisations, 
such as (P)TA institutions.80
Challenges to Public Involvem ent Procedures
Using the theoretical concepts unfolded above, I will now suggest a systems theoretical re­
construction of the social location of public involvement procedures. I shall also draw on 
the theoretical reflections to suggest certain challenges such procedures are likely be faced 
with when observed from this perspective. It must be kept in mind that these are theoreti­
75 “Mit der Einebnung von Entscheider-Betroffenen-Differenzen fallt der Öffentlichkeitsbeteiligung also 
ganz offensichtlich die Funktion zu, Protest zu absorbieren(Bora 1999; 81).
80 Bora has the following to say about the legalSystem *s mereased involvement o f  the public in administrative 
decisions regarding the licensingofcontroversial technologics: “Wo Systeme über Leisfungsbefiehungen nur lose 
gekoppelt sind, soll dann womöglich Inklusionsvertief mg asfunktionales Äquivalent eintreten. Zurechnungsprobleme bei Risiko- 
entsebeidungen lassen es verlockend erscheinen, sich angesichts des Versagens von Politik und Wissenschaft wenigstens die Zu­
stimmung derpotentiell Betroffenen tu  sidxm, also etn-a im Falle von raumzpitlich schwer eingrenzbaren Folgen neuer Technolo­
gienjedemann die Teilnahme am konkreten Normbildungs- undEntsdmdungsprozeß z*  gestatten, um mögliche Gefahren gut 
identifizieren, das Verfahren Z?< kontrollieren und genehmigungsrelevante Sachtvrhalte präzisieren. Dies ändert nicht die
Unsicherheit der Entscheidung soll aber im Idealfall den Aurfali ton Politik und Wissenschifft kompensieren, die das Recht mit 
der Entscheidung über die Genehmigung neuer Technik allein gelassen haben, ohne z?norgeseüschfftlichen Konsens über die 
wesentliche Tatbestände sicherzytstellen!' (Bora 1999: 84)
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cal projections, mere tools for the empirical investigations o f the subsequent chapters. 
They serve to guide my empirical attention, not to foreclose the results.
The kind of technological controversies that have a locus in public concerns, declining trust 
in technologists and regulators and a potential for mobilisation are primarily observed in 
the political system as the communication ofprotest from more or less well-organised actors 
on the periphery of the political system.61 Concerns or discontent among members o f the 
citizenry that are not articulated (nor induce resonance) in the public sphere are unlikely to 
have any impact.81 2 O f course, concerns or discontentment are also observed by organisa­
tions operating primarily in other functional systems, for example a research organisation 
experiencing concerns over research methods (animal experiments, research on human foe­
tuses) or economic organisations experiencing targeted boycotts or unorganised declining 
sales (e.g. food scares pertaining to certain products). However, independently of where 
such ‘problems’ are observed, they are usually (also) addressed to the political system with 
demands that ‘action’ must be taken. As suggested by Cultural Theory this location on the 
periphery of the political system is likely to mean that the concerns selected for attention 
are not those that are central to decision makers. This may lead to collisions o f different 
problem framings in different arenas.
As systems theory assumes that the functional systems o f modem societies are autopoietic, 
it claims that the political systems cannot ‘steer’ the operations o f other functional systems 
in any detail. They can only condition certain contextual features under which they are op­
erating — what Willke has discussed under the heading o f decentralised context-steering 
(dezentrale Kontextsteuerung) (Willke 1987,1996). For instance, the political system can­
not produce scientific knowledge or technological innovation, but it can seek to condition 
scientific knowledge production to develop in certain directions rather than others through 
the channelling o f financial incentives and legal regulation.
O f course a multitude of configurations o f  such strategies for conditioning the operations 
of the functional systems and their organisations are possible. However, for the sake o f 
analytical parsimony I suggest here that we may distinguish between two overall strategies, 
which I will describe as aiming at either a strict or loose structural coupling between the 
functional domains.
By strict structural couplings between subsystemic rationalities I mean situations where the 
functional systems condition each others’ operations in well-defined and unambiguous 
manners. In the area of risk regulation this will mean for instance that the political systems
81 By periphery I m ean that they contribute to political communication, and seek to influence decision­
making, bu t they rarely contend for political positions or conceive o f  themselves as part o f the political estab­
lishment
82 The can be considered ‘marginal* in the cultural theoretical sense.
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unambiguously defines the levels of required protection, which are then (at least in princi­
ple) legitimised as collectively binding and ideally ensure the public acceptance of technolo­
gies. The political system then delegates to the scientific system the competence to define 
the cognitive equivalent of this level of protection, typically in terms of limit values (with a 
certain margin, which is usually also left to the scientists to decide). These limit values are 
then applied by the legal system to grant licenses and to monitor whether punishable viola­
tions are taking place. If violations of limit values are observed, these are sanctioned (typi­
cally fined), and economic actors see it as in their interests to stay within the boundaries set 
by the legal frameworks. This is obviously an iterative process. If at some later point it is 
discovered that the limit values do not provide the politically required level of protection, 
they are modified through more research. If it turns out that market actors realise that it is 
profitable to violate them, the fines are modified accordingly. This description is of course 
grossly oversimplified compared to real life processes. However, the point is that when 
public concerns and protest is observed, a regime based on strict structural couplings will 
respond by attempting to minimise the scope for ambiguity in its intersystemic relations. 
This is for instance seen in the insistence that risk regulation should be founded on ‘sound 
science’ or be ‘evidence based’ — and the management of uncertainty and knowledge defi­
cits is delegated to science, which is equipped with a cognitive monopoly. The influence of 
other considerations and the idiosyncrasies o f individual research organisations or regula­
tory organisations are minimised, which means that the domain over which science-based 
organisations can preside is curtailed, yet scientific organisations are accorded autonomy 
within it. Similarly, strict interpretations of and adherence to legal programming will be ob­
served by administrative organisations in order to avoid subsequent criticism.83
Opting for strict structural couplings typically means that processes such as risk regulation 
will be characterised by a high degree of organisational specialisation. As a consequence, 
their functions will be carried out by self-referential ‘epistemic communities’ or techno­
cratic organisations, which are often seen as intransparent to the public and considered dif­
ficult to hold accountable to political agencies. Therefore, ‘independency’ and ‘transpar­
ency’ become keywords when organisations are put under pressure. However, at least in 
certain cases, such organisations are unable absorb protest and command public trust, in 
particular when problem definitions are not shared with those inclined to protest and issues 
begin to resonate in the public sphere.
In such situations strict structural couplings — often hierarchically ordered — are increasingly 
seen as inadequate for the governance o f modem societies. The autonomy of the func­
tional system means that in growing complexity, they not only condition one another’s op-
83 Such tendencies are reported for instance in the administration o f  the first German law on genetic engi­
neering, which demonstrated severe difficulties in legally codifying ‘good scientific practice’. In following all 
the rules laid down, the experiments that the law was meant to regulate (but also enable through permission) 
became virtually impossible to carry out (Hasse and Gill 1994).
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erations but produce externalities, which they ‘load o ff on each other. Politics cannot pro­
duce sufficient legitimacy, nor science sufficient cognitive certainty, nor the legal system 
sufficient acceptance o f its rulings, nor the economic system acceptable distribution of 
goods. These inadequacies are subsequently shifted around between the different systemic 
and organisational contexts.
A different strategy is to loosen the coupling between the functional domains, to allow 
more ambiguity in the interactions between the different systems. This may stimulate sys­
tems to be self-governing, and through the observations of feed-back mechanisms to build 
up an understanding of the effects of their own operations in their environment (Willke 
1996).84 This leads to a differentiation o f arenas of mutual observation and interaction be­
tween organisations otherwise operating primarily within one functional domain. To 
strengthen learning processes in such arenas and the public legitimacy of their outputs, in­
clusion o f ‘the public’ is often seen as desirable.
The kind of ‘organised’ public involvement investigated in this thesis can be seen as delib­
erate attempts to create arenas where different viewpoints, perceptions, and biases can 
‘meet’ each other. Here they may, potentially, be mediated in more holistic assessments of 
technologies — taking into consideration several systemic perspectives, than would other­
wise be the case — and thus absorb some o f the potential for public dissatisfaction. In doing 
so, the participatory rhetoric discussed earlier clearly serves legitimatory and inspirational 
functions, as the search for legitimacy is pursued by the inclusion o f persons or organisa­
tions that would not ‘normally’ be required for the maintenance o f the functions of the or­
ganisations in charge of, say, risk management. However, from a systems analytical mode 
of observation, it is also possible to identify certain challenges to such procedures, which 
can be seen as clues as to where empirical attention should be directed.
One basic premise of autopoietic systems theory is that on the level of the functional sys­
tems there can be no ‘mediation’ or code-syntheses. The codes o f the functional systems 
are binary and cannot change their ‘other side’, nor can they have more than two values. 
Communication within the functional system must proceed on the basis of these codes. O f 
course a definition from a sociological theory does not determine reality, but it seems diffi­
cult to envision ‘alternative’ codes in reality (see e.g van den Daele 1987 for a discussion on 
‘alternative’ science). When communication operates within a certain functional system, it 
has to proceed on the basis of the appropriate code. The scientific system cannot deter­
mine scientifically whether a communicated truth claim is profitable, only whether it is true 
or false. O f course scientists can discuss e.g. whether a given research programme seems 
feasible in financial terms. However, once the code changes, the system reference has
84 The shift from strict to loose couplings can o f  course as well be something forced upon (certain) organisa­
tions as the product o f  a deliberate strategic choice.
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changed and the communication has ‘left the system’. Once scientists stop operating on the 
basis of the true/false code and start debating whether a given experiment is financially 
feasible, communication has changed to the economic system. This kind of change of sys­
tem reference is o f course unproblematic for interaction systems and organisations, they 
are able to operate in multiple contexts.85 However, from the vantage point of systems the­
ory it seems likely that attempts to change the system reference will be met with immunis­
ing reactions so that systems can maintain their autopoiesis (Bora 1999). Attempts at code 
substitutions are not only perceived to be dysfunctional at the systemic level, they are also 
often considered morally objectionable and sanctioned (e.g. attempts to buy legal decision 
or dictate ‘truths’ using political power). At the level of the functional systems, there can 
hence be no mediation. It is not unlikely that procedures of public involvement will be per­
ceived by the organisations ‘normally’ in charge of a given task as processes of ‘politicisa­
tion’, as attempts to continue communication on the basis of a ‘power* code (“we de­
mand”) rather than the expected legal or scientific code. The change of code is perceived as 
‘unfit’ for the purpose that is the primary objective of the organisation.
If there is to be ‘mediation’, it must therefore be located at the organizational level. What 
does this mean in systems theoretical terms? First of all, it is unlikely to mean that other­
wise distinct organisations will merge. Procedures of consultation will not result in envi­
ronmental or protest movements being integrated into risk assessing regulatory bodies (or 
the other way around). At the most it can mean that organisations ‘interpenetrate’, namely 
that they perform certain tasks that mutually condition their operations. Representatives o f 
environmental organisations can participate in the work o f regulatory bodies providing, say, 
special kinds of knowledge and extending public legitimacy to the institutions in return for 
being able to communicate to her constituency that ‘influence’ has been achieved. At this 
level, the Cultural Theoretical approach is instructive in pointing out some of the incom­
mensurabilities that are likely to emerge when organisations with different cultures and 
from different sectors of society confront each others’ framings and observations of ‘the 
same’ topics, which may turn out in fact to be very different. Here it seems likely that what 
can be termed collisions of discourse-formations (Bora 1999) are likely to occur. Collisions 
o f discursive formations happen when diverging framings of the issues to be examined are 
confronted with each other and turn out to be incommensurable. In such situations it is 
likely that arguments and framings will be used strategically with the aim of gaining com­
municative advantages (in front o f an audience that can be mobilised or brought to reso­
nate in other contexts) rather than the establishment of co-operative modes of interaction.
85 With the changes in the biotechnology sector indicating an increasing interaction between re­
search /innovation and the creation o f  spin-off companies, and the profitability o f  research, such interactions 
on the organisational level must be expected to increase. This, however, does no t mean that the scientific and 
economic systems merge as such.
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It is, however, probably no coincidence that such procedures often aim to proceed on the 
basis o f interaction between individuals that are co-present. The co-presence of individuals 
is likely to heighten the capacity to process complex issues to the extent the individuals are 
able and willing to take on different perspectives (van den Daele 2001), or in Habermasian 
terms to ‘virtualise’ their own criteria o f validity. Organisations operating in the medium of 
decisions cannot as such take over the ‘perspective* of another organisation without losing 
their identity and ability to continue as (the same) organisation. Individuals, on the other 
hand, are able to observe an issue from many viewpoints without giving up their identity. 
Therefore, individuals are able to put an enhanced observational capacity at the disposal of 
the organisation or organisations of which they are members. In principle at least, this 
should enhance the potential for an increased observational capacity in the dynamic be­
tween organisations, although it is by no means certain this will happen. Even without or­
ganisational commitments in interaction, the communication o f disagreement is as possible 
as agreement in interaction systems.86
It therefore seems reasonable to expect that much of the potential of such procedures to 
solve the kinds o f problems they are conceived to solve, depends on the ability to create 
framings where, if problem definitions are not shared, then at least the participating indi­
viduals and organisations perceive co-operative solutions as preferable to the continued 
communication o f disagreement. And while it seems possible to theoretically describe con­
ditions that will make this more likely, I believe that the conditions encouraging or discour­
aging such cooperative processes are context-sensitive, and it is thus difficult to specify 
them with sufficient relevance in this context.
Instead I shall briefly return to the organisational level. Here a systems theoretical mode of 
observation foresees difficulties in establishing the kind o f communicative procedures the 
participatory and deliberative ideas envision due to immunising tendencies from organisa­
tions rooted primarily in specific functional systems. These are likely to find the necessity 
to operate with foreign codes troubling, and the incommensurability of different organisa­
tional cultures can lead to mutual misunderstandings. Furthermore, as the formation o f 
such procedures presupposes a more loose and ambiguous configuration of the structural 
couplings between the functional systems, that is when the tasks they can delegate to each 
other are not highly specified, it raises the question of how the ‘products’, the communica­
tive outputs, o f such procedures may resonate with organisational contexts in their environ­
ment is raised. Formulated in systems theoretical terms this requires that the outputs are in 
some way or another made relevant for the organisations that are envisioned to be influ­
enced by such procedures, that there is some kind of connectivity (AnschluCfahigkeit) be­
tween the procedures and their environment. Procedures can o f course be configured in
86 This, in turn, again raises the question of how organisations are structured internally and what mandate 
they can equip representatives with.
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various ways, but to the extent that they are flagged as ‘public involvement’ the frame of 
reference will typically be the political system (or in some cases the legal system in cases of 
specific administrative decision making) rather than the scientific or the economic system. 
Ideas such as ‘Mode 2 knowledge production’, ‘socially robust knowledge’ and the like aim 
at describing how public involvement in science can be envisioned and ideas such as ‘po­
litical consumption’ and the accompanying debates on labelling regimes aim at channelling 
public participation through market activities. Nonetheless, I will argue that these interac­
tions are mostly dependent on at least some political attention to achieve notable effects.
As such, it seems that the couplings to political communication and policy formation o f 
such procedures are an important area o f investigation.
Re-visiting the Research Question
In this chapter I have introduced some of the basic elements in autopoietic systems theory 
and attempted to explicate how this particular theoretical paradigm can contribute to the 
explorations of the topics investigated in the thesis. The discussions have focused on ana- 
lysing the background of contemporary controversies over technology as grounded in a 
functionally differentiated society, where, it seems, the different functional domains are 
likely to create externalities for each other, which allows uncertainties and decision prob­
lems to ‘travel around’ between different systemic and organisational contexts — a tendency 
which seem to be amplified when public attention and resonance is added. This happens in 
ways that, on the one hand, make it difficult to handle the cognitive, normative and social 
complexities attached to technological innovation, and on the other, the active maintenance 
o f the trust and willingness of the public to absorb uncertainties is made still more difficult. 
In this approach risk is not understood as related (solely) to physical hazards, but more 
generally as a mode of observation based on the distinction between decision makers and 
those affected by decisions. Likewise, trust is not understood as a characteristic located in 
individual minds but as a generalized willingness to let others make decisions on one’s be­
half.
Again from the vantage point o f systems theory I have tried to outline a way to approach 
‘the public’ which is sufficiently general in descriptive and normative terms to cover a host 
o f different phenomena observable in the social management o f risk and uncertainty, but 
conceptually specific enough to render the operations and dynamics of ‘the public’ and 
public involvement accessible to empirical investigation. In the following the task will not 
be to ‘test’ these rather abstract assumptions of systems theory, but to apply the conceptual 
tools in order to describe and analyse specific instances o f  processes where ‘the public’ is 
transposed from a general mode of communication to specific, concrete procedures. For 
that purpose it seems pertinent to re-visit the research question and briefly explicate how 
its wording can be interpreted in light o f  the theoretical reflections before proceeding with 
the empirical operationalisation.
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The research question was formulated as:
How are public involvement events organised to impact on the discursive dynamic in the GM biotechnology 
policy arenas?
More specifically, how do conceptions o f \the publictheir concerns and their role in polity-making mediate 
the effects of public controversy on policy formation in this area?
In short, the question is how the public is ‘operationalised* in the kind of procedures where 
public involvement is wanted — and what effects this may have. The theoretical reflections 
so far have indicated that the public should not be understood in an essential sense as a 
sociological entity, but rather as a specific mode of communication, which can resonate 
across different functional domains and organisations. However, in practical instances the 
involvement of the general public’s perspectives and concerns is often based on the inclu­
sion o f either individuals or organisations, which are in some ways perceived to represent 
or articulate this public. The ‘discursive dynamic’ in such procedures will be analysed as 
conditioned by functional differentiation and ‘policy arenas’ will be understood as the specific 
communicative contexts where policy decisions are prepared and made and which serve as 
shared communicative foci for the involved individuals and organisations. Furthermore, 
the conceptual considerations on risk and trust indicated that a distinction between deci­
sion-makers and those affected by decisions — however configured — is likely to induce the 
dynamic of technological controversies observed. Therefore, how the distinctions between 
decisions-makers and ‘affected’ are constituted in specific instances should be explored. In 
this context trust can be understood as the willingness (of individuals and organisations) to 
take over (or silently accept) the selections o f others (decision-makers) and make them the 
basis of their further operations. Here ‘the public’ (as affected) becomes an important rhe­
torical figure, the formation and use o f which shall be investigated more closely. The ex­
planatory focus will be on accounting for similarities and differences in the differentiation 
of communicative contexts aimed at mitigating technological controversies, and how dif­
ferent ‘formats’ of public involvement impinge on the policies pursued. How these consid­





At this point the thesis shifts its focus from the relatively neat and tidy world of sociologi­
cal theory and existing research literature, the topics of the previous chapters, to the more 
messy domain of real life empirical phenomena, where complexities and contingencies can 
be expected to be abundant. In order to make this transition in a conscious and directed 
manner some preliminary reflections are appropriate.87 These reflections will pertain to 
three issues; the operationalisation of the theoretical considerations into empirical ques­
tions, the methodology informing the case studies and the selection o f cases to be investi­
gated.
Operationalisation
In the previous chapter the theoretical explorations regarding the background and dynam­
ics of technological controversies primarily drew on Luhmann’s autopoietic systems theory. 
This theory is in many respects highly abstract and general, and does not translate easily 
into operational research questions or hypotheses. Therefore, some reflections on how the 
abstract theoretical framework can guide concrete empirical research are required.
First, a few clarifications about what the theory does and does not provide in order to an­
ticipate potential misunderstandings which are at times encountered with regard to the use 
o f systems theory in empirical inquiries. In oneway the theoretical work of Luhmann is 
extremely ambitious, in that it aims to produce a ‘grand theory* that can be applied to all 
aspects o f society. In another vein, however, one may also argue that the theory is rather 
modest, as it leaves a large scope to contingency in social life — and hence a considerable 
scope for empirical research into how communication and communicative structures actu­
ally develop in specific instances. The theory outlines some broad assumptions about fun­
damental features o f modem societies, but it does not claim to be able to predict the course 
o f specific events, nor that these are determined by the basic assumptions (they are, rather, 
conditioned by them). As such, the theory is not devised to produce hypotheses which may 
subsequently either ‘confirm* or falsify the theoretical framework whether in part or in its 
entirety. The aim o f the theory is to facilitate a specific mode o f self-observation by mod­
em societies, providing a consistent structure of concepts and distinctions through which 
sociology — as one particular subsystem o f communication — can observe society and re­
flect on this observation. Arguably, one o f the most fundamental ambitions of Luhmann is
87 This chapter to some extent represents a retrospective ‘tidying up’ o f the actual learning going on in the 
research process. It must therefore be read as representing a combination o f  the methodological reflections 
and choices made prior to the initiation o f  the empirical work and a subsequent effort to make this consistent
with what was found as the work progressed.
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to develop a theory that can deal with problems of self-reference, i.e. the fact that a theory 
that aims to encompass all of society will appear as an object to itself itself. A theory of so­
ciety as the totality of all communication must also be a theory o f  the theory itself, as the 
theory is also a product of societal communication. Luhmann’s ambition is hence to de­
velop tools -  concepts and distinctions -  that can deal with these issues of self-implication, 
and this ambition fundamentally conditions the architecture o f the theory.88
These self-implicating issues need not be developed in great depth here. The present task is 
more modest - to apply some of the tools developed for the observation of modem socie­
ties within this general theoretical enterprise to a specific issue, as I assume they may prove 
fruitful for the present topic and purpose. However, it should be noted that the concepts, 
assumptions and distinctions I take from Luhmann are not meant to serve as hypotheses to 
be tested. Rather, they provide tools with the help of which certain aspects o f my cases can 
be observed — hopefully in a manner that proves informative. The ‘test’ of the applied con­
cepts and assumptions is therefore only implicit, namely an assessment of whether worth­
while observations can be facilitated by them.89
Central among these assumptions is the image of modem society as functionally differenti­
ated. This is taken to provide a description o f the societal background against which the 
processes to be discussed took place — an a priori of the investigation if one likes — not a 
hypothesis to be tested. This a priori assumption arguably presents the investigation with 
two challenges when it comes to accounting for the dynamics o f the actual cases to be in­
vestigated. The first has to do with how ageng — the authorship o f specific communications
-  can be understood and accounted for within this mode o f observation. The second has 
to do with whether and how this approach can deal with some o f the diagnostic claims dis­
cussed in Chapter II. The arguments presented earlier actually envision that some kind of 
de-diffeimtiation is taking place between the domains that autopoietic systems theory assumes
-  more or less by definition -  to be mutually exclusive, i.e. that the borders between sci­
ence, politics, business and law (regulation) are eroding. I shall now address these two is­
sues in turn.
Some observers have claimed that autopoietic systems theory exhibits an explanatory defi­
cit regarding processes of societal differentiation. It is claimed that the consequences o f differ­
entiation are well worked out by systems theory, but the processes hading to differentiation 
cannot be explained without recourse to goal pursuing agents, who cannot be accounted
88 This stance on the construction of social theory entails an acceptance that in the final instance a sociologi­
cal theory with global ambitions must inevitably be based on axiomatic assumptions that arc beyond empirical 
verification or falsification. Arguably, one o f  the strengths of Luhmann’s approach is that it makes a virtue of 
reflecting this necessity, rather than seeking to disguise i t
89 I.e. whether they can in fact reduce the complexity o f the observed reality in a way that will provide social 
scientific communication with some advantages as compared to other modes o f  observation. As I do not 
propose to  observe the cases from the vantage point o f  competing theoretical frameworks, this comparison 
will o f  course remain implicit.
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for in terms of autopoietic, functional subsystems alone (e.g. Schimank 1985,1988). The 
point is important, but I am not convinced that systems theory cannot in fact deliver a sat­
isfactory solution. However, this general discussion is too far-reaching to be pursued here 
(see e.g. Bora 1999:150-58 for a more thorough discussion of the critique, and Schneider 
2003 on the systems theoretical approach to action). Here I am not occupied with the long­
term evolution of the functional subsystems and their mutual differentiation, but take pat­
terns of functional differentiation as a relatively stabilised feature of die context in which 
my cases are located. Therefore, the description of functional differentiation is taken to 
serve two main purposes. Firstly, in order to understand important aspects of the back­
ground of the technological controversies observed, which, as I argued in Chapter III, 
could indeed be seen as rooted in problems of coordination between different modes of 
observations owing (in part) to functional differentiation.90 Secondly, functional differentia­
tion is seen to significantly condition attempts to establish communicative forums or pro­
cedures equipped with what must be perceived as poly-contextual competences of observa­
tion.
Systems theory does not explicitly deny the existence or importance o f agency in the dy­
namics of modem societies (Schneider 2003). It only insists -  due to its epistemology -  that 
in the final analysis agency is a communicative product which only emerges as agency when 
‘acts' (as well as interests, goals, strategies etc.) are ascribed to agents in communicative 
processes. Furthermore, in this approach actors or agents -  whether individuals or organi­
sations -  are not perceived as natural entities, they are ‘products' as well as sources of 
communication. Actors as well as acts are important focus points for the communications 
that make up social systems, be they located at the level o f functional subsystems, organisa­
tions or interactions. However, I do agree with Schimank in his assessment that functional 
subsystems cannot be claimed to ‘act’ as such (Schimank 1985, 1988). Rather, the types o f 
communication they facilitate via their codes and programmes condition the ‘acts* of organi­
sations and individuals, who do have the capacity to formulate (communicate) goals and 
strategies. A consequence of this is that they are observed and communicated about as ac­
tors acting by themselves and by other systems in their environment.91 Hence, whether or 
not the communicated intentions and goals are in fact achieved, and/or how they are 
modified over time, may also be observed. In the descriptive sections of the empirical in­
quiries such abbreviated (complexity-reduced) forms of observation of communication will 
be widely relied on to account for the actual communication taking place in the processes 
scrutinised. Some of the dynamics of the case will in fact be accounted for as intentional
90 But also in the fact that the institutional consequences of functional differentiation are not necessarily ac­
cepted as legitimate by (all sections) o f  ‘the public’.
91 Although systems theory arguably has a tendency to analyse goal setting and strategies of agents as prod­
ucts of the opportunities offered by the communicative context rather than as independent variables (Schnei­
der 2003).
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actions o f individuals and organisations. The use of autopoietic systems theory is not in­
tended to make the investigations so esoteric that observations of actors and agencies are 
omitted or assumed to be wholly determined by functional differentiation. The goal is to 
facilitate a certain mode of observation o f how (primarily organisational) systems observe 
each other, and how such observations are conditioned by functional differentiation. In 
doing so there is no need to ignore agency, as long as it is kept in mind that the fundamen­
tal units o f  analysis are communicative events.
In the present study agency is primarily located at the level o f organisations (but in some in­
stances also with individuals who are observed as persons in communication). Unlike the 
functional subsystems, organisations are systems of communication that are able to set 
goals, devise strategies, and actively monitor the effects of their communications on their 
surroundings. As argued in Chapter III, organisations may — or may not -  understand 
themselves to be primarily affiliated to a particular functional subsystem, but they cannot 
be oblivious to communication based in other subsystems or organisations pursuing differ­
ent goals. As such, much of the descriptive tracing of the communicative dynamics in the 
cases will take the form of recounting communicative ‘events’, which are seen as contin­
gent outcomes o f the decision making resulting from mutual observation between organi­
sations and collective actors, and the resulting communication in and outside various ‘pub­
lics’ or ‘arenas’ (understood as shared foci of communicative attention). This means that 
for most o f the investigation, organisations will be considered as unitary actors, although 
they are in fact made up of multifarious communicative processes. In some instances in­
formation concerning the goals, motives and strategies of such organisational actors will be 
sought in the communications not only o f the organisations themselves (e.g. analysis of 
documents), but also in those of individuals speaking on behalf o f  the organisations.
The second issue to be addressed in the operationalisation is how a theoretical framework 
which more or less a priori claims that modem societies must be considered as functionally 
differentiated, relates to claims that de-differentiation is taking place, for instance in the 
production and validation of the knowledge guiding technological dynamics (see Chapter 
II). This is particularly pertinent as the thesis aims to investigate procedures whose raison 
d’etre is to process issues in what can be termed a poly-perspectivistic manner. One may 
ask, then, if such procedures should be seen as a challenge to the systemic autopoiesis of 
the functional subsystems or of specific organisations. But do such procedures constitute 
processes o f de-differentiation? I believe — and take as a working assumption — that this is 
not the case. At the very least, one needs to be highly specific about what one labels de­
differentiation or erosion of the borders between different communicative domains. The 
central distinction is again one between functional subsystems and organisations.
The functional subsystems are, in the chosen approach, considered as evolutionary prod­
ucts, which are very stable and extremely unlikely to be circumvented. In this perspective 
arguments about de-differentiation or code-syntheses defy their own diagnosis. One can
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only talk about the circumvention of, for example, the autonomy of the production o f sci­
entific knowledge or the rule of law, if such codes as truth or justice are taken as existing. 
Otherwise we encounter serious problems, both linguistic and descriptive. De­
differentiation can only be rendered meaningful on the basis o f a reasonably well-defined 
understanding o f differentiation, which I take to be a well established feature of modem 
day semantics.
This, however, does not rule out that on an organisational level there is ample opportunity for 
the intermingling of communications proceeding in different codes -  as well as clashes be­
tween different codes or framings (more about framings below). For instance, there may 
well be a challenge to the possibility for organisations seeing themselves as primarily ‘scien­
tific’ to ignore the non-scientific aspects and consequences o f their activities. They may 
not, as organisations, be able to abdicate responsibility for the application o f scientific 
knowledge. This, however, does not mean that the defining distinction of scientific com­
munication (true/false) is fundamentally negated. It means that the organisations change the 
code o f their internal communication. Scientific organisations may, for shorter or longer 
periods, (be forced to) orient their communication towards an economic, political or legal 
code rather than a truth code. This has been called the politicisation of science (Weingart 
1997). What this means, however, is that the focus o f communication has changed charac­
ter, not that the truth code has been invalidated or circumvented. This would be that case 
only if decisions on ‘truth-issues’ were decided by means of political or legal communica­
tions; if, for example, parliaments voted or courts ruled on scientific disputes. This, I be­
lieve, takes place extremely rarely and is most likely to be sanctioned as an illegitimate use 
of discretion on the side of political or legal organisations and met with immunising reac­
tions in scientific communications. I therefore take as a working assumption that any diag­
nosis of de-differentiation must be located at the organisational level, not at the level of the 
functional subsystems. This may cause disturbance and frustration — or excitement and ad­
vantages -  in organisations. It does not do away with functional differentiation as the 
dominant operational principle of modem societies.
The procedures to be explored in more detail can be considered — indeed, if they are to ful­
fil their purpose they must be — as ‘poly-contextual discourses'. That is, they need to de­
velop and nurture the ability o f their communicative processes to more or less simultane­
ously consider the expected effects o f their selections in several communicative domains. 
This is why I suggest the procedures should be considered as interactions and organisa­
tional systems, conditioned but not determined by the existence o f functional subsystems.
These communicative systems can be temporary, i.e. organised for specific purposes and 
within designated temporal limits, or more permanent Such communicative procedures are 
often brought about by different organisations together (through structural couplings with 
co-present individuals). In the communicative processes the organisations involved (who 
have some kind of ‘organisational identity’) can and will pursue strategies, although they
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obviously will not be able to determine the course of the communicative events, which will 
inevitably be the intermingled product o f communicative contributions from many such 
organisations, and in some cases particular individuals, the outcome of which is difficult to 
predict.
In sum, I argue that systems theory assumes that communication is autopoietic, and that 
the elements necessary for the communicative processes must be produced and rendered 
applicable within the communicative processes themselves. However, that systems work 
autopoietically implicates neither that they are wholly oblivious to effects or events in their 
surroundings,92 nor that they are causally determined. Such implications would render em­
pirical research futile — and would obviously fly in the face of all experience.
Therefore, although working within a systems theoretical framework focussing on func­
tional differentiation as the central characteristic of modem society, the aim here is to con­
sider how communication on biotechnology and its regulation is differentiated into particu­
lar forums which cut across the modes of observation of the various functional domains o f 
modem society. These separate domains are then seen as conditioning factors and provid­
ers of discursive resources, notas determinants of the communicative dynamic of the 
processes under investigation. Hence, the main focus will be on the organisational aspects of 
the processes o f public involvement, that is how the perceived need for larger public in­
volvement (in itself a specific semantic from) has been transformed into organisational 
processes facilitating particular modes of communication.93
The ambition is therefore to investigate in some detail how the class of procedures chosen 
for closer examination unfold in reality. In doing so, I shall make use of the general as­
sumptions discussed in Chapter III and so far in this section. However, I shall also make 
use of some of the more specific concepts and distinctions explored in Chapter III in un­
dertaking a systematic comparison of different solutions to some o f  the controversies out­
lined in Chapter I, which will be expanded upon and specified in the individual case stud­
ies.
The theoretical explorations in the previous chapter focused on three major themes of 
relevance for the analysis of technological controversies: a sociological understanding of 
risk based on the distinction between the modes of observation o f  decision-makers and
92 Only they observe these events and effects according to their own criteria o f  relevance, not necessarily as 
intended by other organisations.
93 Here I largely follow the suggestion o f  Schimank (1988, see also 1995) to consider the codes and modes o f 
operation o f  the functional systems o f society as ‘actor fictions’ (Akteurfiktionen), i.e. the codes or ‘framings’ 
actors perceive as ‘real* — as conditioning their selections — and thereby reproducing them. As such, ‘inten- 
tionality’ (e.g. goal oriented, strategic behaviour) is possible throughout for an organisation, but not for a 
functional subsystem. A research organisation can ‘act’, ‘science’ as such cannot. But of course actors can — as 
we shall see — claim to act or speak on behalf o f ‘science’.
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those affected when decisions are made under uncertainty; the analysis of trust as a (gener­
alised) willingness of social actors to allow others to make decisions on their behalf; and 
finally the cultural theoretical claim that differing forms of social organisation result in dif­
ferent and (possibly) incommensurable worldviews, which produce biases enabling selec­
tions when faced with uncertainty. These three themes will be operationalised as the focal 
points o f the description and analysis o f the cases.
The assumption is that procedures that are communicatively and organisationally differen­
tiated with the purpose of mitigating technological controversies through inclusionary 
means all express particular choices on issues pertaining to what I shall call a risk contro­
versy thematic, a trust thematic and a mediation thematic, which are to be accounted for in 
the analyses. Arguably, these are issues that all of the procedures o f the kind investigated 
here must -  implicitly or explicitly -  address. Hence, these thematics form the common 
template for the empirical enquiries.
The risk controversy thematic has to do with how the distinction between decision-makers and 
those affected by their decisions is reconfigured in such procedures, and how this is legiti­
mised. The aim is to establish what assumptions underlie the claims that the activities and 
the participants in the procedures are better able to represent ‘the public* and can facilitate 
‘better7 decision-making than traditional modes of policy making.94
The trust thematic has to do with how the procedures plan to contribute to the facilitation of 
the willingness o f ‘the public* to delegate competence to particular decision makers or deci­
sion making forums to make collectively decisions affecting all in a legitimate manner.
Finally, the mediation thematic has to do with how the procedures are designed to mediate 
between the incongruent and possibly incommensurable observations and assessments of 
the technologies in question and the risks affiliated with them, which are held by different 
(types oi) organisations and collective actors.
If these three thematics are cross tabulated with the systems theoretical claim that all com­
munications make reference to three meaning dimensions, namely social, temporal and sub­
stantive, the following scheme emerges, in which I have formulated a number o f ‘operative* 
questions to be asked of the individual case studies. These should help to characterise the 
cases in analytically relevant aspects and render them comparable:
94 In order to avoid semantic misunderstandings, everything in the procedures and the wider social contro­
versies may be argued to be to do with ‘risk’, especially if this concept is understood as pertaining to uncer­
tainties regarding the physical and social effects o f  the technologies in question. However, the labelling o f  this 
analytical dimension is specifically derived from the Luhmannian discussion regarding the distinction between 
risk and danger, which in social terms translates into the distinction between decision-makers and affected.
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\  Theory-derived 
\ th e m a tic  aspects 
\  of the
Risk controversy 
thematic
T rust thematic M ediation the­
m atic
\  procedures
M eaning \  
dim ensions \  
of involved \  
com m unication \
Envisioned flow o f  
information from af­
fected to decision 
makers in procedure
In short; Principles o f 
Inclusion
Basis o f delegation o f  com ­
petence from affected to 
decision makers aimed at in 
procedure
In short Principles o f  Dele­
gation
Envisioned principle o f 
mediation o f  diverging 
perspectives
In short: Principles of 
Mediation
Social Who sets the agenda 
for die debate?
W ho is included in 
the procedure?
Through w hat m echa­
nism s is the willingness to 
delegate regulatory co m ­
petence envisioned to  be 
strengthened through the 
procedure?
W hat (if any) control 
m echanism s will the p ro ­
cedures install -  w hat 
possibilities are there to  
w ithdraw  trust?
Are there distinct 
social bases for dif­
ferent perspectives 
on the issues?
H ow  arc diese m edi­
ated?
Tem poral When are concerns 
taken up and ad­
dressed?
Is a build up phase fo r the 
establishm ent o f  trustful 
relations envisioned?
Are diere diverging 
tem poral framings o f  
the issues at stake?
•
I f  so, how  arc they 
reconciled and whose 
tem poral perspective 
prevails?
Substantive W hat issues are seen 
as fit to be on  die 
agenda o f  the p ro ­
cedures?
F o r which issues is de le­
gation  seen to  be re­
quired?
Is there a dom inant 
cultural pattern  u n ­
derlying die p roce­
dures?
Obviously, I do not claim that the above provides any exhaustive list of the design consid- 
rations such procedures entail, nor of the aspects on which they can vary. However, the 
aeoretical reflections have, I believe, established that these issues must be considered es- 
mtial for such procedures, as they pertain to the core functions the procedures are in- 
mded to fulfil. In order to enhance the understanding of the dynamics of such procedures 
i general, the cases should ideally be selected so as to span a significant variation across 
lese dimensions.
he attempt to answer these questions for the individual cases will form the common op- 
ational framework for the investigation. The scheme should help, on the one hand, in 
tablishing that the cases, despite significant differences, can be seen as cases of the same 
ind’ and hence are comparable. On the other hand it should also help to ensure that sig­
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nificant variation is identified. Exactly because the cases are in many respects different, I 
aim to remain as sensitive as possible to their individual characteristics. Therefore, the cases 
are all structured via an initial descriptive and chronological mode of observation, which 
seeks to bring out the particularities, and is followed by an analytical section seeking to 
provide answers to the questions posed in the table above. After this selected aspects o f the 
cases will be compared more explicitly in a separate chapter.
The theoretical considerations in Chapter III identified a number of potential challenges to 
such procedures, circumstances that may make it difficult for such procedures to fulfil their 
self-prescribed purposes. Part o f the purpose of the empirical investigation is furthermore 
to explore if and when such challenges are found in the actual application of such proce­
dures. To anticipate the studies, this is, arguably, the case, but to different extents across 
the different cases. I shall therefore use each of the cases to explore one type o f challenge 
in particular where it is particularly pronounced. Subsequently it will be demonstrated that 
these challenges can be seen to be present in some form in all cases. These challenges I la­
bel, respectively, the problem of resonance, the problem of inclusion and the problem of 
mediation. These thematics are identified, observed and labelled in accordance with the 
applied systems theoretical framework, although their actual specification is empirically de­
rived. Therefore, the discussion of these issues will emerge from the actual studies rather 
than being anticipated here.
M ethodology
As should now be clear, the empirical part of the study is based on case studies, all of 
which focus on events that are flagged as processes aimed at increasing public involvement 
or the uptake o f public concerns in policy making regarding agricultural biotechnology. By 
events I understand communicative processes that can be fairly accurately delineated in the 
social, substantial and temporal dimensions. It is clear who participated, what was being 
communicated about and when the processes began and ended. The events were observed 
by the participants and the addressees as events, and they all produced ‘outputs' in terms of 
reports and other communications (not to be equated with the ‘effects’ of the events). 
However, the processes I wish to study cannot be adequately understood as abstract from 
the contexts in which they are situated. Therefore, the description and characterization of 
the contexts surrounding the events will form an important and integral part of the case 
studies. As will become clear, the cases (event and context together) do not necessarily 
have natural or self-evident contours, they do not emerge as fixed and self-contained sets 
of data, like survey data or transcripts o f interviews or focus groups discussions. As such, 
the delineation of the cases is to some degree observer dependent, based on my assess­
ments of and decisions about what ‘belongs’ to the cases and what does not. In my opinion 
no unambiguous rule can be devised for deciding what communication ‘belongs to’ or ‘is 
relevant for’ the cases. It will inevitably be a matter of selectivity based on the observers’
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research interests, knowledge o f the cases, and the material compiled. I hope, however, that 
the reader will be convinced that the cases are explored and documented sufficiently to 
warrant the conclusions drawn. This does not mean that selections have been made ran­
domly. In the previous section I presented some of the operational considerations that 
guide the enquiry, and in the following I shall briefly present some of the methodological 
considerations that inform the case studies in general. More specific choices will be ex­
plained in the next three chapters.
In line with the assumptions derived from the theoretical discussions in the previous chap­
ters, where communication is made central in social analysis, it is the communicative dynamic 
of the processes that lead to and make up the procedures of public involvement that is of 
central interest. To analyse such processes I consider a type of discourse analysis the most 
suitable methodology. However, as discourse analysis is a contested concept in the social 
sciences, it seems necessary to briefly explicate how I understand and use the concept and 
reflect upon how it fits together with the theoretical framework of the thesis.
By discourses I understand repertoires of communicative expectations, structures of meaning 
that enable speakers to link together series o f utterances in ways that are likely to be mean­
ingful and thus form the basis o f continued communication for listeners (this is of course 
not limited to verbal communication, but applies equally to texts). As such, discourses are 
formations of meaning that are already, in part, defined and can be drawn upon as reper­
toires, whereby communication can proceed with fewer complications and more limited 
contingencies. At the same time, discourses typically carry series of connotations, which are 
then implicitly ‘brought along’ (but not actualised) in communication. In relation to the 
Luhmannian concept of meaning, discourses can be understood as condensed meanings where 
certain pre-selections have already been made and the horizon o f further communication is 
circumscribed (as a matter of likelihood, not determination).95
Thus understood, discourses are seen to operate within systemic contexts of communica­
tion, be it interactions, organisations or functional systems. Discourses are not themselves 
systems, they depend on the autopoiesis o f social systems to be activated (Bora 1999: 165). 
However, they can be understood as making up or expressing the internal structures o f so­
cial systems in providing or producing expectations that guide communication within all 
types of social systems. In functional systems discourses are typically located at or ‘below’ 
the programmatic level (and not on the level of codes). As such, several (competing) dis­
courses may be at work within the same functional system, without the system losing its 
identity. For example, competing theoretical and methodological approaches compete 
within the scientific system, but all operate on the basis o f the truth/false code that defines
95 This hence entails a more ‘benign’ use o f the concepts of discourse than is found for instance in the post- 
structuralist approach o f  Foucault and research inspired by him, where discourses are more o r less immutable 
epistemes regulating what can be communicated at all in a given period. As I use it, the concept of discourse 
is therefore not as theoretically loaded as in certain other approaches.
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the scientific system, just as several (party) political programmes based on different ideolo­
gies (which are also structures o f condensed meaning) can contend for the same positions 
of power within the political system, or split markets with different pricing mechanisms can 
co-exist in the economic system.96 However, at the level of interactions and organisations it 
is always possible and very likely that different discourses may collide with each other in 
ways that seem incommensurable. Mutually incompatible expectations of what counts as an 
appropriate communicative contribution can compete within interactions and organisa­
tions, and the dominance of one discourse over another may depend on relationships of 
power between (collective) actors.97 This dominance is then not dependent upon the Torce 
o f the argument* in the Habermasian sense, but on the ability to create resonance, which 
may depend on a multitude o f factors, argumentative or otherwise. Discourses can, but 
need not, make reference to the code of a specific functional system. As such, there may be 
discourses that can only or are primarily found in the communication affiliated to a specific 
domain, for example scientific discourses of ‘truth’ are likely to create only little resonance 
in other domains, e.g. economy or politics. However, discursive formations may, through 
the intervention o f  interactional and organisational systems, span more than one functional 
domain. An example could be the discourse on ‘participation’, which carries rich connota­
tions and references, and can find applications in the political, scientific, legal and eco­
nomic systems, just as discourses on ‘risk* appears to resonate in still more communicative 
domains.
As discourses are understood as ensembles of arguments and distinctions they are not eas­
ily captured empirically. We must then step down a level and considerframings orframes as 
the unit o f analysis through which discourses can be approached. Frames can in the present 
theoretical context be understood as the individual distinctions by which communication 
proceeds. They can make use of or refer to ‘objects’ or ‘concepts’ in the way introduced in 
the previous chapter, distinctions that have an implicit or explicit other side which is always 
co-processed when the frames are activated. When speaking of ‘frames’ it is often implied 
that they carry rich connotations, that they represent ‘symbolic packages’ (Eder 1996b: 166- 
71). Discourses or discursive formations (used interchangeably here) are then made up by 
ensembles of frames.
If we understand ‘frames’ as distinctions nith impliedfurther references, it is possible to analyti­
cally distinguish between what I would call the conscious or strategic use of frames and a 
more unconscious or aggregated use o f framings as the indispensable use of distinctions in 
communication. Eder (ibid: 169) reserves the word ‘frames’ for the manner in which col­
lective actors deliberately/strategically use frames in order to further their causes and
96 For example GM and non-GM food mean different things to consumers and are hence priced differently.
97 Or, rather, power can be understood as the ability of one party to a communicative process to make his or 
her distinctions and selections the basis upon which further communication proceeds, whether the other 
party finds this desirable or not.
131
achieve their goals. ‘Discourses’ is then designated for the emergent effects of use and col­
lision o f different framings in the public space. Here I will not follow this nomenclature, as 
I prefer to use ‘frames’ as the analytical unit o f discursive formations independently of 
whether they are propagated consciously/strategically o r not, as I expect that the distinc­
tion may be difficult to trace empirically in a reliable manner (how does one decide whether 
a frame is propagated strategically simply because it belongs to the controlled repertoire o f 
a collective actor or to the uncontrolled but constraining context o f a larger cultural collec­
tive?).
A different set o f distinctions is found in Schón and Rein (1994), who distinguish between, 
‘rhetorical frames’ and ‘action frames’. Rhetorical frames are used for purposes of persua­
sion whereas ‘action frames’ are used to actually formulate policies, as “frames implicit in 
the language used to “win the allegiance o f large groups of people” differ from the frames 
implicit in the agreements that determine die content o f  laws, regulations, and procedures” 
(ibid: 32). Secondly, Schón and Rein distinguish between three levels of action frames; pol­
icy, institutional action and metacultural frames, where “ (a) policy frame is the frame an 
institutional actor uses to construct the problems of a specific policy situation”, “ (a)n insti­
tutional action frame is the more generic action frame from which institutional actors de­
rive the policy frames they use to structure a wide range of problematic policy situations” 
and finally “(institutional action frames .. .[are] local expressions of broad, culturally 
shared systems o f belief, which we call metacultural frames.” (ibid: 33). Schón and Rein 
make it clear that “ (i)n terms of practical methodology, it may be difficult to tell, in an ac­
tual situation, what frame really underlies an institutional actoris policy position” (ibid: 34- 
35). Likewise, the same action may be consistent with different frames and the same frame 
can lead to different courses of action. Nonetheless, it will be the interpretive task o f the 
case studies to explore just how such different types of frames compete and interact. It may 
then be a matter o f interpretation whether (or when) the participatory and deliberative se­
mantics that arguably inspire the kind o f procedures investigated here should be considered 
as specific policy frames, institutional action frames, or meta-cultural frames. Arguably, in 
different guises, they may work on all three o f these levels.
If one takes framings as the analytical units of discourses, it seems obvious that not all 
frames are propagated consciously by collective actors, some are clearly an ‘incorporated’ 
element or set o f distinctions in their operations — they are integral elements o f their ‘cul­
ture’. They allow collective actors to operate, they are not something that can be chosen at 
will. On the other hand, not all communication is innocent and some ‘framings’ are applied 
strategically to achieve aims (as is particularly obvious in political ‘spin’). For an external 
observer, however, it is difficult to assess exactly when this is the case and if it is in fact a
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clear-cut distinction in empirical reality.98 However, this need not inhibit or invalidate re­
search, as the effects of communicative contributions can be observed independently of 
whether they are ‘authentic* or ‘strategic*. Here I again propose to take the position of a 
second order observer and not (necessarily) try to assess the motives of the involved or­
ganisations, but rather to observe how communication is observed by other actors.99
Finally a note on what is particular of the approach in this thesis. Where most of the litera­
ture (known to me) using frame analysis take ‘the public* more or less as a location or medium 
in which struggles between different framings are played out (the public sphere or arena), 
and hence focus primarily on the substantive content o f the ‘symbolic packaging’, the focus 
here will be to explore the discourses and framings involved in defining processes o f public 
involvement, what I have called the operationalisation o f the public. This entails a strong 
focus also on the social dimension of such procedures, and the organisational features o f 
the embodiment of deliberative and participatory discourses in social procedures will be 
thoroughly explored.
Selection of Cases
I have already hinted several times at the empirical enquiries to be carried out in the follow­
ing. In what remains of this chapter I shall describe and motivate the way in which the ex­
plored cases were selected for examination. For several reasons, it seemed clear to me from 
the outset that the kind of questions I was interested in could best be explored through in- 
depth studies of a limited number of cases. The research question o f the thesis concerns 
the relationship between problems’ settings, the internal dynamics of participatory proce­
dures and their effects (or lack o f the same) in policy contexts. This was to be analysed on 
the background o f an explication of the normative and functional expectations attached to 
such procedures and an analysis of the sociological importance and effects of (technical) 
risks in functionally differentiated, modem societies, which, I have argued, are among the 
primary causes for which such procedures have evolved. In order to fulfil this ambition it 
seemed that a relatively detailed level of analysis was necessary, which it did not seem feasi­
ble to pursue through statistical analysis. Hence a qualitative research design was opted for.
98 Cultural Theory would suggest exactly that what for some organisations are ‘natural’ ways o f observing 
themselves and their environment may for others seem either purely irrational o r solely strategic communica­
tion.
99 For the observation o f participatory procedures staged to be argumentative and deliberative rather than 
strategic, one might also argue that the distinction is relatively unimportant: "Dabei ist relativ gleichgültig, ob 
die Beteiligten beim Argumentieren eine strategische oder kommunikativ-argumentative Einstellung einneh­
men, weil Einseitigkeiten /Halbwahrheiten durch die Präsenz anderer Wîssensbe stände/Positionen korrigiert 
weiden. Die Diskurse vedaufen also auf jeden fall so, als ob sie argumentative orientiert wären.” (Dobert 
1997:207).
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I also chose from the outset to focus on non-human biotechnology- This ensured that dif­
ferences found between the cases could not be ascribed to differences in the subject matter 
of the procedures to be looked into. The Topics’ of die procedures were to be similar 
enough to consider them identical, although of course differences in the specific framings 
they received is o f significant interest The focus on agricultural biotechnology also ensured 
that the level of articulated societal controversy was high compared to other domains of 
technological innovation across the cases. O f course the public controversies are not ‘iden­
tical’ across the cases, but I will argue that the level o f antagonism regarding GMOs in the 
respective public spheres can be considered a constant in the research design.
These choices made the universe of potential cases to be explored limited (especially when 
focusing exclusively on agricultural biotechnology), but still too large to enable me to ex­
plore all o f them at the level o f detail I found desirable.
I worked out the following list o f potential cases, all o f which could be argued to fall within 
the universe I was interested in exploring (only European events were considered). These 
were all flagged as procedures aiming to establish policy advice on non-human biotechnol­
ogy in ‘untraditional’ manners based on either the active involvement o f ‘the public’ (lay 
citizens) or an elevated inclusion o f participants/stakeholders. They are also all based on 
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In this situation I was faced with the dilemma that, on the one hand, qualified choices re­
quire as much knowledge of the cases as possible, but, on the other hand, this knowledge
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will typically only be available once the choices have been made and the compilation of 
data begun. Hence, the choice unavoidably had to be made on the basis of incomplete in­
formation. When one can neither embrace the complete universe of cases, nor make a sta­
tistically valid sample, the choices are to some extent arbitrary. Much in line with the the­
matic of the thesis, one could say that it becomes risky!
However, there were additional criteria and assumptions on which the selection was sup­
ported. Apart from the fact that the chosen methodological approach required certain lin­
guistic skills, other considerations pertaining to the contexts o f the cases were made as well, 
which I will argue made the selection somewhat less arbitrary.
The research topic o f the thesis is motivated by sympathy for the arguments in favour of 
increased public involvement in the governance of science and technology, but also some 
sociological reservations about the ability o f such procedures to fulfil their self-proclaimed 
ambitions. As most o f the theoretical and normative arguments for procedures of increased 
public involvement are (surprisingly?) silent about the political-cultural and institutional 
prerequisites for the successful application of the envisioned procedures, there are no hy­
potheses a priori (from the normative perspective of the advocates o f increased public in­
volvement!) about how and if the potential challenges such procedures will be faced with 
may or may not vary systematically in modem democracies.100 As such, the participatory 
and deliberative postulates explored in Chapter II do not themselves deliver criteria for the 
selection o f cases.
It can be argued that i f  the purpose of the thesis had been a comparative study o f the suscep­
tibility o f different political cultures and institutional arrangements to such procedures, it 
would have been preferable to seek procedures that were very similar in procedural aspects 
and compare how these were adapted in different contexts.101 This would have allowed for 
the most controlled examination o f the relationship between political culture, institutional 
set up and the effects of such procedures.
However, the aim was, rather, to explore the organisational and institutional diversity in how 
‘public involvement’ can and has been actualised in order to investigate the challenges such 
procedures are faced with in a broad and encompassing sense rather than as related to one 
specific procedural design. Hence, the intention was to ensure a certain variance in the pro­
100 This is perhaps so because these contextual features are not considered objects of deliberate change (at 
least in the short run), e.g. if one argues in favour o f  more public involvement in policy making in the UK, 
inspiration can be sought in Denmark, but it can hardly be argued that the background conditions in the UK 
‘ought’ to be more like Denmark.
101 See e.g. Einsiedl et al. (2001) for an — albeit not particularly convincing -  comparison of the use o f  the 
Danish style consensus conference format in three different countries (Denmark, Canada, Australia).
101 While o f  course making sure that the procedures were still relevant examples o f processes claiming to in­
clude public concerns closer in policy formulation through participation/deliberation.
136
cedures investigated.102 This variance should, preferably, be on dimensions expected to be 
significant according to the theoretical considerations outlined in Chapter III and opera­
tionalised above. At the same time I aimed to find procedures that were important m their 
respective national contexts. Importance is of course a complex, non-trivial criteria and 
difficult both to define and to establish, especially prior to the actual investigations. How­
ever, following the increasing interest in participatory and deliberative formats o f policy 
making a number of'experiments’ have been carried out in several European countries, 
some of which are rather distant from actual policy institutions, for instance by university 
academics and NGOs of various kinds (Joss and Bellucci 2002). My ambition was to look 
at procedures where at least the potential for effects were clearly present. Two meanings 
may be drawn from the phrase ‘potential for effects’. In a wider sense, (desirable) ‘effects’ 
can be understood as the self-prescribed aims of the procedures, namely to contribute to 
the mitigation o f lingering controversies over technology, in order that trajectories of tech­
nological development be rendered more legitimate in eyes of ‘the public’. At the more op­
erational level (which is often entailed in the criteria of success envisioned by the proce­
dures/organisers) this is most often understood as effects on (political) decision makers, 
that specific framings (issues, problem-definitions etc.) are transferred from the procedures 
to the centres of poliqr making — and make a difference there. Although effects from the 
procedures could in principle be detected in different sectors o f society (science, economy, 
law etc.) the focus will predominantly be on policy and regulation. The effects on actual 
policies are often seen as a necessary (although not necessarily a sufficient) condition for 
mitigating controversies. On the basis of this criterion it seemed desirable to seek out pro­
cedures rooted in organisations with reasonably close institutional links to policy-making. 
This also meant that the procedures should not be too ‘alien’ to the political environment 
in which they were located. Finally, for reasons of expediency (access to material, memory 
o f participants etc.) it seemed preferable that the cases should be relatively recent.
In the end, cases were selected from Denmark, the UK and Germany, which I assessed to 
be the most interesting to examine more closely. They all had the advantage of been fairly 
recent events, but also providing the opportunity of contrast with earlier events in the same 
national settings, i.e. as products of some degree of social learning. I shall not expound on 
the cases in any detail here, as they will be thoroughly motivated, described and analysed in 
the following three chapters. A few remarks may however be required to justify the set o f 
cases as a set.
The cases can all be seen as deliberate deviations from the standard modes of technology 
policy making in their respective contexts, albeit the Danish case less so than the British 
and German. As such, they are attempts to experiment with new institutional forms, which
102 While o f course making sure that the procedures were still relevant examples o f processes claiming to in­
clude public concerns more closely in policy formulation through participation/deliberation.
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in the applied Luhmannian evolutionär)7 vocabulary can be interpreted as deliberate at­
tempts to induce variation in institutional formats that may eventually, over time, stabilise 
themselves as more ordinary modes of operations in the policy arenas. As such, they all 
have ‘experimental’ policy7 objectives in common. I also take them all as indicative o f 
strategies to move from policy regimes based on ‘strict’ couplings towards more ‘loose’ 
couplings in the arrangement o f inter-systemic coordination in the regulation o f biotech­
nology7 (in the sense explored towards the end o f Chapter III). This is so because the pro­
cedures, in various ways, invite greater flexibility in the modes o f observation that guide 
technological choices.
Denmark is known in the literature (often mentioned along with the Netherlands) as one of 
the front-runners in experimenting with participatory forms o f governance o f science and 
technology. Hence, Denmark provided the opportunity to include one of die countries 
where such procedures appear to be most integrated into policy making. The consensus 
conference format invented in Denmark has been widely discussed as an ideal typical 
model o f how the viewpoints o f ‘ordinary citizens’ can be included in policy discourses. 
Hence, it seemed like a good idea to look at the format in its ‘natural’ setting.103
The procedure central to the British case took place during the work on the thesis, and I 
had the opportunity to follow the process relatively closely as it unfolded, which provided 
me with rich material. The British procedure is not typical of how science and technology 
policy has traditionally taken place in the UK. The fact that this procedure took place in the 
way it did must be ascribed to the shock released by the BSE scandal in Britain. As such, it 
may possibly herald a new way o f doing things in Britain, as the procedure turned out to be 
relatively influential in subsequent policy debates.
Finally, the German case represents a more corporatist arrangement than the other two 
cases, which appears to be well in line with the German political culture. However the pro­
cedure also exhibited a significant touch of participatory7 and deliberative elements, which 
must be considered less conventional in the German context.
Hopefully, without pre-empting the actual studies too much, it can be argued that on what 
I label the risk controversy dimension the cases display quite different solutions to managing the 
decision maker/affected interface. They range from a rather uncontroversial use of a very7 
small panel of lay people in the Danish case, a quite controversial use of general inclusion 
in the British case, and a deliberate choice to activate only the organisational representa­
tives of those affected (in various respects) by regulation in the German case. Likewise, the 
trust dimension spans variation in the ways the procedures are envisioned to establish legiti-
103 It would be deceptive to deny that the fact that as a citizen o f Denmark choosing Denmark as a case 
seemed natural and expedient. However, it also played a role that as a Dane I was always a bit puzzled by the 
attention Denmark had received in the discussions about technology assessment as I was somewhat sceptical 
about the blessings o f consensus conferences. Hence, it seemed obvious from my personal perspective to 
include Denmark in a study where I could compare it to howr things were done elsewhere.
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macy in decision making. The Danish procedures emphasised political attention to ‘ethics’ 
as well as ‘common sense’ as articulated by lay people, the British case scientific compe­
tence, and the German seeing the road to public acceptance as via the organisational land­
scape. Finally, in order to mediate between conflicting views on and interests in biotech­
nology, the different procedures employed quite different social mechanisms. The Danish 
case again emphasised the ‘unitary’ common sense of ordinary people, the British case a 
separation of the debate into quite distinct meaning domains, and the German procedure a 
search for regulatory principles abstract enough to ensure the consent of major stake­
holders.
The three cases — seen in their respective contexts -  deliver, I believe, the possibility for the 
investigation to span a spectrum of organisational forms of public involvement procedures 
in terms of the configuration of stakeholder/lay-elements, institutional anchoring, size and 
representativity o f the exercise as well as different uses o f scientific expertise in such 
events. As such, their analysis should be able to deliver insights into the possibilities and 
limitations of the use of participatory and deliberative mechanisms in the governance o f 
science and technology in a highly detailed manner.
In addition to spanning a certain, and in my opinion interesting, organisational space of 
such procedures, the selection of cases from Denmark, the UK and Germany also — and 
perhaps not incidentally — covers different political-cultural and institutional traditions 
which, according to comparative social research entail significant differences (e.g. Esping- 
Andersen’s (1993) distinction between a ‘social-democratic’, a ‘liberal’ and a ‘corporatist- 
starist’ welfare-state regime). This assignment of the three countries to different clusters o f 
political cultures and institutional traditions is also found in other comparative work (e.g. 
Crouch 1993, Torgersen et al. 2002 regarding biotechnology). This is not in itself an active 
component in the research design, but it corroborates the assumption that interesting dif­
ferences may be spanned through this selection of cases.104 It is not an aim in itself to pur­
sue in detail to what extent the susceptibility to public involvement in science and technol- 
ogy governance in my cases is correlated with a more generic variance of political culture or 
institutional structure. The focus is more directly on the operationalisation of public in­
volvement in particular modes of communication of participatory/deliberative procedures 
and how they are perceived by their surroundings. In doing so political culture and institu­
104 From the perspective o f  comparative social science a more complete study could arguably have been 
achieved through inclusion of cases from the more statist French context and a case from southern Europe. 
Apart from the linguistic challenges this undoubtedly would have caused me, another problem would be the 
lack o f suitable events to centre the cases around. To my knowledge France has only had one event that falls 
within the category investigated here, namely a Danish style consensus conference undertaken in 1998 (Marris 
and Joly 1999). This was in many respects an interesting case, but it seems that it is best considered as some­
what of an institutional outlier in the French context (Ibid). Hence, I chose not to examine it in any detail. As 
regards southern Europe, it seems that participatory and deliberative ideals have not really had any trenchancy 
here pertaining to agricultural biotechnology, which has until recently been a lot less controversial compared 
to northern Europe.
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tional structure are more generally relegated to the status of ‘contextual features’ o f the in­
dividual cases rather than explanatory variables investigated as such. In short, the purpose 
is not to establish if and how different policy contexts respond to ‘the same’ type o f tech­
nological controversies, but to explore how the co-occurrence o f the GM controversies 
with the circulation o f participatory and deliberative discourses and ideas has led to differ­
ent policy innovations — the establishment of specific, inclusionary contexts of communica­
tion — and whether this has led to different outcomes in terms o f their use in policy making 
and in popular acceptance of such policies.
A consequence o f this is that the cases, on immediate consideration, are rather heterogene­
ous. Therefore the necessary accounts o f their respective contexts will not subscribe to a 
common template as might be expected from a comparative study. Not all the same con­
textual factors are considered in each o f the cases, as the primary aim is to provide ‘thick 
descriptions’ of the cases in order to make them accessible and comprehensible to die 
reader, rather than seeking to force them through a common matrix. Arguably, the driving 
initiatives for the procedures came from different ‘places’ in the national contexts, which 
has as a consequence that the descriptive sections do not all focus on similar contextual 
features. I hope nonetheless that the preceding theoretical reflections on the background of 
technological controversies and the common intellectual inspiration arguably underpinning 
the procedures, as well as the analytical dimensions developed, will convince the reader that 
it is in fact meaningful to compare the cases as different but functionally equivalent re­
sponses to technological controversies.
One final disclaimer may be in order here. Because o f the wish to select cases that at the 
outset appeared ‘important’, I have arguably also selected cases that are rather well adjusted 
in terms o f organisational features to their respective political cultural contexts. As it is 
known that in these contexts other experiments have also taken place — not only in various 
technological domains, but across a number of policy domains — with different participa­
tory/deliberative modes of policy making (or policy preparation), it does not seem feasible 
or reliable to seek to explain the selected formats as causal products of the political cultural 
contexts in which they are located. I will at times hint at affinities between the wider politi­
cal culture and the format and use of particular procedures, but the concept o f political cul­
ture will predominantly be used to explore the dynamics and effects of the procedures 
rather than their design.
Finally, a few words on the compilation o f  the empirical material is required. As the inves­
tigation is carried out via case studies I have deliberately chosen a rather eclectic approach to 
the empirical material. The aim has been to interpret the dynamics of the individual cases 
as well as possible, and to use any available evidence for that purpose. Several types o f ma­
terial have therefore been used to piece together the descriptions of the processes investi­
gated. I have obviously used textual material which is not prepared for research purposes,
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such as policy documents and news reports (typically first order observations), but I have 
also drawn upon existing research literature documenting some o f the objects o f interest 
(second order observations). Furthermore, I have conducted a number of interviews with 
various people involved with the procedures under investigation in one way or another. 
These are what one could call ‘expert-informant’ interviews — as distinct to research inter­
views in the interpretive, qualitative research tradition — as they aimed primarily at gaining 
an insight into processes, and not at exploring the worid-views o f the informants. How­
ever, at times they will also used to explore differences in how the various organisations 
frame the processes and contexts in which they have participated. As the interviews were 
conducted with representatives o f organisations that are clearly identifiable, it would make 
little sense to render the informants anonymous (and they have not been promised, nor did 
they request anonymity).105 Finally, in one of the cases (the British) I was able to undertake 
participant observation at public meetings, which was not an option in the two other cases. 
As such it can be said that the study does not ascribe to any particular research methodol­
ogy, but has proceeded pragmatically in order to construct the body of empirical matter on 
which the study is based.
r
; rr




The Problem of Resonance -  The Danish Case
The central empirical interest o f the thesis is to investigate the relationship between public 
concerns about biotechnology, framings of ‘the public* in participator)' events and the dy­
namic of biotechnology policy arenas. To briefly recapitulate; by participatory and delibera­
tive events I understand communicative processes where the public (in one form or an­
other) is, for a shorter or longer period o f time, transformed from a passive audience of 
political and scientific communication into active participants (in one form or another) in 
the policy arena, with the aim that their ‘concerns’ be considered in policy making or miti­
gate controversy through ‘dialogue*. As such, I am referring to processes where the assess­
ment and regulation of new/risky technologies is deliberately expanded beyond techno­
cratic circles or institutions with the purpose of increasing democratic accountability 
and/or mitigating controversy, and in particular processes which are provided with an or­
ganisational locus, thereby going beyond market based transactions and ‘unstructured’ 
communication in the public sphere. As was argued in Chapter III, in a systems theoretical 
perspective this can be understood as attempts to move from ‘strict’ to ‘loose’ couplings 
between the functional subsystems through the establishment o f organised communicative 
processes with ‘poiy-perspectiviStic’ competences.
In the Danish case there is one particular institution -  the Danish Board of Technology 
(DBT) -  and one particular participatory format -  the consensus conference -  that has been 
central (but not exclusive) in the discussions about how to achieve increased public in­
volvement in the assessment and regulation of new technologies. Consensus conferences as 
developed by the DBT have also attracted significant attention in international debates on 
public participation, and are often presented as paradigmatic examples of how increased 
public involvement with science and technology can be organised.
It is therefore instructive to consider the latest consensus conference on GM food and ag­
riculture one of the pivotal points of the Danish case study. This is so for several reasons. 
Not only will it allow a thorough discussion of a particular participator)' event in its con­
text, it will also facilitate a discussion of the consensus conference format and the DBT as a 
particular TA institution, which can be compared to how the science/policy/public inter­
faces are dealt with in the other cases. Furthermore -  as it seems that this particular partici­
patory event did not achieve any significant direct political or regulator)' resonance -  it will 
facilitate a critical discussion of the potentials and limitations o f such participator)' events, 
both in practical and more structural terms, to achieve effects o f the kind foreseen in their 
self-descriptions. Hence, with regard to the spectrum of challenges participatory and delib­
erative procedures are faced with, the Danish case will motivate in particular a discussion 
on what I call the problem of resonance.
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However, neither consensus conferences nor the DBT is the only institutional initiative in 
the Danish policy arena that has addressed controversial aspects o f biotechnology from the 
particular viewpoint o f public concerns. Therefore, another major initiative by the Danish 
government to mitigate public concerns about biotechnology in general will also be dis­
cussed in some details. This is the BioTIK initiative initiated by the Ministry of Trade and 
Industry in 1997 with the formation of an expert committee on (bio)ethics, which was sub­
sequently continued as a cross-ministerial task force to disseminate information and stimu­
late debate about biotechnology, and to work to coordinate and further the inclusion o f 
ethics in the regulation of various applications of new biotechnologies. On the face o f it 
this BioTIK initiative appears to have had a greater impact on the political discussions and 
discursive framings operating in the policy arena than the consensus conference. A closer 
look at this will assist me in a discussion o f a particular mode o f argumentation -  ethics — 
which is often mentioned as particularly pertinent in relation to biotechnology, but which 
exhibits some particular challenges in regard to the problem of resonance.
The chapter is divided into two main parts, the first describing the historical background 
and development o f  the interaction between biotechnological development, political regu­
lation and public debate in Denmark. This includes a general introduction to the DBT as 
an institution in the Danish political landscape, a description of consensus conferences as a 
participatory method and a discussion o f their underlying assumptions or framings o f ‘the 
public’. The descriptive section will also include an account of the two central processes 
investigated, the BioTIK initiative and the 1999 consensus conference as well as an assess­
ment o f their impacts on the biotechnology policy arena.
The subsequent more analytical section will fulfil two tasks. First, it will attempt in a more 
analytical vein to contrast the two described processes according to their configurations in 
the social, temporal and substantive dimensions by providing answers to the operational 
questions posed in the previous chapter. I shall try to analyse why the 1999 consensus con­
ference — given that it is often seen as an ideal typical participatory method, which in the 
Danish case was situated in a relatively open political context, where it has been accepted in 
the repertoire o f policy tools — appears to have created very little visible resonance or pol­
icy impacts. Similarly, I shall discuss what difficulties the BioTIK commission encountered 
in substantially shaping the biotechnology policy agenda.
Secondly, I will take the two procedures as a starting point for a discussion of the issue o f 
resonance and discuss more generally the challenges associated with ensuring resonance 
from such procedures. In doing so, I shall address the somewhat peculiar observation that, 
on the one hand, the two procedures did not appear to have much resonance with the 
wider contexts, and yet, on the other hand, the Danish policy subsequently pursued in this 
domain seems to be comparatively congruent with the attitudes o f the population.
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Structure and Dynamic o f the Biotech Policy Arena in Denmark 
before 1996
As both the initiatives to be discussed claim an intimate relationship to the Danish political 
culture and context, it seems pertinent to briefly characterise this. The Danish political cul­
ture can — comparatively -  be characterised as relatively consensual. Furthermore, it exhib­
its some corporatist traits, with social interest groups having a fairly strong influence on 
policy making (Jelsoe et al. 1998). This takes the form of consultations with a number of 
institutions and organisations when bills are proposed as well as a comparatively strong 
delegation o f power to non-governmental negotiations and sectorial self-governance. For 
instance, the agricultural organisations have had a relatively strong influence on agricultural 
policies, especially through their historical links with the liberal party, and since the 1970s 
environmental organisations have established themselves as significant dialogue partners o f  
the political system. In international comparison these corporatist traits are, however, 
somewhat moderated by the relative openness of the policy making process in terms of the 
transparency of the administration and the hearing rights of organisations. This is particu­
larly the case in ‘newer* policy fields, such as environmental legislation and regulation, 
where the inclusion and attention to various stakeholders and social movements has be­
come quite significant since environmental issues emerged on the political agenda in the 
late 1960s and early 1970s. This political culture consisting of a mixture between corpora­
tist negotiations and attention to various stakeholder perspectives has significantly shaped 
the social responses to new technologies in general and biotechnology specifically, as will 
be elaborated in the following.
Denmark joined the EC/(EU) in 1972 by a referendum with a small margin, and the coun­
try has ever since been quite sceptical and divided in its attitude towards European integra­
tion. Although there is a relatively strong parliamentary control over the shifting govern­
ments’ negotiations in the Council, EU regulation is often claimed to lower high Danish 
standards of environmental and consumer protection in ways that are framed as undesir­
able, as it goes against the preferences o f  the majority of the Danish electorate. Scepticism 
towards the EU has been a significant factor in the debates over environmental and con­
sumer protection policy, where it is often claimed that the EU leans towards a more lax 
regulatory standard than the Danish authorities and public would prefer. This EU scepti­
cism has, sometimes latently, sometimes explicitly, been a sub-theme in recent debates 
about agricultural biotechnology accompanying the gradual transfer of regulatory compe­
tence to EU institutions.106
106 Danish political parties have, however, been quite cautious blaming the EU for the criticised regulationsin 
order not to aggravate public animosity towards the Union, the doser integration o f  which most o f  the tradi­
tionally gpveming parties are all in favour.
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A number of Danish food and pharmaceutical industries had been working with biotech­
nology development long before the emergence of recombinant genetics, and the country 
has a comparatively strong knowledge base in biotechnology. There is a significant indus­
trial and political wish to retain and strengthen this knowledge base, as pharmaceuticals and 
biotechnology are considered the ‘technology of the future* and the sectors hoped to sus­
tain and expand Denmark as a ‘knowledge society*.107
In Denmark, as elsewhere, bio technolog}7 policy and regulation, as well as public debate, 
has gone through different phases since the emergence o f the field.108 Here as in other 
European countries a relatively calm period in the first half of the 1990s was followed by 
what several observers consider a significant resurgence of public controversy in the late 
1990s (Jelsoe et. al. 1998, 2001; Lassen et. al. 2002, Joss and fCluver 2001), This case study 
focuses on events from 1996 onwards, but in order to understand the background o f these 
events — and in turn their effects — I shall briefly recount some general characteristics o f the 
policy process and public debate until the mid-1990s, as they have significantly shaped sub­
sequent developments.109
Debates about biotechnology took off relatively slowly in Denmark. The international Asi- 
lomar conference in 1973 on the safety o f genetic research did not provoke any reaction in 
the political system (if it was noticed at all) and little media attention. Until 1983 the regula­
tion was non-statutory and consisted only in voluntary registration and the monitoring of 
research by a commission set up by the Danish Research Council.
In the early 1980s industry started to apply manipulated microorganisms for process pur­
poses, which on the recommendation o f the research council and the then newly estab­
lished Technology Council (later Board o f  Technology, see below) led in 1983 to the estab­
lishment by the Minister of the Interior o f  an advisory committee on gene splicing. The 
committee was to consider whether any regulation was required in this new area, and if so, 
to draft legislation. The committee came up with three drafts for regulatory acts, none o f 
which where immediately taken into consideration. However, in 1985 when the two medi­
cal companies Nordisk Gentofte and Novo both stated their intention to use GMOs for 
insulin and enzyme production, the issue was put on the agenda, both in the public and in 
the political system. Due to the committee’s work the political system was relatively well 
prepared to deal with the prospective challenges raised by biotechnology. Where most dis­
107 Due to the country’s size, its industries are relatively small on an international scale. However, since the 
merger o f  Nordisk Gentofte and Novo to Novo Nordisk, this pharmaceutical company has a dominant posi­
tion on the world market for insulin production and a leading position in the production o f  enzymes, and has 
been one o f  the engines o f  Danish biotechnology. This also means that it has been the pharmaceutical indus­
try that has been the m ost visible advocate o f  biotechnology in the Danish public, whereas the agricultural 
and food industries have been less visible until recendy.
108 Jelsoe et. al. (1998: 30-32) differentiate between six phases, with varying degrees o f policy activity and in­
tensity o f public debate.
109 This section is based primarily on Jelsoe et. al. (1998,2001).
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cussion so far had been on ethical and human issues, safety and environmental concerns 
now moved to the centre of attention, and one environmental organisation in particular 
(NOAH) put biotechnology on their agenda and started debating and producing informa­
tion about the prospects and potential problems regarding biotechnology. It was, however, 
still only the object o f a fairly specialised public and politically not very significant
In June 1986 the Danish parliament unanimously passed an act on all the three areas sug­
gested by the advisory committee. This was the first law in the world to make gene tech­
nology a distinct regulator)7 domain, thereby taking a clear political stand in the discussion 
on whether GMOs should be understood as a significantly new technolog)7 or simply as 
more precise breeding/processing technology. A new, clearly process-based regulatory domain 
was opened up, but was not yet the object of party political strife. The law consisted of 
four main principles. 1) All deliberate releases of GMOs were banned, 2) the Ministry of 
Environment could under ‘extraordinary circumstances* make exceptions to the general 
ban, 3) contained use must be approved by the Ministry of Environment and 4) all foods 
consisting of or containing GM material must be approved by the authorities.110 In the 
years following the 1986 legislation minor adjustments in the regulation were made in line 
with the industrial uptake of contained genetic engineering, where the industry’s arguments 
for a more relaxed regulation in order to enhance the competitive ability of Danish industry 
found some support in the revisions.
When in 1988 a Danish sugar factory and its seed division handed in an application to con­
duct field trials with GM herbicide resistant sugar beet, a review process and a parliamen­
tary debate was instigated. However, no mention was made of the ‘extraordinary circum­
stances’ stated in the law, and permission was granted. So, although the deliberate release 
of GMOs was in principle banned, industry was not in practice prevented from undertak­
ing R & D activities.111
After the EC issued directives on the contained use and deliberate release of GMOs in 
1990, the Danish law was adapted accordingly, which meant that the ban on deliberate re­
110 Parallel to this, some debate was going on in regard to human biotech nology, which in 1987 led to the 
establishment o f ‘The Ethical Council’, an advisory board established to monitor and debate the develop­
ments of new biotechnologies affecting humans. The Ethical Council has both professional members from 
the relevant scientific disciplines as w'ell as ‘lay’ members, who are appointed in part by the Minister of 
Health, in part by Parliament. The Ethical Council has no regulatory competences, and serves a purely advi­
sory function for the Parliament and the Government. This was later followed in 1992 by the establishment 
o f an Animal Ethical Council’, occupied with the ethical aspects of husbandry and the use of animals in re­
search. Although the Council’s standpoints have at times been controvenial, there seems to be a general con­
sensus that the Ethical Council is a good institutional locus for addressing the many dilemmas raised by new 
technologies in the human domain.
111 An explanation o f  this apparent contradiction must be sought in the fact that Denmark throughout most 
o f  the 1980s was gpvemed by various conservative-led minority governments, but the environmental legisla­
tion was mostly decided by a leftist ‘alternative majority’- Hence, legislation was in the hands o f the more en­
vironmentally concerned left wing o f the Parliament, whereas the administration was in the hand o f  the more 
industry friendly centrist-right governments.
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lease was abandoned and substituted with a general approval procedure. The procedure 
entailed that all releases (R & D and commercial) were assessed by the Aliljostynlsen (the 
Danish environmental protection agency), the put through an open consultation procedure 
with the scientific community, industry and certain NGOs, and finally required approval by 
the Parliament (Toft 19%). Hence, the political system remained closely involved with ap­
proval procedures, which were not, at least in principle, delegated to administrative bodies, 
and stakeholders were allowed to comment on releases. Despite this formal political con­
trol, the assessments only evaluated the risks associated with release, and not its goals (i.e. 
whether the characteristics to be experimented with were desirable and beneficial). The 
procedure did, however, through its requirements of principled parliamentary approval, 
acknowledge that whether a given risk is acceptable is not only a scientific question, but 
also a political one. It has therefore been noted that . this consultation system encour­
ages open discussion on the more value-oriented considerations, which are recognised as 
part o f the decision-making, rather than relegating them to an advisory committee.” (Toft 
1996: 172). After the EC directives had been implemented a relatively quiet period set in 
both in policy terms and in regard to public debate. As food products containing GMOs 
came closer to being marketed, a parliamentary debate in 1993 showed broad support for 
the principle that products based on genetically engineered processes should be clearly la­
belled, and a parliamentary decision in 1994 turned this attitude into national Danish policy 
and a policy goal to be worked towards within the EU. A t that time most observers con­
sidered the regulatory questions around GMOs as settled,112 and the activities of the major 
environmental organisations all but died out. In other words, it was expected that an estab­
lished regulatory framework would gradually ‘normalise’ the surrounding society’s percep­
tion and acceptance of biotechnolog)7.
These policy developments were followed in the public sphere as well as among more spe­
cialised pulics, debating both regulatory principles and broader issues pertaining to the new 
biotechnologies.
According to Jelsoe et. al. (1998) the public debate -  mapped via a survey of newspaper 
articles and letters to the editor in the period 1971-96 — exhibits both changes and continui­
ties as well as variance in volume.113
112 For instance, Toft (1996) concludes that “(a)s the public and the politicians are well aware, the initial de­
bate led to democratic influence over regulatory decisions. This democratic feature helps to explain the le­
gitimacy o f GMO releases in Denmark.” (Toft 1996: 174).
113 Recurrent issues are ethical issues related to new biotechnologies as well as continuing‘educational efforts’ 
where newspapers run ‘fact boxes’ explaining the basics o f  molecular genetics and biotechnology. However, 
the educational efforts have declined somewhat. Jelsoe el. al. (1998) interprets this as a sign that newspapers 
assume a higher scientific literacy in this field among their readers than they did 25 years ago.
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Jelsoe et. al. claim that the public debate during the period develops towards a clear con­
frontation between three argumentative positions:
■ “technological optimists who requested extra Danish R&D efforts for the benefit 
of Danish science, industry and agriculture;
■ technological optimists who saw possibilities for solutions for environmental and
social problems in new ‘sagacious* technologies; and
■ critical experts who warned of environmental consequences as well as o f trespass­
ing ethical borderlines that might endanger social and political values” (ibid: 33).
The early phase of the debate was thus primarily defined by people who could claim scien­
tific or technical expertise, even if not all held established institutional positions.114
The first law on genetic engineering in 1986 was described in the media as providing a sta­
ble environment for R & D activities, yet at the same time being strict enough to ensure 
public safety and acceptance through rigorous regulation and oversight. In the period fol­
lowing the first legislation, public debate and involvement turned more towards ‘ordinary 
citizens’. One environmental movement in particular, NOAH, was quite active in distribut­
ing popular information about biotechnology and in mobilising against it.115
At this point in the story the Board ofTechnology, a parliamentary institution, began a 
public campaign. The Board sought both to inform the public and to instigate public de­
bate and participation. One of the means of doing this was its first consensus conference, 
held on “Gene Technology in Agriculture and Industry” in 1987.1 Icncc, relatively early 
there was an awareness in the policy arena and in the TA community that the emerging 
biotechnologies could raise socially sensitive issues and would require some kind of democ­
ratically informed guidance. The citizen panel’s report from the conference was reviewed in 
the media and generally described as an expression o f‘informed public opinion*, although 
it took a quite concerned stance and stressed ethical and social aspects of the emetging 
technology.116 In the early 1990s the reports on gene technology ceased to appear so fre­
quently in the public sphere. Jelsoe e t al. take this as a sign that gene technology
. .seemed to be accepted as a fact -  perhaps deplorable, like so many other features of 
the world, but something that, in any case, was here to stay.” (ibid: 34). I lowevcr, when 
Dolly the cloned sheep arrived on the international media stage at more or less the same
114 A substantial part o f the critical voices came from younger academics and science students.
115 The mobilising strategy was primarily ‘informative’ rather than symbolic, assuming that if the public was 
aware of what was really at stake, they would reject these technologies. Therefore, demands for transparency 
and the 'right to know* has been a central part of NOAH’s programme, which has made the organisation 
conceive of itself as both an environmental and a consumer organisation.
116 Despite the early attention to potentially socially sensitive aspects o f the new technologies, the output o f  
the 1987 conference allegedly had little impact on the subsequent revisions o f the legislation (Achen 1997).
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time as the first commercial GM food products arrived on the European market, the de­
bate was reopened with renewed energy.
The fact that Denmark was the first country in the world to enact a specific law regulating 
biotechnology was probably no coincidence. When comparing surveys of public debates 
and public opinion Denmark, stood out early as being one of the most critical populations 
of biotechnology in Europe. A number o f factors contributed to this critical attitude.
Among these is the fact that Denmark had an active and well organised anti-nuclear 
movement in the 1970s. This movement had a quite high level o f technical expertise, as it 
managed to mobilise academics with scientific training. It furthermore developed a status 
in the public as competent and reliable, and based much o f its campaigning on information. 
Unlike, for instance, the German anti-nuclear campaign, the Danish campaign was based 
on information, the mobilisation of public opinion, and legal (if unconventional) political 
activities, not on legal litigation or paralegal direct actions.117 18When the debates about bio­
technology took off in the late 1970s and early 1980s the ‘battle’ over nuclear energy had 
more or less been won by its opponents. Many of the members and supporters of the 
NGOs now turned their interest towards other environmental issues, amongst which the 
new biotechnologies began to be included. Therefore, much o f the organisational re­
sources, experiences and public credibility went into providing information on and debat­
ing biotechnology. The nuclear debates were also probably quite significant in exposing 
scientific uncertainties to the greater public. It became ‘public wisdom’ that cutting edge 
scientific knowledge is not monolithic and that institutional affiliation is likely to influence
liftexpert assessments.
Furthermore, the nuclear debate had clearly shown that public mobilisation could influence 
policy making significantly -  even in highly technical domains. Therefore, policy makers, 
scientists and industry had an interest in providing a regulatory framework, which could 
keep public resistance and controversy at a low level, but without impeding those activities 
considered essential for the industry. The passing of the world’s first law on genetic engi­
neering, which was rather strict, had a significant symbolic value. Industry representatives 
initially complained that regulation was overtly strict, but after the first public controversies 
over the contained use of GMOs they turned to a more open dialogue with stakeholders. 
Hence, in contrast to, say, German biotechnolog}7 companies, the Danish industry ex­
117 This can perhaps be explained by the fact that the Danish nuclear programme never reached a state of 
actual construction plans before it was abandoned, Le. there was no ‘need’ for or possibility o f physical block­
ades etc. However, it probably also reflects a less confrontational political culture and atmosphere at the time.
118 This was o f course experienced by most European publics since the 1960s. However, it can pethaps be 
argued that in the Danish consensus seeking culture this led to a broad recognition o f a need for an open and 
inclusive public debate on scientific and technological issues earlier than in most other European countries.
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pressed satisfaction with the first EU directive as they perceived it to allow their activities at 
the same time as facilitating public acceptance.
Up until the mid 1990s biotechnology issues in the non-human area were mostly debated in 
rather technical terms between scientists, technologists and industrialists in favour of apply­
ing the new technologies, and environmentalists and counter-experts sceptical about safety 
issues and the transparency of regulation. It should be noted that even if the constituencies 
o f the environmental movements presumably had social and cultural reservations against 
biotechnology (of the kind described in Chapter I), the campaigns were almost exclusively 
centred around technical issues — perhaps because many of the active members were 
trained in the natural sciences, combined with the fact that the religious organisations (and 
forms of arguments) in Denmark have been practically absent from the biotechnology pol­
icy arena. The regulation aimed to prevent risks, not to set broader social goals for the 
technology (beyond enabling a Danish share in the economic growth believed to accom­
pany the application of these technologies). Hence the institutional opportunity structure 
favoured a 'technical’ mode of argumentation, from which ‘ethics’ and social benefits were 
virtually absent as explicit modes o f argumentation.
These differing views on the technology were primarily mediated in the political system 
(rather than in the mass media, the legal system or in the market, as few actual products 
emerged). The Danish political system chose the course of balancing regulatory and pro­
motional policies and at the same time attempting to accommodate public concerns. This is 
evident in the fact that, as the first law on genetic engineering was followed by a biotechno­
logical research programme, the Danish Board of Technology was provided with the 
means to undertake technology assessments and initiate a qualified public debate. There 
were some surveys about the population’s attitudes towards the new biotechnologies that 
showed a rather sceptical mood, but as most of the technologies were still in the R & D 
stages, this did not attract much concern among the protagonists o f the technologies, who 
likely expected that public scepticism would decline with increased popular knowledge and 
practical experience with actual products. However, exactly the opposite happened.
Re-emergence o f Controversy around Commercialised  
Biotechnology
In 1995 Monsanto applied for approval o f  a herbicide-tolerant soy bean (‘RoundUp 
Ready*) for human and livestock consumption in the EU.119 This approval was granted by 
the EU commission in the spring of 1996, after an expert committee had judged it safe for
119 The GM soy was not, in the first instance, to be grown within the EU, but imported primarily from North 
America.
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human consumption on the basis of the ‘substantial equivalence* principle.120 However, as 
the then ongoing work on a Novel Food Directive was not yet completed, labelling re­
quirements and safety approval o f  food containing GM ingredients were still within the 
competence of national authorities (Lassen et. al. 2002: 280).121 Hence, when Monsanto 
sought and received approvals to market the GM soy in the EU,122 it became clear to the 
political system in Denmark that the 1994 principled decision by Parliament that all GM 
food should be labelled had not been operationalised in the regulation. The authorities 
were not prepared for this situation — they had expected a pending EU directive on Novel 
Food to deal with most of the practical questions regarding labelling — and were somewhat 
irresolute about what to do. Hence, they requested political guidelines. This led to several 
debates in the Parliament in the autumn o f 1996 about how the labelling requirements 
should be made practicable, which also touched upon more principled issues regarding the 
purposes of labelling. It also re-activated the N G O  community, which saw both new ave­
nues to further their standpoints in the public arena (as the issues in food seemed ‘nearer* 
to many people than R & D releases), and as new actors and framings emerged in the 
arena.
Importantly, these debates in the political system occurred at the same time as the first 
shipments of GM soy from America arrived in Europe. Therefore, although the Danish 
food safety authorities had declared the soy safe for human consumption, the political sys­
tem was seen as being reactive rather than pro-active in the field, and the responsible min­
ister made several policy changes due to political pressures (ibid).
Both Danish environmental and consumer organisations and the Danish media got hold of 
the information that a shipment containing 2% GM soy mixed with conventional crops for 
use in processed food was on its way to the country to be used in the Danish food indus­
try. The fact that the shipments were on their way, with a cargo that was both controversial 
and, in the eyes o f some observes, not safe for human consumption while the political sys­
tem were still debating how to handle the crops proved a strong symbolic image. This was 
used by the environmental organisations to claim the alleged impotence of the political sys­
tem while reiterating concerns that the approval procedures were not thorough enough to 
establish if the food was really safe. This re-opening of the controversy over GM crops had 
several discursive dimensions, which were to unfold both in the political system and the 
mass media in the months and years to come.
120 This assessment principle, which has been quite controversial, assumes that if a GM crops is 'substantially 
equivalent* in biochemical and physio-sanitary terms to its conventional counterpart then is it safe to eat. This 
means that approval procedures are based on biochemical property analysis, not the actual testing o f nutri­
tional effects through, for example, animal experiments.
121 The Directive on Novel Food was passed in late January 1997. However, in the meantime national policies 
were possible (Lassen et. al 2002).
122 The RoundUp Ready soy was also approved as safe for human consumption by Levnedsmiddelstyrelsert, the 
Danish food authorities, as part of the community wide assessment procedure (Lassen et. al. 2002).
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First, there was the perception among activists and in certain media reports that Monsanto 
had mixed the GM soy-beans with conventional ones with the deliberate intention o f mak­
ing them unavoidable and difficult to trace, thereby making effective labelling impossible.1 ̂  
Among GM sceptics this fuelled the argumentation that the technology would only benefit 
large multinational corporations, which were virtually impossible to hold accountable. This 
marked the uptake in the Danish debate on biotechnology of issues that were neither of a 
‘technical’ nature (i.e. whether the crops and products are ‘risky* in a well defined, measur­
able sense), nor regarding what can be considered as‘(bio)ethical’f i.e. having to do with the 
integrity of nature or animal welfare. Instead, they were concerned with the motives and 
driving forces behind the technological trajectory, and were to expand rapidly in the years
124to  come.
O n  the environmental side, discussions were also influenced by the fact that in the years 
leading up to these events, residues from the herbicide RoundUp, which was claimed to be 
relatively benign as it was supposed to break down in the soil, ware found in Danish 
ground water resources, which have traditionally been used without purification. The dis­
covery of herbicide residues in the ground water was looked upon as quite serious and has 
since been used in arguments both for and against GM crops, depending on whether the 
use of herbicides are claimed to increase or decrease as the result of the application of GM 
crops.
Furthermore, the questions on both the technical and legal character of labelling tapped 
into a relatively strong discourse on ‘political consumption’ in Denmark at the time, where, 
for example, boycotts o f Shell after the Brent Spar affair, and of French food in general 
and wine in particular following the French nuclear tests in the Pacific, had fuelled the idea 
that political statements could be expressed through consumption, which some environ­
mental and consumer organisations also wanted to pursue in regard to GM food (Lassen et 
al. 2002:290). As reliable labelling is essential for consumers to identify desired or unde­
sired commodity traits, this became a key issue in the public acceptance discussions. For 
the GM sceptics it became a standard argument that people should have a right to choose 
whether they wanted to consume GM food or not At the same time ‘moderate’ GM pro­
tagonists acknowledged that consumer trust depended critically on transparency and in­
formation -  basically, that GM food could not survive a widespread suspicion that some­
thing was being kept secret. The principle of consumers being allowed an informed choice 
was widely recognized among the political parties in Parliament, as it proved to be a regula­
tory mechanism that sat well with otherwise diverging political framings of the technology'. 1234
123 Monsanto argued at the time that it would not be practically possible to keep GM and non-GM crops 
separate all the way through the production chain, something which in the light of the continuing European 
hesitation has subsequently been established.
124 O f  course these issues had not been completely absent in Danish debates before 19%, but became signi6- 
cantly attenuated in this phase.
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Opinion polls at the time showed a significant majority o f the population to be opposed to 
GM food in general, and a strong desire to have their presence indicated in labelling (Las­
sen et. al. 2002). Given that a significant majority of the members of Parliament belonged 
to parties with a cautious but basically positive attitude towards biotechnology, this led to 
some attention to the fact that the political system seemed to be out of touch with their 
constituencies. For some of the GM sceptics the continuing public scepticism became an 
argument in itself against allowing GM food as they could successfully use framings o f elite 
insensitivity to the will o f the citizens and ‘common sense’. Environmental organisations in 
particular began to use not only technical or scientific arguments, but also ‘democratic* 
ones, i.e. that GM crops were ‘being stuffed down our throats against our will*.
Around the time when GM food reappeared on the public and political agenda with re­
newed intensity, Denmark also witnessed a ‘radicalisation’ in the activities of environmental 
and consumer organisations, as well as a change consisting in a gradual shift from informa­
tive to symbolic campaign formats. Whereas NGO activities had so far consisted mostly in 
the dissemination of information, the stimulation of the public debate and lobbying in the 
policy arena, new actors now emerged in the arena and new action forms were introduced. 
Most notable is that Greenpeace International put GMOs on their agenda, both in regard 
to human health and environmental effects at this time. Therefore, the theme was also 
taken up by the Danish branch, which has since been one of the most important NGO ac­
tors operating in this domain. However, other minor organisations also emerged around 
the topic and some existing organisations put it on their agenda (Jamison and Lassen 2004), 
and some of these worked with more unconventional methods.125
In effect, a new wave of public attention to and concern over agricultural biotechnology 
took off with the commercial introduction o f GM based food products. This renewed at­
tention and concern remained on the public agenda for quite some time and entailed a 
number of topics and problem framings. Initially, in this new wave the focus was primarily 
on the safety o f GM food for human consumption, as well as how this could be ensured. 
Later environmental concerns moved to the centre of attention. However, these discourses 
were increasingly mixed with debates about the ethical and socio-economic features o f the 
new technologies.
The announcement o f the birth o f Dolly, the cloned sheep, in February 1997 further inten­
sified debate over the ethical perspectives o f the new biotechnologies, which also ‘spilled 
into* the use o f plant genetics. Other issues and scandals in the European food sector, no-
U5 This ‘radicalisation’ can be seen for instance in the fact that when the first shipments of GM soy arrived in 
Arhus harbour in December 1996, activists blocked the unloading for several days, literally while the Parlia­
ment was debating the labelling regime. The simultaneity o f die two events obviously attracted a lot o f  media 
attention to the issues, which remained in the following months (Lassen et. al. 2002). Other examples o f  these 
new forms o f political action were incidents where environmental and consumer organisations did their own 
‘labelling’ o f products that contained GM ingredients by putting stickers on products in supermarkets, as u’ell 
as a single incident o f an attempted sabotage o f a field trial of GM crops by a Danish company.
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tably the BSE affair, also impinged on the public debate on whether approval and control 
procedures were sufficient and reliable, and whether the further intensification of agricul­
tural production was desirable and justifiable, also trickled into the Danish debate. It was 
against the background of this apparent resurgence of a very lively public debate that the 
political system launched the different initiatives to be discussed in the following.
Public Participation in the Danish Context
Initially in this chapter, I stated that Danish science and technology policy-making is and 
has been relatively open to public inputs. This is manifested in two principle manners. The 
policy making process is relatively transparent and accessible to various social interest 
groups. Furthermore, Denmark has a particular tradition for ‘peoples’ enlightenment’ dat­
ing back to the mid 19th century, where adult educational institutions were established -  
especially in rural areas. The essence of this tradition is to educate people to participate in 
the political life o f their municipality and the country through a high level of general educa­
tion and a culture o f open debate. The tradition has been carried on in the present day. The 
general population is relatively well educated,126 and to a political culture of public debate 
and the idea that ‘ordinary citizens’ are generally competent to participate in complex po­
litical choices, including where technical matter reigns. This meant that when technological 
optimism was gradually mixed with and replaced by concerns about the side effects of 
technical modernity, as promoted by a growing environmental awareness due to the emerg­
ing environmental movement, technocratic solutions were tempered by public debate 
about means and ends, and significant citizens’ involvement on the level of local admini­
strations. It can thus be argued that whilst in other European countries public involvement 
has been initiated as a solution to various legitimacy and efficacy problems observed by the 
political and innovation systems in Denmark such developments emerged more spontane­
ously from the existing political culture.127
As a prerequisite for maintaining an informed and engaged citizenry, die state has provided 
funding for a number of activities meant to stimulate debate on various issues. In the 1970s 
when nuclear energy was debated, public funding was provided not only for publicly run 
information campaigns, but also for the information campaigns of NGOs such as labour 
unions, co-operatives and environmental organisations. This was continued with regard to 
the emerging biotechnologies in the 1980s.
Parallel to the ‘self-organised’ (but often state supported) information campaigns on nu­
clear energy and biotechnology — as well as other issues — a particular institution, The Dan­
126 Danes score relatively high °n the Eurobarometer measurements on scientific literacy on biotechnology 
(Jelsoeetal. 2001: 166).
127 Which is probably why Denmark has in the international discussions, been considered a pioneer in com­
bining involvement o f  the citizenry with a relatively innovative and competitive business environment, i.e. 
citizen involvement has not been seen to stifle technological dynamics in the long run (Cronberg 1996).
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ish Board of Technology (DBT), was established by the Danish Parliament in 1985. The 
Board was conceived to bridge a perceived gap between experts, politicians and the public, 
and arguably the establishment of the Board was an attempt from (parts of) the parliamen­
tarian system to give an institutional focus and channel to the grass root activities that had 
emerged in the 15-20 years preceding to its establishment. The DBT was clearly inspired by 
the US Office o f Technology Assessment, but was given a particular Danish character 
(Kluver 1995: 41). As such, the Board consciously sees itself as contributing to the particu­
lar Danish tradition of ‘peoples enlightenment’. For instance, the DBT from the outset 
took a less expert-based approach to technology assessment than most other TA institu­
tions at the time, meaning that
.. the understanding of technology assessment gradually shiftedfrom an ‘objective* assessment sys­
tem in which only the directly involvedparties take part, to a ‘social* system in which the assessments 
of as broad a spectrum ofinterested parties as possible are juxtaposed, and common assessment is 
sought. A t the centre of such assessment was no longer merely technology itself, but the complex in­
teraction between technological development and societal needs. ” (Joss 1998: 7, see also Cron- 
berg 1996)
As an organisation, the DBT has hence sought to serve a dual function in the Danish pub­
lic and political landscape, on the one hand stimulating broad public debate and knowledge 
uptake about technological issues, and on the other delivering expert recommendations to 
the Parliament and the Government on present and prospective technological issues as well 
as functioning as one the political systems ‘sensory organs’ on public concerns.128 129Accord­
ing to its director it does so by intervening and mediating in selected topics fields to pursue 
one or more o f three functions: the creation of new knowledge (be it of a scientific, eco­
nomic or social nature), to pursue normative clarification in controversial areas or to sug­
gest practical solutions to a given problem. Problems chosen for the attention of a DBT 
intervention must have an element of technology, but cannot be purely ‘technical’ in na­
ture. There is no particular constituency for whom these problems must exist, although 
they typically involve the interest and attention of the political system as an addressee of 
recommendations.129,130
128 Organisationally, the Board consists o f three elements. An approx. 50 person council with members ap­
pointed by a wide range o f public institutions (ministries, agencies, research councils) and private organisa­
tions (labour unions, employers organisations, professional communities, N G O s etc.), which serves as a fo­
rum for debate on the activities of the Board and as a vehicle for the concerns o f various social interests to 
find their way into the work of the Board. Second, it has a board o f  governors o f 10 members also appointed 
by various social interests, which oversees the work o f the Board’s secretariat and decides on the thematic 
activities o f the Board. Finally, there is the secretariat, which is the executive branch o f  the Board, with 
around 10 professionals to undertake the activities o f the DBT. It has no in-house technical expertise, bu t 
engages expertise from research institutions, consultancies and stakeholders.
The annual budget o f  the DBT is approx. 10 million Dkr, or 1,3 million Euro. The Board is politically inde­
pendent o f  the Government and reports to the parliamentary research sub-committee.
129 Interview with L. Kliiver 13.01.2004.
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T he Consensus Conference Format
Since its creation the Danish Board of Technology has been developing and experimenting 
with a variety of methods to foster public involvement with technology. Common to these 
methods, m the words of the Boards’ director, is the ambition to embrace:
■ “the wisdom, experience and visions of citizens
■ the insights and tools of experts
■ the needs and working conditions o f decision makers
■ the democratic traditions in Denmark.” (Klüver 1995:41).
Judging from the literature on public involvement with technology, the method that has 
received the most attention is clearly the consensus conference, which is often discussed as an 
exemplary mechanism for facilitating both an uptake of public concerns in the political sys­
tem and the stimulation of public debate. Because of this prominence in the debates, the 
consensus conferences format is interesting both in its own right, and also, in my opinion, 
for discussing more general issues regarding procedures of public participation and delib­
eration. Therefore, I shall explain the format in some detail the following by looking at how 
the DBT frames the methodology, how the conferences are organised practically and how 
they can be interpreted using some of the theoretical concepts discussed in this thesis. Sub­
sequently, I shall then look at the organisation, output and effects o f a particular confer­
ence, using this as a starting point for a discussion of some of the challenges related to such 
procedures.
Consensus conferences belong to what the DBT call ‘participatory methods’:
, 'W e apply the wordpartidpatory to methods involiingpeopkfrom outside the relevant expert drcles, 
in order to give the process an assessor who has credibility in the yes of the relevant decision makers. 
Partidpatory assessments thus take place at the interface between expert and non-expert, uith ex­
perts giting input, non-experts making the assessment and dedsion makers using them. ” (Klüver 
1995:42)
13° Despite a significant international interest in the work and methods o f the DBT, one can detect a rise and 
dedine of the DBT in regard to the Danish political system. It was established on a probationary basis in 
1985 by a left-of-centre parliamentarian majority in opposition to the then governing right-of-centre coalition 
government. This government considered the envisioned technology assessment as hostile to technological 
innovation and the business environment. However, the activities o f  the board gradually won the approval o f  
m ost political parties, and in 1995 the institution was made permanent under a social democratic gpvemment 
with broad parliamentarian support. By then allegedly most parliamentarians occupied with science and tech­
nology were supportive o f the DBT as an institution (Joss 1998). However, with the shift to a rightist gpv­
emment in 2001, wTho cut public spending and political dependency on all sorts o f  advisory committees and 
councils (and a perceived ‘expert-dominance* o f  policy formation), the DBT had to fight for its existence and 
had approximately a third o f its budget cut. It w’as, however, saved by parliamentarian pressure on the Gov­
ernment -  possibly with the reference to the international standing of the Board. One explanation of this 
suggested to me is that some parliamentarians use the Board as a sort of ‘counter expertise’ to confront ex­
perts from the various government departments (Interview S. Gram, 21.01.2004),
1 5 7
1
The particular trademark of the consensus conference format is the central position re­
served for a panel o f laypeople, which serves a direct and autonomous advisory function 
for the political system. The primary task o f the lay panel is to articulate the concerns and 
wishes o f ‘ordinary people’ in front o f decision makers. They do not do this, however, as a 
simple expression o f public opinion. The decisive element here is the dialogue with experts, 
which allegedly turns this into ‘informed public opinion’, i.e. what the general public would 
think o f a given topic, i f  it was appropriately enlightened. The assumption (or hope) is that 
the evaluations and the recommendations o f the lay panel will then flow into the debates 
and decision making of the parliamentary system.
The consensus conference format is also equipped with a number o f other, secondary 
functions. In line with the dual institutional aim of the DBT it is hoped that consensus 
conferences will have an effect on broader public debates as agenda-setting events and 
through media attention to the process and outcomes (ibid: 44). Furthermore, it is stressed 
that consensus conferences -  in addition to the direct outputs and the possible instigation 
of or contribution to public debate — also serve to demonstrate that ordinary people are 
capable o f dealing competently with complicated issues. As such, consensus conferences 
are informed by an anti-technocratic ideology and aim to strengthen a democratic ideology 
that people are in general competent to rule themselves. In my interview the director also 
stressed that consensus conferences often have also had the effect o f intervening in discus­
sions in expert communities by forcing them to perform these in front of a lay audience. 
Allegedly, in this way epistemic communities o f experts can learn from dialogical confron­
tation with ordinary people and be brought to contextualise their knowledge in manners 
that would not otherwise happen.
In practical terms the consensus conferences are organised in the following way. When the 
DBT decides to work with a topic for which a consensus conference is considered a suit­
able methodology, the board puts together a steering committee o f 5 to 10 people to over­
see the preparation of a conference, which takes six months to one year. In addition to a 
project coordinator from the DBT, these are representatives o f various stakeholders with 
knowledge of the conference topic. They ensure that all important topics are covered in a 
balanced manner and that appropriate experts are short-listed. Some time before the con­
ference commences, the Board contacts a number of citizens from a random, representa­
tive sample and asks if they would be interested in participating. From the positive re­
sponses the Board selects a panel o f around 15 people to make up the laypersons’ panel. A 
panel o f this size evidently cannot be representative in any statistical sense of the Danish 
population but facilitates the dialogical form of interaction. However, in the compilation of 
the panel the Board strives for coverage o f a broad spectrum of socio-economic traits in 
terms of age, gender, level of education as well as geographical dispersion. The lay panel,
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which must consist of people without ‘interests’ in the topic,151 are brought to \vell-above- 
average-knowledge’ on the theme to be analysed through a couple of weekend training ses­
sions, typically given by academics. They are then asked to make up a list of issues and 
questions they would like to address to the expert panel. On the basis of these questions, 
the expert panel is then compiled by the steering group. This typically entails some negotia­
tion among the stakeholders on the steering committee about who the suitable candidates 
are, as it is assumed that the composition of the expert panel has some influence on the 
conclusions the conference will reach. According to the director the expert-role is con­
ceived quite broadly, spanning from very ‘cognitive’ competences where academics are 
typically invited, to knowledge of quite ‘politicar issues where ‘expertise’ does not consist 
in scientific merits or knowledge, but other insights into the issues are sought. In very con­
troversial and clearly polarised cases, like the GMO issue, balance in terms of pro and con­
tra views is usually considered before scientific credentials.
The actual conference typically runs over three days. The first day the expert panel give 
presentations on scientific, technological, legal, economic, social and ethical aspects o f the 
technology under consideration on the basis of the questions asked by the lay panel. The 
presentations are supposed to convey state-of-the-art knowledge, but also reflect expert 
disagreement and current controversies in professional communities and among stake­
holders. The second day is devoted to discussion between the experts and lay panel and 
among the lay panel themselves. After that, the lay panel produces its final document with 
assessments and recommendations, which on the third day is presented to the participating 
experts, the public and interested parliamentarians.152 As indicated in the name of the for­
mat, the panel is encouraged to reach consensus on as many issues as possible, but this is 
not a demand.153 Hence, it is not unusual that minority statements are mentioned on certain 
topics where the panel has not reached a consensus.
The director of the DBT accentuates four aspects of consensus conferences as a democ­
ratic mechanism, which make them relevant to policy makers:
1. They often provide specific recommendations, which can inform decision makers 
o f the citizenry’s view on the need for regulation of a given area. 132
131 The panel is o f course interested, but panelists may have no immediate involvement with the issues to be 
debated, i.e. they cannot themselves or their family work in the industries concerned, be active in grass root 
movements or the like.
132 The experts are allowed to correct factual misunderstandings, but apart from that the document is passed 
unchanged on to the Parliament and the media
133 The director explains it as an attempt to see — given that the panel is sought compiled o f people from quite 
different backgrounds -  how far the panel will 'go together* and when it starts 'hurting’ and some of the par­
ticipants no longer want to endorse o f the common statement (Interview, L. Ktiiver).
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2. They express an ‘ethics in practice’ as they are a democratic formulation and ex­
pression o f attitudes towards specific technologies.
3. They are non-technocratic as the assessments put forward can be seen as a manifes­
tation o f widely shared ideas and values from a non-partisan lay panel.
4. They have an inherent political appeal. As the lay panel does not have any ‘interests’ 
in the topic (as a number of other advisory channels do) the results appear as the 
product o f a dialogue, not compromises between conflicting interests or the appli­
cation o f non-discursive resources. Klüver hence labels consensus conferences an 
‘ideal mini-democracy’. (Klüver 1995: 45).
As should be evident from this description, consensus conferences can indeed be viewed as 
bodies in which ‘the public’ is operationalised in a specific manner in order to facilitate the 
uptake o f public concerns in policy making. As this issue is central to the thesis it seems 
worth trying to explain a little further what the underlying assumptions behind this particu­
lar operationalisation are. This should also serve to sharpen the observation to be made on 
the specific conference I then analyse.
A notable feature o f the conferences is that although the output from the conferences aims 
to inform the political system about how ordinary people view and assess certain techno­
logical developments and options, they do not aim or pretend to be representative of the 
population at latge. The fact that the participants can in no way be representative in the 
statistical sense, which is often considered an essential presupposition for a political 
mechanism to be considered ‘democratic’, is compensated for in two ways. The first is to 
strive for inputs that are cognitively qualified\ the second is seek inclusion of a broad spectrum 
of values.
One assumption underlying the conference model is thus that a certain level o f factual and 
cognitive knowledge is an advantage for taking a standpoint on a given issue, but that such 
a learning process does not change people’s basic values (Klüver 1995: 45). It is assumed 
that people have some basic values that are not altered by additional cognitive knowledge. 
Consensus conferences do not aim at normative learning among the participants (i.e. that 
they should change their viewpoints), but at confronting technological dynamics with basic 
values. However, it is assumed that increased knowledge and mutual dialogue can have a 
‘civilising’ effect: “Additional knowledge may allow you to understand the motives and atti­
tudes o f other people, and as a result you may add nuances to your opinion” (ibid). This is 
why participatory and deliberative procedures are hoped to mitigate or domesticate techno­
logical controversies (whereas consensus conferences are less fit to serve public educational 
purposes).
When viewed from the perspective o f sociological theory it seems that the conferences’ 
inspiration can be traced back to two — partly contradictory — models of social rationality. 
On the one hand there is, as in much of the normative and organisational discussions on
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public participation, a clear inspiration from a Habermasian ideal of communicative ration­
ality, namely that it is possible and desirable for social collectives to test different validity 
claims against each other and amve at common, agreed viewpoints of a cognitive, norma­
tive and expressive character. This is the consensus aspect of the conferences. On the other 
hand, an assumption also seems to be made that values are deeply rooted in people, and are 
immune to discursive argumentation but related to the individuals’ location in the social 
structure. Therefore, numerical representativity, which cannot be achieved due to the size 
and nature of the procedure, is replaced by the wish to span as broad a spectrum of values of 
relevance to the issue as possible. Practically this is done by assuming that values are sys­
tematically related to the social structure, which is why the organisers seek the lay panellist 
among people with very different characteristics and life experiences in regard to gender, 
age, socio-economic status and geographical dispersion. These assumptions are well in line 
with the cultural theoretical paradigm discussed in Chapter III. Abstractly speaking the 
consensus conference format can then be seen as an attempt to facilitate an articulation of 
a plurality of (perhaps incommensurable) values present in modem societies and the neces­
sity of seeking a common ground on which to collectively regulate technologies.
As discussed in Chapter III, processes of public involvement can be seen as ways to absorb 
protest potential among those affected by technological choices. When viewed with this 
purpose in mind the number of people that actually partake in the conferences makes it 
obvious that in order to fulfil that function, the ability not only to be organised according 
to competent and fair principles internally (Renn et al. 1995), but also to influence policy 
making beyond the procedures themselves is a critical issue. This is a topic I shall have more 
to say about later on. For an immediate consideration it can be noted that the investiga­
tions indicated that consensus conferences as a method has found broad acceptance in the 
political system in Denmark, where politicians allegedly find the inputs from ordinary peo­
ple a stimulating alternative to other advisory sources (see Joss 1998 for interview quotes 
from parliamentarians).
Some of the issues introduced in this section will be elaborated in the analysis of a specific 
conference from 1999. However, before moving on to that I shall discuss an initiative also 
intended to address concerns circulating in the public sphere. This initiative framed the 
controversies as being of a particularly ethical nature.
The BioTIK Commission
Following the renewed controversy over GM crops and food after 1996, the agricultural 
and food industry in Denmark considered not only the climate among consumers but also 
the political conditions as too uncertain to make robust choices about biotechnology. The 
business sector organisations therefore requested clarification and guidelines from the po­
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litical system. This was the immediate reason for the establishment of the BioTIK commis­
sion134 in the autumn o f 1997 by the Ministry of Trade and Industry.
The ministry put together a temporary expert group and commissioned them to produce 
an introductory presentation, which could "set the scene for a nuanced debate on bio- and gene tech­
nology and create a broader understanding of the population's attitudes towards new technology (BioTIK 
1999:15).
As the quote indicates, the re-emerged controversy initiated by the commercialisation o f 
agricultural biotechnology had clearly left both producers and the political systems some­
what baffled about the concerns expressed in the public and the roots of the controversies.
In matters like these the Danish political institutions understand themselves as operating 
within a culture o f open dialogue, transparency and the consensual or compromising ac­
commodation o f interests. This understanding is reiterated as the motive behind the 
BioTIK initiative.135 However, the ‘interests’ were not particularly clear, nor well articulated. 
They seemed be characterized by some vague uneasiness with these new, and to many 
people undesirable technologies. The dominant interpretation o f such uneasiness at the 
time, the deficit model, obviously did not apply, as the Danish population were, according 
to surveys, among the most knowledgeable in Europe but also among the most sceptical. 
Hence, it was assumed that public uneasiness was not something, which could be settled 
through educational efforts (alone). From this situation, it seems, springs the dual task of 
the initiative to stimulate a ‘nuanced debate’ and to investigate the motives behind the 
‘population’s attitudes’. One could argue that these tasks do not seem obvious candidates 
to be addressed in one and the same process. At least from a social scientific perspective, 
structuring and stimulating a debate is not naturally complementary to investigating the fac­
tors and mechanisms underlying the formation of attitudes. However, the ‘ethics’ framing 
underpinning the initiative may render this dual task more intelligible. In the report it is ar­
gued that all technologies pose ethical issues, but that this is particularly so for biotechnol­
ogy because it is based on manipulating living material (ibid: 10). At the same time it is as­
sumed that much o f  the scepticism towards these new technologies is of an ‘ethical’ nature 
and can only be settled on the basis o f normative clarification. Hence, the need for ethics is 
framed as both ‘intrinsic’ to the contested technologies and ‘extrinsic’, since it is a precon­
dition for popular acceptance of a technology in which great expectations were invested.
In this investigation I have not attempted to clarify how or where this ethical framing 
emerged. It is, however, clearly part of a larger discursive trend emphasising ‘ethics’, which 
applied to biotechnology in a number o f national contexts around that time (e.g. Wynne
134 The name is a contraction in Danish o f  biotechnology and ethics.
135 It is for instance argued that. “The insecurity [of foe population] cannot be managed by suppressing or 
denying i t  Openness and dialogue is required. And it is necessary that decisions about using gene technology 
are based on a nuanced discussion of options and risks, where all viewpoints have the possibility to be articu­
lated” (BioTIK 1999: 9).
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2001a, 2001b), and what can perhaps best be described as a Zeitgeist giving ‘ethical’ dis­
courses a certain trenchancy across a number of social contexts, at least in Denmark, in this 
period (ethical accounting in business and so forth).136 Instead o f delving into the genea­
logical roots of this choice o f an ethical master frame, I shall take a closer look at how the 
ethical framing was specified and what effects the work of the BioTIK commission had.137
The location of the BioTIFC initiative within the Ministry for Trade and Industry was partly 
a consequence o f the immediate demand for the process from the food industry. However, 
according to my interviewees it must also be attributed to the fact that the permanent sec­
retary in this department took a particular interest in the topic, which other government 
departments were rather reluctant to deal with. This permanent secretary was keen on in­
troducing an explicit ethical framework in the regulation of biotechnology, something that 
had consisted only in very implicit considerations in the dealings with non-human biotech­
nology in Denmark up to this point (Achen 1997).
The fact that the explicit considerations o f ethical issues was a new way of approaching the 
popular acceptance of biotechnology made the initiation of the BioTIK work quite contro­
versial within the political system, in regard both to its composition and terms of refer­
ence.138
According to my interviewee who sat on the committee, the work was conflict-ridden. This 
tension was the result of an allegedly unspecific reference for the committee’s work, com­
bined with the fact that the members of the committee had very different perspectives on 
what the issues concerning biotechnology really were.
After about a year and a half the committee’s work resulted in a 140 page report, which, 
arguably, is not entirely coherent. Nonetheless, most of its conclusions and recommenda­
tions were subsequently adapted almost word for word in a policy statement issued by the 
Government and debated in the Parliament a year later. As the report and the subsequent 
policy statement is one of the most systematic and explicit ways the Danish political system 
has dealt with public concerns over biotechnology, I shall explain some of the frames in it.
136 At the time of writing (November 2004) another topic, functional food, that is food with technologically 
enhanced nutritional characteristics is being intensely debated in the Danish public and both politicians and 
industry representatives have reiterated the need for an ‘ethical’ debate with the population in order to avoid 
risks in investing in innovations for which there is no market. Here, however, it seems that ‘ethics’ are a re­
sidual category into which the kind of concerns that cannot be otherwise accounted for (e g. physical risks) 
are placed.
137 In addition to the BioTIK report, a number o f  issuing policy documents and transcripts o f parliamentary 
debates, the following description is based on interviews with one committee member, professor of bioethics 
Peter Sandoe, The Royal Agricultural and Veterinary University o f Denmark (Internewed 14.01.2004), con­
sultant and former NOAH activitst Jesper Toft, who was engaged to do documentation work for the com­
mittee (Interviewed 19.01.2004). Further details were elicited from civil servant Mette Gjerskov from the sub­
sequently established BioTIK secretariat (see below) (Interviewed 16.01.2004).
138 Allegedly the composition o f the committee was changed several times in negotiations between different 
government departments and consulted organisations in order to find a composition that could satisfy every­
body (Interview, Sandoe).
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The report deals with the following issues: what concerns lay people hold about the new 
biotechnologies; what the mechanisms underlying genetics are; what can potentially be 
done through genetic manipulation; what the hopes and concerns (among professionals) 
are in regard to both medial and agricultural /industrial applications; how different types of 
ethical reflections can be brought to bear on these issues. On this background, the report 
suggests some criteria to be applied in the regulation o f biotechnology and discusses differ­
ent ways o f doing this.139
This section of the report aimed at improving the understanding o f  public concerns and 
opinions and explicitly draws on some o f  the literature reviewed in Chapter I. It discusses 
the work o f  Beck and Giddens to situate the concerns in the context of modem societies 
and the EuroBarometer studies as well as Wynne’s more qualitative work on the interaction 
between lay people and experts.
The general conclusion drawn is that a successful application o f the potentials of the new 
biotechnologies presupposes not only an adequate level of protection against risks, but also 
that the political character of risk assessment and management is recognised and that peo­
ple in general trust in the experts they are unavoidably dependent on. Such trust can only 
emerge if the concerns of the public are taken seriously and dealt with openly. “It is only 
through openness and dialogue that the impasse of uncertainty and anxiety can be broken” 
(p. 23). Hence, risk politics is here presented as requiring ‘dialogue’, and the report sees 
self-organised social movements as an important vehicle for such a dialogue between those 
who make decisions about applying new technologies (industry), those regulating it (politi­
cians) and ‘the public’ (p. 29).
A certain rhetorical tension can be seen in the fact that the report presents itself as being in 
line with a broadly participatory or consensual Danish political culture, which it, as it argues 
through references to selected sociological literature, should be strengthened to deal with 
the challenges the advent of a risk society. This means that all should be allowed to articu­
late their concerns. Yet one requirement for this according to the report, is the existence of 
a ‘common language’, in which political visions and societal values can be formulated and 
debated (p. 30). Though this is only hinted at, parts of the report seems to suggest that 
such a common language can be found (only) in the formulation o f generally agreed ethical 
principles, which the report articulates in an authoritative fashion.140 As such the report in a
139 The report was meant to stimulate a ‘debate’ on the ethics of biotechnology, hence the ‘technical’ chapters 
are not o f  interest here, although it does contain interesting issues about how biotechnology was framed from 
a regulatory point o f view. For instance when the possible coexistence and compatibility of GM crops and 
organic farming ate touched upon. Here organic farming is referred to as a ‘way o f  thinking’ (p. 92) whereas 
genetic engineering is framed solely as a technology, as a means. Hence, organic framing is given a ‘cultural’ 
framing, which genetic engineering and conventional agriculture is not. Organic farming is seen as more value 
based, whereas the productivist paradigm is not seen as a cultural product at all.
140 It is stated that dialogue must be based on some broadly accepted values and ground rules (p. 10). A set of 
such values, claimed to mirror the values underlying the Danish welfare society, are explicated and suggested
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sense predefines the kind of rationality public debates must be based on. The need for ‘eth­
ics’ as a necessary platform for common debate is linked to sociological studies suggesting 
that the concerns o f the public are primarily about trust (which is not defined further). It is 
argued that trust only comes about if a social dialogue using a shared language can be es­
tablished, and the report defines such a language as ‘ethics’. In effect, the willingness of 
both policy makers, technologists and the public to adapt an ‘ethical’ stance on biotechnol­
ogy is framed as a prerequisite for reaping all the potential benefits o f bio technolog}" in a 
socially acceptable manner and the remainder of the report sets out to define what this 
‘ethics’ is.
The discursive framing of public concerns as fundamentally ethical is reiterated throughout 
the report. However, the report claims that if ethical considerations are to be useful in the 
regulation of biotechnology, ‘bioethics’ must dispense with the traditional divisions be­
tween ‘ethics of duty’ and ‘ethics of consequence’, as neither can fully address the chal­
lenges raised by modem biotechnology. Instead three other ethical approaches are intro­
duced, which are claimed not to be mutually exclusive, but complementary; utilitarianism, 
the ethics of integrity (of humans, living beings and nature) and discourse ethics. None o f 
these can, according to the report, be dispensed with if ethics is to deliver adequate guide­
lines for the social regulation of biotechnology, but it is not explained how they relate to 
each other.141 The report acknowledges that politics, legislation and regulation in modem 
societies must make considerations other than ethical ones. It does suggest, however, that 
ethically based guidelines may be useful in shaping regulation to fit better with public con­
cerns over new technologies.
Ethical considerations serve two purposes in regard to biotechnology, they indicate what 
are reasonable and ethically défendable applications of the technology and set limits on ap­
plications, i.e, they serve both guiàng and restricting functions. These requirements are real­
ised as a number o f general principles, gathered under five headings, namely that gene 
technology must be developed and applied:
•  to the benefit of the human being, society and living nature
• respecting the autonomy and dignity of the human being
• respecting the integrity o f life
• respecting the vulnerability of life
guiding future dialogue on the issues. Hence, the report frames itself as mirroring shared values and at the 
same time strives to explicate and enforce these in regard to biotechnology governance, i.e. the report (implic­
itly) argues that although widely shared in Danish society, it cannot be taken for granted that such values will 
automatically influence the regulation o f  biotechnology if they are not articulated.
141A cynical observer might suggest that the report could not dispose o f  them if  all the philosophers and so­
cial scientists on the committee were to have 'their* approaches included and that the argument is as much a 
product o f the composition o f the committee as o f  the topic it dealt with.
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• to promote justice (reasonableness) in the distribution between human beings of 
benefits and burdens (respectively food and acceptable risks)
•  respecting individual societies’ right o f self determination and freedom of choice, in 
decisions reflecting the concerns and wishes of the population
Here the report clearly holds the moral high ground, as these principles can hardly be ar­
gued against in the abstract. However, nor are they particularly operational, o f which the 
report is aware. Therefore they are boiled down to four thematic clusters from which ethi­
cal ‘check lists’ are formulated for different areas of application (humans, animals, plants, 
democratic procedures) and different social contexts (regulation, research and develop­
ment, public debate). The thematic clusters are:
• Economic and qualitative benefit
• Autonomy, dignity, integrity and vulnerability
•  Just distribution
• Participation and openness
In its conclusion the report discusses various ways in which these principles and checklists 
can be incorporated in regulatory activities, research and development and public debate 
and makes a number of recommendations.
Uptake of 'Ethics' by the Political System
The BioTIK report subsequently formed the basis for a policy statement paper by the 
Government on ‘Ethics and Gene Technology’ (Regeringen 2000), which was presented by 
the Minister of Trade and Industry and debated in parliament in April 2000 (Folketinget 
2000). A notable feature is that although the original report was labelled as stimulus for a 
broad public debate, the statement paper mirrored the report quite closely, and the four 
ethical ‘principles’ listed above were reiterated as the basic ethical principles that should 
underlie Danish policy on gene technology. Furthermore, the Government turned some of 
the proposals from the report into policy goals, namely to create an Internet site to dis­
seminate information and create a forum for debate,142 to develop new methods to stimu­
late debate between experts and lay people and to establish an inter-departmental task force 
to ensure implementation of ethics in all relevant legislation. The statement recognises that 
the central political challenge is to influence the international regulation of gene technol­
ogy. It is claimed that in regard to GM crops and food the options for Denmark to apply 
ethical criteria on its own are rather limited, as this area is regulated through EU directives
142 The idea for this was taken from a similar initiative in the UK, which may be taken as one illustration o f  a 
significant international exchange of experience and mutual observation between different policy contexts.
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and to some extent WTO regulations. Hence, the suggested policy is to work for the incor­
poration o f ethical principles in as many international forums as possible.
The subsequent parliamentary debate was marked by the almost complete absence of a 
substantive discussion of the ethical criteria. Apparently they were readily accepted as an 
expression of the relevant ethics, not as the working compromise of a committee. As such, 
ethics became a ‘black-boxed’ resource that political communication could draw on to pur­
sue different (party political) agendas, and not a matter to be contested in itself. In effect, 
the political system took the presented ethical principles as an opportunity to discuss politi­
cal disagreements regarding biotechnology, not to politically process ethics. The debate in 
the Parliament focused almost exclusively on applications in agriculture and food produc­
tion, possibly because the existing controversies here allowed for the clear articulation o f 
(party) political standpoints (leftwing opposition critical o f industry dominance, centre-right 
parties more interested in growth potential).143 It seems that the ethical principles as such 
did not resonate in the political communication as principles. Their acceptance depended on 
a clarification of their implications.
The key phrase o f the policy paper- which also emerged as a dominant rhetorical theme in 
the issuing parliamentary debate -  was qualitative benefit. This entails that genetic engineering 
must serve purposes other than monetary gain for private enterprises if it is to be deemed 
ethically acceptable (and -  by implication, it seems -  also publicly acceptable). However, 
what did not emerge from the paper or the issuing debate was how and who should estab­
lish whether, for instance, a GM crop or a particular technological innovation entails a 
qualitative benefit.
In the parliamentary debate on the statement paper, wide support was expressed for the 
principle o f  including ethical principles in the regulation, although the accentuation of the 
different principles (or more precisely their implications) varied according to political pref­
erence. The left wing opposition expressed concerns that the criteria were too unspecific 
and did not reflect current practice in the area in terms of the extension of permissions and 
funding o f  research. The right wing opposition expressed concern that some of the ethical 
criteria for evaluation could make society blind to the disadvantages o f rejecting gene tech­
nolog}7. However, all parties backed the principle that dialogue nith the population is essential
The BioTIK Secretariat
The most material result following the recommendations in the BioTIK commission’s re­
port, the policy statement paper from the Government and the issuing parliamentary de­
bate was therefore the establishment o f the BioTIK secretariat for a four-year period from
143 Traditionally political parties in the Danish parliament do not enforce party alignment in votes on ‘ethical 
issues’, e.g. abortion and similar issues pertaining to interventions in human beings. Here the parliamentarians 
are to be guided and bound only by their conscience.
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2001-2004. The secretariat’s dual was task to function, firstly, as a coordinator ensuring that 
‘ethical’ aspects o f biotechnology were considered in all Government departments when 
new legislation and regulation was prepared, and secondly to promote ethical considera­
tions in EU and other international regulations. The aim here was to attempt to equip ‘ethi­
cal considerations’ with an institutional locus, that is to ensure the use of the formulated 
ethical ‘checklist’ in political decision making at home and if possible abroad. Secondly, the 
task was to initiate and ‘secure a good debate and dialogue about biotechnology on an ethi­
cal basis’.144 This institutionalised branch o f the BioTIK project was hence not a participa­
tory project in itself, and the activities aimed at including ethics in legislation and those 
aimed at stimulating public debate were considered as two separate strands with no linking 
mechanism (except overlap in the executive staff). The ethical principles to be taken into 
account when issuing policies were already formulated and were considered applicable 
without further inputs from ‘the public’.
The secretariat was equipped with two reference points, namely an interdepartmental task 
force with the participation of nine different government departments to oversee its work 
and an advisory board consisting o f various stakeholders to comment and advise on the 
public various initiatives undertaken by the secretariat This design led to a situation where 
the secretariat had the initiative to suggest various activities, but the task force — and hence 
individual government departments -  practically had veto-rights in regard to suggested ac­
tivities, but felt little responsibility for carrying out the overall mission of the project This 
meant that in practice the secretariat was not always allowed to instigate public debate 
about politically sensitive issues that could result in questions to ministers, nor did it in 
practice have any possibility to press for the uptake of ‘ethics’ in regulation if this was con­
sidered disturbing by individual government departments.145
One recommendation from the expert report, which was taken up as a cornerstone o f the 
secretariat’s work, was the establishment o f an Internet portal combining a news service, a 
common point o f entry to all regulatory authorities and regulatory initiatives and a debate 
forum. The aim was to create easy access to all aspects o f the biotechnological debate and 
regulation in accessible and non-technical language, run by a credible public authority. This 
initiative won broad political support as the more optimistic political parties saw an oppor­
tunity to enlighten the population and probably create greater acceptance for new tech­
nologies, whereas and the more sceptical parties saw an instrument to qualify the public 
debate through the provision of high quality information, which also included ‘ethical’ and
144 From mission statement on home page fwww. biotik dk).
145 One example given to me was that when the secretariat wanted to experiment with a ‘citizens’ jury* (as 
they are known in the UK) on the doning of husbandry animals, a hearing was established as a judicial trial 
with barristers and cross-examination o f  experts. However, as the minister responsible for the pending legis­
lation had not finally decided on the political course o f the Government, the trial was not allowed to end in a 
‘people’s verdict’, which could be at odds with the political standpoints to be formulated subsequently (Inter­
view with civil servant Mette Gjerskov, the BioTIFC secretariat, 16.01.2004.)
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broader social aspects of the new biotechnologies. Underlying the establishment of the 
Internet site was the assumption that the public debate needed both qualification in terms 
of knowledge and easy access to information -  that it was desirable that interested, non­
expert parts of the population should be enabled to debate on a qualified basis — and that 
there was a lack o f ‘public spaces’ for such debates to take place.146
Some particular aspects of the BioTIK initiative are worth noticing when considered as a 
means of enhancing the public’s engagement with new technologies from an ‘ethical’ view­
point. First of all, in the work of the secretariat, the meaning of ‘ethics’ is predefined 
through the expert report and the subsequent formulation in the Government’s policy 
statement. For instance, the secretariat worked to develop a template for a survey of atti­
tudes towards various biotechnological applications based on an operationalisation of the 
ethical criteria (rather than attempting to explore whether the formulated criteria corre­
sponded with the actual concerns of the members of the public).147 In other words, it was 
(implicitly) assumed that because an expert committee had reached a consensus (or a com­
promise) on what pertinent ethical aspects needed to be considered when assessing new 
biotechnologies, then these wen the criteria through which the public had to articulate any 
concerns with regard to specific applications.14*
Temporally the established BioTIK secretariat exhibited a strong symbiosis with the politi­
cal-bureaucratic system. It was launched to run for a defined period of time149 that was 
clearly decided ‘bureaucratically’ rather than ‘substantially’ (in relation to issues arising, 
which required ethical reflection or public clarification). Organisationally it was clearly 
shaped by bureaucratic requirements, namely that a devoted amount of money was spent in 
the best possible manner within a given timeframe. One could also say that it embodied the 
assumption that the substantial ethical reflection had already taken place in the expert 
committee. Therefore die secretariat had the dual task o f diffusing knowledge of these 
principles in the public sphere, and working towards their implementation in legislative 
work, not to contribute to their ‘modification’ in the light of emerging issues.
A final distinctive institutional feature of the BioTIK initiative was that no organised feed­
back channels existed. The task o f the secretariat was to create and stimulate debate on
146 In addition to this ‘information’ approach, which included 'quizzes’ about ethical dilemmas, testing of 
knowledge and virtual shopping in a ‘genetic supermarket* the secretariat has undertaken a number of other 
initiatives to enhance debate, e.g. distributing a role play game called ‘Master o f  Creation’ elaborating societal 
issues and conflicts about biotechnologies to all secondary schools in Denmark, organising a number of local 
debate meetings around die country, and expert hearings. The impact o f the Internet portal and other activi­
ties have not been measured, and it is no t easy to assess to what extent it has influenced the public debate.
147 Interview, M. Gjerskov and Rambol Management (2004).
148 This seems to lend some plausibility to Wynne’s interpretation that (bio)ethirists are taking over where 
traditionally natural scientific experts had ruled, so that one expert dominance is replaced with another
(Wynne 2001a).
149 Four years, January 1M 2001 to December 31st 2004.
169
ethical issues pertaining to biotechnology. However, they were neither expected to attempt 
to involve ‘the public* in regulatory activities, nor to elicit and report the public’s view on 
ethical questions and report that to the political system. Hence, unlike the Board of Tech­
nology, there was no organisational link between public information and debate-stimulating 
activities and the policy process in the BioTIK activities.150 In their debate-stimulating ac­
tivities the secretariat has attempted to coordinate their activities with issues on the political 
agenda, but there were no organised channels through which the impacts of its activities 
could be conveyed to the political system. In sum it seems that activities aimed at the pub­
lic sphere can best be described as ‘awareness raising’.
The 1999 C onsensus Conference on GM Food and Crops
In the spring of 1999 the Board o f  Technology arranged a consensus conference on ‘Gene- 
spliced foods’. The background o f the conference was, like the BioTIK initiative, the resus­
citated public controversy in the public domain and several indications that the general 
population remaind sceptical towards the commercialisation o f these new technologies.
The initiative was taken by the secretariat o f the DBT, which in the first half of 1997 
judged that a renewed clarification of the issues surrounding GM crops from the perspec­
tive of the general population was required. It was hoped that such a clarification could as­
sist the Danish political system in clarifying its standpoints and strategies in advance of the 
negotiations in the EU about new directives on deliberate release, applications in food and 
feedstuffs, labelling requirements and traceability. However, due to other priorities the GM 
conference was delayed while the EU directives were processed at great speed, to the sur­
prise of the secretariat.151 Hence, it looked as if the DBT had an unfortunately timed pro­
ject on their hands, as the principles to guide the new directives had already been laid out. 
However, it turned out that the passing o f  the EU legislation and its implementation in 
Denmark did not remove the GM issue from the public agenda, either in Denmark or 
elsewhere in Europe, and the DBT judged that the issues were not settled and decided to 
press ahead with the arrangements.152 According to the project manager of the conference 
there was significant perplexity and confusion among Danish politicians about what the 
reasons for the continued public scepticism were. As such, this particular consensus con­
ference was seen primarily as a means to probe into public concerns and in a sense ‘materi­
alise’ public debate and opinion (Joss and Kluver 2001: 56).
In the preface o f the subsequent report from the conference containing the statements and 
recommendations o f the lay panel it is stated that the background o f the conference was
150 In an evaluation by a consultancy it is claimed that no substantive results have yet arisen from the attempts 
to operationalise the ethical criteria into a survey template (Ramboll Management 2004: 9)
151 Interview with Soren Gram, project manager on the conference (21.01.2004).
152 Which turned out to be a rather accurate assessment as the work on the directives dragged on and the 
moratorium imposed in June 1999.
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“ .... the population’s continued scepticism towards gene spliced food. Why does this scep­
ticism exist, and what is to be our attitude towards gene-spliced food now that they really 
are about to land on the shelves of Danish supermarkets.” This indicates three things. 
Firstly, that persistent public scepticism towards the technology is seen as an anomaly in 
the social appropriation of new technologies. The renewed probing into public attitudes 
and concerns was necessary because it was more or less taken for granted that controver­
sies would gradually cease once regulations were put in place. Secondly, it indicates a suspi­
cion that some o f the renewed controversy had to do with the fact that the technology was 
entering a phase o f  large-scale commercialisation, which could entail new and different 
concerns. Thirdly, although much of the discussion at the time hinted at a ‘market solution’ 
o f the controversy through labelling, the W  in the motivation indicates that the DBT 
framed the issue as one to be dealt with by the polity, and which could not be shifted to a 
solely market based regulatory regime without prior political and public deliberation.
The lay panel compiled for the conference came up with a series o f questions they wished 
to have explained by the expert panel. These were gathered under ten headings, addressing 
the following issues:
■ To what extent can the production of genetically engineered food alter natural 
processes? What impacts will the development and production of genetically engi­
neered food have on the environment?
■ How will the consumption of genetically engineered food influence the human or­
ganism?
■ How can a monopoly-like market where a few corporations control safety, supply, 
price formation and quality of food-stuffs be prevented?
■ How can an independent, competent approval procedure and controls for geneti­
cally engineered food be ensured?
■ How can the consumer be ensured access to adequate information about geneti­
cally engineered food?
■ What content should Danish/EU legislation regarding liability have?
■ What advantages do genetically engineered food entail for consumers?
■ What values and ethical deliberations ought to underlie the research, development 
and production of genetically engineered food?
■ How can ethical aspects can be incorporated into approval- and control procedures 
of genetic engineering in animals, plants and micro-organisms?
As is clear from these topics, the agenda cuts across a vast range o f issues and covers both 
cognitive and normative themes considered essential at the time. To illuminate these ques­
tions the steering committee of the conference selected a panel o f  twelve experts.153 The
153 They were:
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compilation of the expert panel was the object of some negotiation in the steering group of 
the conference. As shall be discussed in more detail in chapter VIII this indicates that the 
consensus conference methodology does not avoid a power struggle among the stake­
holders present in the policy arena. However, this is temporally preceded by and thus to 
some extent made invisible by the deliberative character of the expert panel’s interaction 
with the lay panel. In my interviews the director o f the DBT and the responsible project 
manager readily admitted that the conclusions of the lay panel could be significantly influ­
enced through the compilation o f the expert panel, and due to the sensitivities linked to 
this particular topic, a ‘balanced’ expert panel in regard to attitudes towards GM agriculture 
was considered as more important than scientific competence.* 154
After its deliberations the lay panel produced a 12 page final document presenting what the 
panel had learned through the expert presentations and discussions, and what it would rec­
ommend to politicians. The issues discussed were practically all topics present in the mass 
media debate at the time. Hence, no new issues can be said to have been introduced 
through the conference, it was rather an assessment by the lay panel of ‘already known’ 
prob lematiques.155
The final document opens with a paragraph stating that the production of genetically engi­
neered food without a doubt changes processes in nature. However, experts disagree on 
the degree of influence and whether the effects are harmful. The lay panel mentions that
An associated professor (biologist/ecological scientist) from the Department o f  Environment, Technology 
and Society, Roskilde University, also affiliated with the association o f  organic farmers;
A research director from the Danish Institute o f  Agricultural Sciences under the Ministry o f Food, Agricul­
ture and Fisheries (plant biologist),
A head o f  the section for plant biology and biochemistry at the Rise National Laboratory (public research 
centre),
A representative of the environmental movement NOAH (Danish branch o f  Friends of the Earth),
An agricultural scientist from the section on food safety and toxicology at the Danish Veterinary and Food 
Administration,
A professor o f plant biology at the Royal Veterinary and Agricultural University,
A food scientist from the Danish Forestry and Nature Agency under the Ministry o f Environment,
A representative o f Greenpeace Denmark,
A representative o f ‘The Consumers’ Council* (an association o f consumers’ organisations in Denmark),
The head o f  the international section o f  the food legislation office at the Danish Veterinary and Food Ad­
ministration,
The head o f  the patent section o f Danisco Ingredients (Danish biotech company),
A researcher from ‘Centre for Justice and Ethics’ at Copenhagen University,
A political analyst at the Danish Association for Organic Agriculture.
154 More specifically, the project manager noticed a certain ‘skewedness’ in this particular expert panel. The 
steering committee did not wish to expose itself to  the criticism that the panel was biased either for or against 
GM food. Hence, an equal number o f ‘experts’ known to be for and against the technology, respectively, had 
to be selected. However, as both a number of more traditional ‘scientific’ and industry representatives were 
positive towards the technology, the internal balance between different competences in regard to the ‘techni- 
cal/political’ knowledge seemed somewhat skeu'ed, i.e. the GM sceptics were overrepresented by ‘political’ 
competence and an underrepresented in o f  ‘scientific’ competence and vice versa.
155 Due to  fhg (¿ng p assed since the conference took place, I assumed it would be rather futile to attempt to 
reconstruct the communicative dynamic o f  the procedure itself (no audiorecordings or transcripts exist). Nor 
does this seem essential for the present investigative purpose.
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one viewpoint is that the risk of damage is small, but that damage, should it occur, can have 
enormous effects. Although nuclear energy is not mentioned, it seems clear that genetic 
engineering is here being categorised as belonging to those technologies, which could have 
irreversible, catastrophic consequences and hence require very rigorous controls. As this is 
chosen as the opening statement, the lay panel signals that uncertainties are central to the 
challenges raised by biotechnology.
The panel acknowledges that disagreements about the effects of gene splicing are not solely 
of a scientific character, but are rooted in ideological differences. They claim that this in­
termingling of scientific information and ideological viewpoints makes it difficult for them 
to draw adequate conclusions. Nonetheless, the final document articulates a number of as­
sessments and recommendations, which are kept at a very general and principled level.
The report of the lay panel does not reject the application of gene technology in food pro­
duction as such, but urges caution on a number of issues. The overall interpretation among 
the organisers156 as well as other observers157 was that the thrust o f  the lay panel’s conclu­
sions was a ‘Yes, but on the condition t h a t . . but that the conditions were virtually im­
possible to fulfil and in practice amounted to a rejection of the introduction of the tech- 
nology on the existing regulatory terms and for existing applications. Furthermore, one of 
the more general messages emerging in the subsequent discussions was that the panel had 
articulated a widespread attitude among the population, namely that in order for the tech­
nologies to be acceptable, not only should they be labelled and allow for co-existence with 
other production forms, a general, societal benefit should be shown in order to justify their 
application. Economic benefits for producers and farmers were not sufficient to justify 
their introduction. This has a certain discursive affinity with the stress on ‘qualitative bene­
fit’ expressed during the parliamentary debate on the BioTIfv report.
Impacts of the Consensus Conference
A central question for this thesis is not only how ‘the public’ is operationalised in participa­
tory events, but also to analyse how such operationalisations mediate the effects of ‘public 
concerns’ in the policy arena. This raises the rather difficult question of how to trace the 
effects of such events, i.e. how ‘impacts’ should be defined and measured. Depending on 
what perspective is chosen and what the purpose of such procedures are thought to be, 
very different assessments are possible. In the case of the work o f the DBT in general and 
consensus conferences in particular with their dual purpose of (possibly instigating and) 
stimulating public debate as well as feeding the viewpoints of the population into the po­
litical system, ‘impacts’ can be understood in several ways (Hennen 2002). Among the most 
accessible, empirical indicators are mass media resonance and uptake in political communi­
156 L. Kluver and S. Gram in interviews.
157 E.g. J. Toft in interview.
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cations o f  the events and themes that emerged from the exercises, although in principle 
they cannot stand alone. However, this strategy will be pursued in the following. Later I 
shall argue that perhaps other more subtle and interpretive assessments may in fact be nec­
essary.
A search in a database carrying all Danish newspapers with the search terms *Board of 
Technology’ or ‘consensus conference’ or ‘citizens’ panel’ raging from one week before the 
conference until 40 days after produced 16 hits. O f these, three were notices announcing 
the event before it took place, four were reports from the first day of the event covering 
the expert panels* presentation, two were reports on the recommendations o f the lay panel 
after the conference, and finally there were seven commentaries and letters to the editor 
commenting either on the procedures o r the conclusions o f the conference. O f these two 
were essentially the same letter printed in two different newspapers and two were re­
sponses to critique o f the conference by the project manager from the Board o f  Technol­
ogy. The public radio channels’ news also carried a report about the conference.
Several o f  the reports on the event described the conference’s purpose as informing the 
politicians about the population’s view on gene technology and being a contribution to an 
ongoing debate on the technology without referring to any of substantial issues on the con­
ference agenda.
This can hardly be said to be a powerful media impact, and neither the holding of the con­
ference nor its output was arguably a ‘public topic’.158
In terms o f political attention, the objective traces of impacts are also scarce. A search on 
the Danish Parliament’s Homepage containing all publicly available documents (including 
verbatim transcripts of all talks delivered from the rostrum and documents from the pro­
ceedings o f sub-committees) reveals that the conference is referred to five times in the 
work o f the Parliament. I shall list these in detail, as they are telling on the question o f how 
the outcomes o f the conference were (not) taken up in the political system.
■ The consensus conference is highlighted out as a method for enhancing dialogue 
about technologies in a hearing response sent from the Danish Ministry of Trade 
and Industry to the EU commission on its ‘Strategic Vision for Bioscience and Bio­
technology in the EU’. Positive Danish experiences with this type of conferences 
are stressed, but no substantial references to die outcome of the conference on GM 
food or any other conferences are made. The Danish government encourage such
is» Even ¡f the search is extended up to a year after the conference no more references appear, although the 
public debate on gene technology certainly continued during this period. It cannot be exduded that other 
search terms could have found references to the conference, but it seems unlikely that they would substan­
tially alter the picture. Hence, I conclude that it did not initiate much resonance in the mass media.
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conferences in other countries and on the ELJ level. This indicates that the Danish 
political system is aware that consensus conferences have attracted international at­
tention as a means to address issues that are common to the EU member states, 
and can possibly function as a sort of institutional export good.
■ During the Parliament’s discussion of the BioTIK. report consensus conferences 
are mentioned positively in the Minister of Trade and Industry’s statement as a 
means to broaden and qualify the public debate on biotechnology. Here, however, 
it is claimed that additional methods, which will draw in broader segments o f the 
population are also required. This indicates that although consensus conferences 
are seen as useful by the political system, issues of some sort o f numerical represen­
tativeness in public involvement are also seen as important.159
■ The conference is mentioned by the Minister of Science in a statement to the 
standing committee on Environment and Planning as an answer to what the Gov­
ernment is doing to ensure independent knowledge and ethical reflection on bio­
technology. The conference is described as a successful element in the strategies to 
create public debate alongside the activities of The Ethical Council and the Animal 
Ethical Council. No reference is made to the substantial outcomes of the confer­
ence.
■ Ten days after the conference, it is briefly mentioned during a debate in Parliament 
about a bill proposed by the left wing opposition (Enhedslisten) to secure the pos­
sibility of GM free agriculture through a ban on the release and marketing of 
GMOs. The Minister for the Environment mentions the conference as showing 
“that the population is interested in gene technology, that the population has a nu- 
anced view on genetic engineering, but that it does not principally reject it.” 
(Folketinget 1999) ‘The population’ is described by the minister as being of the 
opinion that the technology should be applied, as long as it is ensured that adequate 
precautions are taken. While this is not a false interpretation one could argue that it 
is one formulated to serve the cautious, but basically positive stance of the then 
Government. More importantly, it shows how the lay panel’s complexity reduced 
formulations in the final document are reduced even further to fit a political 
agenda. The fact that this interpretation is not contested by any parliamentarians 
suggests — but of course does not prove -  that the output o f the conference may 
not be known by the parliamentarians participating in the debate.
■ The report from the conference was distributed among the members of the stand­
ing committee for Food, Agriculture and Fisheries, which is where many of the
159 As I shall show in the next chapter, this can be likened to the British case, where civil servants pointed out 
that the organisers o f  the public consultation on biosciences had to supplement the applied qualitative meth­
odology with representative data for it to appear credible in the eyes o f politicians.
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technical aspects of GM regulation are processed by the Parliament. There are no 
indications that the output from the conference was made the object o f a focused 
debate by the standing committee.
It is not entirely clear what to make of the scarce references to the outcomes of the con­
sensus conference. The Board o f Technology is an organisation created and funded by the 
Parliament to provide advice on technological matters. Hence, it would be expected that 
evaluations and recommendations would be applied in the work o f the Parliament. Still, it 
seems as if the substantial outcomes of a conference on a topic debated several times since 
in the Parliament scarcely received any attention. (Of course, this investigation does not 
allow me to assess whether the individual politicians had read or taken these into consid­
eration). However, the fact that the conference is referred to several times as a good proce­
dural tool to initiate and sustain public debate could indicate that it was seen more as a rit­
ual of attention to public concerns, rather than fulfilling an actual need for information on 
which to formulate policies.
However, the conference may have had other impacts, which are not easy to trace in a reli­
able manner. At least two such channels deserve mentioning.
The responsible project manager in the DBT claims that there was a significant informal 
interest among politicians, as they realised that controversies had not been settled through 
the passing of EU legislation. During the political discussions about revisions o f the EU 
directives, several parliamentarians contacted the DBT to get briefings on the results, 
which were generally viewed as reliable insights into what public concerns were about. 
Therefore, the outputs may have flown into the political system through the attention of 
individual politicians to the public concerns and hesitations expressed in the conference. 
Such informal contact is however virtually impossible to trace in a research project like this.
Secondly, another type of impact stressed by the director of the DBT is the effect o f par­
ticipation in the conference on the expert and stakeholder community. It was his assess­
ment that the largest impact of this particular conference was to be found here. The as­
sumption is that the perspectives o f the ‘epistemic communities’ o f expert and stakeholder 
communication is modified as a consequence of taking place in front of a lay audience. 
Hence, consensus conferences may potentially impinge on innovation in more subtle and 
indirect ways than through explicit uptake in political communication and regulatory prin­
ciples. However, he also acknowledges that in this particular topic area there were so many 
other debating activities going on — also o f a participator)7 and deliberative character — that 
it is very difficult to significantly alter the agenda through a single event limited in time.
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Danish Policy Subsequent to BioTIK and the Consensus 
Conference
Both of the initiatives described above took place or were reported in 1999 (the BioTIK 
policy statement was debated in Parliament in 2000). Since that time there has been signifi­
cant policy activity in the agricultural biotechnology domain, and it seems worth trying to 
assess the impacts of the procedures. Such an assessment -  as complex as it is in the Dan­
ish context — is further complicated by the fact that most regulatory competence is located 
at the EU level (and is also conditioned on the global level by the WTO negotiations). 
Therefore, effects can perhaps most conveniently be assessed by looking at the position 
taken by the Danish government on various issues in EU negotiations, since the actual dy­
namic of the EU policy arena cannot be retraced here.
After the principled parliamentary debate in April 2000 the position of the then Social De­
mocratic government and the subsequent neoliberal /conservative government can be de­
scribed as one of principally favouring GM agriculture, but proceeding with great caution 
in practice. Despite their greater rhetorical allegiance to freedom of innovation, in practice 
the neoliberal/conservative government has been only slightly more GM positive than its 
predecessor. This assessment is based on several observations.
In negotiations in the EU about the revision of the directives regulating GM releases into 
the environment, safety approvals of food and feedstuff, and labelling and traceability, 
Denmark has pursued one of the most restrictive positions. They argued for the most ex­
tensive risk assessments possible, very low thresholds for the acceptance of adventitious 
presence of GM material in non-GM food and for a labelling and traceability regime that 
would include products based on GM crops, but where no traces could be measured (e.g. 
labelling of meat and dairy products from livestock fed on GM crops).
Denmark also advocated the inclusion in the directive on deliberate release the possibility 
for national authorities and the EU commission to consult an ‘ethical advisory body’.160 
This was included, although, as shall be mentioned later, with little practical effect. When 
the directive on deliberate release was implemented in Denmark, the four ‘guiding princi­
ples’161 formulated by the BioTIK commission were included in the preamble o f the revised 
law on the deliberate release of GMOs. The law also extended die consultation procedure 
in relation to approvals in a manner that went beyond the requirements of the directive,
160 Similarly, it is stated in the directive on food and feed stuff that in addition to risk assessments 'other le­
gitimate concerns’ can be taken into consideration when authorising GMOs for food production. However, it 
is not defined or specified what ‘other legitimate concerns’ consist of, nor what role they can play in regula­
tion (Poli 2003).
161 That the application o f biotechnology should aim to 1) secure economic and qualitative benefits, 2) respect 
autonomy, dignity, integrity and vulnerability o f human beings, animals and nature, 3) secure a just distribu­
tion of goods and burdens and 4) foster participation and transparency. (Forslag til lov om ændring af lov om 
miljo og genteknologi, 2002 (www.ft.dk/samhng/2P012/lovforslap som frem sat/Ll 31.htm))
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not only allowing recognised stakeholders to comment on suggested regulatory approvals 
but individual members of the public as well.162
When the EU passed the revised directives on deliberate release and the new directives on 
food and feedstuff as well as labelling and traceability as a prelude to lifting the morato­
rium, the one key policy topic left to the individual member states was the formulation o f 
the rules for co-existence between GM, conventional and organic agriculture. At the time 
of writing Denmark is one of the few countries that have completed legislation on this 
topic, and in a manner that is considered quite restrictive.163 Yet Denmark remained op­
posed to the lifting o f the moratorium to the very end, allegedly because the rules for coex­
istence were not quite in place when approvals o f GM crops were slowly resumed in the 
summer o f 2004.
All in all it seems that the Danish policy on GMOs has practically been as restrictive as 
possible short o f an outright ban, and in European comparison Denmark has been among 
the most hesitant countries to accept the application of GMOs in both agriculture and 
food production, which in fact is well in line with the concerns articulated by the lay panel 
in the 1999 consensus conference. There are, however, a few additional circumstances, 
which must be taken into consideration to complete this picture.
The ‘principles* formulated by the BioTIK commission were included in the preamble of 
the legislation. However, whereas the technical requirements applicants must fulfil to 
achieve an approval were specified in extensive detail, it was not specified how such ethical 
criteria were to be assessed, nor who would be responsible for such an assessment. No 
special organisational locus has been established for assessing the ethical aspects of agricul­
tural GMOs and the responsible regulatory agencies are as far as I have been able to estab­
lish not equipped with employees with particular ‘ethical* competences.164 Hence, the GM 
sceptical NGOs considered this inclusion of ethics as rhetorical window dressing. In my 
interviews, representatives of NOAH claimed that in their experience objections based on 
‘ethical’ arguments or arguments about a lack of ‘qualitative benefits’ never had any influ­
ence on the decisions made by the responsible authorities.165 As such, it seems that al­
though ‘public concerns’ are meant to be channelled into regulation through ‘ethical prin­
ciples’, in practice only technical risk assessment are undertaken (though possibly in a more
162 Normal Danish practice is that the comments following a specific piece o f  legislation specify what stake­
holders are to be consulted on e-g- changing legislation, or administrative decision making.
163 Opting for mandatory registration o f all GM  planting, obligations to inform neighbours and erect ‘safety’ 
belts to hinder pollen flows and the establishment o f  a fund for compensation in the case o f  adverse effects.
164 In the law it is made possible for the responsible minister to ‘consult a Danish ethical body about princi­
pled issues regarding gene technolog}', which occupy the Danish public’ (Forslag til lov om aendring af lov om 
miljo og genteknologi, 2001). However, no such body has been established, although the purview o f the 
‘Ethical Council’ is currently being expanded to potentially include agrifood issues.
165 Interviews J. Toft, B. Normander
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thorough and restrictive manner).166 As technical risk assessments are rather complicated 
procedures (mostly carried out by the applicants themselves) it seems somewhat doubtful 
that the rights of individual citizens to submit objections will have any significant effects at 
the operational level of administrative decision-making.
It thus seems that the public concerns articulated in the initiatives investigated, which — 
with reference to the investigations reviewed in Chapter I -  can perhaps best be described 
as a somewhat vague uneasiness with the intended and unintended effects of techno- 
scientific dynamics in the agri-food domain, have had some effects on the political system’s 
‘attitudes’ towards biotechnology7. However, this is modified partly through the EU frame­
work, and partly, perhaps more fundamentally, by a need for translation into frames where 
it can be handled bureaucratically or technocratically. However, research indicates that a 
significant part of concerns are exactly rooted in the perceived inadequacy of technocratic 
governance, because risk assessments rarely facilitate or even permit a more extensive 
evaluation of the purposes behind a given technological trajectory7. In essence, public con­
cerns of a socio-economic/cultural/ethical nature have been responded to by making tech­
nical risk assessments more comprehensive and requiring labelling, and not by attempting 
to establish a stronger political guidance. Therefore, one may speculate whether the ana­
lysed initiatives will in fact be able to absorb future protest potential.
Analytical Perspectives on the Danish Case
Having described in some detail two central Danish initiatives aimed at addressing the rela­
tionship between public concerns and policy making regarding biotechnology7 and the con­
text in which they were located, I shall now assume a more interpretive and analytical 
stance. To that end I shall attempt to characterise the two Danish initiatives according to 
the questions posed by the scheme developed in Chapter IV. The ambition is to tease out 
the social and communicative mechanisms aimed at and those actually provoked through 
the processes. In short, to explore in more detail how the perceived need to involve the 
public is operationalised. By contrasting the two initiatives, I hope to bring out their indi­
vidual features more clearly. For reasons o f descriptive parsimony, this needs to be done in 
a somewhat stylised manner, which can hardly do full justice to the real social processes in 
play and may arguably exaggerate some o f the differences. I hope, however, that this will 
create a reasonably sound basis for a comparison with observations from subsequent cases. 
Following this I shall attempt to assess the impacts of the two events in combination and 
reflect upon their ability to facilitate an uptake of public concerns in the regulation of tech­
166 Fundamentally, this means that ethical assessment is something that at best enters into consideration sub­
sequent to ‘factual’ risk assessment, but not as something that can either guide the developmental logic o f 
technological trajectories or be involved in the selection and operationalisation o f  the models according to 
which potential risks are assessed -  a process that inevitably entails choices among values but is mostly made 
invisible through technical framings (Levidow 2001, Levidow and Carr 1997).
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nology. This will be discussed as a question of creating resonance, which, I will argue, is a 
challenge to all procedures with participatory and deliberative intentions, but it is particu­
larly pronounced and evident in the Danish case. In doing so, I shall finally seek to account 
for a somewhat peculiar fact; namely that the procedures analysed here appeared to have 
created little resonance, and yet the Danish policy in this domain seems, comparatively, to 
be relatively in line with public attitudes (within the degrees of freedom for the Danish po­
litical system to operate in respect to EU regulation).
Characterising the D anish Initiatives -  Framings and D ynam ics
In the social dimension the BioTIK commission is characterised by consisting o f an exclusive 
group o f experts. These were appointed by the Ministry o f  Trade and Industry with the task 
to deliberate primarily with each other on what the nature of public concerns could be and 
how they could be responded to ethically, i.e. it as assumed that ‘public concerns’ primarily 
had to do with the absence or lack of explication of values in the social regulation o f bio­
technology in a broad sense. The experts investigated what public concerns were and by 
what values political responses to these concerns should be guided by. However, no direct 
flow o f information from the public to either the commission or decisions makers was es­
tablished. In this process one can therefore only talk about a ‘virtual’ inclusion of the public 
-  ‘the public’ is communicated about rather than sought included in communication. Sub­
sequently an unorchestrated public debate was initiated to further clarify of value-based 
assessments in the population. However, this was not fed back into political communica­
tion in any systematic manner either.
In the consensus conference a small selection of lay people chosen to represent ‘the public’ 
in a democratically ‘dignified’ manner was engaged in deliberation with experts and encour­
aged to make recommendations to policy-makers.167 Here lay people function as assessors 
and mediators o f divisive expert knowledge claims and put their assessments at the disposal 
of policy-makers.
In terms o f facilitating public confidence in regulatory frameworks, the BioTIK commis­
sion was initiated on the assumption that the possibility to debate and clarify the ‘values’ 
underpinning the political guidance o f biotechnology (distinct from all matters ‘technical’) 
would help ensure public trust in regulation and innovation. It seems that the implicit as­
sumption behind this approach was that the willingness of the public to delegate compe­
tence to policy-makers and regulators should be rooted in the willingness of policy-makers 
to make explicit value commitments, which should in turn actively influence what they 
would support and allow, and what they would work against. In the subsequent work of
167 ‘Dignified* in the sense that they were selected to speak on behalf of the public understood as ‘ordinary 
people*.
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the BioTIK secretariat the attempt to ensure public confidence consisted mostly in making 
the political and regulatory processes transparent
The public confidence perspective that can be read into the consensus conference format 
consists in letting ‘ordinary people’ articulate their concerns and attempting to create atten­
tiveness among legislators. This meant that willingness to delegate decision-making compe­
tence was perceived to hinge primarily on the attentiveness of policy makers to the concerns 
of ‘ordinary people’ and that such concerns are given a significant weight compared to 
other interests trying to influence policy formation.
Regarding the social mechanisms designed to mediate between different perspectives on 
what the issues at stake with regard to biotechnology actually are, it can be argued that the 
BioTIK commission proceeded on the assumption that the required mediation was be­
tween different ethical principles, or rather that an adaptation of a consensual ethics should 
facilitate a mediation between, for example, diverging cognitive assessments or socio­
economic interests by providing ‘a common language’, a meta-frame to embrace all view­
points (‘cultural’ and ‘functional’) in Danish society. The commission sought an all- 
inclusive compromise by claiming that different ethical principles (utilitarianism, ethics o f 
integrity and discourse ethics) were all necessary for assessing different applications of bio­
technology rather than choosing between them or trading them off against each other in a 
principled manner. In effect the concrete choice or trade-off process was delegated to pub­
lic debate and the political process. Hence to the extent that ‘mediation’ was envisioned, 
this was to take place primarily through an explanation of the different modes of ethical con­
sideration (in practice by establishing a sort of ethical checklist).
The consensus conference, with its attempt to compensate for a lack of numerical repre- 
sentativity with other maximum socio-demographic variation possible among 15 people, 
can be interpreted as an attempt to mediate through a discursive procedure (in the Haber- 
masian sense) by encouraging mutual respect for all articulated viewpoints. The procedure 
entailed a very clear role differentiation between experts and lay people, and made the lay 
panel responsible for mediating different viewpoints and concerns.
In the temporal dimension the two approaches also display some differences in their underly­
ing assumptions. They were in a sense both conceived as a response to what was consid­
ered a temporal anomaly in the social appropriation of a promising technology, namely 
persistent public hesitation towards what the protagonists of the technologies considered 
some very promising applications. The BioTIK commission was established to make up for 
what was perceived as the absence of an explicit value basis for biotechnology policy mak­
ing, and proceeded to articulate some generic ethical guidelines, which were meant to influ­
ence regulation prospectively. Compared to this the consensus conference functioned primar­
ily as a retrospective articulation of the reasons why the population still proved reluctant to 
accept GM food rather than a prospective articulation of what ends the lay panel would like 
to see encouraged in regard to the technology. Their suggestions primarily focused on in­
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adequacies in the then existing regulatory framework and principles, that should be recti­
fied for them to feel less uncomfortable with the application o f  biotechnology. If there was 
a specific temporal message from the recommendations o f the lay panel, it was that the 
technology was moving too fast to acquire confidence among ordinary people. This may be 
a product of the framing from the DBT-steering committee, who asked question to the lay 
panel focusing on what was to be done in the area in terms o f regulation, not regarding 
more ‘strategic’ governance of the technological trajectories, which was probably perceived 
by both organisers and lay panel to be something beyond Danish political and regulatory 
intervention.168 This means that where the work o f BioTIK proceeded on an assumption 
that public confidence could to develop through a prospective inclusion and articulation of 
‘values’, which were conceived in a rather a-temporal manner, into regulation, the consen­
sus conference can be seen as a recognition that a perpetual re-articulation o f public con­
cerns (in an organised manner) is desirable and necessary to maintain public confidence.
In terms of mediating between different perspectives the ideal propagated by the BioTIK 
work was, as mentioned, that ethical principles can be formulated in a generic manner, but 
that these principle must be traded off against other ‘non-ethical’ considerations in a per­
petual public debate taking issue with specific technological developments. The under­
standing of the DBT was not that different, the Board also seems to think that a constant 
public debate about new technologies is the democratic ideal for the governance of tech­
nology.169 However, in practice the consensus conference format does not really facilitate a 
perpetual public debate but a temporal snap-shot of public concerns, which can hopefully 
be fed into the political system at strategic points in time in relation to the policy agenda.170
Although the two initiatives are both occupied with the relationship between public opin­
ion and acceptance and the social regulation o f biotechnology, they do exhibit differences 
in the substantive dimension. Both initiatives were clearly technology induced. In the work of 
the BioTIK commission public concerns are pre-framed as ‘ethical’ and value based. This 
was more or less defined by the terms o f reference for the expert committee’s work, al­
though it was contested by some of the members, who felt that the separation of ethics 
from other dimensions in the social management of biotechnology was somewhat artificial. 
This in turn led to a relatively broad conception o f what ‘ethics’ are, and in some sections
168 When asked about whether the DBT had 'pre-framed’ the topic o f the conference to be ‘only’ about how 
GMOs ought to be regulated rather than asking the more fundamental question of whether GMOs  should be 
accepted, the project manager at the DBT replied that GMOs were already not only a technological but also a 
political reality, and that this was the point o f departure for the Board’s activities. This, however, would not 
have prevented the lay panel from taking up issues of whether GMOs were to be accepted at all, if they had 
so desired. However, the panel did not do this, according to the project manager probably because they did 
not perceive this to be a feasible question (Interview, Soren Gram).
169 Though the Board would probably not privilege 'ethics’ in any particular manner
170 An ambition which did not seem to be fulfilled in the specific conference scrutinised here as it suffered 
somewhat from unfortunate timing.
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o f the committee’s report ethical reflections seems to be more or less equated with democ­
ratic debate. However, the specific contribution of the BioTIFC initiative was the formula­
tion of a particular and unitary ‘ethical perspective’ to be applied to issues pertaining to 
questions o f ‘values’ raised by the adaptation of all sorts of biotechnology in a number of 
societal domains (i.e. more or less the same value issues were seen as pertinent to medical, 
agricultural and industrial applications). The consensus conference, on the other hand, was 
thematically more focused as it was only occupied with the application of biotechnology in 
the agricultural and food domain, but took a much broader stance in terms to the issues 
requiring public assessment, including the social management o f cognitive uncertainties, 
regulatory mechanisms and principles, socio-economic impacts as well as ‘ethics’. This can 
be seen as a manifestation of different assumptions about what should be at the basis of 
public confidence in regulation. In the BioTIK. initiative the primary emphasis was put on 
the willingness of the regulatory system to be guided by commonly shared values. Allegedly 
these values are present in civil society (claimed to be relatively homogeneous) and the task 
o f the expert committee was to articulate these in a clear and operative manner and put 
them at the disposal o f both policy makers and continued public debate.
Compared to this, the consensus conference arguably sustained the necessity o f safeguard­
ing the regulatory competences of the political system, i.e. the ability of the state to actually 
control the effects of biotechnology on nature and society, independently of whether the 
need for regulation was ‘ethical’ or otherwise.171
The BioTIK. initiative aimed at mediating between different perspectives on and evalua­
tions of biotechnology by means of formulating an integrative ethical framework, which 
should influence regulatory agendas across the board. Allegedly, this can be done by articu­
lating principles, which should be able to find wide support; i.e. ethics is fashioned as a 
mode of observation, which is potentially beyond bias and interests.172 As such, I will inter­
pret the initiative as primarily expressing a bureaucratic (hierarchical) cultural bias, where 
the development and adherence to rules andprinciples are seen as essential for the successful 
mediation o f different perspectives. The consensus conference sees ‘common sense’ as the 
more genuine type of rationality through which different (functional) perspectives can be 
mediated. Therefore it is required that ‘ordinary people’ (the periphery), free of interests 
articulate concerns about elite decision making (the centre). As such the consensus confer­
ences perhaps lean towards expressing an egalitarian cultural bias as discussed in Chapter 
III.
171 This may be a product o f  the concerns articulated by organised GM sceptics in the initial phases of GM 
commercialisation, when the first imports o f GM  soy was taking place ,that Danish authorities were some­
what impotent in the face o f  Monsanto’s attempt to muscle their products into European markets.
172 Although there seems to be a certain tension in the report between suggestions aiming at making ‘ethics’ a 
common master frame to potentially influence all biotechnology policy and a more modest ambition to make 
it a complement to existing regulator)' mechanisms.
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I have summarised the observations from this section in the following table:
R isk  controversy th e ­
m atic :
T ru s t them atic: M ediation them atic:
Social BioTIK: Experts deliberate 
on ‘public concerns’ and 
make recommendations to 
policy makers + unorches­
trated public debate
(virtual inclusion)
BioTIK: Ethical guidance o f  
technology suggested to 
ensure public confidence
(delegation to be based on 
value commitments ex­
pressed by decision makers)
BioTIK: Compromise 




CC: (Exclusive) lay panel 
deliberates with experts and 
formulates recommendations.
Lay panel as assessors o f  ex­
pert knowledge claims
{direct inclusion of limited 
number o f people)
CC: Representatives o f ‘or­
dinary people’ articulate 
concerns in specific policy 
domain, which is fed into 
policy discussions
(delegation on basis o f  atten­
tiveness to ‘ordinary people1)
CC: Socio-demographic 
variation in lay panel as­
sumed to mediate plurality 
of viewpoints
(mediation through social 
learning and mutual re­
spect)
T em pora l BioTIK: Generic ethical 
guidelines formulated to in­
fluence regulation prospec­
tively when public contro­
versy becomes evident (pro­
spective articulation in light 
o f  principles)
BioTIK: Public confidence 
to develop through prospec­
tive inclusion and articula­
tion of values in regulation
(a-temporal value fixation)
BioTIK: ‘Ethics’ to be 
traded off against other 
considerations through 
public debate as techno­
logical development pro­
ceeds
C G  Conference used to ar­
ticulate present concerns 
when these became more 
prolonged than expected
(retrospective articulation in 
light o f  experiences)
CC: Public unease with exist' 
ing governance and desired 
changes articulated
(perpetual re-articulation o f 
concerns desirable)
CC: Snapshots o f  public 
concerns to be considered 
in policy making at strate­
gic points
Substantive Dominant cultural bias in 
procedure
BioTIK: Public concerns * 
(pre) framed as ‘ethical’ 
(=value based)
BioTIK: Governance o f 
technology must be based 
on commonly shared values, 
crystallised in civil society’
BioTIK: Bureaucratic 
(procedural), regulatory 
agendas should be com­
plemented with ‘ethics’
CC: Public concerns articu­
lated as pertaining to cogni­
tive uncertainties, socio­
economic effects and value 
issues. (Fundamental rejec­
tion o f  technology not on 
agenda)
CC: Governance o f technol­
ogy must be based on gener­
ally trusted political control, 
which requires attention to 
public concerns on their 
terms
CC: Common sense
(critical), representatives of 
‘ordinary people’ articulate 
concerns about elite deci­
sion making
The Problem  o f  Resonance
As briefly touched upon above, assessing the impacts o f participatory and deliberative pro­
cedures is no straightforward task. The policy' arenas, in which the governance of technol-
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ogy is shaped are a multi-layered ensemble of communication, which is not necessarily or­
dered according to any simple or unitary logic, and it is not self-evident where to look for 
traces of the kind o f procedures explored here.
The two initiatives scrutinised here present the social scientific observer with an explana­
tory and interpretive challenge. On the one hand it seems that the political system has been 
willing to devote resources and attention to addressing public concerns in the domain of 
biotechnology, and that it has been willing -  at least rhetorically -  to modify technocratic 
dominance over policy formulation to a significant extent by permitting the ‘ethics* and 
concerns of ‘ordinary people* to be articulated in a dignified and officially legitimate man­
ner. On the other hand, however, it has been difficult to trace any substantive effects in 
regulatory principles and practices that can be attributed (directly) to these procedures. I 
will take this apparent paradox as an occasion to discuss in more general terms an issue, 
which I consider to be common to most participatory and deliberative procedures, namely 
what I call the problem of resonance. Subsequently, I shall briefly discuss why I believe that in­
stead of seeing the Danish policy in this domain as the product of an undetected resonance 
o f the two procedures investigated, it is more fruitful to see both the policy and the two 
initiatives as two different effects of a common cause, namely a more longstanding political 
culture of public debate on new technologies.
As a methodological issue resonance poses different challenges depending on whether it is 
posed to organisers of participatory or deliberative procedures (the self-descriptions of the 
procedures) or external (social scientific) evaluators. In the first instance the problem is 
about how to achieve resonance, in the second it is about how to measure resonance. Both are 
o f  relevance here, but I shall focus primarily on dissecting the first as this is intimately con­
nected to the question regarding how the public is operationalised in such procedures. It 
should be mentioned that in the section above in which the consensus conference is ana­
lysed, I have applied some rather crude measures of resonance by simply looking at refer­
ences to the event in contexts I expected to be central to the issue at hand, namely political 
communication (parliamentary activities) and mass media attention. I argued that in this 
particular case, this rather crude approach was relatively unproblematic because it was evi­
dent that there was in fact very little resonance achieved.173 This meant that the task of trac­
ing the effect of particular ideas or discursive frames across different domains was of sec­
ondary importance (it will be more of an issues for my other cases).174 The work o f the 
BioTIK commission left more discursive traces, both within political communication and 
in the subsequent attempts to stimulate broader public debate. The two initiatives pose
173 A fact that was partly admitted to me by the interviewees at the DBT.
174 I have not attempted to trace possible impacts o f  the conferences in expert communities or among organ­
ised stakeholders, See Joss and Kluver (2001) for such an assessment.
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slightly different issues in relation to the question of resonance» which will be discussed in 
turn, based on the assumption that these experiences may have something more general to 
tell about the challenges posed to bringing ‘public concerns’ into the governance o f science 
and technology.
If in this context we generally understand resonance as the transfer o f particular issue fram­
ings from one to another or several communicative contexts, the challenge for participa­
tory or deliberative procedures arguably consist in making their distinctions relevant in out­
side contexts, be this the political system, regulatory institutions, centres of techno- 
scientific innovation or the mass media public sphere. If a particular way of framing issues 
is transferred from one context to another, we can speak of resonance. In general, the issue 
of resonance is applicable to the conditioning of any two communicative systems by each 
other. In this context the issues of resonance can then in principle be posed between such 
procedures and other organisational and functional contexts. I will, however, limit my in­
terest primarily to the effects on the political system and its organisations (and to a lesser 
degree the mass media system). In this case this will mean that a particular mode o f obser­
vation or problem framing pertaining to biotechnology is transferred from the (organisa­
tional) context where public concerns are articulated to contexts where policy is conceived. 
Whether such resonance can be achieved, in a general consideration, probably dependent 
on a host of factors, some more contingent than others. I will suggest four such factors, 
which I judge to be of fundamental importance for the creation o f such resonance, and 
characterise the two Danish initiatives in regard to these.175 (The problem of resonance is 
most pronounced in the Danish case. However, in the comparative Chapter VIII I  shall 
clarify how some of these factors are configured in the other cases, resulting in different 
outcomes).
The four factors arguably o f central importance for whether participatory or deliberative 
TA procedures can achieve resonance are legitimacy, relevance or compatibility, organisa­
tional links and (external) mobilisation potential.
Legitimacy. If participatory and deliberative procedures are to achieve resonance in contexts 
where the governance of science and technology is shaped (and fulfil the aim of démocrati­
sation often present in the self-understanding of the organisations in charge of them), they 
need to be seen in these contexts as legitimate representations o f ‘the public’ or a relevant 
subsection thereof. This is why claims from (even very loud) social movement actors are 
not always ‘taken seriously’, they are seen as professional alarmists, not true representatives 
of the general public although the often claim to be so.
Relevancejcompatibility. It is not enough that such procedures are seen to articulate genuine 
and legitimate concerns, the articulation needs also to be relevant for the kind of decisions
175 These four factors are not derived from any source in particular but inspiration is drawn from a large array 
o f  literature on organisational aspects o f  technology assessment.
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being made and exhibit compatibility in terms of themes and levels o f complexity of the is­
sues at stake. For example, the argument that ‘the population don’t want it’ (whether true 
or not) is not perse relevant to a regulatory regime based on assessments of physical risks as 
understood by mainstream, regulatory science in a liberal regime (as discussed in Chapter 
I). When viewed in this manner the problem of resonance can be seen as the flip side o f 
the tendency o f autopoietic systems to immunise themselves against intrusions into their op­
erative autonomy (see Chapter III). When little resonance appear in intersystemic relation­
ships it may then both have to do with communicative incommensurabilities (lack of rele­
vance) and with a more active ‘fending o ff  foreign communication to maintain the identity 
of the receiving system or to defend present system states, e.g. political pre-commitment to 
GMOs in the light of articulated public discontent.
Organisational links. All other things being equal, it must be expected that the communica­
tive transfer of problem framings from one context to another will be smoother if there is 
some kind of organisational link, which can facilitate and focus ‘attention’ in the addressed 
organisational context. From die perspective of procedural design, this will ideally entail 
some kind of prospective commitment on the side of the addressee before the process is 
initiated.
Mobilisation potential Finally, it seems reasonable to expect that the attention of the ad­
dressed organisation is enhanced if it perceives itself to be the object of public attention,176 
which may turn nasty if the articulated concerns are ignored. N ot only are the quality of the 
articulated concerns important, so is the ability to orchestrate collective actions to back 
them up.
When the two Danish initiatives are characterised according to these dimensions, the fol­
lowing observations can be made:
It seems that despite the fact that the consensus conference format includes very few ‘ordi­
nary people’ (usually around 15) it is generally considered by the political system in Den­
mark as a legitimate and reliable articulation of the concerns o f  the broader population. As 
shown, the Danish government considers consensus conferences as a democratic proce­
dure worth exporting to other contexts. Nonetheless the relevance and compatibility with 
regulatory activities seems more questionable. The output from consensus conferences may 
well give legislators a snapshot of what preoccupies ordinary people about a given technol­
ogy in a fairly holistic manner. However, in the procedure investigated the observations
176 i.e. perceives itself observed in the medium o f ‘the public’, cf. Chapter III
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and recommendations made by the lay panel were arguably under-complex compared to 
the regulative issues at stake and their institutional framework.177
The fact that the DBT is a parliamentary institution (though not one closely integrated into 
the political system) should in principle provide relatively favourable conditions for creat­
ing resonance between the consensus conference procedure and communication in the po­
litical system.178 Nonetheless, little such resonance with either the political system or the 
mass mediated public sphere was registered.
Finally, it seems that the consensus conference commanded little interest in the NGO 
community, which mostly saw it as a legitimating exercise for decisions taken elsewhere. 
The fact that the conference had a mediating (consensus seeking) aim made it rather less 
interesting for NGOs to mobilise around, although the lay panel did in fact support a 
number o f the viewpoints articulated by the organised GM sceptics. Basically, the message 
from the conference had few advocates beyond the DBT, which may account at least in 
part for its relatively modest impact.
Formulated more generally within a systems theoretical perspective it can be argued that by 
attempting to holistically embrace a broad spectrum o f systemic references or perspectives 
on biotechnology (political, scientific, economic, legal) in one procedure, events like con­
sensus conferences may in common sense considerations appear very promising. However, 
given their event-like character, they run the risk of appearing under-complex and thereby 
irrelevant from all systemic perspectives. Because the functional systems are highly special­
ised, they are more or less immune to communications proceeding in other codes than 
their own, despite the fact that most technologies are shaped exactly by the ‘interaction’ of 
multiple systemic dynamics. O f course consensus conferences are primarily addressed to 
the political system, the self-understanding of which is arguably to condition the workings 
of other systemic contexts. However, exercising such steering capacities requires significant 
knowledge about their working principles, which is difficult to convey through such a pro­
cedural format. Hence, although consensus conferences may be democratically sound from 
a normative perspective, they seem less robust from an instrumental perspective where 
their effects are likely to hinge on a number o f contextual features rather than their proce­
dural qualities.
177 ^ h e n  for instance the lay panel recommends that it should be ensured that "...consumers are ensured a a 
genuine access to non-GM  food” (Teknologiradet 1999: §8), this can of course be adapted as a policy goal by 
the political system (which it in fact was), but it still leaves quite a scope for interpretation not only about 
what regulatory mechanisms are required, but also about what GM free food actually means.
178 One may of course speculate whether a more direct link to the agencies responsible for writing up and 
administering regulation would lead to a greater resonance than a filtering through the Parliament. In the pre­
sent institutional set-up none o f the agencies actually occupied with the regulation are to my knowledge en­
couraged to take account o f  public concerns as they are articulated in consensus conferences.
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The activities in the BioTIK initiative were configured somewhat differently along these 
dimensions. The statement from the group of experts was commissioned by the executive 
branch of the political system, which initially compiled the composition o f the committee. 
As the statement was primarily a formulation of a set of normative principles it was not as 
such an articulation of public concerns, though it was implied that the formulated princi­
ples embraced the latter. For these two reasons, its legitimacy in the political systems did 
not really seem to be an issue, it was accepted as one among other pieces of policy advice. 
However, just as the concerns articulated in the consensus conference may be ‘relevant’ but 
not operational, so it proved difficult for the ethical framing to impact significantly on 
regulatory principles and practices. The problem here was not one of ‘complexity’, but 
relevance still proved to be critical. From the parliamentary debate it is clear that ‘ethical’ 
framings did not induce much political resonance as such. ‘Ethics’ was used as a label for 
something, which, as a matter of principle, should be present when making political deci­
sions, but it did not seem to significantly alter political or institutional priorities. Rather it 
was used for ornamental functions in the legislation, but with little actual effect. This is de­
spite the fact that organisationally both the work of the commission and the subsequent 
activities of the Secretariat were closely linked up with the political system. This is partly to 
do with the embedding of Danish policy making in the wider European context where the 
kind o f ethical principles formulated in the BioTIK work found even less resonance. How­
ever, from the perspective of the theory of functional differentiation, this can also be inter­
preted as an indication that ‘ethics’ does not provide an adequate framework within which 
the complexities accompanying technological innovation can be processed communica­
tively as problems in science, the legal system or economics.179 Finally, it seems that the 
kind o f ethical principles formulated in the BioTIK work did not have much appeal among 
the GM sceptic NGO community, which found it implausible that such principles would 
significantly influence a technological trajectory deemed undesirable. Hence, the work of 
the BioTIK committee did not induce any ‘public’ mobilisation, which could potentially 
have ensured it more resonance in the political and regulatory contexts.
As no attempts were made to channel information from the public debate on biotechnol­
ogy based on the normative principles outlined in the expert committee’s work into politi­
cal communication, only very indirect effects can be expected to have taken place. For 
these activities it therefore hardly makes sense to discuss issues of legitimacy and relevance 
because the organisational link was completely absent.180
179 “.„die Dominanz funktionaler Differenzierung, wenn und soweit sie sich als Formprinzip der Gesellschaft 
durchsetzt, die Moral evolutionär abhängt und ideologisch wie motivational dispriviligiert.” (Luhmann 1978: 
90, quoted from van den Daele 1986: 160).
180 Initially, the NGOs involved with the work had an ambition, it seems, to use the established Internet site 
as a platform to reach a larger audience for their mobilisation efforts. However, in the eyes o f the NGOs the 
civil servants managing the site valued neutrality and quantity o f information higher than engagement and 
relevance, and the NGOs withdrew from the activities. (Interview,J. Toft.)
189
Given that the exploration so far has indicated that two central Danish initiatives aimed at 
exploring and addressing public concerns in regard to bio technolog}7 appears to have had 
limited resonance in the relevant political and regulatory institutional contexts they were 
allegedly addressing, i.e. neither political decision making nor regulatory practices appears 
to have adapted the framings articulated in the initiatives in anything but a superficial man­
ner, how may one account for the comparatively hesitant Danish position in the EU con­
text?181
Here a disclaimer may be called for. The postulate that the two initiatives have achieved 
only little resonance could in principle be the result o f an insufficiently sensitive research 
methodology — that I have not been able to register the effects o f the two procedures in 
sufficient detail. However, I will suggest a different interpretation, an interpretation that in 
part points to the necessity of slightly different research methodologies to explore these 
issues more thoroughly, in part one that urges a less optimistic assessment of the use of 
one-off deliberative and participatory procedures and ‘events* to intervene in technological 
trajectories and mitigate technological controversies.
My conclusion from this enquiry is that the relationship between the two initiatives scruti­
nised and the subsequent Danish policy regarding GMOs is probably better seen -  and 
ought to be investigated as -  one of co-founding rather than o f causality. They are, so to 
speak, both the product of a longstanding culture of debate on new technologies, rather 
than the one (the procedures) the cause o f the other (policy). One implication of this inter­
pretation is that in order to properly understand how public concerns or public discourses 
impact on or condition policy-making and regulatory principles, a longer temporal perspec­
tive may in some cases be required. Similarly, this interpretation indicates that attention 
needs to be devoted to more subtle mechanisms of the discursive transmission of issue 
framings than clear and observable transfers as carried out.
It seems that in the Danish case the mere presence o f an organisation like the Danish 
Board o f Technology (for which the articulation of public concerns is a central element of 
organisational self-understanding) in the institutional landscape for an extended period of 
time, aside from its specific activities, has apparently made the Danish political system 
more sensitive to cultural reservations regarding technologies than in other contexts. This, 
combined with the activities of NGOs, has — over a prolonged time span — developed a 
sensitivity in the political system to the fact that technological innovation and the (cultural) 
evaluations of the population of these appear to evolve — at least in some technological
181 To pose the question in this manner can of course be seen as biased in the sense that it assumes that the 
‘natural’ or default attitude o f the political system is one o f  embracing and promoting biotechnology. I be­
lieve, however, that this is justified, as the majority o f the political system in Denmark does adhere to a 
growth oriented and optimistic position in other technological domains and is, in other contexts, keen to em­
phasise research and innovation as a important factor for the maintenance o f  welfare.
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domains -  according to different and unsynchronised temporal orders, and an acceptance 
that a cautious political attitude -  substantially as well as rhetorically -  is required. This 
means giving space for the articulation of concerns -  but not necessarily adhering to them.
This said, it must also be noted that the Danish policy response was not formulated by at­
tempting to intervene substantially in the technological trajectory, but by stricter regulatory 
requirements and oversight. Although the concerns articulated in the consensus conference 
as well as in by BioTIPC commission arguably express profound reservations among parts 
of the population towards still more industrialised agricultural production systems, the po­
litical response has basically consisted in slowing down this process and raising the safety 
requirements, and not in a fundamental questioning of the substantive aspects of the tech­
nological trajectory. For this, of course, a host of reasons can be given including conspira­
torial or moralistic ones that see public involvement initiatives as mere lip-service* to par­
ticipation. I will suggest that from a systems theoretical perspective seem to have less to do 
with ill faith or hidden motives among politicians and more to do with some deeply in­
grained structural features of modem societies that are fundamentally ‘programmed’ to op­
erate on the basis o f constant innovation. When it comes to technological dynamics few 
mechanisms are available, to stay continue in the vocabulary to create resonance for ‘cul­
tural* framings where such technologies are shaped and regulated. This invites a less opti­
mistic evaluation of the possibilities for minor, short term ‘events* and ‘procedures’ -  
independent o f their ‘democratic’ appeals — to more fundamentally mitigate technological 
controversies. “ 182
182 It could also motivate a less optimistic stance on the prospect o f exporting such procedures to other policy 
contexts as quick solution to acceptance problems in very different political and institutional cultures, as is 






The Problem of Inclusion -  The British Case
As the focal point for the British case study I have chosen a procedure that can best be 
characterised as an orchestrated public debate on the commercialisation of GM crops and food 
in the UK with a participatory and deliberative intention and format. This debate, accord­
ing to my impressions at the time of writing, had a more significant effect on the appro­
priation of the technology in Britain than many observers expected at its outset. It has, 
however, divided opinion in regard to the actual effects and especially the legitimacy of 
these effects, which makes it interesting for the present purpose. The debate was instigated 
by the British government, but run by an independent steering board appointed for the 
purpose. The ‘public’ phase of the debate took place during the months of June and July 
2003 and was reported in September 2003.
Unlike a number o f other participatory' procedures this debate was structured and targeted 
to feed into a specific process of policy decision-making, but its organisers also intended it 
to be broad and open in its outreach. This produced a specific configuration of science, 
politics, and the public, which is interesting for the topic of this thesis for at least two rea­
sons. It is a specific example o f how a certain framing of and assumptions about ‘the pub­
lic* and their concerns, as well as the ‘concerns’ of the political system, are configured and 
develop a particular communicative structure that facilitates certain contributions and rules 
out others. Secondly, the challenges and obstacles the debate encountered as a particular 
mode of organised communication can, in my opinion, help shed light on some of the pos­
sibilities and limitations this type of procedure of public involvement in science and tech- 
nology policy-making is likely to encounter.
This particular procedure was chosen because it is considered by most observers as a very 
significant (and path-breaking) attempt at instigating broader public engagement with sci­
ence and technology7 in the British context.183 As in the Danish case the inquiry7 wall com­
mence with a primarily descriptive section recounting of the context the procedures 
emetged in and was shaped by, the procedure itself and an attempt to retrace (some of) its 
effects. Subsequently, I will take a more analytical stance and discuss certain aspects of the 
case in die light o f the theoretical reflections and operational questions developed in earlier 
chapters. In conclusion I shall take the opportunity7 to introduce a theme to which I shall
m  The organisers, on their web page, describe the debate as “an innovative, effective and deliberative pro­
gramme, with the issues for debate framed by the public.” See also the written evidence for the House o f  
Commons (2003) comprising written submissions from a number of stakeholders’ evaluations of the process. 
Incidentally, it so happened that the procedure took place during the work on this thesis, which provided a 
particular opportunity7 to observe a deliberative procedure ‘in the making’.
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also return in the comparative section, namely how mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion 
are used to establish the credibility of such exercises, what I call the problem of inclusion.
The Context
In order to set the scene for the description and analysis of the event, it is necessary to look 
at the context in which the debate came about. Some of this is obviously covered in the 
general section on the GM controversy as an example o f late modem risk controversies. 
However, this case also has its specific history and dynamic. This, I will argue, must be lo­
cated at the intersection of a number o f different discourses and policy developments, the 
most important o f which I shall try to disentangle and explicate in the following. The de­
scription will consist of four parts, which are separated for descriptive reasons, but are ob­
viously interrelated. Subsequently, I hope to demonstrate how all these contextual elements 
flow into the shaping and flow o f the debate as an event and help to interpret its specific 
features. The first o f the contextual features is a longstanding debate in Britain among both 
academics and policy makers on the nature and importance of public understanding o f sci­
ence. The second pertains to the various effects on the relations between political decision­
makers, the scientific establishment and the wider public following the policy failures in 
regard to BSE and to a lesser extent other problems in the UK food sector. Thirdly, I shall 
look at the emergence of a ‘new mood for dialogue’ in policy discourses as a response to 
the diagnosed lack of public trust in scientists and regulators. Finally, I draw a bnef sketch 
of British policy on biotechnology and its organisational form to the present and describe 
the interaction between British, European and wider international developments.
The Public Understanding o f Science D iscourse in the UK
Britain has a longstanding reputation as one of the front runners in Europe in regard to 
biotechnological research and development, a position that goes back at least till the dis­
covery by Watson and Crick in 1953 of the DNA structure. However, Britain has also wit­
nessed some o f the most thorough discussions on the effects o f  science as a cultural and 
economic force. Since the end of the Second World War at least academics and policy 
makers virtually everywhere have assumed that a strong (scientific) knowledge base is an 
indispensable prerequisite for industrial innovation and hence for a prosperous economy 
(See for, various perspectives, Martin and Nightingale 2000)).184 Opinions vary on what is
JM This linear model o f  innovation* (direct flow from basic to applied research to product innovation), 
epitomised in the report by Vannavar Bush ‘Science, the Endless Frontier* (1946) underpinned much o f  US 
post war science and technology policy. However, subsequent research on innovation has cast serious doubts 
on die theory (Martin and Nightingale 2000). Nonetheless, it remains a strong implicit idea in many policy 
discussions. In this context this point is clearly expressed in a speech given by Tony Blair in April 2002, 
claiming among other things that: “The strength and creativity o f our [the UK] science base is a key national 
asset as we move into the 21n century*’ (Blair 2002). The speech made a strong case for Britons and Europe­
ans to embrace the possibilities offered by new biotechnology, and not “retreat into a culture o f  unreason”.
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the optimal mixture of basic research relative to applied R&D efforts for various econo­
mies and how the right balance between public and private funding of research activities 
across different sectors is best achieved. These discussions are often highly technical and 
have generally not attracted much public attention. However, a fundamental precondition 
for policy makers to be able to allocate resources as they believe desirable is that research 
activities, both basic and applied, are generally held to be both legitimate and desirable 
among the wider public. As a number o f different technological controversies have shown, 
this precondition appears to have become increasingly fragile across the Western world185 -  
and therefore the object of growing political attention. Where post war science and tech­
nology policy for a long time consisted almost exclusively in a nurturing of innovation and 
economic growth (paired with a paternalistic protection of public safety) such objectives 
must now increasingly be balanced with public acceptance of new technologies.186 Britain 
has a long history o f scientists who discuss both the cultural and the economic value o f a 
scientifically literate population that could facilitate and legitimate scientific progress, tech­
nological innovation, and economic prosperity (Irwin and Wynne 1996, Martin and Night­
ingale 2000). Arguably, these debates have featured more forcefully in the British context 
than in my other cases and they have undoubtedly left more traces in policy' discourses in 
Britain than elsewhere,187 which is why they should be considered here -  although aspects 
of this debate also has relevance beyond the British context. It is today widely accepted that 
many such considerations were rather elitist and framed as a question of how best to 
achieve and maintain a one-way educational effort flowing from scientists and engineers 
into ‘society’, whilst protecting scientific activity from interference from impure interests. 
These ideas were epitomised in more recent times by the publication in 1985 by the Royal 
Society of a report called ‘Public Understanding of Science’. Here it was stated that:
“Science and technology plays a major role in most aspects of our daily lilts both at home and at 
work. Our industry and thus our nationalprosperity depend upon them. Almost all public policies 
halt scientific and technological implications. Everybody, therefore, needs some understanding of sci­
ence, its accomplishments and its limitations. ” (Royal Society 1985: 6)
A statement that construed a rather monolithic image of science and technology, o f which 
‘everybody’ ought to understand at least a little. Not (only) because it impinges on their
185 Durant (1999) likens this to the paradox o f  democracy described by Giddens: countries with well- 
established and working democracies exhibit low levels o f enthusiasm about current politics and politicians — 
whereas people without or with fragile democracies generally want more democracy. According to Durant the 
same trend can be observed for science. Countries with the highest levels o f  science and technology also ex­
hibit large degrees o f  public scepticism and mistrust in experts, whereas developing countries are much more 
optimistic and have fewer controversies.
186 ‘Paternalistic’ in the sense that it was largely considered the task o f a technocratic elite to determine the 
necessary level and appropriate means of public protection on the basis o f  expert knowledge-
187 At least I have not come across similar references to debates about the science/society interface impinging 
on biotechnology debates in my other cases.
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daily lives, but because national prosperity depends on i t  The report describes scientific 
literacy and pro-science attitudes almost as civic duties. By implication, any ‘problems’ in 
the interaction between science and society was thereby placed squarely with ‘society’ or 
the public, not with problematic features of either scientific knowledge or the effects of its 
application in various technologies. Or, these were to be handled by policy makers on be­
half o f a trusting population.
The claimed public ignorance of science and technology -  and the alleged hostility of the 
public towards science and science based policy-making — was posed both as a democratic 
and an economic problem which required urgent attention. Some years later, in 1992, an 
academic journal with the same title as the Royal Society’s report was launched. Although 
this led to or coincided with broader international interest in such issues, the debates about 
public understandings of science appear to have been particularly influential in the UK 
(Elam and Bertilsson 2003).
The thrust of the Public Understanding o f Science (PUS) discourse has been described as a
“... predominantly science-centred and science-led movement It has emphasised the educational and 
'civilising role* science and scientists can play in the context of the new technological competition, and 
hasframed its task asfirst of all one of combatingpublic hostility and resistance to new technology. ” 
(Elam and Bertilsson 2003: 239)
PUS as an academic topic has primarily been about public education, about creating a re­
ceptive audience for scientific communication beyond those o f science’s more traditional, 
limited audience of peers, rather than about ‘science’s understanding of the public’, that is 
the attention o f scientific organisations to the needs and concerns of the wider public.
At the heart o f the discourses on PUS was the now rather infamous ‘deficit model’, whose 
basic assumption is that acceptance o f technologies is directly correlated with knowledge of 
the underlying science. To know science is to love science’, so to speak. The deficit model 
has largely — at least at the rhetorical level — fallen into disrepute in British policy discourse, 
not just through academic and popular critique but also by being proved inadequate in 
practice.188 The PUS research programme has, however, produced both concepts, interpre­
tive frameworks and empirical knowledge, which still influence discussions in the UK sig­
nificantly. As epitomised in the sociological diagnosis o f the emergence of a risk society, 
mishaps and controversies have shown that the effects o f scientific knowledge production 
and technological development do not have only beneficial effects in society at large, nor 
are such effects distributed equally throughout society. This has forced science-based or-
188 As indicated by survey research, no clear correlation between scientific literacy and acceptance o f  tech­
nologies can be established (see Chapter I). However, there may be more structural reasons why the aban­
donment o f the deficit model in practice is mosdy rhetorical.
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ganisations to alter their relationship with their surroundings.189 In order to do this PUS
researchers and other social scientists have been called in to ‘assist* such organisations.190 In
dealing with ‘new* problems -  or new ways of dealing with old problems -  some older j
framings of the interaction between science and the public are (re)activated. This is espe-
i
dally the case in discussions on how the public can be informed about, and what kind o f 
information the public need, to be more actively involved in policy making.
Policy Failure, Intransparency and the D ecline in  Public Trust
It is believed by many commentators that the single most important, although not the sole 
reason for the changes in the discourses on science, technology and the public in Britain 
has been the BSE scandal. The BSE case is important not only because it demonstrated in 
practical terms and under enormous public attention that scientific knowledge is fallible '
and that scientific controversy — especially when it comes to regulatory science where deci­
sions must be made in finite time191 — easily gets entangled in a variety of non-scientific is­
sues, interests and biases. It also demonstrated that organisations — also science-based ones |
— tend to stick to decisions long after they have ceased to be ‘rational’, i.e. that learning ef- j
fects do not necessarily set in when new evidence emerges if these are contrary to organisa- * j
tional commitments. The BSE case furthermore made it clear that in a policy culture like 
the British one, described as ‘informal, cooperative, and closed to all but a select inner cir- ;
cle of participants’ (Jasanoff cited in Bauer et. al. 1998: 164), public confidence is very diffi­
cult to regain once such policy failures have been exposed.192 j
In the aftermath of the BSE crisis, British authorities had difficulties stabilising public ex- j
pectations in food safety in order that the public’s attention be directed towards other is- j
sues. They have in a sense lost discursive control, and food safety has remained a constant
189 By science-based organisations I mean organisations that in their self-descriptions operate primarily with 
the help of scientific theories and methodologies. This does not only include research organisations, but also 
regulatory agencies and companies that purport to apply ‘science-’ or ‘evidence-based’ procedures.
190 This is also the case in the preparation o f the debate to be analysed here, where the initial recommendation 
by the Agricultural and Environmental Biotechnology Committee (see below) stated that: "In order to dis­
cover what might satisfy the public, it would be useful to have a more systematic understanding of the basis 
o f public responses to new technology. There is already a largp body of existing research by social scientists 
and market researchers, but this is dispersed and fragmentary: an over-arching study distilling and integrating 
the various approaches would be invaluable. We see a need for a network o f  social researchers working in this 
field to create a continuing body o f improved social intelligence, which the Government can use in decision­
making” (AEBC 2001: 43). Following this quote, it does not seem necessary to mention that several social 
scientists sen e on the committee. One may feel tempted to wonder, however, if this is not in fact to over­
stretch the expectations o f what the social sciences can deliver, both due to epistemological difficulties with 
the predictability o f the phenomena at hand and questions of disciplinary dispersion of perspectives.
191 Which means that science’s traditional social processes of quality control maybe circumvented, both or­
ganisationally and temporally.
192 The BSE case is o f course also important as it serves as a symbolic ‘anchor point’ for a number of con­
cerns in regard to modem industrialised food production, which are often aired in discussions about GM 
food as well as the regulatory framework surrounding GMOs (Grove-White et. al. 1997, see also Chapter I o f 
this work).
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‘irritation’ in public communication. Therefore, the proponents o f GM technolog)7 have 
not been able to establish the image o f this technolog)7 as a stable ‘causal simplification* in 
public perceptions -  surprises are expected and issues can (perpetually) be (re)po!iticised.
In Luhmannian terms one can say that communicative complexity has not been reduced to 
the degree achieved in other technological domains.
However, the BSE debacle is not only invoked by opponents o f GM crops as an example 
of how ‘meddling with nature’ can have unforeseen consequences and of how public bod­
ies are unreliable. It is also at times used by those same public bodies as an example o f how 
not to do things — accompanied by assurances that ‘the lesson has been learned’193.
A central example o f such claimed policy learning was the establishment in 1999 of the 
Food Standards Agency (FSA), an independent regulatory agency combining risk identifica­
tion, risk assessment and regulation as well as risk communication for all matters pertaining 
to food safety. The FSA works on a self-proclaimed basis of openness, transparency and 
consultation, putting consumer safety first. The establishment of a ‘transparent* and ‘inde­
pendent* government agency with consumer safety (rather than industry success) at the top 
of its agenda was hoped to help rebuild public confidence in the regulatory oversight o f the 
food sector, i.e. a return to a situation where consumers do not worry about the food they 
consume. The establishment o f the FSA was proclaimed to be a major shift or innovation 
in the British policy culture. This meant that areas previously considered ‘technical’ and left 
to closed, self-recruiting expert bodies now were perceived to require transparency and so­
cial inclusion in order to command public confidence (Salter and Frewer 2003). However, 
such institutional innovation was not automatically propelled by the observation of public 
distrust following the BSE scandal. The idea that transparency and consultation could pro­
vide solutions to public distrust in the food chain did not come out of the blue .194 Argua­
bly, its intellectual underpinnings had been maturing for some time before it was adopted 
by central policy making institutions.
A N ew  M ood for Consultation and Public Participation
Alongside the original strands o f  PUS in academia and among policy7 makers focusing on 
scientific literacy among the public, the acceptance o f new technologies, and the authority 
of scientific expertise a growing ‘reflexive* or ‘critical’ stream o f PUS discussion on how to 
‘democratise’ science and technology or make it more attentive to the needs and creeds of
193 An argument which, on the political scene, is helped by the change o f  government -  as well as perhaps 
contributing to bringing this change o f  government about
194 This is o f course no t to argue that the BSE problems are the only reason for the establishment o f  the FSA 
or other institutional changes at the interface between scientific expertise, policy making and the public. 
However, in a number o f policy documents the BSE debade is presented as the prime example o f how not to 
do things.
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the public has also developed, which also questions the feasibility o f a concept of ‘a public’ 
for science and technolog}7 at all (see e.g. Durant 1999).
This is a way o f thinking about the interaction between science, technology and society, 
which has risen to some intellectual prominence internationally. In Britain, however, more 
explicitly than elsewhere, it seems to have had a direct influence on the rhetoric of the pol­
icy-making establishment. This in part happened through the appointment o f some leading 
academics within the PUS research discipline to various advisory boards. This can be ob­
served in a number of policy documents where both the Parliament and the Government 
present themselves as having won a new type of attentiveness to public concerns in regard 
to science and technology -  and stage this ‘new mood’ for consultation and dialogue as the 
result o f a learning process where old routines are being revised.
This is perhaps most clearly expressed in the 2000 report from the House of Lords’ select 
committee on science and technology report entitled ‘Science and Society’. This widely 
cited paper is often considered a landmark for the in British science and technology policy 
away from elitist educational approaches towards interaction with broader constituencies. 
The basic diagnosis of the report runs as follows:
“Society's relationship with science is in a criticalphase.... On the one hand, there has ne ter been a 
time when the issues involving science were more exciting, the public more interested, or the opportuni­
ties more apparent. On the other hand, public confidence in scientific advice to Government has been 
rocked by a series of events, culminating in the BSE fiasco; and many people are deeply uneasy 
about the huge opportunities presented by areas of science including biotechnology and information 
technology, which seem to be advancing far ahead of their awareness and assent. In turn, public un­
ease, mistrust and occasional outright hostility are breeding a climate of deep anxiety among scientist 
themselves. ’’(House of Lords 2000: §1.1)
The report reviews a number o f findings from the research on PUS and acceptance of 
technologies and concludes that the root of the problem has to do with a ‘crisis of trust’, a 
concept (trust), which the report admits it does not understand well (ibid: §2.36). A number 
of suggestions as to why this crisis of trust has emerged are debated in the report. A central 
one is that “(t)he administrative culture of the United Kingdom is notoriously secretive” 
(ibid: §2.45), another is that in practical matters scientific issues are mixed up with a num­
ber of other concerns of a more social, economic or ethical character:
“It is a difficult challenge to get this balance right: on the one hand to address the scientific questions 
seriously, but on the other hand to avoid reducing the whole public issue to one of science. A  negative 
response to expert assertions on issues invoking science may be mistaken as negative to science, when 
in reality people are responding negatively to the way in which this reduction to a “scientific issue" 
alone distorts or excludes other legitimate concerns. ” (ibid: §2.49, emphasis in original)
The reports cites GMOs as just one example o f this, stating that “(t)his is a political ques­
tion of the balance o f power between agribusiness, the small farmer and the consumer, not 
a scientific issue about the effects of GMOs on human health or the environment.” (ibid:
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2.50). So when ‘science’ gets blamed by the public, it is because no sufficiently clear distinc­
tion between science and non-science is maintained when political choices are dressed up 
o r ‘translated’ into scientific issues —in short when politics is ‘scientificated’.195
The report also includes a chapter on new ways of ‘engaging’ the public in issues o f science 
and technology, which is both descriptive and prescriptive. Various formats for involving 
the public(s) that were then beginning and endorsed as something to be nurtured. It is con­
cluded that “ (t)he United Kingdom must change existing institutional terms of reference 
and procedures to open them up to more substantial influence and effective inputs from 
diverse groups” (ibid: Summary §18). There is allegedly no alternative to this as “ .. .science 
as any other player in the public arena ignores public attitudes and values at its peril.” (ibid: 
Summary §19).
This observed and proscribed ‘new mood for dialogue’ was taken up by the Parliamentary 
Office of Science and Technology (POST) in a 2001 report titled “Open Channels — Public 
dialogue in science and technology” where various formats o f public dialogue and partici­
pation are described and evaluated for their applicability to various types o f issues, and a 
number of guidelines and recommendations are given for public authorities that wish to 
pursue such activities. Here it is stated that participatory procedures and consultative exer­
cises — if properly conducted — can serve both to support democracy and make better deci­
sions (i.e. both normative and instrumental arguments are invoked). This report was fol­
lowed by yet another publication -  this time from the Government’s Office of Science and 
Technology (OST) in collaboration with the UK research councils, called “Dialogue with 
the public: Practical Guidelines” (OST 2002). This indicates that the problem-definition of 
the ‘Science and Society’ report rippled through the political system, where attempts were 
made to gradually transform its analysis and abstract goals into practice.
It thus seems as if the analyses and vocabulary of the more critical PUS research tradition -  
much in line with the considerations on ‘socially robust knowledge’ and ‘extended peer re­
view’ discussed in Chapter II — have been adapted by central (both legislative and execu­
tive) political institutions in Britain, at least on the rhetorical level. The relation ‘science and 
society’ is depicted as something, which both is and ought to be more interactive than in 
the traditional discourses on scientific literacy and public acceptance framed by the deficit 
model — and differently that it had hitherto been. However, two things must be kept in
195 In a more analytical vein it can therefore be argued that the Sdeuce and Society report can be seen as a central 
British institution’s attempt to wrestle with the challenges raised by the dual process of a scientification of 
politics and a politicisation of science (Weingart 1999). The discourses on transparency and dialogue suggest 
that one way forward is to bring science ‘doser’ to the public in order to maintain the legitimacy o f  scientific 
activities (Elam and Bertilsson 2003). One may ask, however, if  this will really make sdence less politically 
virulent, as ‘transparency’ seems to have the character o f a horizon, always revering when ‘approached’ 
(Brown and Michael 2002). If  some degree o f  trust does not already exist, transparency will only lead to in­
formation overload, a problem that cannot be solved through yet more transparency. Instead, organisations 
will have to stage themselves as ‘authentic’ (ibid.), i.e. as being sincere in their attempts to be responsive and 
therefore making the ‘relevant’ or ‘essential’ information available.
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mind when assessing these developments. Firstly, authorities on the more operative level 
are complex organisations with many tasks and objectives to attend to. They might be re­
calcitrant to adapt externally decreed ‘cultural’ transformations if they see no immediate 
benefits from these, typically understood as their work being made less rather than more 
complex. This is perhaps especially the case if they have a strong ‘scientific’ ethos and self­
understanding, i.e. they see themselves as operating on the basis of scientific rationality and 
evidence, which is considered superior to other types of knowledge. Therefore, secondly, it 
is by no means certain that such programmatic statements are reflected in the actual policy 
formations and day-to-day activities of public bodies (or scientific and technological or­
ganisations for that matter). This must be considered an empirical question, and will in part 
be examined in the case of one such organisation, the Agricultural and Environmental Bio­
technolog)7 Commission (AEBC).196
The biotechnology sector and the regulation of food safety provides a good opportunity7 to 
study whether and how this new mood has had any substantial trenchancy beyond program­
matic statements, and how it is actually implemented in practice.
Previous Public Participation in the Biotechnology Domain
Biotechnology also happens to be one of the areas where Britain has carried out many of 
its experiments with public participation in science and technology7, both in terms of the 
direct involvement of lay citizens, and the (corporatist) involvement of stakeholders in pol­
icy-making. Two such instances are especially worth mentioning as the case to be analysed 
has been likened and contrasted to both.
The first ever UK consensus conference, designed after the Danish model, was held on 
biotechnology in 1994. It has been argued that the conference was not particularly success­
ful (Purdue 1999, 1996). Several reasons are given for this. The conference was arranged by 
the Science Museum and it is claimed to be somewhat unclear whether the goal of the con­
ference was to function as an educational event, as an experiment in participatory proce­
dures or to provide actual policy recommendations (ibid.). The output of the conference 
did not really have an ‘addressee’ or well defined aim, which means that its effects on policy 
have been negligible (POST 2001:10). That such conferences can potentially serve an ‘early 
warning’ function in regard to potential conflicts is, however, underlined by the fact that 
many of the themes and public concerns identified and addressed in the 1994 conference
196 This commission, which proposed and directed the public debate to be analysed cannot, however, neces­
sarily be taken as representative for wider developments in the UK, as it was formed under the new ‘regime’ 
o f  transparency and consultation. As such, it o f course recruits its members from different background and 
organisations with certain wap of doing and viewing things, and has a certain history7. However, they are put 
together in a context where there are no in-built routine as such to break with. Therefore it can be expected 
that — all other things being equal — it is easier for such a committee to adhere to this new moodfor dialogue than 
for existing organisations.
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were still present in the debates in 2003 (ibid.). It seems that the idea of directly using de­
liberative inputs from citizens in policy-making found little resonance at the time.
However, the willingness of the political system to engage with the public gradually 
changed over time.197 In 1998/99 the OST undertook a ‘public consultation’ on develop­
ments in the biosciences,198 which included some participa tory/deliberative events. These 
consisted of a number of workshops where lay people were invited to form and formulate 
opinions on various aspects of new biotechnological developments and their regulatory 
oversight as well as to articulate their concerns in regard to the emerging technologies. It 
has been critically noted that the participatory elements mostly served as pilot studies for a 
more traditional, non-interactive quantitative investigation o f awareness and opinions 
among a representative sample (Irwin 2001). As stated by the minister for science:
“The consultation sets the challenging task of seeking the public's liens and promoting informed de­
bate. Our long-term aim is to encourage public confidence in the Government's use of scientific infor­
mation and know-how. Understanding what people expect of Got>emment and science is crucial to 
meeting their needs. I  hope that the consultation »ill helpfocus the policy-making process. .. ”
(Quoted in Irwin 2001: 8)
The aim of the consultation was, then, to inform the Government about knowledge and 
concerns present among the public, rather than to actually involve the public in policy­
making. Therefore, a tension between the citizen-led and policy-informing intentions o f the 
consultation has been noted as the political system sought to control the framing o f the 
issues to be addressed (Irwin 2001: 9).199 Nonetheless, the consultation’s approach indi­
cated the emergence of an awareness in the political system that ‘the public’s’ frames and 
concerns are not necessarily identical to those of either the political or the scientific system 
and that this must be reflected and possibly acted on. Hence, although the activities of the 
exercise were criticised for being framed by the Government’s quest for knowledge, which 
is shaped according to its own agendas, rather than by the concerns of the citizens in­
volved, the exercise was taken to illustrate that ‘ordinary people’ were able to engage seri­
ously and competently in complex scientific and regulatory issues, and hence as encourag­
ing for more citizens’ involvement in science and technology policy making.
The results of the consultation are claimed to have fed directly into the establishment of 
two new advisory bodies on biotechnology, one on human genetics and one on agricultural 
biotech (the AEBC) (OST 1999).
197 Perhaps especially after consumer pressure led leading retail chains to remove GM ingredients from their 
produces and used this for advertising purposes.
198 Broadly defined to include both agricultural and medical applications
199 Also, it is noticeable that although the aim o f  the consultation was to understand what the public expects 
o f science (as well as Government use o f  it), this was to be mediated by the political system. No direct public- 
science interaction was mentioned.
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As will be shown in the following all the discourses and experiences discussed in the previ­
ous pages contributed in one way or another to the procedure explored here. However, the 
intellectual underpinnings and discursive context of the debate form only part of the in­
formation necessary for its analysis. In order to get a grip on what the public debate was 
meant to contribute to (and to establish if it altered anything), I must also describe the 
regulatory and institutional context surrounding biotechnology in the UK.
The UK Regulatory Framework
Since the emergence of genetic based biotechnologies, Britain has been one of the front­
runners in Europe, both with regard to investment in research and development and in 
terms of relatively unrestrictive policy making support for innovation. In this respect UK 
policies were for some time closer to US than other European models. The British policy 
style has been described as differing from other European countries in that: ... “UK sci­
ence and technology policy-making generally favours a pragmatic, case-by-case approach. 
The tendency is to avoid detailed regulation in the first instance and to opt instead for 
flexible arrangements — often involving voluntary codes of practice in preference to formal 
statutes -  that are capable of responding rapidly to subsequent developments. Biotechnol- 
ogy policy initiatives in the UK over the past 25 years have largely conformed to this style.” 
(Bauer et al. 1998:163, see also Salter and Frewer 2003). Up to around 1990 the UK regula­
tory framework was largely based on voluntary consultations between the scientific com­
munity, industry and regulatory authorities with few statutory restrictions on activities and 
little involvement o f external stakeholders or non-technical perspectives (Bauer et al. 1998, 
Lewidow and Carr 1996). Generally, party political competition has had little influence on 
the regulation o f biotechnology. Nor have there been any institutional avenues for the pub­
lic to influence regulatory procedures.
The principal aim o f the policies, until that point, was to stimulate biotech research devel­
opment as a potential economic growth area, as little public or parliamentary attention was 
devoted to potential problems and risks in relation to biotechnology.200 Regulation was ad 
hoc and based on a case-by-case evaluation within sector specific regulatory bodies, and no 
horizontal ‘gene-laws' were created as in Denmark and Germany. However, once concerns 
began to emerge over a number of issues (unlike the US and similarly to a number of 
European countries) Britain opted for a ‘process-based’ regulation and from 1990 statutory 
regulation was enacted, which required prior consent for specific activities based on a ‘pre­
cautionary approach'. At the time of the first EU directive on the deliberate release o f 
GMOs (1990, implemented in Britain with some delay in 1993), the UK government estab­
lished an expert Advisory Committee on Releases into the Environment (ACRE) as well as
200 Only the health and safety of laboratory workers were addressed in statutory regulation, mainly because 
the labour unions showed an interest in the issue as part of a larger struggle for work place protection (Gott- 
weis 1998).
203
an Advisory Committee on Novel Foods and Processes (ACNFP). The membership and 
range of expertise in these committees have gradually been expanded to accommodate 
growing public awareness and concerns regarding GMOs, including environmentalist and 
consumer representative members (Bauer et al.: 164). Although there was some attention 
to the GM issue among environmental NGOs, the regulatory framework managed to keep 
public controversy in the UK limited, and towards the middle o f the 1990s moves were 
made towards relaxing statutory regulation. At the same time the UK was working to get 
the EU to adapt a more 'product-based* approval procedure, as the British industry argued 
it was overburdened with regulation and that biotechnology was unnecessarily stigmatised 
through the ‘process based* regulatory framework (ibid.).
The drive towards deregulation was, however, markedly slowed down by the combined 
effects on the public o f the outbreak o f the BSE scandal in 1996, the controversy sur­
rounding the arrival of Monsanto’s GM soybeans on European markets (Lassen et. al.
2002) and the announcement of the cloning of Dolly the sheep, which in combination put 
the public safety, corporate motives and ethics of the new biotechnologies on the public 
agenda in the UK. From then on biotech policy changed from being primarily promotional 
to balancing technology promotion and public acceptance, and potential problematic as­
pects of new biotechnologies were placed higher both on the public agenda and m regula­
tory discourses.
Hence, since 1996 both European and British biotechnology policies (in the non-human 
area) have been increasingly preoccupied with human health, environmental safety and 
consumer acceptance. This concern with public health and public acceptance was further 
intensified after the ‘Great GM Debate’ as the media storm in early 1999 has been termed 
(Durant and Lindsey 2000). Here both tabloid and broadsheet newspapers campaigned 
against GM food on the basis that it was uncertain whether it was safe for human con­
sumption and that the Government was being too lax about safety to please the biotech 
industry. This ‘debate’ was part of the reason why several leading retail chains removed 
GM food from their shelves and exerted pressure on their contractors to supply GM free 
produce. This development put the power of consumers on the agenda, and showed that 
major food retailers had become an independent factor to be reckoned with in the wider 
social regulation o f food technologies.201 In effect this meant two things. Firstly, a defacto 
dual governance regime evolved where consumers and retailers became as important in 
technology regulation as politically determined statutory regulation (Salter and Frewer
2003) . Secondly, the political system had in effect lost discursive control over the framings 
of GMO risks and had to change from a mode of control to one of negotiation in its policy 
making (ibid).
201 Much to the dismay o f  parts o f the industry", who argued that in this way consumers were actually de­
prived o f choice rather than exercising i t
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Although the UK government and regulatory agencies had grown increasingly attentive to 
public concerns, the UK, however, was not among the countries that imposed the EU 
moratorium in 1999. The UK was also one of the most ardent advocates for a return to an 
‘evidenced based’ approval procedure within the EU comitology system.202 This discrep­
ancy between public attitudes and the standpoints of the British government was rooted in 
a number of factors. One was that central members of the Labour government, including 
Prime Minister Tony Blair, science minister Lord Sainsbury and agricultural minister Mar­
garet Beckett were known as committed proponents of GM food.203 The Government 
wished to protect and support the relatively strong standing of British biotech science and 
industry through as liberal a regulatory climate as politically possible. Part of the explana­
tion was undoubtedly also the threat of a pending trade war with the US over the GM is­
sue. Therefore, in the work on the revision of the EU directives on deliberate release, food 
safety and labelling, the UK presented a more technology and industry friendly stance than 
many other EU countries, favouring the case-by-case approach, which tones down the 
more programmatic aspects of the technological trajectory as an object of regulatory inter­
vention. Although actual regulatory regimes never ascribe clearly to ideal types, compara­
tively the British approach arguably drifts towards the ‘individualistic’ pole in the cultural 
theoretical classificatory scheme outlined in Chapter III.
In order to both further the technology and bolster it against public opposition and con­
cern, several policy initiatives were undertaken beyond the programmic statements on the 
‘new mood’ for public dialogue described above. Three of these are especially worth men­
tioning.
The first is the establishment of the Food Standards Agency as a high profile, independent 
agency in charge of all matters pertaining to food safety as described earlier. The FSA has 
undertaken several initiatives to both inform and create debate about GM food, including a 
Citizens’Jury held in April 2003.204
Secondly, in 1999 the ministry of the environment initiated a large-scale program of field 
trials for several GM crops to assess their effects on biodiversity in ‘realistic’ circumstances, 
i.e. ordinary farm practices. This programme was accompanied by a voluntary agreement 
between the government and the organisation representing the agribiotech industry and 
seed companies that there would be no commercial growing o f GM crops before the com­
202 I.e. one that does not take subjects other than risks to human health and the environment into considera­
tion, and assumes that if no unacceptable risks (proportional to other food o r environmental risks) are docu­
mented, no restrictions should be put on products for other reasons.
203 As stated for instance in a speech in April 2002: “In GM crops, I can find no serious evidence o f health
risk.” (Blair 2002).
204 This Gtizen's Jury was not only criticised by some observers for 'confusing’ the public before the major 
debate was launched. GM critics also reproached the FSA for being biased in a pro-GM direction. This is for 
instance claimed to be the visible in the public announcement of the result o f  the Citizen’s Jury, where the 
FSA was accused o f distorting the outcome (S. Mayer, GeneWatch press release, May 9th 2003).
205
pletion and evaluation of the trials. Nevertheless, these field trials proved to be contentious 
and some were obstructed by GM opponents with significant media attention (Reed 2002). 
Furthermore, the Government was later criticised by the AEBC for overstating the scien­
tific value of the trials in the public. The AEBC claimed that the impression was given that 
the trials would settle all significant scientific doubts standing in the way of a political deci­
sion, which it claimed the Government knew (or ought to know) was not the case (AEBC 
2001). As such, the Government rhetoric surrounding the farm scale evaluations (FSEs) 
can according to the AEBC be seen as an example o f the ‘scientification’ o f politics the 
HOL ‘Science and Society’ report warned of.
Thirdly, at the beginning of 2000, following advice both from the Nuffield Council on Bio­
ethics205 and analysis following the public consultation on the biosciences, the Agricultural 
and Environmental Biotechnolog)' Committee was formed as an independent advisory or­
gan to the government. This committee has within its remit:
■ “to advise the Government on the ethical and social implications arising from de­
velopments in biotechnology and on their public acceptability
■ to consider the wider implications of the lessons to be leamt from individual cases 
requiring regulatory decision
■ to make recommendations as to changes in the current structure of regulatory and 
advisory bodies.” (AEBC 2001: 6)
This meant not only an extension of the advisory competence to deal with biotechnology, 
but also the separation of ‘technical’, statutory regulation in charge of safety assessments, 
approval procedures and so on,206 and more strategic and public oriented advisory func­
tions. The establishment of the AEBC can be seen an indication of the UK government’s 
acceptance that the survival of agricultural biotechnology depended on more than its safety 
as regulated by the Government’s scientists. On the one hand it indicated a recognition that 
public sensibilities require more systematic attention than the traditional and mass mediated 
channels of communication between Government and the electorate allows. On the other 
hand, it also allowed a continued screening off of the technical aspects of regulation from 
politicised interventions, i.e. the social inclusion of diverse interests was re-focused from 
technical expert bodies undertaking specific approval procedures to a strategic, non­
technical body with an advisory function only. In effect it means a differentiation o f com­
munication about public concerns into specific, specialised organisational forums.
The committee was presented in several policy documents as one of the first official organs 
to embody the ‘new mood’ for public dialogue due to its composition and routines. Its
205 A charity with close ties to government, W'hich functions as an unofficial advisory organ.
206 These were dealt with by ACRE (Advisory Committee on Releases to the Environment), a technical expert 
body under the Department for Environment, food, and rural affairs (DEFRA)..
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members were appointed to represent viewpoints both in favour of and sceptical towards 
agricultural biotechnology, and it works on the assumption that transparency and consulta­
tion yields better results than the simple application of the best available scientific expertise. 
The committee is therefore characterised by its composition from a broad range of exper­
tise and can be seen as one attempt by the Government to deal with social controversy 
through social inclusion. As will be shown in the following this is not a strategy that comes 
without (political) risks. The work and recommendations of the AEBC forms the back­
ground of die *GM Nation? The National Dialogue’ analysed in more detail in the follow­
ing.
To summarise the context of the work of the AEBC and its initiation of the public debate, 
one can say that the UK was in this period characterised by the aftermath of the BSE scan­
dal, which had led to public scepticism towards GM food and low trust in regulatory au­
thorities and their scientific advisors. Furthermore, the policy context was marked histori­
cally by a culture o f intransparency and step-by-step adaptation, which was allegedly in the 
process of transforming into a more open and consultative one in order to regain the pub­
lic confidence it was keenly aware of lacking. This was paired with a government, which for 
both ideological and economic reasons was relatively strongly in favour of biotechnology 
and an international context pressing in different directions.207 In cultural theoretical terms 
the regulatory regime hence can be described as developing from a predominantly ‘indi­
vidualist’ mode to one entailing more ‘hierarchical* and ‘egalitarian’ traits (more precaution 
and surveillance and more participation) and a differentiation in the institutional locus o f 
regulation.
The D ecision  to Have a Public Debate
The AEBC was set up in June 2000 following a Government review in 1999 that identified 
a need for more strategic advice on a number of issues relating to biotechnology, partly 
arising from the mismatch between the then regulatory principles and practices and public 
opinion (OST 1999). The committee does not have any regulator)' remit, and serves only as 
a strategic advisory body. The composition of the committee includes a range of expertises 
and viewpoints on agricultural biotechnology. As such, it can be viewed as more socially 
inclusive and extensive in its knowledge base than most committees in the British policy 
making system.
The committee’s first major output was a case study on the farm scale evaluations (FSE) 
initiated by the UK government in 1999, which the commission believed to be a good way
207 The US in favour o f  a liberal approach to GM Os based on a principle o f  substantial equivalence, large 
parts of the European populations hesitant toward them, but the EU pushing for the reinstallment o f stan­
dardised approval procedures
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of getting to grips with some o f the issues that had proven controversial in the public 
sphere. One o f the major conclusions o f that report was that:
“(t)he appropriate development of GAf technology has suffered as a result of the lack of opportunity 
of serious debate about thefull range of potential implications of GM agriculture, on the basis of 
clear understandings of what is involved, awayfrom concern that has been promoted by campaigning 
dements of the media. ” (AEBC 2001: 12). The report goes on to argue that: “... the Government 
must now encourage comprehensive public discussion of the ecological and ethical -  including socio- 
economic- issues which have arisen. Time is neededfor people to overcome differences of language 
and explore the extent of their shared understandings, and above all there is a need to include those 
who have felt themselves to be excluded and hence to have no control ot>er events. ” (ibid.)
On that basis, the committee recommended that the Government should arrange for a 
more systematic public debate on the issues involved in the commercialisation o f GM
20ftcrops.
In its response the Government accepted this recommendation and asked the AEBC for 
further advice on how to arrange such a debate and make the best use of its results. There 
was a clear perception common all my interviewees that the Government accepted the call 
for this kind o f  debate only very reluctantly. The Government had expected the AEBC to 
advise on public acceptance through its own expertise and minor investigations. However, 
the Government could hardly ignore such a clear recommendation from its own advisory 
body on such a contentious issue: “we recommended it to them and they didn’t have much 
option” as one member o f the AEBC explained.208 09
In its response and acceptance o f a public debate, the Government also asked AEBC for 
advice on how to “determine the public acceptability of GM crops, in particular, cross­
pollination thresholds and GM presence in organic crops”. This can be seen as an indica­
tion that from the outset the Government and the AEBC had different perspectives on the 
debate. One might say that the Government wanted to probe the acceptability o f its poli­
cies — which it knew could be controversial — as they already existed (opinions, acceptabil­
ity), ‘out there’ in society.210 The AEBC assumed that such opinions have a more proces- 
sual character, and would only emerge in communicative processes. Therefore, the aim of 
the exercise for the AEBC was to let the general (interested) public explore these issues in a 
dialogical form, which was not necessarily linked to very specific issues such as pollination 
or threshold limits.
208 As in the Danish BioTIK initiative the importance o f a shared language is stressed. However, no  assump­
tions are made here about what ‘kind’ o f language this should be, e.g. whether ‘ethics’ should have a privi­
leged status.
209 R. G  rove-White in interview.
210 As such, the approach resembles the more generic public consultation on developments in the biosciences 
undertaken a few years earlier.
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The AEBC then drafted a suggestion for such a debate, which it held to be “imaginative 
but also practicable and that offers value for money” (AEBC 2002). The Government’s 
wishes were incorporated, as it was stated that “©he principal objective of stimulating a 
public debate, therefore, is to assess the nature and spectrum o f the public’s views on the 
possible commercialisation o f GM crops in the United Kingdom and any conditions under 
which commercialisation might or might not acceptably proceed so that the public’s view 
can inform decision-making.” (ibid.) It was noted that an ‘inevitable’ outcome of the debate 
would be a better informed public, and it was also stressed that the debate should not act as 
a quasi-referendum. Furthermore, it was believed that the debate would serve as an impor­
tant example of public participation in the discussion o f scientific issues.211 Here the plans 
for the debate clearly linked up with the programmatic statements o f the political system to 
establish more interaction between science and society.
As the neutrality of the process was believed to be essential for the legitimacy of the out­
put, the commission suggested that the debate should be arranged by an independent 
committee at ‘arm’s length* from Government However, it was stated to be essential that 
the Government committed itself to the debate and stated clearly what it expected from it, 
as well as how it intended to use the output. This reflected the experiences that earlier exer­
cises in public involvement, such as the 1994 consensus conference and the 1998/99 public 
consultation described above were seen as either lacking a clear policy aim or as being too 
rigidly tailored to Government purposes to allow the public to deliberate on its own terms.
A central element of the suggested debate was that the topics to be debated were to be 
framed by ‘the public’ itself. This was to be achieved through the use of focus groups to 
formulate “ .. .terms which are likely to be widely recognised by other members of the pub­
lic”. Furthermore, a core aim of the exercise was to “reach people who have not expressed 
a view”. Therefore, the focus should be moved away from established groups to the ‘grass 
roots level’, which should form the main target, a goal based on the assumption or suspi­
cion that the GM sceptic environmental and consumer NGOs did not represent the ‘real’ 
public.
It is interesting to note that although the recommendations of the AEBC were directed to 
the Government, the House of Commons select committee on Environment, Food and 
Rural Affairs also commented on the suggestion. This shows that the debate was observed 
from other parts o f the political system from its very inception, not only because of its po­
tential direct influence on specific policies, but also because it could herald a new way o f 
policy making on science and technology issues more generally. The committee generally 
endorsed the suggestion of holding a public debate, but was somewhat reticent about its
211 To that end, it was deemed desirable that social scientists were involved to “incorporate the most in­
formed academic understanding o f the possible significance and meanings o f  the views that emerge.” (AEBC
2002).
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potential ability to engage a ‘wider’ audience, rather than just letting the established actors 
reiterate their polarized views. Therefore, the committee expressed concern that the debate 
would not lead to anything resembling a consensus or convergence of viewpoints. The 
committee explicitly saw the merit o f  the dialogue in its potential to make the public better 
informed on the issues surrounding GMOs “in a rational and intelligent way”. This focus 
on the ‘rational’ was further strengthened by the fact that the committee “urge(s) those in 
favour of GM crops and those opposed to approach debate on the subject in as responsi­
ble and open-minded a manner as possible. In particular we urge them to base their argu­
ments on rigorous science, rather than conjecture.” (House of Commons 2002) The com­
mittee thus expressed the hope that the conflict over GMOs could be de-politicised or de- 
fundamentalised through science. As it clearly saw at least part o f the controversy as rooted 
in a sensationalist press, the committee also urged the media to approach the topics at hand 
in a ‘responsible’ and ‘rational and constructive’ manner. Here some reminiscence of the 
deficit model can be detected, as a significant cause o f the virulence of the GM issue is as­
cribed to an uninformed and misled public, whereas science and rationality is depicted as 
unitary and authoritative.
It also indicates that the political system was keenly aware o f some of the challenges par­
ticipatory procedures may be exposed to, such as capture by vocal groups, factual confu­
sion or misunderstanding non-dialogical interventions etc., as well as the irritations they 
can cause in the political process. Both Government and the parliamentary committee 
therefore ensured they were not tied to the outcome in any substantial sense (e.g. in the 
statement that the debate should not acquire the status of a semi-referendum). Both the 
executive and the legislative sought to create in advance a communicative flexibility allow­
ing them to move in ways, which would not be bound by ‘public opinion’.
Despite some of these concerns and reservations, the UK government largely accepted the 
suggestions put forward by AEBC, and by the end of July 2002 the environment secretary 
announced that a public debate would be conducted under the direction of an independent 
steering committee led by the chair o f the AEBC. However, it was announced at the same 
time that in addition to the format suggested by the AEBC, the programme for the ‘Na­
tional Dialogue’ as the project was temporarily named would consist of two additional 
strands, namely a review of a broad range of scientific issues relating to GMOs and an eco­
nomic study o f the over-all costs and benefits of introducing or not introducing GM crops 
on a commercial basis in the UK. The scientific review was to be run by the Governments 
chief scientific advisor in collaboration with the chief scientific advisor of DEFRA212 and 
the economic study was to be undertaken by the Cabinet Office’s Strategy Unit. The Gov­
ernment stated that there was to be a “throughout... two-way interaction between the
212 Department o f  Food, Environment and Rural Affairs — the government department responsible for ad­
ministering the regulation of agricultural biotechnology in the U K
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three components. Outputs from both the science and economics components will feed 
into the public debate. Equally, issues emerging from the public debate would help frame 
the direction o f the technical work.” (Government’s reply to AEBC, July 2002.) This 
should allegedly encourage .. a dialogue between all strands o f  opinion on GM issues, in 
the light of the fullest available factual information.” (ibid). It is unclear -  even to people 
central in the work — how the three strand model came about. It seems to have emerged in 
intra-govemmental discussions of the AEBC proposal. One observer suggested that it 
evolved as a combination o f political strategy and the contentment of institutional inter­
ests.213 The AEBC wanted a public debate, but the pro-GM government wanted to make 
sure that the science was properly presented to the public (a remnant of the deficit model) 
and ensure that DEFRA did not get disconnected from the process despite its being con­
ducted at ‘arms length’ from the Government. It was also clear that some o f the strong ar­
guments in favour of GM crops -  such as the combating of nutritional deficiencies in the 
third world -  would be unlikely to emerge in either the scientific review or the public de­
bate with any force. An economic study could address such issues legitimately, as well as 
the consequences for the British biotech and agricultural industries. By letting the Strategy 
Unit undertake the study the Cabinet Office could also be securely linked to the process.
For the members of the AEBC -  and in particular those more sceptical about the benefits 
of GMOs -  it was hard not to see this ‘expansion’ of the suggested debate as a means to 
counterbalance concerns within the Government that public concerns (which the Gov­
ernment perceived as unfounded, anxious, and emotional) could override the fact that 
there was at the time little scientific evidence of the risks related to GMOs, as well as die 
argument that potential economic benefits could be endangered. There were therefore 
“long and agonising” discussions within the AEBC about whether to accept the terms for 
the debate as proposed by the Government. However, the members agreed that having the 
debate was so important that they ought to proceed.214
The genesis of the three-stranded structure can in this interpretation best be seen as a 
process of the mutual accommodation o f various institutional interests and political objec­
tives, rather than the effectuation of an overall plan. As I shall show, this led to a situation 
where, apart from the very programmatic statements by the minister responsible that the 
three strands should cross-fertilise one another, it was unclear who was supposed to report 
to whom about what. There was no clear model for how the interaction was to take 
place,215 which in effect meant that very little managed to take place.
213 Interview with A. Stirling, 20.08.03.
2,4 Interview with R. Grove-lXTute.
215 In the case o f the science review panel, even the appointment procedure was intransparent, both in terms 
o f  procedures and criteria for membership. Appointments were made by DEFRA, but the ABC (Agricultural 
Biotechnology Council, industry organisation) and certain environmental organisations were invited to sug­
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The public debate strand was initially granted a budget of £250.000 and the AEBC was 
given until the end of June 2003 to report the results of the debate. In the following the 
primary focus will be on this strand. Subsequently I shall have more to say about the inter­
action with the other strands.
The Run Up to the Debate
After the Government decided to endorse and finance the debate a number of preparations 
were undertaken before its actual launch. A steering board was appointed by the chair of 
the AEBC to oversee the process.216 Some of the issues encountered by this board and the 
ways they were dealt with are quite informative for understanding of the final format of the 
debate and its political effects. I shall therefore take a closer look at some of them. The fol­
lowing observations are based on material available on the debate’s official website, in par­
ticular the minutes of the steering board’s (henceforth: ‘the board’) meetings, and press ma­
terial combined with interviews with three members o f the steering board,217 the board’s 
secretary218 and one member o f the scientific review panel.219
From the outset the board was keenly aware that public confidence in the Government in 
this area was low.220 Therefore, one o f  the first things the board had to deal with was its 
own credibility in the eyes of the public,221 in effect to prove that it was truly independent
gest experts they thought would be sympathetic to their viewpoints in order to secure a composition, which 
would presumably be competent and credible in the eyes o f the public.
216 The AEBC, as well as the steering committee o f  the debate, was chaired by professor o f  land economy 
and then pro-vice chancellor of Cambridge University, Malcolm Grant. He appointed the committee o f ten 
members, which was broadly inclusive both in terms o f social representation and competencies although 
none were officially appointed as representatives o f  any other organisation, all serving in their 'personal ca­
pacities’.
217 These were:
Robin Grove-White, professor o f Environment and Society, Lancaster University and former chair o f  the 
board o f  Greenpeace, U K  Interviewed July 14th 2003.
Gary Kass, advisor at the Parliamentary Office o f  Science and Technology. Interviewed July 15th 2003.
Gare Deveraux, Director o f Five Year Freeze, an umbrella organisation o f  NGOs working for a moratorium 
on GM crops. Interviewed July 15th 2003.
218 Richard Able, civil servant, secretary of the AEBC and the steering board. Interviewed O ct 5th, 2003.
219 D r Andrew Stirling, research fellow at Science and Policy Research Unit, University o f Sussex. Interviewed 
on August 20th 2003.
220 In the theoretical language suggested in Chapter III it can be said that the board as an organisation consid­
ered itself likely to be observed and communicated about in the ‘medium’ o f  public opinion -  in a manner 
which might interfere with its work in a negative manner.
221 Independency became an issue almost immediately upon the commencement o f the board, as it became 
clear that most o f the practical work needed to  be commissioned to the Central Office for Information 
(COI), the Government's communications office, as primary contractor. This choice was deemed necessary 
in order to avoid time consuming competitive tenderings for the work. This was criticised by some observers 
as being too close to Government. However, according to several members o f  the board the ‘real’ problem 
with using the COI was not its independence, but their competencies and more fundamentally their culture.
It was their experience that the COI did not understand what kind of processes the board wished to have
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and not acting simply to promote or create acceptance o f the Governments policies. How­
ever, it also needed to convince the Government -  which was not too keen on the debate 
in the first place -  that it could deliver a meaningful and worthwhile result.
One of the first tasks of the board was to  formulate in more detail the objectives of the 
whole exercise. This process and its outcomes are interesting as it allows the perception o f 
the GM controversies and the public’s role in them, which underpinned the organisation of 
the debate, to be looked into more closely. It is telling for instance that a central topic of 
controversy within the board was whether the objective should be formulated as the under­
taking an ‘informed’ debate. At first this may seem an odd issue to debate. Obviously, the 
point of the critics of the phrase ‘informed debate* was not that there should be an ‘un­
informed* debate. It was to avoid what they perceived to be a patronising agenda, as “‘in­
formed’ can be a very loaded term -  a surrogate for telling people what is true.”" 2 The aim 
of (at least some of) the board members was to create a situation where technical expertise 
would not be given a privileged argumentative position, and where critical issues could also 
be explored by lay people. In the final wording of the objectives a compromise was found 
in the formulation that the debate should seek to “enable (through dialogue with experts 
and other activities) access to the evidence and other balanced and substantiated infor­
mation the public may want and need to debate the issues” (emphasis in original). This 
formulation underscores the intention that scientific (and other) knowledge should be ac­
cessible to the participants in the debate, but at their own request and selection, not via a 
top-down process of feeding information.
Other formulations of the objectives o f  the debate also warrant attention. One is closely 
linked to the above, as it claims that the debate should “allow the public to frame the is­
sues for debate so that the programme o f  debate focuses on what the public sees as the 
relevant issues” (emphasis in original). Practically this framing was undertaken by a market 
research company which undertook nine ‘Foundation Discussion Workshops’.2 23 The 
analysis of the discussions in these workshops was then applied to the creation of the dis­
cussion material that was later disseminated and the ‘frames’ and questions distilled from 
the workshops were passed on to the economic study and the science review panel so that 
they could proceed to address ‘public concerns’ on that basis.
A third issue transpiring from the formulation of the objectives o f the debate was that it 
should seek to “focus on getting people at the grass roots level whose voice has not yet 
been heard to participate in the programme” (emphasis in original). It is explicitly stated
established. In the eyes o f the board the COI perceived of the assignment as one o f their typical tasks: dis­
semination o f  information, which missed the allegedly more innovative and deliberative expectations o f the 
board.
222 R. Grove-White in interview.
223 Which have the format normally known as focus groups, but which the board insisted on not calling focus 
groups as they should be more participatory and open.
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that “people who have expressed their views will not be excluded from participation, but 
neither will they be specifically targeted and will not be allowed to steer events in the pro­
gramme of debate” . This is clearly intended for the more vocal campaigners, in principle 
both those in favour of but perhaps primarily against GM crops, and constructed an image 
on the one hand of communication in the public sphere until the debate as (too) uncom­
promisingly divided and on the other hand a majority of ‘ordinary people’ who had not 
been heard because there was no space for more moderate voices. Ordinary people were 
depicted as those ‘caught’ between the static viewpoints of organisations lobbying either 
for or against GM crops, who nonetheless ought both to be enabled to form a considered 
opinion and to have a say if they should so desire. In order to mobilise such people to par­
ticipate it was perceived as necessary to curb the dominance o f ‘the usual suspects’ in the 
debates over GMOs.
As such the opinions and evaluations o f ordinary people were framed as more authentic, 
presumably more ‘fair’ towards the technology, and more valuable for political decision 
makers than those of organised actors, which were (implicitly) framed as self-serving and 
not prone to learning in deliberative procedures. This viewpoint is put particularly poign­
antly by Lord Robert May224 in his claim that: “(t)hose who are only interested in portraying 
GM technology as either inherently dangerous or entirely problem-free will be left on the 
margins, alone with their ideologies and vested interests, whilst everybody else engages in 
informed discussion about how we might use GM technology to create the kind of world 
we want” (quoted in The Guardian, Feb. 11, 2003). In this respect an assumption was in­
voked to justify the public consultation procedure in that (some of) the organised actors 
normally giving their opinions and claiming to speak in the interest o f the general public 
were not in fact representative of the wider public, and hence distorted rather than enabled 
rational and democratic debate on the issues. In this call for ‘ordinary people’ to participate, 
so-called ideological commitments and vested interests were disqualified from participating. 
The objectives stated instead that the debate should help to “calibrate the views of or­
ganisations who have already made their views known by contrasting their views with 
other participants in the debate” (emphasis in original). This can be interpreted as a call on 
organised interests to modify their positions where not aligned with those of the general 
public, as they were envisioned to emerge from the debate. Organised interests should be 
aligned with authentic public opinion in order for them to be considered legitimate actors 
in the debate.225 Although the Government had made it clear that the debate should not
224 Chair o f the Royal Society (UK academy o f science) and significantly involved in the debate and other 
ac tin  ties to promote interaction between science and society.
225 It can of course be argued that since it is unlikely that there will be one public opinion on this topic a multi­
tude o f  voices will still be required in the public sphere. However, it does seem that the image o f a reasonable 
public opinion was suggested to be able to tame some of the more fierce standpoints among activists.
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function as a referendum, issues and images of ‘representativeness’ were invoked with, it 
seems, the intention of preventing certain actors from taking control o f the agenda.
Involvement with participatory procedures is not risk free for organised actors, and it can 
be expected that actors will develop strategies to ensure that they need not be wedded ar­
gumentatively to outcomes if these are unfavourable to their interests. This was seen as a 
number o f environmental NGOs expressed concerns about the procedure in advance o f its 
commencement, just as the Government was less than fully committed in the eyes of the 
board. The NGO community was sceptical towards both the meaningfulness o f the exer­
cise as such as well as the set up and procedures involved. They claimed that it was either 
unclear what import the output was going to have, since the Government was not properly 
committed to the debate, or that the whole event was a public relations exercise as deci­
sions were taken at the EU level anyway.226 Thirdly, some argued that there was too little 
time for a genuine debate. This was further exacerbated by the fact that the debate was to 
close before the results of the Farm Scale Evaluations, which were claimed to contain 
knowledge crucial to the decision-making, had been analysed.227
This indicates that the debate was arranged in a situation where both NGOs and the politi­
cal system (the Government) were uncertain about what they could expect to emerge from 
the debate.228 Therefore they devised strategies to ensure they would not be committed too 
strongly to the outcomes should these turn out to be unfavourable to their respective 
viewpoints. As such, political uncertainties were dealt with by means of a Svait and see’ 
strategy o f non-commitment. It was at the time a ‘public secret* that the Government was 
quite keen on promoting GM crops commercially, but publicly it reiterated the statement 
that no decision had been made. This led to some irritation within the board.
During the preparation of the debate the commitment of the Government to the outcome 
was a recurring theme. The initial attitude of the board, which was reinforced by prepara­
tory research on other experiences with public participation or consultations commissioned 
by the board, was that it was important that the Government clearly signalled what it saw 
the purpose of the debate to be, and how it intended to apply the outcomes (e.g. Minutes 
07.11.02 §14,20.11.02 §21-22). Therefore, the board on several occasions challenged the 
responsible ministers to make clear statements on the issue. A first response formulated by
226 Which an unnamed Government minister was, at one point, quoted as having said (Quoted by newspaper 
commentator G. M onbiot in The Guardian, June 10,2003).
227 Initially the debate was intended to indude the results, but as their publications gpt delayed, and the prepa­
ration o f the public debate had progressed so far, the board did not consider it feasible to change the sched­
ule (GM Nation report §23).
228 Tlie business sector organisations, it seems, kept a relatively low profile in the public sphere during the 
preparatory phase, presumably to avoid accusations o f manipulation, and showed willingness to engage with 
‘the public'. In any case, at the time the business organisations expected to have the Government ‘on their 
side’.
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the cabinet minister responsible for Environment, Food and Rural affairs, Margaret 
Beckett, dated 7 November 2002, ran as follows:
“It might be helpful, finally, i f  I  set out how Government sees the role of the debate in decision­
making on the possible application of GM  technology in this county: Over the comingyears we nill 
face decisions on a range of GM issues, not ju st crops. There an established criteria, enshrined in 
EU  and UK legislation, which milprovide a basisfor thefuture decision making process. The 
starting point is that decisions are based on the scientific evidence as to whether there is a risk to hu­
man health or the environment. It is, however, important that these decisions are taken in the con­
text of a fu ll understanding amongst the public of their implications. The debate could be invaluable 
in this respect as well as in informing the government's approach to decision-making and our view of 
the overall framework in which decisions are taken. We m il listen, and learn, from the news emerg- 
ingfrom the debate. ”
This unspecific reply on how the outcomes would be applied consisting o f a reiteration of 
the principle o f science based decision making was not enough to convince the board as a 
whole that they could establish a process, sufficiently credible and important to mobilise 
wider sections of the public to participate. The chair therefore challenged the Government 
to state more clearly how the outcomes would be applied.
In a second response the minister promised that the Government would produce a written 
response to the report of the debate and “indicate what the UK Government has learned 
from the debate when making future announcements on GM issues” (Letter from Beckett 
to steering board 20.01.03).
This was accepted by the board and settled the issue for a while, especially as the commit­
ment to respond to the outcome was accompanied by the additional funding and time the 
board had requested to be able to arrange a debate, which was both ‘narrow and deep* and 
‘broad and public’ (see below). However, shortly after, it emerged in the press that the UK 
Government had — following new EU directives — reassumed the scientific assessments in 
approval procedures for a total of 19 different GM crops. This raised new concerns in the 
board and among environmental NGOs that the debate was perceived by die Government 
as a mere PR exercise, and would have little or no effect on policy. The board therefore 
asked the minister to explain how the Government saw the relation between the outcome 
of the debate and the pending approval procedure, as: “(t)he public may wonder however 
why Government is participating in approval processes while the programme of GM de­
bate activities is underway. They may think that if the approvals process seems to be carry­
ing on regardless, it undermines the credibility o f calling for a debate” (letter from M. 
Grant, chair o f the board, to M. Beckett, 18.03.03). This concern was shared by some of 
the NGOs campaigning against GMOs, such as GeneWatch, whose director claimed more 
boldly that “ If the Government allows these GM crops to be approved before the public 
debate ends it will be a slap in the face for democracy” (GeneWatch press release 03.03.03).
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In her response the minister claimed that the government remained committed to the de­
bate and that “ [n]o decisions have yet been taken in the UK on the commercial cultivation 
of genetically modified crops, including those being grown in the crop trials” (letter from 
M. Beckett to board, 24.03.03). However, she explained that under EU legislation the UK 
Government was obliged to assess applications addressed to British authorities as compe­
tent, and if they do not comment on applications handed in elsewhere within the given 
timeframe, this would be taken as sign o f consent The minister furthermore claimed that it 
was unlikely that any decision would be taken at the EU level before both the Farm Scale 
Evaluations and the public debate had been evaluated. She reiterated the claim that if risks 
to human health or the environment were identified from any GM crop, it would be halted. 
However, in a telling passage she also stated that “The Government shares the European 
Commission’s view that the EU moratorium is illegal, and we have long supported a return 
to evidence-based decision making in the EU” — a discreet way o f  saying that ethical or 
socio-economic reservations, which were likely to emerge in the debate, would be given 
little room in specific approval procedures.229 Furthermore, it emerged that agreement 
within the Government was not unanimous, as the (non-cabinet) minister for the environ­
ment, Michael Meacher -  known for his scepticism of GM food for and giving more lee­
way to environmental NGOs in policy-making -  declared shortly before the launch of the 
debate that the UK could not prevent the EU licensing of commercial growth if no risks 
were documented (quoted in The Guardian, May 20, 2003).230 He thereby implicitly ac­
knowledged that the effects of the debate would be negligible if they were at odds with sci­
entific tests.
At the time the debate went into its public stage the topic of a Government that was not 
really committed to the results was raised in the press, both by N G O  representatives and 
commentators.231
229 This, for instance, contrasts sharply with a joint statement by twelve aid, consumer, environment, farming 
and trade union organisations, stating as key points in the debate about whether to commercialise GM crops. 
Here, the claim that “Biotechnology companies will gain the most from GM food” is point number one in 
their press release. Organisations include Greenpeace, GeneWatch, Soil Association (press release at 
http://www.gcnewatch.org/Press%20Releases/Attachments/GM_Debate_JOINT_NGO_STATEMENT.rt 
0
230 In a later reshuffle o f  the Government, Meacher was replaced as environmental secretary and became a 
more outspoken critic both o f the quality o f the scientific knowledge about the safety o f GM crops and food 
and o f Government politics in this area. It seems that Meacher was in fact sacked primarily because o f dis­
agreement with the cabinet about GM issues.
231 For instance: G. Monbiot writes on June 10 in The Guardian that “ ...it [the Government] now seeks to 
revive ... confidence, by claiming — rather too late — that it is open to persuasion. Again, the decision to in­
troduce the crops to Britain appears to have been made long before the debate began ... In March, Maigerett 
Becket began the licensing process for 18 applications to grow or import commercial quantities o f  GM crops 
in Britain. Her action pre-empts the debate, pre-empts the field trials designed to determine whether or not 
the crops are safe to grow here, and pre-empts the only real decision which co u n t namely those made by the 
EU and the World Trade Organisation.”
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The impression o f a government not completely committed to the debate’s outcome was at 
the same time mirrored by a public that did not seem as enthusiastic to participate as 
hoped.* 232 *Critical observers ascribed this not only to the lack o f Government commitment 
on taking the outcomes into proper consideration, but also to budgetary strains, which al­
lowed for practically no advertising o f  the event
The budget was a perpetual issue in the work of the board. The board was originally pro­
vided with £250.000, which was subsequendy raised to £500.000 as it was otherwise 
deemed impossible to organise a debate, which was both ‘narrow and deep’ and Vide and 
public’. The demand that the debate should be ‘narrow and deep’ as well as Vide and pub­
lic’ expressed the perception that on the one hand a consensus conference style format of 
public participation was not considered representative, nor legitimate enough to address 
the GM controversy. Such a format could not allow for a process where everybody who 
wanted to could participate. N or could it fulfil the function o f  public education as hoped 
for by some actors. On the other hand, the steering board clearly wanted an arrangement, 
which could achieve social learning effects that were not possible with traditional survey 
methodologies. This desire for a more interactive format also sat well with the Govern­
ment’s demand that the debate should not take the form of a quasi-referendum — the out­
comes could not be too quantitative or representative in nature.
The board members interviewed unanimously describes the budgetary issue as a major rea­
son for which the debate did not create as much public resonance as, in their opinion, 
could have been achieved with more time and initial clarity o f the available resources. They 
claim that the board was very keen on making the debate happen and actually considered a 
collective resignation if the sufficient funding was not provided to undertake what they 
considered to be a reliable process. They all describe the board’s insistence on wanting 
more time and money — and getting it — as crucial to the fact that the debate took place.
Although the additional funding was provided, board members felt that much time was lost 
both in the struggle to secure the funds and in planning under uncertain budgetary con­
straints. Many o f these problems were ascribed to the executing organisation, the COI, 
which the board members described as not understanding the nature of what the board 
wanted to achieve. As one member expresses it: “We were an informed client, but we 
didn’t have an informed contractor. For a steering board we had to do an awful lot of row-
On June 2nd (the day before the debate’s start) The Independent ran the debate as its front-page story and 
opened with the following words: "It’s obscure. It’s small scale. It has been starved of funds. It has not been 
nationally advertised. In fact, it hasn’t been advertised at all. You could be forgiven for thinking the Govern­
ment doesn’t want you to know about it”.
232 The headline o f  the Guardian’s coverage o f  the opening o f  the debate is telling. 'T he man in the street 
gets his forum on GM food -  but decides to stay in the street” (The Guardian, June 4).
213 Gary Kass in interview.
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As an external sociological observer one should of course keep in mind that such an ascrip­
tion o f blame to external factors may be a way of justifying lack of success.254 However, the 
frustration experienced by all actors involved indicate that the organisation of such a pro­
cedure -  which was seen as a political experiment — entails a significant amount of social 
and organisational learning that can be ‘painful’ for all organisations involved.
In order to remain within the financial frames given, however, the board had to prioritise 
between a number of suggested activities. The final format was one where six regional con­
ferences (called launch meetings) were arranged by the COI, around 40 meetings hosted by 
local authorities (county councils, etc) and finally a ‘debate tool kit*, including feedback 
questionnaires, was prepared for anyone who wished to arrange their own meetings. The 
issues to be addressed were ‘distilled’ from the ‘Foundational Discussion Workshops’ and 
framed as a number of for and against positions on a number of issues presented on the 
debate’s web page, on a CD ROM in the debate tool kit and in a booklet handed out at 
meetings.234 35 This was paralleled by a number of reconvened, non-public focus groups with 
recruited members of the public (i.e. people who did not participate of their own accord) to 
act as a ‘control function’ on the representativeness of the open debate meetings.
A final feature of the public debate that warrants attention is its relation to the two other 
strands of the overall debate framework, the science review and the economic study. In the 
minutes of the board’s work and elsewhere it is repeatedly claimed that the results from the 
foundation discussion workshops were used to structure the scientific review and the eco­
nomic study. These claims may, however, serve an integrative function rather than be accu­
rate descriptions of the actual process.
When queried about their impressions of the interaction between the three strands the 
board members gave slightly differing accounts. However, they do agree that their dealings 
with the economic study were more intensive and fruitful than with the science review. It 
appears that all three strands had to go through learning processes to establish interaction. 
As one member explained it: “Both the other strands started off with fixed ideas o f what 
the issues to be dealt with were. We (the board) started out assuming we did not know 
what the issues were for the public.”236 Eventually, however, the two expert strands were, 
to differing degrees, adapted to the framings of public concerns that emerged from the 
foundational workshops. As it turned out, the scientific review panel’s report was struc­
tured around topics generated — in part — through public concerns as they emerged from
234 The boaris member I interview all claimed that it was a bigger challenge to make the COI understand and 
deliver what the board wanted than to reach agreement within the board itself.
235 As different view points on GM crops were represented within the board the nature and content o f  this 
material was o f  course a contested issue. However, in retrospect the interviewed board members felt it more 
problematic that they were led astray’ and spend ‘agonising’ amounts o f time on developing a CD ROM, 
which they perceived to be a ‘technological fix’ proposed by the COI that had little understanding o f the kind 
of dialogue the board wanted to promote.
236 Interview with Gary Kass.
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the workshops. These concerns were then 'responded to* with scientific arguments and as­
sessments o f the uncertainties of the science involved. The review was, however, a review 
o f existing research,237 and it would be an overstatement to say that the public concerns 
generated their own research agendas. In effect this means that the questions were applied 
to (re)order existing knowledge, but there was little 'interaction* between the actual public 
debate and the work of the scientists. The report from the scientific review panel only 
came out after the end of the public debate.
The board saw the group undertaking the economic impact study as more attentive to the 
board’s interventions. In turn the study adapted a scenario based approach where public 
acceptance and hence market demands and liability issues were chosen as key elements in 
modelling the potential benefits and costs of a commercialisation of GM crops in Britain. 
The results of this work, however, also only came out when the public debate was practi­
cally over.
The D ebate Process
When the debate was launched, it was given a three-tier structure. It was initiated through 
six regional meetings around the country arranged and run by the COI with a moderator. 
The second level consisted in calls on local authorities to host meetings at county level. 
Approximately 40 such meetings were held. Finally, the organisers of the debate called 
upon everyone with an interest in the topic to arrange their own meetings. Members of the 
steering board expressed dismay in advance with the short timeframe within which these 
meetings were to be held, as they did not feel this would give enough time to mobilise the 
desired level of activity among local networks and organisations. Both board members and 
others expressed their criticism that the debate was to end very shortly after the results of 
the economic impact study were published, and before the results of the scientific review 
were even known. Nonetheless, the total number o f meetings held grew to around 675, 
with an estimated 20.000 participants (GM Nation report §82). These were arranged by a 
variety of organisations like city councils, local branches o f environmental organisations or 
church parish councils. In addition to this more than 36.000 responses (questionnaires) 
were received.
The intention of the steering board was to achieve a format that was different from -  more 
engaging and deliberative — than traditional public meetings, which typically involve staged 
confrontations between two viewpoints. The format selected for the first six regional meet­
ings was the following. First a short introduction to the event and the issues to be dis­
237 One GM-sceptic scientist left the review panel before its work was completed and publicly argued that he 
considered it to be biased in a pro-GM direction. One of the arguments he gave was that just studying peer- 
reviewed research could not provide a reliable picture of the uncertainties involved as: “Side effects would be 
viewed as negative results and scientists tend not to publish those.” (Professor of ecological agriculture Carlo 
Leifert, interviewed in The Guardian, July 24th 2003)
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cussed was given by the moderator. Then the participants gathered in small groups (typi­
cally 8 to 12 persons) to discuss for approximately one hour. The groups were encouraged 
to focus their discussion around some questions laid out on the tables, but were obviously 
free to take up other issues as well. The themes to be discussed were gathered under three 
main headings: what benefits were seen to arise from GM crops; what risks and impacts 
were seen; and what the opinion of the group was on whether GM crops should be intro­
duced or not. The tables were encouraged to select a spokesperson, who would then pre­
sent the main points of the discussion and its conclusions to the plenary. No general con­
clusions from the meetings were drawn, but the presentations from all tables were recorded 
and transcribed. At the end the participants were asked to fill out a questionnaire with 13 
multiple-choice questions on their views on GM crops, some questions about themselves 
and their involvement with the debate and fields allowing more open-ended remarks.
In the discussion kit prepared by die organisers it was suggested that the second and third 
tier meetings be given the same general format, with small group discussions followed by 
presentations o f the main points discussed. It is not possible here to judge to what extent 
this template was followed. Some meetings had different people giving presentations, in a 
number of cases two speakers arguing for and against GM crops respectively.238 239
Obviously, the description of the formal framing of the debate says little about the dynam­
ics achieved in the discussion. However, as the debate took place during work on this the­
sis, it was possible to make observations ‘on the ground’ at two different meetings.259
Im pressions from M eetings
At the beginning of both the observed meetings a quick show of hands was made to get an 
idea of the distribution of viewpoints on the GM issue. At the launch meeting in particular 
it was clear that the meetings were attended by many people with established views on the 
issues, whether for or against It also seemed that in both instances the majority of the par­
ticipants were negative towards GM crops.240 Although the participants described them­
selves as ‘ordinary* or ‘interested’ citizens, it was evident that many of them had clear opin­
238 The semi-official accompanying evaluation carried out by researcher from University o f East Anglia dis­
cusses the non-uniformity of the procedures as a methodological problem (Understanding Risk 2004). This I 
will not touch upon here.
2391 was present at two such meetings, one o f  the six regional launch meetings (Harrogate 13.6.03, approx.
180 participants) and one local meeting arranged by the city council o f  York (15.7.03, approx. 50 partici­
pants). Full transcripts of the presentations at all six launch meetings were also available, approx. 100 pages of 
text.
240 This was also the impression o f  an industry representative who had participated in several meetings, both 
as speaker and observer. He claimed to have seen the same ‘activists’ at different meetings across the country 
and felt that the meetings attracted a disproportionally large share o f concemed/GM  negative people com­
pared to the general UK population (Dr. Julian Little, Bayer Crop Science, interviewed 15.7.03).
This is also the conclusion reached in the board’s report, which claims a 5 to 1 ratio o f ‘negative’ compared to 
‘positive’ statements in the transcripts of the debates in the six launch meetings (GM Nation report §84).
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ions and a considerable knowledge o f the issues. As such, the participants were probably 
not representative o f the general population in terms of interest, attitudes or knowledge. 
Many seemed to have prepared by reading leaflets, articles and the like, and during the dis­
cussions references were often made to various publications and statements from organisa­
tions.
Again, at the launch meetings in particular it transpired from many of the questions raised 
in regard to the debate process that a number of participants were sceptical towards the 
process and as to whether their views would really be taken seriously by the Government. 
Nonetheless, there was a serious and substantial engagement with the issues. The discus­
sions I had the opportunity to observe showed that both advocates and opponents o f GM 
crops engaged with the arguments o f the opposite position. Despite often stark differences 
of opinion, I did not witness that any attacks were made on the motives or integrity of the 
participants. Even i f —as it seems reasonable to assume — some participants held their dis­
cussion partners' views to be wrong, misled or invalid, there was social pressure to not let 
this show in face-to-face interaction. Although scientists from companies involved in bio­
technology and farmers that had participated in the farm scale trials (some of whom were 
quite positive towards GM crops) were present, these were not identified with either ‘in­
dustry’ or ‘GM technology’ as such, nor did they make opponents out to be self-serving 
activists. Differences in points of view were dealt with through argument, not through 
symbolic attacks on motives, personal integrity or through denigrating gestures or the ridi­
cule of people present. As such, it seems that deliberative face-to-face interaction does ac­
quire a dynamic, which is significantly different from staged debates with an audience or 
mass mediated exchanges of view (cf. van den Daele 2001).
The discussions, however, were only moderated Ín a very loose sense. This meant that the 
debates were not structured as rational discussions in a Habermasian sense, where argu­
ments or viewpoints are necessarily met with counter-arguments or ‘evidence’ on the same 
reality-level, and discussions are brought to their ‘logical’ conclusion. Rather, the debates 
constantly oscillated between factual and normative statements o f various kinds. For in­
stance, a claim that GM crops would lead to a decrease in the use of herbicides could be 
countered not only by disputing that dais in fact would be the effect, but also through 
claims that organic farming was preferable (i.e. ‘moral’ arguments about the appropriate 
baseline o f comparison), or that GM crops were only marketed to create profits for the 
agrochemical industry (i.e. arguments about the distributional effects of the technology). As 
such, a number o f different types o f knowledge were brought together and confronted. 
This, however, rarely led to a consensual end o f disagreements. As I observed it, conver­
gence occurred only on where agreements and disagreements existed (to the extent that 
perspectives could be brought into congruity with each other at all). No one, it seemed, was 
at any point persuaded to change his or her point of view substantially.
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Although many of the participants were prepared and well informed, much of the discus­
sion was concerned with the general feeling that not enough was known. Hence only few 
participants made cocksure cognitive claims on matters of fact. When somebody did, they 
were typically met with the question o f  ‘how do you know?*, that is the questioning o f the 
quality of available knowledge, or ‘says who?’, i.e. questioning the reliability of the source of 
knowledge. The participants drew on ‘personal’ experiences, either as farmers, consumers 
or citizens. This meant that BSE was often brought up as an example both of the uncer­
tainty accompanying interference with nature and unreliability of responsible regulatory 
agencies. The reference to uncertainties did not mean that a number of ‘facts* were not ex­
changed. Many factual statements were aired, and there was little ‘quality control’ o f  the 
facts stated even if some participants made references to different reports, investigations 
and the like. Factual statements were typically impossible to assess or verify in the discus­
sions, and most were about things beyond normal sensory or everyday life experience and 
belonged in the sphere o f ‘science*. Regarding the status of science in the debates, it seems 
as if all participants assumed and accepted that facts could be ‘spun* in certain directions to 
serve the agenda of a given source, and that it was extremely difficult for ordinary people to 
undertake any reliable quality assessment. Yet paradoxically, although the reliability o f the 
science involved — Ín both cognitive and institutional terms — seemed to be at the root of 
the issue, everybody seemed to agree that research was needed as an indispensable precon­
dition of settling the issues. Although GM technology was seen as a -  largely unpopular — 
product of science, science was not demonised as such. Rather, it was implied that the reli­
ability of facts was impossible to assess without knowledge o f its source. As one participant 
summed up: “ ... we are mainly for the further research, we are not quite sure how we are 
going to get research that we will believe in.” (Debate meeting Harrogate 13 June 2003 
transcript). It transpired that the assessment of die reliability o f sources of information was 
more closely linked to the interests o f their originating organisation than an assessment of 
cognitive competences. Although industry may have the best scientists and most resources 
at its disposal, this does not convince people that their claims are more reliable than those 
of an under-funded NGO — rather on the contrary.241
The oscillation between factual and normative statements meant that often the morals and 
ethics o f the promoters of GM technology were touched upon.242 However, on closer in­
spection the discussions I witnessed actually showed no signs of disagreement on the basic 
normative principles that ought to guide the regulation of technology. Everybody (at least 
implicitly) agreed that things that could potentially damage human health or the environ­
ment should not be permitted. As such, the discussions were not so much about moral
241 This corresponds to social psychological research showing that evaluation o f  source credibility is deter­
mined by whether their messages correspond with pre-existing attitudes (Freweret al. 1998,1999).
242 Mostly that their motives were questioned and — to put it in Luhmannian terms — a withdrawal o f  esteem 
was communicated.
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principles as about how such principles should be interpreted and possibly traded off 
against each other.243 There was what seemed to be an uncontested consensus that health 
and the environment should be protected. The discussions were about the interpretation of 
these principles in the light o f cognitive and social uncertainties, and what distributional 
effects these uncertainties potentially could lead to. For example, if such basic principles 
could be expected to be upheld where technology is primarily or exclusively driven by the 
interest of multinational corporations.
The organisers on the steering board expressed -  both in interviews and in the final report 
— contentment with both the quality o f the debates and the resonance achieved,244 even if 
some o f  them believed that much more could have been achieved with a better planed 
process. However, the verbal communication of meetings is transient and since I am pri­
marily interested in the effects o f the debate it is not enough to analyse interaction at meet­
ings.245 We must see what parts of it were carried into the continued communication in the 
policy arena.
D ebate Outcomes
The public part o f the debate process continued for six weeks and ended in late July 2003, 
after which a report of the whole debate (GM Nation Report 2003) was written up for the 
steering board by a consultant hired for the task under the board’s supervision. It came out 
in late September 2003, and represented die final product or output from the debate.
During the process both GM sceptic NGOs and participants in the meetings had ex­
pressed concerns that the whole debate was a PR scam designed to legitimise decisions al­
ready made. These speculations did not appear to be well founded, as the report was 
judged as surprisingly blunt to many observers. Apart from the disclaimer that the report 
only attempted to reveal what the public thinks and feels about GM issues, and not 
whether they are right or wrong, “even on matters o f fact” (ibid: §29) -  the message is 
rather unambiguous. The results were summarised in seven key messages:
1. “People are generally uneasy about GM
2. The more people engage in GM issues, the harder their attitudes and more intense 
their concerns
243 An observation that sits better with a cultural theoretical framework o f  analysis than with, for example, the 
deficit model ascribing differences in technology acceptance to the command o f cognitive knowledge.
244 The final report claims that: ‘‘Despite some adverse and at times cynical media coverage of the launch of 
the debate, the volume o f  activity increased week by week. ... N ot only the quantity but the quality of re­
sponse — all of it voluntary — was impressive.... Whatever its other results, the debate demonstrated the 
power o f  people to engage in complex policy issues if they are given the opportunity.” (GM Nation report 
§28)-
245 As is done in m ore detail in the volume edited by Renn et al. (1995), where the focus is primarily on the 
deliberative or process quality rather than die effects o f such procedures.
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3. There is little support for early commercialisation
4. There is widespread mistrust of government and multi-national companies
5. There is a broad desire to know more and for further research to be done
6. Developing countries have special interests
7. The debate was welcomed and valued”
(ibid: p. 6-8)
The points are elaborated through descriptions of how the debate came about, why it was 
different from usual consultation exercises and more detailed description of the various 
elements, processes and contributions to the debate. Although the report duly lists both 
arguments made against and in favour of GMOs, as was laid out in the agenda for the dis­
cussions, there is no doubt that the picture painted is one of an overwhelmingly negative 
attitude to GMOs among the participants.
Perhaps the most interesting aspect o f  the report in the present context is the apparent 
strategy for establishing the credibility of the outputs. This I see as consisting in two fea­
tures. One is that despite the claim to be largely qualitative in character (§37), there are 
numbers strewn throughout the report. It has been noted that in order to appear credible 
in the political system, a certain quantifiable element seems desirable — politicians want 
numbers! (Irwin 2001). However, in this case an argumentative problem clearly existed in 
the fact that the participants in the debate were not statistically representative in the sense 
normally required from surveys.
Therefore, a substantial part of the report is devoted to comparing the contributions and 
attitudes of the ‘self-selected’ participants in public meetings and those writing letters or 
filling out questionnaires, and the ‘selected’ recruited participants in the reconvened ‘con­
trol’ focus groups. This is perhaps where the politically most interesting perspective 
emerges, as the report concludes that: a) Although there are differences between the two 
groups, they are more on the level o f detail and forces of conviction rather than fundamen­
tally different perspectives on GMOs.246 There is therefore no ‘silent majority’ in the “sense 
of being a completely different audience with different values and attitudes from an unrep­
resentative activist minority” (ibid § 195) b) Rather, the more the selected focus group par­
ticipants engaged with the issues, the more they grew sceptical and aligned themselves with 
the voluntary participants on some dimensions. Although they were more willing to ac­
knowledge that there might be benefits from GMOs (ibid: § 205-206), they grew more 
convinced over time that not enough was known at present to introduce the technology ■- 
(ibid: §172).247
246 Put more abstractly, the report argued that the intensity o f the preferences varied, not the direction.
247 As it was not within the remit o f  the steering board to formulate policy recommendations, the report did 
not entail any such valuations o f whether the public sentiments explored were ‘reasonable’.
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The publication o f the report received significant media attention. The chair of the steering 
board was interviewed on BBC’s Today programme248, the major TV news programmes all 
ran features on the report and several leading newspapers provided substantial cover and 
leading articles on the outcomes.249 The coverage was tinged by mild surprise, not at the 
fact that The public’ had proven hesitant or resistant but by the “startling [...] scale of that 
rejection” (Leader in The Independent, September 25th 2003). Most reports carried many 
of the percentages listed in the report, but also commented on the fact that the quantitative 
result did not represent a cross section o f the British population. Nonetheless, it was 
stressed that the non-public focus groups seemed to indicate a significant reluctance to­
wards the technology and low trust in the Government The media did not really question 
whether the results were a reliable indicator of public opinion, but provided commentary 
both on the ‘reasonableness’ o f public opinion250 and the challenges this raised for the 
Government.
Naturally, however, the media carried reports on the reactions o f the various stakeholders, 
which responded in ways that were hardly surprising. The GM sceptic NGOs -  who had 
been quite critical o f the process leading up to the debate -  framed the outcomes as signifi­
cantly supporting their cause. For example, a spokesperson from Friends of the Earth 
claimed in a press release, which was quoted in several newspapers, that: “The Government 
will ignore this report at its peril. There must not be any more weasel words from the Gov­
ernment on this issue. It must stand up to US and corporate lobbying, honour the findings 
of its own consultation and rule out the commercialisation of GM crops”. The Consumers’ 
Association claimed that: “The consumers view could not be clearer and the government 
can no longer afford to hide behind industry skirts and ignore it.” (M. Wamock, quoted on 
www.bbc.co.uk).
Industry representatives, on the other hand, tried to play down the importance o f the de­
bate. The Agricultural Biotechnology Council said only 0.1% of British citizen had been 
interested enough to take part in the discussions — 99.9% had not been heard -  and that 
those participating were mostly “orchestrated by campaigning groups”. “It is clear that the 
opinions of those ideologically opposed to [GM] technology were given equal weighting to 
carefully researched, factual evidence about GM foods” claimed Paul Rylott, chair of the 
Agricultural Biotechnology Council (industry organisation) — and member of the steering 
board (The Guardian, September 25th 2003).
248 Considered a leading agenda-setting news programme on BBC Radio 4.
249 The Guardian, The Independent and The Times all commented on the debate outcomes in leading arti­
cles.
250 Mostly, the outcomes were interpreted as the exercise o f common sense given the uncertainties the scien­
tific review — published between the end o f  the debate and the publication o f the report from the public de­
bate -  had pointed out, and the lack o f  direct consumer benefits
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In effect, immediately upon the publication a discursive struggle about the interpretation 
and importance of the output broke out — and it would probably be fair to say that the GM 
sceptics had the upper hand. The sceptics had the wording of the report on their side, 
whereas the GM proponents had to attempt to discredit the process, which they had to 
some extent participated in shaping. However, more interesting is that most sections o f the 
media took the report more or less at face value as a reliable product and representation of 
public sentiments and started spelling out the dilemma it might present to the Govern­
ment.251 As formulated in The Independent “And now this scepticism and hostility has 
been rubbed in the Governments face -  through a public debate it endorsed and funded 
itself — in away that will be politically very hard to ignore” (September 25th 2003). The 
Government itself kept a rather low profile in the days around the publication of the re­
port. It only reiterated the promise that it would ‘listen’ and respond to the results publicly. 
However, it was clear that the Government was in a dilemma. Not only because it was 
committed to the technology, but it was also clear that ‘public opinion* would not be ac­
cepted in the EU system as a reason to reject specific GMOs if it was not at the same time 
grounded in scientific proof that risks to human health or the environment existed. The 
Farm Scale Evaluations, which were supposed to answer questions about biodiversity had 
not yet been published, but they were mentioned -  should indicate adverse effects -  as the 
last ‘excuse’ to change policy. “An atmosphere has therefore been created that may induce 
Mr Blair and his like-minded ministers to retreat on the basis that the political costs o f go­
ing forward may be too high -  but only if the Farm Scale Evaluation give them the oppor­
tunity.” (ibid). In fact, a few weeks later the Farm Scale Evaluations did provide such an 
opportunity (at least for some crops), but the Government did not wish to pursue a signifi­
cantly altered policy course.252
The British Procedure Analysed
Thus far I have described in some detail the processes of the GM Nation? procedure. The 
description entails a significant simplification and reduction o f the actual volume of com­
munication involved, but hopefully the aspects most important for my research problem 
have been captured. In the remaining part of this chapter I shall take a more analytical ap­
proach to the material and interpret some of the events and discursive framings in order to 
give sociological significance to the story told and render it comparable to the other cases 
investigated. In short, I shall seek to characterise the procedure as a distinct type o f com­
251 The Government subsequently complained that the media had reported the quantitative outputs as if  they 
were a representative survey (DEFRA 2004b).
252 The FSEs subsequently came under public attack for being based on insufficient or outdated assumptions 
to be o f real value for comparison o f  the effects from conventional and GM agriculture on biodiversity, as 
they were based on the application o f  a herbicide (Atrazine), which was to be phased out shortly after due to 
a ban imposed by the EU. This subtheme I cannot pursue in details here.
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munication and attempt to explicate its discursive components and constellation o f actors 
involved.
In the previous case die analysis proceeded by means of contrasting two different initia­
tives aimed at integrating public concerns into policy making. Here I shall take a slightly 
different approach and attempt to analyse the discursive dynamic shaping the procedure as 
the outcome o f a discursive struggle between different framings of the steering board of 
the debate and the UK Government the appropriate modes o f public involvement. Basi­
cally, I will pose the question o f why the Government and the GM proponents apparently 
lost discursive control in this policy area.251 *53 On the basis of this analysis, I shall briefly 
characterise the case according to the questions posed in Chapter IV. Finally, I shall raise 
the issue of representativeness and inclusion/exclusion as general issues to be addressed by 
participatory or deliberative procedures, which in my opinion are particularly evident in this 
case.
Configuring the Science and Society Interface
Arguably, the 2000 House o f Lords report ‘Science and Society’ marked the culmination of 
a change in discourses about the use o f scientific advice in policy making towards a more 
consultative and dialogical mode (Irwin 2001, Elam and Bertilsson 2003). This ‘new mood 
for dialogue’ clearly informed the AEBC’s suggestion to have the debate in the first in­
stance. Although the AEBC had no statutory power to insist on an organised public de­
bate, some o f the programmatic communications from the Government, which followed 
these principled debates made it difficult to reject the suggestion, even if the Government 
foresaw that the outcomes could be awkward for its envisioned policies. The ‘Science and 
Society’ discourse therefore flowed into and shaped the event.
It is noticeable and perhaps symptomatic that the title of the HoL report is Science and So­
ciety, rather than for instance Science in Society. For a sociological observer it can seem 
untenable to think of science as something beyond society.254 However, in order to estab­
lish a ‘dialogue’, it is necessary to have at least two distinct actors, and neither ‘science’ (as a 
functional system or a set of knowledges) nor ‘society’ are actors that can immediately enter 
into dialogue. Hence, a distinction must be drawn between science and society by designat­
251 To choose this explanatory focus calls for two disdaimers. First, it does no t imply that the Government
‘ought’ to have remained in discursive control, only that it either expected or hoped to stay in control, or saw 
no feasible alternative to agreeing to the procedure. This can perhaps be taken of an example of Luhmann’s
claim that the political system is capable of steering society only to a limited extent Secondly, o f course, no­
body ‘admitted’ defeat. However, the interpretations in the media left little doubt that the GM sceptics ‘bene­
fited’ m ost from the activation o f ‘the public’ in terms of public resonance for their framings of the GM is­
sues.
254 At least this is problematic within the broadly Luhmannian framework applied here, where by definition all 
communication, also when spedally coded, takes place within and contributes to ‘society*. Saence may be a 
particular, self-referential mode o f communication, but this communication is co-constitutive of society, not 
‘beyond’ it.
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ing who speaks on behalf of science and who speaks on behalf o f society. Therefore, the 
issue to be pursued here is not to what extent science is in- or outside society, but how the 
distinction is drawn and what effects this has. As such, the distinction is seen as a product 
of communication, not as a cause or determinant of i t
As neither science nor society are socially well-defined entities (j.e. perceived from all view­
points in a consensual manner as represented by particular (collective) actors), there is a 
certain contingency in how the distinction is drawn, which in turn may have consequences 
for how the dialogue develops. Here I wish to pursue first how ‘the public’ was operation­
alised, then how ‘science’ was brought into the procedure.
The ‘science and society* discourse leaves open what exactly the social locus o f ‘society’ or 
‘the public* is. Hence, when the process was instigated choices needed to be made about 
how to operationalise the demand for public involvement. My argument is that the selec­
tions made — and thereby the specific shape of the procedure — can be seen as the outcome 
of a struggle between the steering board and die Government emerging from different as­
sumptions about what the public is and ought to he, and what its legitimate role in policy 
making should be.
In this case the ‘society’ side of the science/society distinction refers to ‘a general public’ in 
a rather unspecific sense. On the one hand, this public is clearly framed as something other 
and ‘more’ than public opinion as measured through surveys. As indicated by the perceived 
necessity of holding a 'narrow but deep’ debate, the public is seen as bearer of richly tex­
tured knowledges, which cannot be adequately captured through opinion polls. This public 
is not equated with the communicative events of the mass media either, in fact it is in dan­
ger of being both misled and misrepresented by the media. These images of the public thus 
have similarities with the concept o f civil society developed in some branches of (political) 
sociology (e.g. Cohen and Arato 1992). However, civil society is, in this case, not consid­
ered as capable of the sufficient and reliable self-organisation required to be democratically 
accountable. The organisations present ‘in society’ and visible in the media (NGOs) claim­
ing to speak in the public interest were perceived (at least from parts of the political sys­
tem) as biased and self-serving in their stand on GMOs, and not as genuine representatives 
of the public. Therefore, it was an explicit aim of the debate to bypass such actors, whose 
“viewpoints have already been made known”, aiming instead to the ‘real’ public. As such, 
the public hoped to participate in the debate is seen as more authentic than both its elected 
(parliamentarians) and self-proclaimed (NGOs) representatives.
This authentic public is understood as equipped with competences, interests and values, all 
of which cannot be known in advance by experts and hence cannot be substituted with ex­
pert inquines.255 Therefore, it was considered important that ‘the public’ itself was allowed
255 Not even by sociologists!!!
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to formulate the issues for debate. The steering board saw its assumption of an ‘otherness’ 
of problem framings by the public confirmed in the initial focus groups, as it was noted 
that
“... people's overriding frame was question and questioning; but the generalpublic did not demar­
cate issues andfacts into categories of ethics, science, economics etc, as policymakers and professionals 
tended to—  People approached GM issues through their lived experience (food, myfamily's health 
andfuture, and the cost to me), not experience of GM as sué, or a 'debate\ ” (Minutes 17 De­
cember 2002, §6)
Sociologically, this finding can be interpreted to mean that in the perception of ‘the public’ 
the problems associated with GM are not ‘ordered’ along the lines of the functional differ­
entiation claimed by systems theory to be one of the most significant traits of modem soci­
ety. They are instead, to some extent in tension with these principles. These tensions pri­
marily manifest themselves as unfulfilled expectations and demands addressed at the politi­
cal system, techno-scientific innovation and to some degree at retailers. The discrepancies 
between public perceptions and institutional practices are clearly part of the background of 
the debate. In the policy arena different actors interpret the causes of such discrepancies 
differently and try to use them to their advantage. In this case I will suggest an interpreta­
tion of the shaping of the debate as the outcome of a struggle in particular between the 
AEBC steering board and the Government about what this discrepancy is and how it 
should best be handled. This was a discursive struggle in a public or at least semi-public 
arena. This meant that although the Government clearly had the political power (discre­
tionary competences), this alone could not be relied upon to see its objectives through, and 
a number of argumentative resources were brought into play.
I shall describe this struggle, following Luhmann, along three meaning dimensions: the so­
cial, the temporal and the substantive dimension. These are obviously intertwined, but the 
analytical separation allows me to dissect in a non-arbitrary way the different dimensions of 
the communicative processes involved. The focus will be on, respectively, who represented 
‘the public* and how (as well as who was ‘forced’ to learn), which ‘time-regime’ dominated 
the debate, and what ‘issues* were put on the agenda o f the debate.
O perationalising the Public for Debate
When attempting to analytically reconstruct the shaping of the GM Nation? debate, as well 
as its relationship with the two other strands, a number of complexities must be faced. In 
the social àmension one of these is how to construe agency. As discussed in Chapter IV I 
locate agency primarily with organisations. The debate was run by a steering board, which 
was compiled o f persons representing a broad spectrum of viewpoints on GM agriculture 
and with diverging concerns. Likewise, the British government may not, internally, be a 
unitary political actor. When I talk about actions or statements of ‘the Government’, a large 
number of communicative contributions may be involved, which are ‘boiled down’ to spe­
230
cific communications taken to represent the decisions of the Government. However, for 
reasons of analytical parsimony I shall in the following assume that both organisations can 
be considered more or less as unitary actors. I hope to demonstrate that this assumption 
can facilitate an account of the shaping and dynamics o f the procedure as the outcome o f a 
discursive struggle primarily between these two actors, which is relevant for the present 
research purpose. This struggle was based partly in diverging assumptions about what the 
issues at stake were and partly on diverging organisational commitments and interests.
The AEBC was formed as an advisory body to the Government. As such, its point o f  ref­
erence is primarily the political system, but in principle it should not operate ‘politically* in 
the policy arena but only feed in communication shaped as ‘advice*. Nevertheless, in this 
case it seems that the organisation (and the subsequently appointed steering board o f the 
debate) functioned as a sort of ‘internal’ opposition making demands on behalf of ‘the pub­
lic’ within the policy process. If one perceives of the preparatory phase of the debate as a 
discursive struggle, it seems that the steering board took upon itself to represent (the inter­
est of) the public and function as an intermediate link between the amorphous ‘public* and 
the political and technological establishment It did so not by claiming intimate knowledge 
of the interests and values of the public, but by insisting that greater attention be was paid 
to making sure these interests and values articulated were in the biotechnology policy­
making process in Britain.
Given that the steering board had neither statutory standing nor any alternative means to 
exert political pressure other than its arguments and the threat o f a collective resignation, 
the concessions achieved may seem somewhat surprising. The Government not only 
agreed to double the budget for the debate and extend its timeframe, but also committed 
itself to respond in writing stating what it had learned from the exercise and how the out­
comes would be applied in future policy making.
According to my interviewees the Government accepted the suggestion of the AEBC to 
have the debate because they believed that more political credibility would be lost and 
more attention stirred by rejecting the debate than by holding it.256 If it had rejected the call 
a significant protest potential could have been released, a potential that was arguably in­
creased even further by the initial suggestion to have the debate. At least by agreeing to 
have the debate the Government could hope to retain some discursive influence. This indi­
cates that the situation in Britain was one where the biotechnology policy formation ex­
tended well beyond the institutions o f formal politics (Bauer and Gaskell 2002). This proc­
ess can perhaps be interpreted as one where the Government had realised that ‘acceptance* 
of a technology can be a scarce resource, which is closely linked to trust in the regulatory
256 In systems theoretical terminology it would see itself confronted with increased resonance in the rather 
unspecific medium o f ‘public opinion’ (cf. Chapter III).
231
system. As argued by Luhmann, an organisation is unlikely to ascribe an observed lack of 
trust to its own failings, tending instead to blame the misconceptions o f the trustee, per­
haps due to insufficient communication. This assumption must be temporalised in this 
case, as the British government was acutely aware o f the link with the BSE scandal and past 
policy failures. However, the political system perceived these past failings as rectified and 
the lessons learned. Therefore, arguably, the Government chose to see the debate as an 
opportunity to display its competence in handling this new technology. This, however, left 
some disagreement between the Government and the steering board about the exact pur­
pose and shape o f the debate.
The steering board was appointed by the Government. Nonetheless, in its organisational 
self-understanding as emerges from the minutes o f its meetings and my interviews it was 
probably more inclined to see the Government as its opponent rather than its principal. In 
the preparatory phase this opposition regarded how ‘the public* were to be operationalised 
in the debate.
As described above, this operationalisation drew strongly on the ‘Science and Society* dis­
course with a particular focus on ‘those, whose voices had not yet been heard’. Perhaps the 
most significant feature of this framing of ‘the public* was that it was perceived as compe­
tent, interested, and able to debate complex matters in a ‘fair" manner given appropriate 
facilitation and format.
This image of the public was not explicitly rejected by the Government (which is indeed 
difficult for a democratic government). However, the Government’s decision to have the 
economic and scientific strands added to the deliberation process indicates that it foresaw 
the need for additional symbolic resources in order to defend its policies in the face of 
what it perceived as an excessively hostile public climate, which may or may not be miti­
gated in the debate process. Although the internal communicative processes and strategic 
considerations o f  the Government have not been accessed and analysed, little doubt seems 
possible that the Government was convinced that it had good economic and scientific rea­
sons to support the GM technology. However, the Government was uncertain that these 
arguments would emerge with what would be considered sufficient strength in the public 
debate. In order to harness these types of (functional) arguments, they were to be explored 
and communicated in processes socially distinct from the articulation of public concerns, 
but hopefully resonate in the public debate.
Considering that the whole procedure was instigated as an organised top-down process 
originating in the political system, it is noticeable that there really was no overarching blue­
print for the process. For an outside observer it emerges as something, which can be de­
scribed as a process of mutual accommodation of different interests and discourses. De­
spite programmatic statements by the responsible minister o f the synergistic effects to be 




There was no well-defined responsibility for such interaction to occur, and it only did when 
it seem mutually beneficial for the organisations involved.
There was some thematic transfer from the public debate activities into the scientific and 
economic inquiries, but the activities were kept socially distinct. In short, topics were trans­
ferred from the socially distinct but thematically inclusive context o f public debate to the 
functionally differentiated and exclusive semantic fields of science and economics. Here, 
however, they were processed by more or less traditional means (role differentiation and 
standardised procedures for knowledge production and assessment).
Arguably there were then three competing framings o f ‘the public’, and three designated 
positions from which public concerns could be observed, which intermingled in the over­
all process. The first was propagated by the steering board as citizens to be activated in de­
liberative processes spanning a range of issues; the second by the scientific review panel as 
a questioning, mostly passive audience of expert risk assessments; and the third as virtual or 
potential future consumers, characterised primarily by their expected willingness to con­
sume.
Where the Government’s attitude can perhaps best be summarised under the motto of ‘get­
ting the facts right’, the intention of the steering board was ‘getting the debate right’ or ‘get­
ting the concerns right’. As I have tried to indicate, this led to a shaping of the debate 
which on the one hand was inclusive, i.e. everybody who wanted to could participate, but 
on the other hand the demand of the political system that the debate should not function 
as a referendum was also fulfilled, as no representativity could be claimed for the output. 
This meant that although the procedures was conceived to be non-exclusive, in that the 
public meetings were open to all, the credibility of the procedure could only be established 
subsequently by means of the exclusionary focus groups o f non-voluntary participants, 
who were arguably more socially representative than the participants in the public part and 
yet did not differ fundamentally in their assessments.
In the temporal dimension the struggle between the steering board and the Government was 
mosdy about the timeframe for the debate (how long does deliberation take?), the temporal 
synchronisation with the other strands and the Farm Scale Evaluations (will the debate be 
relevant if timing does not allow the debate o f expert testimonies?) and ongoing policy is­
sues (reassuming approval procedures within the EU framework, avoiding the looming 
trade conflict with the US). The steering board (and the NGO community) wanted time for 
a more extended deliberation, whereas the Government wanted to see the debate com­
pleted and reported in time to make a clear temporal separation between the debate and 
any policy decisions to be made. In this respect, the Government largely achieved its objec­
tives as the public debate terminated before any of the scientific or economic results could
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be included.257 However, on a more ideological level the disagreements in the temporal di­
mension were also about *when’ the public should be involved, and possibly enabled, to 
shape the use o f technology. This perhaps says more about the role ascribed to ‘the public’ 
in the shaping o f technology than the temporal contingencies o f the debate arrangement.
The Government largely ascribed to a liberal model o f technology regulation, according to 
which innovation ought to be stimulated and -  given that no physical risk to human health 
or the environment are identified — subsequent market demands will decide if and in what 
forms any given technology will prevail. O f course, this principle had to some extent been 
modified through the adaptation of a precautionary regime, according to which (‘justified’) 
doubt about safety could halt the introduction of a given technology even if no clear evi­
dence o f  risks could (yet) be provided.258 This type o f regulatory regime obviously presup­
poses public confidence in both the instrumental competences and fiduciary attitude of the 
regulatory agencies, but it does not envision an active citizenry beyond individual choices 
made in the market.
The AEBC and the steering board, on the other hand, to some extent at least, articulated a 
more deliberative democratic model by which the expectations and concerns of the public 
should be articulated and preferably incorporated in the shaping and regulation o f tech­
nologies further ‘upstream* in the innovative process. In addition a more active shaping of 
technological dynamics was envisioned where non-economic objectives could also be in­
cluded.
By obtaining approval for its suggestion to have a debate, the AEBC had already gained 
some concession to its perspective from the Government. However, the two different un­
derstandings o f the appropriate temporal location of public input to the social regulation of 
technology meant differences in the perceptions of the appropriate purpose and scope of 
the debate, and what role it could play in establishing public trust. The Government pri­
marily saw it as an opportunity for scientists and regulatory agencies to display their techni­
cal competence, which could later help the populace to take the ‘leap’ into trusting a well- 
regulated technology. In the eyes of the Government this required some degree o f learning 
technicalities on the part of the public, the debate thus clearly had an educational element.
It seems that the Government’s temporal perspective on the debate was one o f ‘prepara­
tion’ for the introduction of GM technology. To the extent the Government believed that 
it and its regulatory agencies would learn, it was in terms of anticipating public concerns by
257 This was strongly criticised by the House o f  Common’s Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee, 
who saw the debate as ‘an opportunity missed’ due to underfunding and bad timing. It therefore requested 
that: “The Government, in its response to our report, must allay the suspicion that, having agreed to under­
take a public debate, it did as little as it could to make it work.” (HoC 2003: 18).
258 This had, in the opinion of some GM protagonists, been severely violated in the demands for extensive 
labelling, which they claimed entailed an unnecessary stigmatisation o f something which was not ‘substan­
tially’ different from other agricultural products.
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using the debate to probe these and perhaps make minor changes in regulatory principles 
in order to accommodate ‘mainstream’ hesitations and mitigate whatever mobilisation po­
tential existed beyond the already committed NGOs.
The AEBC and the steering board, on the other hand, saw the debate as an opportunity for 
a collective deliberation, which could significantly contribute to the way the technology 
would be adopted in the British agriculture and food industry. As explained by several o f 
my interviewees, the AEBC and the steering board accepted the technology induced ap­
proach — which some of the members considered to inappropriate or insufficient -  exactly 
because they felt convinced that the debate was bound to spread to ‘neighbouring’ issues 
once deliberation got underway.
As such, it can perhaps be said that on the practical level the Government’s temporal per­
spective on the debate dominated, as the timetable o f the process was synchronised with 
the requirements and demands of the political system and not with the needs of ‘the public’ 
as defined by the steering board. However, on the more ‘ideological’ level the steering 
board won more headway as the debate arrangements were shaped by the premise that ‘the 
public’ had legitimate concerns to be addressed by innovators and regulators earlier in the 
process than the market model of governance foresees. This was of course intimately 
linked to the substantive agenda of the debate.
The substantive dimension concerns what issues were put on the agenda of the debate and 
how. The first thing to note is that the event as such was ‘technology induced’ as opposed 
to ‘problem induced’ (cf. Chapter II). This technology induced framing partly originated in 
the genealogy o f the debate as it emerged in the AEBC analyses o f issues surrounding the 
Farm Scale Evaluations. Nonetheless, here too there were tensions between the AEBC’s 
ambitions for the debate and the purposes and scope envisioned by the Government. Sim­
ply put, the Government wished for a ‘narrow’ agenda where technical issues were central, 
and which would allow the debate to function as a sort of probe into the acceptability o f 
their intended policy initiatives. Also, it was in the interest o f the Government to keep the 
agenda relatively closely linked to existing regulatory principles in order that these would 
not be fundamentally challenged. However, aside from the initial remit given by the Gov­
ernment in its acceptance of the debate, the steering board was given a free rein to set the 
agenda for the debate. As described, this was done not by looking at perceived deficiencies 
in the regulatory framework, but by asking ‘the public’, here operationalised through focus 
groups, what the agenda of the debate should be.
The Government did not then directly take part in the agenda setting of the debate. How­
ever, the addition of the two expert strands must nonetheless be seen as an attempt to keep 
some discursive control over the events, and mobilise argumentative resources that could
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help to restrict the influence o f more ‘programmatic’ demands should they emerge in the 
public debate.
These diverging objectives in the substantive dimension also led to some tension between 
the Government and the steering board as I have described. The continued insistence of 
the Government that regulation in the future would be ‘evidence-based’ drew into question 
the meaningfulness of the exercise precisely because the steering board detected great pub­
lic concern over the ability to actually control and predict the potential adverse conse­
quences o f  a large scale deliberate release of GM crops into the environment and food 
chain, as well as the reliability and trustworthiness o f regulatory agencies and biotech com­
panies, and the wider socio-economic consequences expected to emerge from the imple­
mentation o f the technology. Although the steering board did not agree internally about 
whether it would be possible and/ or desirable to attempt to make the agenda ‘science- 
driven’ or ‘concern-driven’, or on the importance o f including these wider aspects of a po­
tential large-scale acceptance of GM  agriculture in the debate, the board as an organisa­
tional unit insisted on allowing a relatively inclusive agenda.
The U se o f Science in  the Procedure
I argued above that neither the ‘science’ nor the ‘society’ sides in the distinction were 
clearly operational, and traced in some detail how the society or public side was shaped as a 
result of discursive struggle and mutual accommodation between the steering board and 
the Government. I shall now devote some attention to the use o f science in this particular 
case.
Today it seems widely recognised both within the scientific community and in its environ­
ment, that science as a system operates with a certain diversity on the programmatic level. 
Different theories and approaches may produce different perspectives on a given problem 
and still be equally ‘scientific’. In areas where the communication o f ‘truths’ (matters of 
fact) have contentious impacts beyond the scientific system itself, this interpretive flexibility 
is often responded to by means o f social mechanisms that can establish the credibility of 
the knowledge required to solve practical problems. One o f those mechanisms is that of 
including both ‘expertise’ and ‘counter-expertise’ (Krohn 1997). This strategy can be based 
both in epistemological considerations about special knowledge possessed by particular 
groups, or on political convenience.
In this particular case it was acknowledged from the outset that the ‘broad’ composition of 
the review panel was necessary if wider confidence in its work was to be achieved, both in 
terms of substantive areas covered and the member’s perspectives on GM agriculture. This 
led to a situation where the scientific review panel had dual organisational goals, as it was to 
deliver both an integrated overview and evaluation of the scientific knowledge — including 
uncertainties and gaps in knowledge — on a number of issues surrounding GM technology, 
and create credibility for itself by being seen as socially inclusive and fair to ‘cognitive mi­
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nority’ positions. In accordance with British traditions all members were appointed in a 
personal capacity. Officially this meant that no member ‘represented’ interests other than 
those of the general public. Nonetheless (some) members were appointed after suggestions 
from different organisations and at meetings with the press the chair of the panel stressed 
that ‘all viewpoints* were represented on the panel.259 According to one of my interviewees 
this led to a split between the internal and external communication processes o f the organi­
sation. On the ‘inside* scientific arguments, methods and evidence were presented as value 
neutral and objective characteristics o f ‘the scientific approach*, to which social affiliation 
or political preference made no difference, in other words as a mechanism to achieve una­
nimity. On the ‘outside’, however, the social inclusive composition of the panel was 
stressed in order to gain credibility for the evaluations.260 This created both argumentative 
advantages and disadvantages for the minority of GM sceptics on the panel.
As the study was organised as a review of existing, peer-reviewed scientific output, the 
mainstream (reductionist) perspective dominated. Due to time pressure, the drafting of the 
report began almost immediately upon commencement of the work, which left little room 
for more ‘paradigmatic’ discussions about what were appropriate theoretical models and 
evidence. And as scientific knowledge production on the operational level has a ‘structural 
preference’ for verified rather than falsified results (as such results are more likely for scien­
tific communication to continue), or, for certain rather than uncertain results, sceptics ar­
gued that there was a scarcity of published research addressing the complex causal interac­
tions they were concerned about.
On the other hand, the true/false codification of the scientific system is just as suited for 
communicating dissent as it is agreement, and as there was a certain pressure to reach una­
nimity in the work, the GM sceptics were given some argumentative leeway in the fact that 
the final report stressed uncertainties and a lack of knowledge more than the majority o f 
the panel thought necessary and appropriate.
One feature, which is emphasised in the report from the panel, is that apart from being the 
most thorough o f its kind, the review is also the first ‘driven by the concerns o f the public*. 
This was stated as an aim within the initial remit of the work. To begin with this was con­
tested by some o f the scientists participating, who felt that they should occupy themselves 
only with the ‘real issues’, not with what they perceived to be public misconceptions.261 In 
the theoretical terminology suggested in Chapter III this can be considered as an immunis­
259 Some members were actually described by the chair as ‘NGO experts’, although they were in fact academ­
ics who had been suggested by NGOs, but did not consider themselves to be any less ‘proper’ experts that 
than those in favour o f  GM crops. Same categprisation wras made by the minister o f environment, Elliot 
Morley, when answering questions about the review in the House of Commons (Commons Hansard, 17* Julv 
2003).
260 Interview with A. Stirling.
261 Interview with A. Stirling.
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ing reaction from the scientific system against the intrusion into its domain o f ‘inappropri­
ate* distinctions. However, some o f the more GM sceptic panel members insisted on the 
importance o f the principle for the panel’s work. Practically, this meant that the report was 
structured around those questions emerging from the steering board’s initial focus groups, 
which the panel thought were amenable to scientific answers. This, however, did not mean 
that ‘the public’ had any say in the selection and weighing o f theories, methods and evi­
dence included in the review. The public was allowed to ask questions, but was not as such 
admitted any influence over how the answers were provided or validated. Here the public 
remained in its more traditional audience role.
Nor was this ‘translation’ o f public concerns into scientific questions without difficulties. 
Typically, it meant a reduction in scope of the issues involved. One example given to me 
was that the scientist in charge o f drafting a chapter on the reliability of GM crops inter­
preted the question emerging from the focus groups: ‘Are GM crops reliable?’ to mean 
‘What proportion of the plants that emerge from a modification process is actually usable 
(get the desired characteristics without ‘side effects’)? Here it seems obvious that everyday 
and scientific language are somewhat at odds, as the concerns about ‘reliability’ aired in the 
public discourse presumably go a lot further than agronomic characteristics. However, the 
scientific terminology has a specific, operational definition of reliability — which is what can 
be assessed ‘meaningfully’ from the scientific literature -  and this is what dominated the 
‘answer’ to public concerns.262
Hence, the scientific review may be structured around the questions posed by ‘the public*. 
However, it is difficult to see the process as one o f a genuine or fully ‘extended peer re­
view’ (cf. Chapter II), as there was practically no confrontation of the methods and conclu­
sion with the broader public.263
Perhaps the most important effect of the socially inclusive way the review was conducted 
was that the GM sceptics managed to make discussions about uncertainty central to the 
work of the science panel (partly because ‘uncertainty’ was central among the public con­
cerns), and although the panel concluded that it had found no evidence or indications that 
current GM food on the market (which was not grown in the UK) posed any health risks, 
the GM sceptics on the panel got the proviso included in the conclusion that ‘the absence 
of evidence o f harm is not evidence o f the absence of harm.’ The conclusion o f the science 
review was therefore a very cautious ‘go ahead’, which emphasised the need for more 
knowledge and the substantial surveillance of released products on a case-by-case basis,
262 Example provided by A. Stirling.
263 When the science panel had published a first version o f its report comments from the scientific commu­
nity were muted. (In principle ‘the public’ was invited to comment, but responses were expected in the eso­
teric language o f science, not in lay terms. Hence, it can hardly be claimed that the review involved ‘the pub­
lic* in the sense discussed here, but perhaps a scientific ‘sub-public*). The N G O  community later made the 
criticism that no revisions were made in the light o f comments actually received (Mayer 2004: 9).
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both in terms o f human health and environmental impacts. It was also projected that such 
assessments would become increasingly complex if or when GM characteristics were 
‘stacked’ in crops to emerge at a later time.264
To the media this was a conclusion which was open to interpretation, and both proponents 
and sceptics saw their cause supported. Hence, the scientific review can hardly be said to 
have fulfilled its function in the Government strategy, namely to convincingly show that 
GM crops do not exhibit significant risks to human health and the environment. Nor did it 
seem that the scientific review brought the opposing positions closer to a consensual view 
o f the risks emerging from the technology. For instance, the science correspondent for The 
Times, Mark Henderson, reported on July 22nd 2003 on the publication of the science 
panel’s report that “The verdict ofthe official GM Science Review... greatly strengthens the position of 
Tony Blair andpro-GM ministers, who are keen to see the technology licensed for commercial use as soon as 
possible*. On the same day, however, environment correspondent Paul Brown reported in 
The Guardian that: “Government hopes o f an early introduction of commercially groan GM crops in 
Britain suffered another setback yesterday when the world's most comprehensive scientific review of the sub­
ject emphasised the uncertainties andpotential dangers of the crops rather than the advantages. . . . .  Perhaps 
the most damning conclusionfrom the government's point of view was that it would be impossible to grow 
some GAf crops without cross-contamination of organic and conventionalfields o f the same species."265
This illustrates how scientific knowledge can be interpreted quite differently depending on 
the preferences or bias of the observer. Internal disputes are reproduced and even ampli­
fied outside scientific organisations. More broadly speaking it can be seen as an exemple of 
the Luhmanman point that more scientific investigation does not necessarily reduce uncer­
tainty at the societal level, nor does it automatically ease political decision-making. Perhaps 
the contrary.
The circumstances surrounding the economic study were somewhat different. The study 
was not undertaken by a broadly composed expert panel, but by the Cabinet Office’s Strat­
egy Unit, which organisationally is a part of the Government. Hence, one may ask how it 
came about that the results were contrary to the goals of the Government. I have not in­
264 i.e. crops containing two or more genetically engineered characteristics.
265 In the same article the Agricultural Biotechnology Council, a bio-industry body, was quoted as saying that 
“the report endorsed its view that there were no expected or observed detrimental health effects from the 
introduction o f GM crops and GM foods, and that genetic modification, as an option for developing crops, 
was as predictable and reliable as other crop breeding methods.” This interpretation contrasts with one given 
on July 21*’, also in The Guardian by Pete Riley from Friends o f the Earth: “Far from giving GM crops the 
green ligjit, this report admits that there are gaps in our scientific knowledge and significant uncertainties 
about the long-term impacts of GM food and crops on our health and environment”. And still stronger by 
Doug Parr o f Greenpeace: “This committee was deliberately stacked with GM flag-wavers, but its so-called 
findings still come nowhere near justifying the risks.”
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vestigated the work of the economic analysis in detail, but a few observations may be re­
quired to understand the role the economic strand played in the overall process.
The economic study had, like the scientific review, reference to a specific functional sub­
system, the economy. This meant that the study and its output belonged in a particular se­
mantic field; that of economic costs and benefits, which largely excludes ‘other’ issues. 
However, the study was not itself ‘economic’, i.e. part o f the economic system, but a social 
scientific observation of the economy. It was built on scenarios, or ‘possible futures’. Such 
scenarios are of course dependent upon the assumptions made about a number o f issues 
and conditions, which tend almost inevitably to be biased.266
The study was undertaken by a group o f economists created for the purpose within the 
Strategy Unit. It seems that the unit was relatively independent of political influence, and 
that the prime interest of the group as an organisational unit was to create scenarios, which 
were not too vulnerable to criticism by any stakeholder. One of my interviewees, who 
served on the steering board, claimed that the group was attentive to the criticisms and 
suggestions made by members of the steering board, but that in the end the report was 
“pushed around Whitehall and was quite significantly tempered. A lot of things did not 
make it into the final version.”267 Hence, we see signs of some politically awkward results 
being ‘tempered’, but a Government very cautious not to be seen as conspicuously manipu­
lative.268
According to my interviewees, the analysis group started out with some ‘traditional’ eco­
nomic cost-benefit methodologies, which were criticised both by members of the steering 
board and other stakeholders as being too insensitive both to public concerns and scientific 
uncertainties. These criticisms allegedly had significant effects, and in the end an approach 
was chosen where scenarios were developed along two central dimensions: whether con­
sumers would embrace or reject GMOs and whether GM-specific regulation would be re­
quired or not. These different ‘possible futures’ obviously entail significant contingencies. 
However, the analysis leaned towards the expectation that in years to come the public was 
unlikely to fully embrace GM products, and that scientific uncertainties combined with a 
sceptical public would mean that GM-specific regulation with substantial monitoring pro­
grammes would be required. This led to the conclusion that in the short term, there would 
be little benefit from the commercial growth of GM crops in the UK, but in the longer run
266 In the cultural theoretical meaning o f  the term, i.e. observer dependent and linked to forms o f  social or­
ganisation.
267 Interview R. Grove-White.
268 The relative independence o f  the analysis is stressed in the press release from the environment minister, 
Elliott Morley, accompanying the publication o f  the report “The Strategy Unit has explored the economics 
o f GM crops in a very open and transparent manner. I am particulady pleased that they involved experts and 
stakeholders from all shades o f opinion to ensure there was balance and rigour when examining this important 
issue.” (Emphasis added). Balance, openness and indusion is stressed, whereas competence o r validity is not 
mentioned — presumably it is assumed to emerge out o f a process with the aforementioned characteristics.
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the British economy might suffer from lost innovation potentials if GM crops were 
banned.
Effects of the Procedure
The results from the debate as formulated in the report from the steering committee came 
out in September of 2003 and the Government’s promised response was expected shortly 
after. However, it did not emerge until March 2004. This may o f course be due to other 
priorities of the Government,369 but it does seem to indicate a certain perplexity in the 
Government about how to proceed in this policy area in the light of fierce public opposi­
tion.
In its response the Government acknowledged that the “findings of the public debate 
broadly reflect the current state of public opinion on GM crops”, and that “the peoples 
attitudes towards GM crops are shaped by a complex range o f issues and concerns, and 
that to some extent GM crops have become a focus for much wider concerns” (DEFRA 
2004a: 4), meaning that the assessment by the public o f whether GM technology Svorks’ is 
based on a more extensive set of criteria than the ones entertained by regulators and tech­
nologists. On this background the response outlines a number o f principles on which fu­
ture policies will be based. These undertakings are not framed as an alteration of policies, 
although perhaps the safeguarding o f choice for both consumers and farmers between GM 
and non-GM products through strict rules of co-existence is emphasised more than in ear­
lier policy statements, and as it is stated that a fund paid for by GM producers to ensure a 
compensatory scheme for adventitious GM contamination will be considered.
When viewed in its entirety the Government’s reply reads almost like an ideal typical articu­
lation o f a ‘hierarchical’ worldview as oudined in Chapter III. It is reiterated again and again 
that a strict regulatory framework will ensure the beneficial use o f the technology. For in­
stance, “ (w)e believe we should keep an open mind and allow the technology to develop 
within a strict regulatory system that is designed to protect human health and the environ­
ment while providing choice. Ultimately the market will decide whether GM crops are a 
success or not ” (ibid: 29). Arguably, the last sentence indicates the admission of a more 
‘individualist’ viewpoint, stating that in the end market forces will — and should be allowed 
to -  decide the fate of GM technology. The image of knowledge propagated in the re­
sponse also seems to correspond very closely to the hierarchical ideal of ‘complete and or­
ganised’, and the gaps identified in knowledge as relatively easily closed.* 270 The concerns 
raised in the debate that GM agriculture would only serve ‘big business* was placed under
369 Notably the political tension preceding the war in Iraq.
270 “As the Review’ [of the scientific panel] states, risk is a product o f hazard, i.e. actual or potential harm, and 
the likelihood o f exposure to that hazard. While we recognise that the boundaries between hazard and risk are 
not always clear -  the Science Review itself blurs these concepts in places — the risk assessment approach 
allows for uncertainty to be dealt with and managed.” (DEFRA 2004a: 26).
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the heading o f ‘ethical issues* and countered with the argument that other ethical view­
points (notably those by the Nuffield Council) had argued that pursuing genetic engineer­
ing was a duty towards the poor. Hence, while the response essentially can be characterised 
as ‘hierarchical’ with some discursive alliance with the ‘individualist’ worldview, concerns 
emerging from an ‘egalitarian’ perspective, concerned with distributive issues, are dismissed 
as adequately addressed through regulation.271 In the theoretical language of the thesis this 
can be interpreted as a certain immunisation by the political system and its central organisa­
tional locus against the intrusion o f  more unspecific concerns that do not translate easily 
into manageable policy objectives — especially as the Government had already prior to the 
debate communicated a relatively strong pre-commitment in favour o f GM crops from 
which it felt reluctant to backtrack. Concessions could then only be made on the basis of 
new scientific insights (for which the political system had no responsibilities) not because 
the legitimacy of decision making was questioned (which is, exactly, the responsibility of 
the political system).
Apparently, however, concessions to the market operators were not considered far reach­
ing enough. One immediate response to the Government’s policy statement was the an­
nouncement by Bayer Crop Science — one of the biggest companies involved with GMOs 
in the UK — that it would move all research and development activities to the US because it 
found the climate in the UK too hostile, and support from the political system insufficient 
(reported in, amongst others, The Observer, September 28, 2003). Obviously other signifi­
cant effects from a procedure like GM Nation? take time to manifest themselves. There­
fore, what I will point out in the following are tendencies rather than definite changes. 
However, it does seem possible to argue that the GM Nation? debate had a significant ef­
fect on the policy discourses and reception in the public sphere of GMOs in the U K - 
perhaps more so than many actors expected at the outset. It did in fact create a significant 
resonance, although this cannot be said to be the product of any specific actors’ intention. I 
shall briefly pursue this subject according to the three communicative dimensions in the 
following.
In the social dimension it seems clear that the GM sceptics emerged stronger from die debate, 
whereas the protagonists lost some argumentative momentum. There was a subde shift in 
the power relations to the advantage o f the NGO community, ‘power* here being under­
stood as the ability to select and achieve attention to specific problem framings in the pol­
icy arena.
271 For instance, it is claimed th a t “Although some people may be uneasy about the role of multi-national 
companies in developing and promoting GM  crop technology, we believe the appropriate response is to en­
sure that the technology is effectively regulated to protect the public interest (DEFRA 2004a: 29).
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If the Government had seen GM Nation? as a contribution to solving both an information 
problem (what is at stake in public opinion?) and a decision problem (what is to be done?) 
it was only partly satisfied. Instead o f acquiring information about the public that could be 
fitted into existing schemes, it seems that it had to, to some extent, rearrange its knowledge 
— which likely did not make decision-making easier. The Government was put on the de­
fensive by public opinion, and the ‘hard’ scientific and economic arguments it had hoped to 
rely on turned out to be more fragile as communicative resources than expected when the 
two expert strands were initiated. However, despite the popular resistance to GM technol­
ogy, it was clear that the Government, because of international pressure and EU regulation 
(and its own commitments), could not choose a ban or indefinite postponement for rea­
sons of ‘public opinion*, even had it wanted to. Continued restrictions could only be de­
fended if risks to human health or the environment could be scientifically proven or at least 
shown to be probable. The outcomes of the Farm Scale Evaluations did in principle pro­
vide the Government with such an exit-strategy for at least some crops. However, the re­
sults were far from unanimous and the ‘opt-out* strategy was not pursued. In conclusion it 
seems that if the Government had hoped for conflict mitigation through ‘enlightenment’ 
via the educational aspects of the debate, this did not emerge.272
The industry representatives were by the end of the debate clearly engaging in an up-hill 
struggle. One indication of this is that they initially framed GM crops as a generally benign 
and useful technology, which did not differ significandy from other plant breeding tech­
niques. The industry was therefore content with the technology-induced approach underly­
ing the debate, as they believed they could convince, if not the entire populace, then at least 
the political system, that the benefits by far outweighed the potential risks without having 
to discuss alternative breeding and production regimes. However, towards the end of the 
debate a more problem-induced argumentation can be observed, whereby GM was pre­
sented as one possible option among a number of technologies which all had a place in 
modem farming. This indicates a shift in strategy from an attempt to achieve general accep­
tance o f the technology to ‘just* making sure that it would not be regulated so strictly as to 
be further stigmatised and therefore unfeasible for farmers.
Affiliated with the industry responses was a reaction from the scientific community (or 
parts o f it), who in an open letter to the Prime Minister complained of a mishandling of the 
public debate, as proper scientific argumentation had allegedly been marginalised by activ­
ists and the Government had failed to correct misconceptions and address public hostility 
to the detriment o f the economic and scientific well-being o f the country (e.g. The Guard­
ian, 1 November, 2003). They aigued that if unfounded public hostility was allowed to im­
272 Partly perhaps, as noticed in House of Commons (2003), through its own faults in insisting on a timeframe 
that did no t allow the evidence o f the two expert strands to flow into the public part o f the process.
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pede on the commercialisation o f plant science research the knowledge-base would dete­
riorate and scientists would leave the country.
The GM sceptic NGO community, on the other hand, who had initially showed little con­
fidence in the debate process, and mostly saw it as a PR exercise in favour of GM crops, 
emerged triumphant from the process and framed themselves and their cautious attitude as 
aligned with that of the broader public. This is seen in claims that the Government can ‘no 
longer’ ignore public concerns, and implicitly that now ‘the public’ is once again ‘virtual’ in 
the policy arena, then NGOs are representing them. Furthermore, the NGOs seemed to be 
able to do so without having to reflect upon whether they themselves had contributed to 
creating these public concerns. As such, it can be argued that the ‘learning incentives’ pro­
vided by the debate seemed bigger for the GM proponents than for the sceptics.273
In the temporal dimension it seems evident that the public hesitation slowed down any policy 
initiatives in the field aiming at an introduction of GM crops on a commercial basis in the 
UK. The sceptics’ temporal perspective — the postponement of any large scale releases until 
more knowledge and more rigorous regulatory frameworks are in place — seems to have 
won out so far over those who think that enough experience has been established to pro­
ceed to large scale growth under some type of regulatory surveillance.
There also seems to be a subtle shift o f the framings in the Government’s communication 
on the issues from the problem o f the public not being ready for GM technology to the 
technology not being mature enough for the needs and preferences of the British public. 
More abstractly it can be argued that the Government as an organisation works by making 
decisions and the moving on to other issues. This is not so for the NGOs, who need to 
constantly (re)problematise broadly similar issues (environment, consumer choice etc) to 
maintain their presence in the public sphere. The debate did not settle many issues and the 
GM topic remained on the public agenda.
If the substantive dimension is broadly understood as communication about when a technol­
ogy Svorks’, the outcome o f the debate was clearly that broader ethical and socio-economic 
issues, which were officially excluded from regulatory processes, gained more prominence 
in the policy arena, even if the Government attempted to tone them down in its response 
to the debate. The same goes for the recognition o f uncertainties related to both health and 
environmental effects of GM crops and food, which strengthened the demands for more 
knowledge. This, however, was perhaps more due to the outcomes of the scientific review 
and the economic analysis, which made it more difficult for proponents to argue that po­
tential problems would largely be outweighed by environmental and economic benefits.
The debate arguably exposed a mismatch between the expectations of the public as opera­
tionalised in GM Nation? and the regulatory principles and institutional framework sur­
273 Although one o f the consequences drawn — withdrawal from the UK by a major commercial operator 
arguably constitutes a perverse kind of learning.
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rounding biotechnology. This made it clear that the Government’s insistence on a purely 
science based approval procedure combined with the market regulation o f technological 
development did not command public confidence. As summarised by the GM sceptical 
NGO GeneWatch: “The lack o f public appetite for GM crops is clearly contributing, be­
hind the scenes, to delays in allowing growing to go ahead, but this is a rather underhand 
approach that helps no one. Rather than having any dialogue, where views are exchanged in 
an iterative fashion, the public has expressed concerns and the Government has told it that 
everything is OK. (Mayer 2004:17). In short; the assessment concludes that: “ ... the UK 
Government really can please nobody” (ibid: 18), as neither the sceptical public nor the 
GM protagonists are happy with the policies suggested in the area. O f course this consti­
tutes a very simplified description of the situation, but in my opinion it does convey the 
basic dilemma of the British government subsequent to the GM Nation? debate.
For comparative purposes I shall now summarise the most important characteristics o f the 
UK case in the table devised in Chapter IV and proceed to some final observations about 




T rust them atic: M ediation thematic:
Sodal Ail-inclusive procedures 
(open meetings) supported 
by non-inclusive ‘control- 
procedure’.
Agenda set by exclusive 
focus groups.
Outcomes from all- 
inclusive public process 
‘funneled’ into political 
communication by organis­
ers
Government ‘forced’ to pay 
attention to concerns o f  the 
public by advisory board, but 
insisted that articulation o f 
public concerns should not 
foreclose political decision­
making. Due to pre­
commitments the Govern­
ment sought to immunise 
itself to non-scientific con­
cerns and ‘ethical’ reserva­
tions towards the technology 




included in organising and 
reporting procedure.
Scientific panel ‘inclusive’ 
regarding perspectives on 
GM agriculture, but ‘public’ 
not arbiter o f knowledge 
claims
Temporal Procedure initiated prior to 
formulation o f  policy ex­
pected from past experience 
to prove controversial in 
order to mitigate contro­
versy ‘p respectively’
Government seeking to dis­
play attentiveness and com­
petence prior to policy for­
mulation, i.e.‘the public’ 
given early warning function 
regarding acceptability o f 
technologies and policies -  
clearly temporally separated 
from decision-making
Precaution strengthened 
through expansion of tech­
nical approval procedures, 
introduction o f  GM crops 
slowed down
Substantive Separation o f articulation o f 
public concerns from cogni­
tive and economic issues. 
(However, science panel 
exhibit some inclusionary 
traits unusual for the UK)
Policy decisions allegedly to 
be made on the basis o f  best 
available cognitive (factual) 
knowledge, not public sen­
timents, hence public confi­
dence is about the use o f  
scientific advice for policy 
making (e.g. independency 
o f  expertise)
Dominant cultural pattern:
In ‘GM Nation’ procedure: 
Substantive rationality privi­
leged, i.e. predominantly 
individualist cultural bias




assures die adequacies of 
approval procedures)
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The Problem o f Inclusion
In Chapter III I argued that a central theoretical trait of procedures of public involvement 
is that they seek to mitigate technological controversies by means o f inclusion, i.e. by ex­
panding the circle of persons and organisations involved in shaping policies, and thereby 
reconfiguring the decision-maker/affected interface. As the comparison of the cases will 
show, although the substance and social composition o f the controversies is largely similar 
across the cases, inclusionary mechanisms are organised in quite different manners and 
confronted with various challenges (compared to their self-prescribed aims), some of 
which are arguably common to them all, some of which are more specific. Hence, inclusion 
is in practice not an unambiguous or uncontested concept. Perhaps the British case ana­
lysed here brings out most clearly the challenges for such procedures in terms of selecting a 
mode of inclusion. This is, however, a general issue for such procedures and will be expanded 
upon in the comparative section.
Arguably, there were a number of challenges to die GM Nation? procedure’s ability to ac­
tively influence British policy on GM agriculture (discussed in the previous chapter as a 
question of achieving resonance). Some o f these were obviously linked to the external 
commitments o f the British government, notably through the EU regulatory framework. 
However, some were more domestic and had to do with the UK government’s willingness 
to actually modify its policies in light o f the concerns articulated or in systems theoretical 
terms with the political system’s observation of this particular mode of communication as 
relevant and pertinent for its own operations. Some of these challenges, I contend, can be 
reconstructed analytically as questions pertaining to what the systems theoretical observa­
tion suggested here labels the mode o f inclusion, but which can also be analysed as a ques­
tion of how such procedures seek to establish legitimacy for themselves by appearing to be 
‘representative* o f public concerns.
In this case a particular configuration o f the relationship between inclusion and exclusion 
of particular actors in various communicative contexts can be observed. On the one hand it 
was very important for the organisers that what they perceived as the hitherto dominant 
mode of policy formation was supplanted or supplemented by more inclusive considera­
tions, both social and thematic. In order to make sure that the process was also perceived 
in this manner by ‘the public’ they wanted to reach, they chose a format from which no 
one was excluded (open meetings). However, as such a procedure was likely to ‘only’ moti­
vate those feeling particularly strongly about the topic under scrutiny, the procedure would 
run the risk of not being seen as representative of the public or ‘ordinary people’ it was 
meant to lend a voice to (in particular by the political system, for which the outcome could 
be rather inconvenient due to its already communicated commitments). Therefore, it 
needed to be combined with a much more exclusionary parallel procedure of social re­
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search (focus groups) rather than public debate as normally understood. In effect, in order 
to secure the credibility of inclusion, procedures of exclusion were necessary.
Somewhat ironically, the procedure meant to enhance the democratic will formation via 
inclusion needed exclusionary measures to establish its credibility in the eyes of the political 
decision makers (i.e. ‘voluntary’ all-inclusion was not considered to be representative by 
itself). In addition, the process aimed at establishing and certifying cognitive knowledge to 
underpin decision making, which was based on a high degree of exclusivity (allegedly only 
top qualified scientists were admitted), needed to make use o f inclusionary measures to es­
tablish its own reliability in the eyes o f the wider society. This observation does lend some 
credibility to arguments pointing out that the social robustness of knowledge tends to take 
on greater importance in technological controversies. In this case there were particular de­
mands on the social configuration o f knowledge production for the knowledge to be con­
sidered socially robust, i.e. credible beyond the scientific community and thereby useful for 
policy makers. I contend that these issues concerning the effects of particular configura­
tions of inclusion and exclusion — which can arguably be understood as a more general 
formulation of the problem of representativity — warrant particular attention when analys­
ing the emergence and effects of participatory procedures as a specific mode of managing 
technological controversies. Therefore, this issue will be taken up again in the comparative 
section. As the British case shows, the problem of inclusion concerns issues of the ‘repre­
sentativity’ of the communication produced in the procedures (i.e. what the social composi­
tion of the participants should be) as well as issues of competence (i.e. what knowledge 
claims are to be included and how these ought to be balanced against each other). This 
second point regarding the confrontation of different knowledge claims will be particularly 




The Problem of Mediation -  The German Case
In Germany as in other West-European countries the development and introduction o f 
various applications of biotechnology has generated and released a significant societal con­
flict potential.274 The issuing controversies have unfolded in different social and thematic 
dimensions, and a semantic of participation and deliberation has also played a significant 
role in the attempts to establish a broadly accepted social management of the technology in 
the German context
In some ways the German experience is similar to that of other European countries, in­
cluding Denmark and the UK, as the same technical innovations were appropriated and 
many of the same themes have been played out in the public sphere. In other respects, 
however, it exhibits specific traits originating in the German political culture and institu­
tional arrangements. Arguably, just as in the other cases, there is also a certain path- 
dependency to the treatment o f the thematic by the German public, which means that 
‘public’ communication on the topic in the present and immediate past can only be ren­
dered comprehensible against the background of a more extended temporal perspective — 
including previous experiences with participatory and deliberative mechanisms. I shall at­
tempt to outline the most important aspects of this development in the present chapter, 
and I will look closely at one specific initiative which falls among the kinds of communica­
tive processes explored in this thesis.
The central interest will be a discursive and participatory procedure initiated by the Ministry 
for Consumer Protection, Nutrition and Agriculture (Bundesministerium fur Verbrauch­
erschutz, Ernährung und Landwirtschaft, henceforth BMVEL) in 2001 which took place 
between April and July 2002. This procedure involved 30 organisations from various sec­
tors of society, which were all in one way or another involved in or affected by the devel­
opment, application and discussion of modem biotechnology in agriculture or food pro­
duction. This particular procedure has been chosen both because it is the latest in a number 
of processes and procedures aimed at mediating between different perspectives in the so­
cial management o f biotechnology in Germany, and because it represents another way o f 
establishing specialised communicative procedures for addressing technological controver­
sies in the mode analysed within die framework of this thesis. As such, an analysis of this
274 In the following ‘Germany' will be taken to mean West Germany for events taking place be fare the reuni­
fication in 1991. This focus on West Germany is unavoidable for two reasons. Firstly, there was to my 
knowledge very little recombinant DNA research undertaken in the GDR, it was not a ‘public* issue and w ry  
little social scientific research on the social management o f biotechnology in the former East Germany exists 
on which enquiries could be based. Secondly, all regulation of biotechnology after reunification has been 
based on the West German regulatory framework and discussion, which has since the early 1990s been 
closely tied to EU regulation.
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procedure will hopefully contribute to the general aim o f  the thesis, namely to understand 
in more detail the ways in which public controversies over biotechnology are carried out at 
the societal level by the differentiation o f specialised communicative contexts and seman­
tics o f participation. The procedure, dubbed Diskurs Griine Gentechnik (discourse on green 
biotechnology, henceforth DGG), did not entail the active participation of lay members of 
‘the public’ as observed in the two previous cases. However, it still represents an alternative 
to traditional technology policy-making, in which ‘the public’ and publicity constitutes a 
specific mode of observation and induces a particular kind of social dynamic. As will be 
discussed throughout the chapter, the particular shape o f  the event is characteristic of, on 
the one hand, German political culture in general, and, on the other, the way the controver­
sies about biotechnology have evolved in Germany. Through comparison with the other 
cases it will hopefully contribute to generating knowledge on such procedures more gener­
ally. As it is approximately contemporary to the other cases, it can be considered compara­
ble in terms of die substantial issues addressed, and can therefore be seen as an organisa­
tionally different response to the ‘same* social challenges from a new technology.
As argued above, the discursive procedure initiated and sponsored by the BMVEL did not 
take place in a topical or social vacuum. Hence, as in the other cases, partly in order to un­
derstand the context of the procedure to be investigated, and partly in order to allow a 
more extensive comparison with the other cases, the regulatory and political history of the 
event will be traced in broad terms. This will be tackled in two parts. First, I shall character­
ise in general terms the biotechnology debate and regulatory developments in Germany. 
Second, some pages will be devoted to previous PTA procedures in the biotechnological 
domain. Although it will be aigued that these in fact had little impact on the regulation of 
biotechnology in Germany for various reasons, they are interesting in the present context 
as they arguably provided important experiences that flowed into the shaping of the proce­
dure o f interest here. These procedures have been thoroughly described and analysed in the 
social scientific literature and have therefore not been made the object of independent re­
search here. They will, however, serve as a contrast to the procedure to be traced in more 
detail, as they are telling about the challenges to mediation in technological controversies. 
Building on the description of the DGG, another section will focus on some more analyti­
cal perspectives on the discursive frames operating in the procedure and their conse­
quences for the dynamic o f the German biotechnology policy arena. This analysis will fa­
cilitate a characterisation o f the procedure according to the scheme for comparing the cases 
developed in Chapter IV. One issue, which is particularly pronounced in this case, is what I 
shall call the problem of mediation between diverging framings of the technologies in question 
in cognitive as well as normative respects. The problem of mediation will therefore be in­
troduced with in this case, and subsequently be unfolded in relation to the other cases as 
well in a final chapter.
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The Emergence and Shaping o f Biotechnology as a Regulatory 
Issue in Germany
The German political context can in general be labelled neocorporatist (Hampel et al. 1998:
63) . Since the restructuring in the wake o f the Second World War a political culture devel­
oped with an aversion to plebiscitary forms of politics, an extensive sectorial self-regulation 
and a strong role for interest organisations in policy making. For a relatively long time the 
regulation of biotechnological research in Germany remained exclusively in the hands o f 
the relevant professional communities. Only the organisations o f the scientific system re­
sponded to the initial whistle blowing incident within the scientific community at the very 
beginning of research on recombinant DNA. After the second Asilomar conference, where 
guidelines for genetic research were formulated and adapted into regulation by the US Na­
tional Institutes of Health, the Deutsche Fonchungsgemeinschaft (German Research Society) 
proposed that similar guidelines be issued for recombinant DNA research in Germany. 
Following this request from the scientific community the Bundesministeriumfur Forschung und 
Technologies the BMFT (Federal Ministry for Research and Technology) issued guidelines in 
1978, which were by and large an adaptation of the NIH guidelines, and also established a 
Zentrale Kommission fu r Biokgische Sicherheits ZKBS (Central Commission for Biological Safety) 
(Hasse and Gill 1994). Attempts at the time to legislate in the area failed due to strong op­
position from the scientific community. Instead, extensive self-regulation by the molecular 
biological scientific community, to which the public had virtually no access, was established 
(ibid: 258). The purposes of this early regulation were twofold, namely to prevent accidents 
from experiments with biological processes and to buffer the research from public scepti­
cism (ibid.).275
Initially, the fulfilment of both aims was apparently achieved. This can partly be attributed 
to the relatively low interest of the German chemical industry in these new technologies. 
For quite some time most o f the research on recombinant DNA undertaken in Germany 
was conducted within public research institutions and on a small scale (Hampel et al 1998:
64) . In fact, it has been argued that the main impulses for the promotion of biotechnologi­
cal research came from the BMFT, i.e. that the state was the most active promoter of re­
search and development in the field, whereas German industry was rather hesitant to take 
on these new technologies. Therefore, regulatory intervention from the state took the form 
of support rather than restriction (ibid, Gottweis 1998: 129pp). However, in the early and 
mid 1980s environmental organisations and other NGOs developed a more active interest
275 Here the virulent controversies over nuclear power in Germany played a significant role in at least two 
respects. The scientific community was made aware of the importance of public perceptions and was con­
cerned about the difficulties of communicating highly technical topics to a broader audience. At the same 
time ongoing activity in the nuclear power debates and other environmental issues consumed most of the 
mobilisation potential in the social environments from which the social movements recruited their activists, 
which initially meant less attention was devoted to  concerns about biotechnology.
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in these new technologies. This contributed to the placing o f  biotechnology on the public 
agenda not only as a promising technology of the future» but also as a potential generator 
of ecological, social and ethical risks (Gottweis 1998: Chap 5, Hampel et al 1998).276
It was against this background of rapidly growing expectations in the scientific and techno­
logical potential of the new biotechnologies among organisations in science, government 
and industry as well as parts of the public, and growing concerns in other parts o f society 
ecological risks, socio-economic effects and the transgression o f ethical borders, that the 
issues were taken up in a broader manner by the political system.
The thematic expansion of political interest in biotechnology from something to be (un­
critically) promoted to something that required more extensive political guidance was 
sparked by the arrival of the Green Party, which had developed out of the environmental 
movement, in the German political system. More specifically, this happened in a large-scale 
parliamentarian technology assessment exercise running from 1984 to 1986, initiated by Die 
Griinen (with the hope of banning m ost applications) in agreement with the Social Democ­
rats (who were more focused on weighing risks and benefits). This hnquete Konmission was 
half made o f parliamentarians in proportion to party representation, and half by various 
experts in the natural, social and legal sciences as well as philosophers and theologians,277
The work of the Commission (called Chancen und Risiken der Gentechnologie, altogether some 
400 dense pages) entailed a substantial overview and discussion of the state of scientific 
knowledge at the time as well as considerations of potential future applications o f the vari­
ous branches o f the research (Bundestag 1987). It entailed detailed discussions o f potential 
sensitive ethical issues, in particular in the human domain, as well as legal implications and 
requirements. Furthermore, it produced a long list o f recommendations for the Parliament 
in regard to research, technology and regulatory policies in a number of domains, as well as 
assessments of the possibilities of dealing with the various challenges and controversies 
through legislative and legal means. Most of these recommendations were shared by the 
entire commission except for the representative o f Die Griinen. As the Greens realised that 
they would not be able to present their point of view with the force desired in the work of 
the commission, they changed strategy and started using the work as a platform for public 
mobilisation against gene technology (Hampel et. aí. 1998: 65). In this process the political
276 In the German context prospective applications in the human domain proved especially controversial and 
gave rise relatively early to more fundamental discussions in an ethical m ode about why and how the dignity 
o f the human must be protected in light o f  the plethora o f  potential applications of biotechnology. This is 
often ascribed to the historical heritage o f  Germany, which allegedly makes biotechnology particularly vulner­
able to a discursive linkage with (national socialist) eugenics (see for instance Gill 1996:176).
277 The Unquete Kommtssion format is a particular working form o f  the German Parliament whereby important 
and complex issues (bedeutsame Sachkomplexe) can be explored by parliamentarians with the assistance o f ex­
perts, and suggestions to the Parliament can be made. The format serves as a ‘minority right’ to raise issues in 
the Parliament as only a fourth o f  the representatives must be in favour to initiate a commission (Reister 
1997:61).
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frontlines, which would characterise much of German biotechnology politics and policy in 
the years to come were defined. This can be described as a confrontation between a ‘main­
stream* or ‘hegemonic* discourse emphasising the potential for innovation and growth and 
a ‘counter’ discourse emphasising uncertainty, the difficulties o f risk management and the 
potential adverse social and cultural implications of the technologies (Gottweiss 1998). The 
then governing Christian Democrats were the most positive towards the applications o f the 
new biotechnologies and focused on the potentials for innovation, emphasising that no 
inhibitions should be placed on the growth and competitive edge o f German industry. The 
Social Democrats in opposition were likewise concerned about economic growth and the 
safeguarding of jobs. However, they took a more risk averse approach to environmental 
and consumer protection than the Christian Democrats, and envisioned a more substantial 
role for state intervention in either furthering or delimiting certain technological trajectories 
according to politically negotiated perceptions of societal needs and benefits.278 The Green 
Party decided to take an individual point of view and was given a separate chapter, in which 
many of the assumptions and recommendations in the report were critically discussed, 
concluding that gene-technology basically ought to be rejected as a viable path o f social 
development. It can be argued that this rather polarised approach has remained a defining 
feature of the German biotechnology debate ever since.279 280
The commission's report was a defining technology assessment in the German context in 
the sense that it set both the political agenda for debates about biotechnology in the fol­
lowing years and its recommendations formed the basis of the first German law on gene 
technology, which was issued a few years later.
It has been noted that a significant discursive effect of the work of the Etiquete Kommission 
was that a substantial differentiation was established in the political communication be­
tween the different applications of recombinant DNA knowledge, research and application 
that had to that point existed as a unitary subject. This meant that in several domains risk 
averse ‘decision blockades’ with reference to undefined or hypothetical risks were no 
longer a viable political option (Gloede 1997: 104,118). In this sense the commission both 
drew some central lines of political confrontation, which remained controversial, but also 
paved the way for a step-by-step introduction of the technology into society through the 
political acceptance of a ‘Soyaladaquan^ des Restmikos’2*0 and where adequate regulation was
278 Although the specific recommendations o f the report are carried by the entire commission except for the 
representative of Die Grünen, a minor section is devoted to the expression o f particular viewpoints on the 
preferable role o f state regulation, especially in the formulation o f research policies (Bundestag 1987).
279 One observer described the German debate as characterised by a strong ‘Freund/Feind trait (Interview, 
Gill), a description that was more or less present in several o f the interviews. See also Gill 1996: 175, where it 
is argued that “The opposed sides in Germany are fighting to win, not to compromise”.
280 Literally ‘Social adequacy of risk residues’, i.e. that risks that cannot be adequately legally regulated either 
due to knowledge deficits or a lack o f  suitable risk management methods, but which are considered to be
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put in place. This broad mode of assessment qualifies the German approach as ‘program­
matic' (see Chapter I)
Although the Enquete Kommission finished its work by late 1986 no legislative initiatives were 
taken immediately in regard to deliberate releases o f GMOs, again due to opposition 
among the scientific community and to some extent industry. It was not until the political 
system was in 1989 ‘forced’ to take action as signals from the legal system indicated that the 
area was insufficiently programmed, that legislative work gained momentum and the scien­
tific community and industry accepted that a legislative framework was urgently needed 
(Gottweis 1998: 280-88).
This realisation occurred in November 1989 when the administrative court in Hessen, fol­
lowing a complaint from a citizens’ initiative, mied that a construction permit granted to 
the company Hoechst to build a production facility for genetically engineered insulin could 
neither be given nor denied on the basis of existing environmental legislation. The court 
mied that given the cognitive uncertainties and social controversy surrounding such tech­
nologies, a clear signal from the legislator was required. Following this, the first German 
laws on genetic engineering (Gentechnik Gesetz, henceforth GenTG) was rapidly prepared 
and passed entering into force in July 1990.
The law had a dual purpose: 1) to protect humans, animals and the environment from risks 
and 2) to create a legal framework within which gene technology could be applied and 
promoted. As such, the law was an attempt to both appease the sceptics and ‘make the 
technology happen’. However, neither sceptics nor advocates were particularly happy with 
the law. The sceptics were unhappy because it allowed and supported a technological de­
velopment they held should be fundamentally rejected, the advocates because they consid­
ered the regulation to be too restrictive.
O f particular interest in this context is the fact that the law prescribed that permissions for 
deliberate releases of GMOs should be preceded by public hearings {Ervrterungstermine), 
where objections were to be discussed orally among applicants, objectors and responsible 
authorities. In the initial period of legal regulation, which can be described as program­
matic, this provided an important avenue for the manifestation of public discontent and 
concerns (Bora 1998,1999).
In the following general elections Die Grünen lost all seats in the Parliament and the GM 
sceptics lost an important political platform. At the same time the proponents criticised the 
GenTG for being hostile to innovation. This was a forceful argument in the wake o f Ger­
man reunification and the revision o f the law in 1993 was driven almost exclusively by de- 
regulatory intentions, and was perceived by the promoters as a step towards the ‘normalisa­
tion’ of the technology.
negligible, are accepted by society because the benefits from the applications o f the given technology are con­
sidered to outweigh remaining risks.
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The revision included the abolition o f public hearings, which in the meantime had proven 
to be platforms of resistance to the technology and did not fulfil their intended purposes. 
The hearing rights were turned into written procedures, which were considered to be a sig­
nificant reduction of the participatory element in regulation (Bora 1994).
The passing and revision of the GenTG aimed to balance the political intention to further 
the development and application of biotechnology in Germany and the widespread hesita­
tion and concern amongst the public, expressed primarily by environmental organisations 
and through survey research. However, neither the public hesitation nor the organised re­
sistance engaged in attempts to (re-)politicise the question o f whether Germany should ac­
cept genetic engineering ceased (Gottweis 1998, Gill 1996, Hampel et al 1998,2002). Al­
though a certain ‘softening’ of the fronts allegedly took place in the mid 1990s (Barben 
1997), most issues remained fundamentally contested and were re-invigorated as commer­
cialisation was approaching.
To summarise the observations so fan as concerns over recombinant DNA research first 
emerged, the affected German scientific communities initially attempted — and largely suc­
ceeded in -  retaining control over the regulation o f their activities. However, as the request 
to the political system for more resources to stay competitive coincided with the growing 
political influence of the environmental movement through Die Gruneny this situation 
changed significandy. Significant involvement in the assessment of the emerging technolo­
gies by the political system led to heightened public attention, a comparatively strict 
(though not prohibitive) regulation and a comparatively highly polarised climate in the po­
litical system as well as in the wider German public.281 It was in this context that various 
organisations launched initiatives to engage with different aspects of biotechnology in par­
ticipatory and deliberative modes. Some of these, I contend, provided experiences, which 
made up the background for the DGG procedure to be analysed here. Therefore, I shall 
devote some attention to them.
Organised Participatory Assessm ents of Biotechnology in 
Germany
One more or less direct effect of the Enquete Commission % work was the realisation by the 
parliamentary system of the need for a greater capacity to process technology assessment 
issues. The establishment o f a TA institution modelled on the American example of the 
OTA had been discussed for a long time in the German political system without any con­
clusion, primarily because the conservative CDU/CSU coalition feared that this would 
curb innovation and thereby inhibit Germany’s competitive capacity. However, the experi­
ences with the commission on biotechnology allegedly turned opinion around (Simonis
281 It should also be that the legal system — the courts -  seem to have played a greater role in shaping regula­
tion than in the other cases examined.
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2001: 441» Ropohl 1996:176-80). This led to the establishment in 1990 of the Biiro fiirTech- 
nikfolgen-Abschàt̂ tmg bêm Deutschen Bundestag (TAB). The organisation reports to the Parlia­
ment’s standing committee on science and technology, and since its birth biotechnology' 
and the acceptance of technology' had been one o f its central areas of work. The TAB pri­
marily undertakes ‘traditional’, expert based technology assessments, forecasts and moni­
toring tasks.282 As such, it primarily serves as one among many channels through which the 
political system attempts to keep itself cognitively equipped to register and respond to 
technological issues. Although discourses on and methods for public participation and dis­
cursive procedures have been present in the German TA community for quite some time 
(significantly influenced by the reception o f Habermasian ideas about communicative ra­
tionality, see Renn et al. 1995, Kôrbele et al. 1997), the German political system has been 
quite hesitant in using these ideas on a more practical level.283 To the extent that the TAB 
has worked with participatory methods this has not involved members of the lay public as 
such, but has been shaped as stakeholder participation.
As a political compromise to appease Die Griinen after GenTG entered into force thus 
permitting some (restricted) research on and application o f GMOs, one of the first tasks of 
the TAB was to undertake a technology assessment process on ‘biological safety’. Here a 
participatory approach involving a number o f stakeholders was chosen by the TAB. How­
ever, briefly after the decision to undertake the TA project, the Green Party lost the elec­
tion and was no longer represented in the Parliament. Therefore, the political addressee of 
the project disappeared, and as the majority o f the political system was sympathetic to the 
request from science and industry to have the regulatory burden on GM research and ap­
plication lightened, the thematic of ‘biological safety’ appeared as inadequate for a ‘sym- 
metrical’ discourse between two opposite stakeholder viewpoints (Gloede 1997:107-8).
The fundamental question at the centre o f the discursive process, that is whether risks from 
GMOs should be considered in an ‘additive’ or ‘synergistic’ perspective was no longer po­
litically relevant as the ‘go ahead’ had already been given for biotechnological development. 
Hence, according to the organisers, the participants did not really engage in argumentative 
confrontations, but primarily in strategic and positional communication (ibid). The effect 
was that the project had virtually no effect on political communication (ibid: 110).284
282 An employee at the office told me that there is a certain interest among the employees in public participa­
tion methods, but such methods receive a somewhat mixed reception by the parliamentary committee in 
charge o f  the office’s work. The office has published some methodological considerations on (public) partici­
patory and discursive procedures as TA tools, bu t have not applied such methods to any significant extent.
283 A hesitation which has been ascribed to both  a constitutional prohibition as well as a rather deep-seated 
reservation against plebiscitarían forms of politics.
284 This was further underlined by the fact that the project was ended in August 1993, which practically speak­
ing did not allow any effect on the revision o f  GenTG, which was proposed in May and passed in November 
1993.
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Whether this unsuccessful participatory technology assessment project is to blame or not 
has not been investigated, but since this incident the TAB has not (as far as I have been 
able to establish) applied participatory or discursive procedures in its assessments on bio­
technolog)7, seeing itself instead as a provider of (politically relevant) expertise. However, 
other such attempts have been undertaken by organisations further removed from the po­
litical system.
Probably the most significant and ambitious event in the German technology assessment 
of plant biotechnology before the D GG was a discursive and participatory technology as­
sessment experiment on herbicide resistant crops carried out at the Wissenschaft Centrum Ber- 
Un fur Soyafors chung (WZB) in the period from February 1991 to June 1993. This discursive 
procedure is interesting for the present purpose for two reasons. Firstly because it can itself 
be considered as a significant example o f the kind of procedures being investigated here, 
namely an attempt to manage technological controversies through inclusion and argumen­
tation in specialised organisational forums at the interface between several functional sys­
tems. As such, it has been the object o f significant interest in the research literature.285 Sec­
ondly, because it constitutes an experience of discursive technology assessment in Ger­
many, which, I contend, forms part o f a social learning process feeding into the procedure 
to be traced in more detail in the following.286
The WZB project was deliberately formulated as an ‘experiment’ with accompanying socio­
logical research and evaluation, whose aim was to investigate to what extent conflicts over a 
controversial technology could be resolved through a discursive process with two central 
characteristics, namely that it should be based on scientific argumentation (exchange of 
cognitive knowledge claims rather than political campaigning) and that the process should 
be controlled by the participants themselves, i.e. there should be no third party present to 
make decisions on the quality or relevance of the outputs (van den Daele 1996).
With a conscious and explicit Habermasian inspiration, the procedure was designed to in­
vestigate if, under what circumstances and to what extent technological controversies, 
which in the mass mediated public sphere usually consisted o f the announcement o f stand­
points and symbolic issue framings, could be mitigated through discursive rules and the 
‘coercion’ to proceed argumentatively. The project was, in other words, framed as a real- 
world test of the force of the ‘better argument’.
285 The project has inspired a significant amount of social scientific analysis o f  various aspects o f  the proce­
dure by researchers involved in the organisation o f the project (Bora and van den Daele 1997, van den Daele 
2001, van den Daele and Neidhardt 1996, van den Daele et al. 1997) as well as a number o f external observa­
tions and criticisms (Gill 1996, Gloede 1997, Skoiupinski and O tt 2000, Gloede and Hennen 2002).
286 One indication o f  this influence is that in the Trocess Report’ from the moderator o f  the Diskurs Grüner 
GtnUchnik the WZB experiment is mentioned as a predecessor and a comparison is undertaken between the 
two processes (Hammerbacher2003).
257
For this purpose representatives with scientific competence from public research institu­
tions, industry, environmental organisations and regulatory officials were invited to partici­
pate. Both industry representatives and environmental organisations were rather ambivalent 
about participation but in the end agreed. Altogether approximately 60 persons participated 
over the 2Vz years the procedure lasted.
Even if this procedure was organised as a technology assessment experiment and had no 
direct link to either political or regulatory decision-making, the organisers were well aware 
that it entailed significant ‘discursive risks’ for some o f the participants (van den Daele et al. 
1997: 2). However, it was not easy publicly to justify non-participation, which could be 
taken as an indication of the inability to support a position with aiguments. In order to 
protect participants against such discursive risks the fact that the procedure was ‘process- 
oriented’ rather than ‘result-oriented’ was emphasised (ibid: 9). It was not clear beforehand 
what conclusions were to be reached or whether they could be reached (consensually) at 
all.287
The procedure was explicitly technology induced. A particular application of genetic modi­
fication was to be assessed (herbicide restistance), it was not a process to identify and com­
pare alternative agricultural technologies. This was criticised by the gene technology scep­
tics in the process, but was considered as an issued pre-determined by the research funding 
application and the organisers insisted that this feature could not be changed by the par­
ticipants (ibid.).
The technology induced approach had the effect that the main focus of the procedure was 
on the potential risks of introducing herbicide resistant crops into German agriculture, nei­
ther on the potential benefits arising from such an introduction and possible alternative 
technologies (van den Daele et. al. 1997: 5-6). The procedure was organised with a primary 
focus on the cognitive dimensions o f risks, i.e. establishing adequate models for assessing 
them and providing empirical evidence for what physical risks existed, how likely they were 
to occur etc. This proceeded from the assumption; “Before we ask whether a risk is accept­
able we have to ask whether the risk exists” (ibid: 9). As such, the organisers and modera­
tors attempted, in the first instance, to screen off the discursive procedures from political, 
economic or ethical arguments and focus on cognitive dimensions, in short to differentiate 
the appraisal o f facts about the physical characteristics of plant manipulation from the con­
frontation of values. The procedure can hence be interpreted as an attempt to funnel a 
broad social controversy into a more narrow substantive dimension and solve at least as­
pects of it using argumentative means. Arguably, however, in reality this meant that issues
287 In order for such a process to work all steps were in principle to be taken consensually by the participants. 
This o f  course provides some logistic problems for a group o f  60 people, and a certain moderator and steer­
ing function had to be established. But according to the organisers, all major decisions o f  both procedural and 
substantial character were supported or at least silently accepted by all participants until the near end o f the 
procedure (Bora and van den Daele 1997: 126-27).
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of risk acted as a proxy for the fundamentally different evaluations of the need and desir­
ability of GM technology (cf. Chapter I).
This approach was by no means uncontroversial among the participants, who clearly had 
‘procedure-external’ interests in what results the procedure would produces as well as dif­
fering ideological commitments. Although the controversies about biotechnology are not 
only of a cognitive nature (regarding the existence and magnitude of risks), cognitive as­
pects certainly constitute an important argumentative resource in the public sphere. The 
environmental organisations in particular were sceptical of a process where scientific argu­
mentation would be the central mode of communication, which for other participants was 
as sine qua non condition for participation. However, as procedural fairness — including a 
undistorted access to resources -  was acknowledged as a central prerequisite of a successful 
discursive procedure, they were provided with means to commission scientific reports from 
experts believed to be sympathetic to their viewpoints.
The discursive procedure then proceeded on the basis of arguments and counter arguments 
on the existence and significance of various risks as the central themes. When a certain 
string of arguments was exhausted, the matter was considered as settled by the moderators 
if no objections were raised, which were supported by arguments. A central bone of con­
tention in this process was whether GMOs carried risks that were peculiar to transgenetic 
organisms, or whether the risks they could entail were of the same ‘nature’ as those arising 
from conventional breeding techniques. In effect this can be seen as a ‘scientification’ of 
some of the differences in worldviews that, as I argued in Chapter III, are at the root o f 
many of the controversies observable in the European publics.
In the course o f the procedure there was allegedly a tendency towards sceptics running out 
of arguments and evidence o f why the herbicide tolerant GMO techniques should entail 
particular risks or risks of a different magnitude, which would require that they were either 
banned or need particularly strict regulatory approval and oversight.
At the end of the procedure, before the final conference where results were to be summa­
rised and made public, the environmental groups decided to leave the procedure (ibid: 16). 
They allegedly did so on the grounds that the process was taking up too many resources, 
that the participants from industry had undermined the purpose o f the process by applying 
for research releases during the process, that they were flooded with documents and that 
the WZB working group had been biased in a pro-GM direction. In the assessments o f the 
organisers the decision of the environmental organisations had more to do with the fact 
that the discursive procedure was about to undermine a significant argumentative resource 
of their campaign, namely that genetic engineering entails ‘special risks' of a qualitatively 
different nature from traditional plant breeding and that the knowledge-base was insuffi­
cient to make reliable estimates concerning ecological effects arising from large scale delib­
erate releases. The environmental groups had not been able to substantiate this assumption
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in the discursive procedure and therefore felt uneasy about backing the result of the tech­
nology assessment.
As no consensual result was achieved (for whatever reasons), the discursive procedure 
could not be considered a success.288 However, it must nonetheless be considered a central 
PTA exercise in the German context due to the attention it received from TA practitioners 
and the academic community.
Although the WZB procedure was criticised for being overtly expert based and reductionis- 
tic in its focus on specific, identifiable physical risks, and thereby effectively de-legitimised 
concerns based on other reasoning, it did seem to dampen the enthusiasm for participatory 
procedures in the biotechnology domain in Germany — at a time where such ideas were 
arguably gaining momentum elsewhere in Europe. GM sceptics were particularly hesitant 
to be tied into such procedures if they were to ‘fight’ organised, mainstream science on its 
own turf. Instead they sought other avenues to further their viewpoints.
The procedure was initiated and carried out primarily as a ‘social experiment’, without any 
specific political or regulatory aim beyond the cognitive and social learning processes insti­
gated in the participants. Therefore, the impacts were, perhaps due to the failure to pro­
duce a consensual output, which could have legitimated new political initiatives, rather lim­
ited. As such, the procedure remained a communicative event, which, although in principle 
centra! to the social controversy about gene technology, created relatively little resonance 
and has remained invisible outside the specialised sub-publics o f bio technologist and (P)TA 
practitioners, where disagreement still exists in regard to whether the procedure should be 
interpreted as a misguided attempt to ‘scientificate’ a technological controversy with a 
much wider scope or a demonstration that argumentative agreement is unlikely to be 
reached on such issues.
Although the legal codification o f biotechnology regulation in Germany is located at the 
federal level, a significant amount o f factors, which are decisive for its application are situ­
ated at the Lander level. Therefore, there have also been attempts to undertake technology 
assessments and mediate controversies over biotechnology at the regional level. One insti­
tution and its work on technological controversies deserves special attention in this con­
text. This is the Academy of Technology Assessment in Baden-Württemberg. The academy 
was considered as one of the main organisational loci of the technology assessment com­
munity in Germany (until it was shut down in 2003). The academy has worked quite exten­
288 Allegedly, this did not surprise the organisers who note that: ,{Proceduralfairness is the essence of participator 
technology assessment. I f  tins principle is violated then withdrawalfrom the procedure can he expected and is legitimate. However, 
one cannot legitimately nithdrawfrom afair procedure simply because the emerging results contradict ones own strategic interests. 
Nevertheless, in terms o f “ReatpoMk " mtbdrawal must be expected in such a case, too. I t must also be expected that arguments 
refuted in a participatory technolog assessment will nevertheless continue to be used outside and after the technology assessment; as 
long as these can still impress the public, "(van den Daele et.al. 1997: 19).
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sively with participatory and discursive procedures in conflict mediation in various techno­
logical domains, in particular pertaining to local planning and the location of waste incin­
erators, chemical industry plants and the like. It was an integral part of the Academy’s 
working philosophy that the active involvement of all persons affected (Betroffene) is increas­
ingly necessary to maintain the acceptance and legitimacy of technological decision-making.
As part of a larger TA project commissioned by the local government in Baden- 
Württemberg in order to assess the potential for the growth o f a biotechnological sector in 
the Land, the TA Academy undertook a Citizens’ Assessment (Bürgergutachten). The 
background was not only a political wish to know what potentials the technology held for 
the regional economy, but also an acknowledgement that:
“Gleich^etiig besteht in derGeselischaft deridi kàn Konsens darüber, auftveicben Gebieten und in wel- 
chem Umfang gentechnische Verfahnn eingeset̂ t tverden soli Die unterschiedlicben Argumente und Hal- 
¿ungen müssen in geeigneter Weise in Verfahnn des geselischaftlichen Disburse aufgegriffen tverden 
(Grabe and von Schell 1995:1).
The aim was hence to investigate not only what the growth and innovation potential for 
various biotechnologies in the Land was, but also “tveiche spetgfischen Antvendungen von gesell- 
schaftiichen Gruppierung b%»>. den Bürgem des Landes getviinscht order abgelehnt tverden oderttie die 
Rabmenbedingungen von Amvendung aus der Sicht der Bürger ausgestalten tverden soUten (Garbe and 
von Schell 1995: II).
The part of the TA project involving ‘the public’ consisted o f two elements. One was a se­
ries o f Werkstattgesprdche (Svorkshop dialogues’) involving various organised stakeholders, 
the other was an attempt to ‘involve (einzubinden) non-organised citizens in the societal 
discourse’ (ibid.). The public involvement in this project was based on a methodology 
called ‘planning cells’, developed in Germany since the 1970s, primarily to be applied in 
local planning contexts.289
In this case 194 randomly sampled citizens from three locations in Baden-Württemberg 
participated in groups of around 25, who heard various expert presentations and debated 
for a total of four working days. The scientific experts were deliberately selected ‘in pairs’ 
to represent ‘conventional’ and ‘critical’ perspectives respectively (ibid: 29). This indicates a 
perception that the recognition of both cognitive and normative uncertainty surrounding a 
number of aspects of biotechnology must be dealt with in the social dimension by present­
ing the assessors, the lay citizens, with diverging perspectives.
The moderators encouraged the participants to make several individual and collective as­
sessments of various issues surrounding the use of biotechnology in agriculture and food 
production, including the social management of risk and uncertainty, regulatory issues,
289 The procedure shows significant similarities with the Danish consensus conference model described ear­
lier, where the central element is the confrontation o f expert knowledge and lay people’s value judgements 
(Abels and Bora 2004).
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economic importance and potential ethical problems pertaining to the application of bio­
technology (ibid: 1).
The biirgergutachten did not produce a single consensual statement, nor did the individual 
groups. However, the report from the TA Academy included a number o f statements of 
opinion from the participants, which were dominantly sceptical towards the application of 
biotechnology in agriculture and food production.
The results o f the entire TA project were delivered and presented orally to the state legisla­
ture in Baden-Württemberg. According to a later assessment, however, the burgergutachten 
had virtually no effect on the subsequent formulation of a biotechnology policy for Baden- 
Württemberg. This has sparked some criticism that the involvement of lay citizens is pri­
marily “a symbolic appendix attached to the exploration of economic opportunities” 
(Gloede & Hennen, n.d.), and that the forum, despite the intentions of the TA Academy, 
primarily functioned as a processor o f lay attitudes towards biotechnology as an ‘accep­
tance problem*. The fact that, just as in the Danish case, the results indicated that ‘ordinary 
citizens’, when given the opportunity, are able to make informed and reasoned assess­
ments, is something registered in the social scientific community already sympathetic to the 
idea — and not in the political system or elsewhere.290 The public participatory branch of the 
technology assessment project seemed to have emerged from an interest in such proce­
dures by the TA Academy rather than in the political system. Once suggested, however, it 
was probably not easy for the political organisation commissioning the TA project to de­
cline, but neither did it entail any commitment for it to respond or commit to the results. It 
seems that in this case the kind of knowledge communicated at the end of the process 
found little resonance outside the TA community.
In an abstract perspective the three procedures briefly reviewed here can all be seen as ex­
amples of what this thesis has set out to explore, namely the development of certain organ­
isational forums whereby modem societies, in this case Germany, have attempted to con­
front and manage some of the social challenges posed by the introduction of a technology 
which is observed from different positions in society in divergent manners in regard to its 
desirability and potential risks.
Arguably, the procedures largely subscribed to the same discursive and participatory se­
mantics, but they express some quite distinct selections when turning these ideals into prac­
tice. Most observers agree that none o f these procedures were particularly successful in 
terms of the criteria set by their self-descriptions and the normative discourses on partici­
pation and deliberation -  and that they were not particularly effective in terms of influenc­
290 This is o f  course a statement which is difficult and quite demanding to ‘prove’. It should be understood as 
my reading of various observations o f biotechnology politics in Germany, where I have been able to trace 
virtually no reference to the outcomes of the Burgrgutacbkn.
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ing the regulation of biotechnology in Germany. In short, they achieved a limited reso­
nance.
As mentioned all have been the object of various social scientific observations, analyses 
and evaluations, and therefore I shall not go into more detail on these procedures. I have 
chosen to dwell on them a little in this context because they 1) are telling about the place of 
such procedures in the German biotechnology policy arena, and 2) they are experiences 
which to some extent have shaped that arena and thereby the context in which the process 
I shall examine closer in the following emerged and unfolded. In the following account and 
analysis they are therefore meant to serve as backgrounds for the procedure under scrutiny.
Before moving on to these more detailed empirical observations it might be beneficial to 
summarise the lessons that may be drawn about the broader German context from the ex­
amination of the three procedures.
The manner in which the three procedures operationalised the underlying participatory and 
deliberative ideals indicates a significant Habermasian influence in terms o f the importance 
ascribed to procedural fairness and argumentation in (predominantly) cognitive modes. 
However, the avoidance in both the TAB and the WZB projects of including lay people -  
and so attempting to keep the deliberations in ‘expert-language* — can perhaps be taken as 
an indication o f a disinclination in the German political culture to engage with what is seen 
as more egalitarian or plebiscitarian forms of politics.291 It is to a growing extent acknowl­
edged that technocratic and exclusionary modes of policy formulation in this domain are 
unlikely to create acceptance and that participatory and deliberative modes o f communica­
tion do seem to have an inherent appeal in modem societies when it comes to ‘inter- 
systemic* coordination problems under public scrutiny. In Germany the operationalisation 
of such procedures has, however, been adjusted to the predominantly corporatist political 
culture -  what in the cultural theoretical approach discussed in Chapter III arguably leans 
towards a hierarchical bias when considered on the macro-level o f shared political culture 
and institutional arrangements (as is also indicated by the ‘programmatic* and legalistic type 
of regulatory approach opted for in Germany as discussed in the previous section).
Perhaps because participatory and deliberative semantics have an inherent appeal in mod­
em societies, apparently extending into organisational contexts with predominantly ‘hierar­
chical* tendencies, when die prospect of lifting the moratorium at the EU level again called 
for political decision and legal codification on a number of issues pertaining to the ex­
pected commercialisation of GM products, the German political system in 2001 made a call 
for a ‘societal discourse’, which led to the process I shall now examine in more details.
291 The Biirgergutachten did engage lay people, but the fact that it was carried out more on the initiative o f  the 
involved TA organisation -  rather than the addressees in the political system where it allegedly received 
sparse attention -  arguably does support the general point about a hesitation to engage with lay participation 
in TA exercises.
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D isku rs griiner G entechnik  -  a Participatory Procedure in a 
Corporatist Setting
The ‘discourses about discourse’ and participatory procedures had their boom in Germany 
in the late 1980s and the first half o f the 1990s. However, the TA community observed that 
experiences from local planning conflicts were difficult to transfer to the biotechnology 
domain in a way that would make their outcomes efficacious on the political level. The po­
litical system seemed loath to acknowledge the value of public participation that was not 
‘representative’ or aligned to the corporatist political culture-292 *Among stakeholders too the 
experiences were assessed as unsatisfactory and it seems that a less optimistic period set in 
where fewer practical procedures were undertaken and more reflection initiated.291
Nonetheless, the perceived need for some kind of mediation between the different per­
spectives and concerns present in the German specialised and general publics had not 
ceased, and in the autumn of 2001 the BMVEL announced that it wished to instigate and 
organise ‘a broad societal discourse’ on ‘green’ biotechnology, its regulation, and its applica­
tion in German agriculture and food production. For this purpose a number of organisa­
tions representing “diegeseUschaftlichen Gmppen,fiir die dieGtiine Gentechnik ton hesondere Bedett- 
ttmgist.., ” (BMVEL 2002a: 1) were invited to participate in the process, which ran for nine 
months from December 2001 to September 2002, when the ‘results’ of the discourse pro­
cedure were presented to the public. 30 different organisations participated in the proce­
dure and a further 11 organisations were invited to participate in one or more sessions of 
particular relevance for them.294
292 This assessment is partly based on a conversation with an employee at the TAB (personal conversation, 
June 2003).
293 This can be seen for instance in a growing amount of more critical assessments emerging from the TA 
community and academic circles.
294 The 30 different organisations could according to the preliminar)' consultations undertaken by the mod­
eration be categorised as belonging to one o f five categories o f  basic attitudes to green gene technolog)’, of 
which the following table offers an overview (I Iammerbacher 2003).
Basically dismissive because of 
negative risk/benefit assess­
ments and/or for ethical reasons
Arbeitsgemeinschaft Bäuerlicher Landwirtschaft e.V. 
Arbeitsgemeinschaft Ökologischer Landbau e.V.




Katholische Zentralstelle für Entwicklungshilfe e.V.
! Rat der Evangelischen Kirchen in Deutschland
i Verbraucherzentrale Bundesverband e.V._____________
Bundesverband des Deutschen Lcbensmittelhandels e.V. 
Deutscher Bauernverband e.V.
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Ernährung e.V.
Gewerk sch a ft N  ah rung-Genus s-G as ts tä tten 
Industriegewerkschaft Bauen-Agrar-Umwelt__________
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In the following I shall describe and analyse aspects of the process according to the theo­
retical framework and comparative dimensions oudined in Chapter III and IV.295
As a starting point it seems desirable to look briefly at the immediately preceding political 
context, where a number of events and developments were defining for the arrangement 
and course o f the procedure. Following the change of the German government to a coali­
tion o f Social Democrats and Greens in 1998, the Chancellor’s Office, at the time present­
ing itself to be growth oriented and innovation friendly, initiated discussions with the bio­
technological industry, farmers’ organisations and the scientific community about launching 
a large-scale field trial experiment (not unlike the Farm Scale Evaluations in the UK) with 
the purpose o f supporting the development of biotechnology in Germany. In these discus­
sions there were also suggestions for public information and debate initiatives.296
These plans were relatively advanced when the news broke that BSE had been discovered 
in Germany. Until this point it had been argued that due to different agricultural practices
Proponents with reference to the 
pressure for action grounded in 
global realities
Bundesverband des Deutschen Groß- und Außenhandels e. V. 
Deutscher Raiffeisen verband e.V.
Deutscher Verband Tiemahrung e.V.
Verband Deutscher Ölmühlen e.V.
Proponents with reference to the 
benefits o f gene technology
Bund für Lebensmittelrecht und Lebcnsmirtclkunde e.V. 
Bundesverband Deutscher Pflanzenzüchter e.V. 
Bundesvereinigung der deutschen Emährungsindustrie e.V, 
Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft 
Deutscher Industrievereinigung Biotechnologie 
Industriegewerkschaft Bergbau, Chemie, Energie 
Industrieverband Agrare.V.
295 The case is built on publicly available documentation of the event, primarily found at the Internet page 
established for the event, rivww.tntnsgen.de/diskurs. still operational 16.12.2004) as well as research inter­
views with the following persons:
Ruth Hammerbacher, moderator of the procedure, interview'ed 25.04.2004
Gisbert Kley, member of steering committee, representing Bund Deutschen Pflanzenzüchter, interviewed 
26.04.2004
Manfried Lückemeyer, ‘Unterabteilungsleiter’ in BMVEL, interviewed 27.04.2004
I lelmut Röscheisen, member o f steering committee, representing Deutsch Naturschutzting, interviewed 
27.04.2004.
Heike Velke, observing member of steering committee, representing Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, in­
terviewed 27.04.2004.
Regine Wollersheim, ‘Abteilungsleiterin’ in BMVEL, chair o f steering committee, interviewed 28.04.2004
Bedihard Gill, Trivatdozent’ in sociology, University of Munich, participated as expert, interviewed 
04.05.2004).
296 This, in terms o f institutional responsibility, somewhat odd initiative m ust be seen in ligjit o f the fact that 
the Ministry of Health, which was then responsible for the administration o f  the GenTG, was headed by a 
green minister, who had little inclination to promote biotechnology in the agricultural sector. In fact, the min­
ister had only abstained from supporting the EU moratorium due to internal pressure in the German gov­
ernment. Hence, the Chancellor’s Office took over the political initiative in the policy domain.
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from the UK and strict safety measures BSE was not a problem in German agriculture or a 
threat to German consumers. The news o f BSE in Germany not only had a significant im­
pact on consumer confidence in the food market, it also sent significant ripples through 
much o f  the political system.
The Social Democratic minister of agriculture resigned, the ministry' was renamed the Min­
istryfor Consumer Protection, Nutrition and Agriculture (BMVEL) in order to signal changed pri­
orities and more independence from the agricultural sector, and the ministry was made re­
sponsible for the administration of the GenTG. The incoming minister was Renate Künast 
from Die Grünen.
At this point, the Chancellor’s Office assessed that it would not be possible to simultane­
ously manage the restoration of public confidence in the wake o f BSE and have a dialogue 
with the public about the risks and benefits of genetic engineering in agriculture and food 
production. As a consequence the field trials programme was cancelled.
Although the EU moratorium remained in place, both external and domestic pressures 
meant that the political system could not just ignore the topic altogether. Already prior to 
the BSE debacle the responsible ministerial department had been considering if and how 
some sort of public consultation on the topic could be initiated and supported along with 
the planned field trials. This idea was taken up by the incoming minister, who opted for a 
stakeholder discourse.297 298The motive for choosing this particular approach seems to have 
been a wish to explore the possibilities for political intervention among some relatively 
‘manageable’ and stable organisational partners with credibility among their respective con­
stituencies. Allegedly, the idea of lay participation was considered, but was abandoned quite 
early in the planning process, as it was taken for granted that the large organisations invited 
‘represented a wide spectrum of citizens’. One of the responsible civil servants explained:
"Öffentliche Debatte haben air ein bisschen gefürchtet weil da der Sachverstand auch nicht sogroß 
ist, wenn man einfach dort Leute einladen. Dieses ist doch auch eine Frage da muss man auch nie­
sen was gentechnische Veränderung ist, sonst macht es keinen Sinn. ... Wir sind also schnell davon 
abgekommen. Aber wichtig war uns von Anfang an über den Diskurs, und ŝ war über jeden einzeln 
Schritt, muss die Öffentlichkeit informiert werden, und das was in dem Diskurs — Basispapierer, 
Reader, Protokolle, die Ergebnisse — (eingegangen ist) darüber musste die Presse informiert werden. 
Und letsgendäch ist ja  eine öffentlich Bericht daraus gekommen, was da im Einzeln diskutiert wor­
den.'™
Hence, the ministry decided against lay inclusion as they assumed that this would endanger 
the possibility o f competent discourse. It was assumed that the broad spectrum of organi­
sations included combined with a transparent process to which the wider public could be a 
relatively unhindered audience would ensure political legitimacy.
297 Interview with Unterabteilungsleiter in BMVEL Manfred Lückemeyer, 27.04.2004.
298 Interview, Lückemeyer
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The process took off with an opening event in December 2001 where Künast introduced 
the task of the process and presentations were given by two experts representing, respec­
tively, an optimistic and a sceptical stance on the application o f green gene technology. As 
such, it was acknowledged from the outset that -  especially from the point of view of the 
political system — there was more than one ‘truth* to be told about the issue. The invited 
groups were then encouraged to suggest themes they considered important to investigate 
and debate, after which a steering committee {Lenkungsausschass) was appointed to set the 
terms and ground rules for the process and formulate the agenda for the discursive proce­
dure. This steering committee was chaired by a representative from the BMVEL and even­
tually expanded to ten representatives of the organisations that had been most active in the 
public debate about green biotechnology thus far with a balance between protagonists and
■ 299sceptics.
Then followed a preparatory phase where the steering committee in cooperation with an 
external moderator from a consultancy prepared the actual discursive process. In this proc­
ess it was decided -  under what the moderator describes as difficult negotiations (Ham­
merbacher 2003) — what the thematic blocks of the discursive procedures should be and 
what experts should be invited.
In April 2002 a two day ‘inspirational meeting’ {Fachtagung) with presentations by a number 
of German and international experts on the themes to be investigated and debated was 
held to kick off the actual discursive process. Here approximately 140 people participated 
and the meeting was open to the press.
After this followed five ‘rounds of discourse’ (Diskursrunden) of two days each. These 
were organised in the following way: for most themes to be debated two experts were in­
vited to give presentations and discuss with the participants. These experts were suggested 
and invited by the steering committee, which in effect meant that they were selected in 
equal proportion to present perspectives that were, respectively, positive and negative to­
wards different aspects of GM applications. These sessions would be open to the press. 
Following this were sessions where discussions among die participants took place without 
any external observers present. In these ‘rounds of discourse’ approximately 40 participants 
took part. In these meetings “wurden in nicht-öffentlichen Sitzungen Positionen den anstehenden 29
299 Initially, the BMVEL expected to be able to steer the procedure itself in collaboration with the modera­
tion. During the opening sessions it was suggested that a small executive o f  four people manage the debate. 
However, in order to ensure the collaboration o f  all important stakeholders, the steering committee was 
gradually expanded to 11 members before it actually began its substantive work. It was chaired by the respon­
sible director from BMVEL, and the two ‘sides* in the debate had an equal number of representatives. Some 
participants expressed concern that scientific expertise was not sufficiently included and the Deutsche For- 
schunggemeinschaft was given an observer’s seat as well.
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Fragen formuliert und diskutiert mit dem Tdel\ Konsense, Dissense, ~// klärende noch offene Fragen und 
Empfehlungen an die Politik und andere Akteure tdentifisferenP (BMVEL 2002b: 18).
At the end of the process a report was formulated by the moderator. After some modifica­
tions and negations this was approved by the steering committee and presented to the pub­
lic in a meeting with the minister as the ‘outcome’ of the procedure. In this meeting the 
participating organisations were also given the opportunity to present their assessments of 
the procedure to the press and the minister.500
In the following my interest is not so much in the detailed content of the communication 
as it unfolded between the participants,501 but more in the discursive frames underpinning 
the procedure and whether any effects from these framings can be established in the sub­
sequent configuration of the policy arena. The central interest o f the thesis is how ‘the pub­
lic’ is operationalised in such communicative contexts differentiated and organised specifi­
cally at the ‘borders’ of the different functional subsystems. In this case no lay members of 
the public were included directly as active participants in the procedures, and the term pub­
lic participation takes on a slightly different meaning. As such, the whole procedure repre­
sents a more corporatist approach to social conflict mediation than the other cases, i.e. ‘the 
public’ is assumed to represented by organisations from the different societal ‘sectors’. 
Nonetheless, I will argue that ‘the public’ was virtually present in the communicative proc­
esses in the discursive procedure. However, the interests o f ‘the public’ were clearly framed 
in different ways by the different participants, all o f whom sought to fashion themselves as 
speaking on behalf of the ‘true’ public interest. Therefore, part of the aim of the following 
analysis will be to bring out the more implicit framings of ‘the public’ articulated in the 
procedure, giving rise to different demands to the regulation of biotechnolog)'.
A defining trait of this debate was that the BMVEL was under the direction of a ‘green’ 
minister. She was placed between, on the one hand, a chancellor who was known to be 
relatively pro-GM and industry friendly, and, on the other, expectations from the grass 
roots in her own party and to some extent its constituency in the environmental move­
ment.502 This o f course made the situation for the BMVEL somewhat precarious in terms 
of making the discursive procedure acceptable to all potential participants, especially the 
organisations sceptical of the motives o f a green minister. Hence, this case in a way ‘re- 301*
300 As part o f the publicity work all agendas, expert presentations and minutes of the discussions were made 
available through an Internet site. Furthermore, the BMVEL produced a booklet with a report o f the whole 
procedure and the most significant outcomes. Finally, the moderator undertook an evaluation o f the process, 
which was also made public (Hammerbacher2003).
301 Although rather extensive minutes were produced it did not seem feasible to trace the communicative 
dynamics o f the procedure through the available material. The interviews undertaken focused more on pro­
cedural than substantial aspects as well as the social, political and scientific context o f the procedure.
3°2 jqere i take a structural approach and leave the personal convictions and aspirations o f  the minister aside, 
as these were not available to the investigation.
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verses’ the problem for the political system compared to -  in particular — the British case: 
The challenge seen from the perspective of the initiating section o f the political system was 
not a clear-cut case of promoting a technology despite public opposition and hesitation. 
Rather, the Government had to balance its own different objectives (promotion vs. precau- 
tion/public acceptance) and externally to respond to international developments as well as 
pressure from domestic scientific and business interests. It was in this particular situation 
that DGG was shaped, as I shall try to bring out in the following.
The Preparatory Phase
First I shall take a closer look at the purposes of the procedure as presented by Renate 
Künast, the responsible minister, at the initiation of the process, which I will take to be an 
indication of the political system’s expectations of the process (or at least of how it would 
like the participants and the public to see its motives).
The task is, in Künast’s formulation, particularly challenging...
“... weil die grosse Mehrheit der deutschen Bevölkerung gentechnisch veränderte Organismen im Le- 
bensmittelbereich ablehnt und sich gleichartig wirtschaftüche Interessen unabhängig von diesem 
grundsätzlichen Unbehagen sehr trat entwickelt haben. Wir müssen also aujpassen, dass der Gra­
ben ^wischen diese Interessen nicht immer weiter wird, immer größeren Teilen der Lebensmittelpro­
duktion der Boden des Verbrauchervertrauens entzogen wird” (Künast 2001: 2)
The central problem to be addressed was hence one o f social integration, namely to ensure 
that the interests and expectations o f different parts of society did not differ so greatly as to 
endanger the maintenance of trust in the food markets. As such, the controversy over the 
application o f biotechnology is seen as holding the potential to spread to other parts of the 
food chain, which had hitherto largely maintained consumer confidence.303 The political 
system sees it as its task to facilitate such social integration. For that purpose it needs to 
gather knowledge of its potential feasible scope of action (i.e. how it can intervene without 
provoking further disturbance):
uEs geht darum, verschiedene Interessenslagen herumzuarbeiten und einen Kommunikationsprozess 
Zwischen den verschiedenen Seiten so weit nach vorne bringen, dass wir staatliche Handlungsopti­
onen benennen können. Handlungsoptionen, die dann möglichst auch in der Mehrheit der Gesell­
schaft auf vertrauensvollen Boden bauen können. ” (ibid: 3)
Implicit in this quote is the assumption that the different ‘sides’ in the procedure are in fact 
representative o f sufficiently large sections of the society that they in aggregation (if not 
collaboration) can outline the conditions under which confidence can be (reestablished 
and maintained.
303 Perhaps this indicates the experience learned by the political system from BSE, that issues which in terms 




However, the different societal actors do not necessarily share the objective of the political 
system to promote social integration (at least in the form suggested). Therefore, their will­
ingness to participate could not be taken as given, it had to be ensured through promises of 
substantive as well as procedural influence.
The longstanding opponents o f  genetic engineering had little motivation to join a consen­
sus-seeking procedure, as they basically depended upon their ability to mobilise a certain 
protest potential (and had had certain negative experiences with such procedures in the 
past). At the time surveys indicated widespread public hesitation towards accepting gene 
technology in the agri-food domain. Hence, publicly these organisations stood to gain little 
in relation to their constituencies from participating (Hammerbacher 2003: 6). However, in 
a corporatist political culture they would also stand to lose political credibility (and eventu­
ally influence) by not participating, especially since the responsible minister was presumed 
to be sympathetic to their viewpoints.
The representatives from industry and the mainstream scientific community considered the 
suggested procedure as a step back from the earlier initiative o f the Chancellor’s Office.304 
Nonetheless, the industry organisations in particular had an interest in exhibiting the will to 
dialogue, and the representatives from plant breeding and biotechnology had an interest in 
getting into closer contact with the food processing industry and food retailers.
None o f the invited organisations declined the invitation from the BMVEL305 although the 
expectations that the discourse would alter something substantially were — at least among 
the longstanding participants in the biotechnology debate — rather limited. Hence, at the 
outset both expectations and engagement were limited.
In her speech the Minister outlined some goals for the process, which she claimed should 
be open-ended in terms of results (ergebnisoffen) but still structured (Kiinast 2001: 9). For 
that purpose she set four expectations, namely that the procedure should:
•  build on an extensive analysis of factual knowledge (Sachstandsanaljse)
•  be guided by a competent management of the discursive procedure
•  ensure the participants information about green gene technology and alterna­
tives, in order to achieve an improved mutual understanding
304 From the perspective o f Verband Deutsche Pflanzenzüchter the procedure was seen primarily as an at­
tempt from a green minister to stall any further steps towards the introduction of gene technology in Ger­
many. “In Wirklichkeit wollte das Ministerium, dass da nichts heraus kam, das war deutlich” (Interview with 
Gispert Kley, 26.04.2004).
305 Although some shifted the involvement to lower levels in their internal hierarchies (Interview Hammerba­
cher, Lückemeyer)
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•  ensure stronger public participation, especially consumers, at the assessment of 
the application of green gene technology (ibid).
Formulated in this way, the goals of the procedure could hardly been seen as controversial. 
However, the minister also mentioned some more ‘personal’ expectations, which to the 
advocates of the technology were seen as indication of an overtly critical stance. For in­
stance, when she claimed that societal benefits should be at the centre of the debate:
“Von zentraler Bedeutung ist für mich die Bewertung des Nutzens der Grünen Gentechnik und die 
Kontro Ui erbarkeit der technischen Entwicklung. Der Diskurs sollte sich aus unsere Sicht daher mit 
den Fragen nach dem gesellschaftlichen Nutzen der Grünen Gentechnik, deren Risikopotential 
und den Voraussetzungen für eine verantmrtbare Nutzjtng befassen. ” (ibid: 9-10, emphasis 
added)306
Where earlier technology assessments had focused more clearly on evaluating only the risks 
o f biotechnology, this broader focus on alternatives and societal benefits was perceived with 
some dismay by the industry representatives, who saw this as an inappropriate intervention 
in their innovative freedom and the principles of a market based economy.
Although the BMVEL left the specific thematic agenda setting to the participants, two 
framing conditions were established from the outset: that the consumers should be pro­
tected:
“Die Verbraucherinnen und Verbraucher müssen geschützt werden. Und das heißt für uns, die staatliche 
Seitey dass w ir ihnen die Wahlfreibeit zwischen Lebensmitteln mit und ohne G VO  sichern müssen” (ibid: 
3). And that suggested solutions had to conform to international regulation and be viable 
under the conditions of a still more globalised agricultural world market.307
As the quote above indicates, the German political system, under the auspices o f a green 
minister for consumer protection, chose a rather wide interpretation of consumer protec­
tion entailing not only the protection against physical risks, but also access for consumers 
to GMO free produce. Thereby an argumentative burden was to some extent put on the 
advocates of GM crops to demonstrate not only that their products did not entail (unac­
ceptable) risks for consumers or the environment, but also that it would not impede con­
ventional and organic farming. Furthermore, the protagonists were ‘forced’ in advance to 
prove that GM technology would also be socially benefical. Although the ministry stressed
306 Here the distinction to the attitude o f the British government is particular poignant. The British govern­
ment tried to tone down these more programmatic aspects and questions about the *societal benetits of the 
technology and focused solely on physical risks.
307 However, where ‘globalisation’ is often invoked to justify a somewhat fatalistic attitude in regard to regula­
tion, the German minister for consumer protection stressed that there was substantial international interest in 
how Germany chose to deal with these issues, and that she thought that Germany should not accept, as sug­
gested by the USA, that labelling and a precautionary approach to risk assessment amounted to ‘discrimina­
tion* against certain products or technologies.
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that the debate was to be ‘open ended’ and controlled by the participants, this ‘preframing’ 
from the political system markedly conditioned the thematic structure of the process.
After control o f the process was handed over to the steering committee (still under a 
BMVEL chairing), five goals were agreed upon by the participating organisations.
•  Clarification of matters in relation to green gene technology;
•  Formulation o f different perspectives on the development of green gene tech­
nology with participation o f  the affected groups;
•  Information for the public, especially consumers about the process and sub­
stance of the discursive procedure;
• Structuring of the debate and development o f new impulses for the public de­
bate on green gene technology;
• Consideration (Erarbatung) o f scope of action {Handlungsoptioneti) and recom­
mendations.
These goal formulations were clearly compromises formulated on an abstract level, and can 
be seen as an indication that no agreement existed as to how the topic ought to be ap­
proached or what outcomes could be expected. The last point was initially formulated as 
targeted specifically at the political system. However, parts o f the Government were anx­
ious that recommendations could end up having too binding a character for the political 
system.308 Hence, a formulation less directed to policy advice had to be found (Hammerba- 
cher 2003:12). A compromise was formulated, which spoke o f providing recommenda­
tions without a specific ‘address’. As such, the process can be seen as one where the politi­
cal system attempted to initiate a dynamic in its environment to search for viable corridors 
of intervention, but without committing itself to outputs in a way that could delimit its fu­
ture scope o f action.309
It was characteristic that not only the substantive negotiations during the discursive proce­
dure were controversial. Some principled issues needed to be confronted even before the 
debate took off, and had to be settled by negotiation and compromise rather than the ar­
gumentative mode of communication envisioned for the discursive procedure itself.310 Two 
issues were particularly controversial: the selection of specific topics to be dealt with, and 
the selection o f experts to be invited.
308 There were certain disagreements between BMVEL and BMFT (ministry for research and technology), 
which under Social Democratic leadership had a more positive attitude to  the promotion o f agricultural bio­
technology and was concerned that the discourse would be used by GM  sceptics as a platform to legitimise’ 
demands, which would tie the hands of policy makers.
309 Here it can be argued that although the substantial aims differed, the manner in which the political system 
handled the ‘discursive risks’ from such procedures was similar to that o f  the British government.
310 As a representative o f  the BMVEL explained, it was in the steering committee that the main struggles were 
fought (Interview, Liickemeyer).
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The agenda-setting process was difficult because fundamentally different perspectives ex­
isted among the participating groups on what ‘the issues* about genetic engineering really 
were.311 As such, it was not possible to establish the programme according to a ‘logically 
coherent* structure (ibid 2003:19-20).312 In the end it became the task o f the moderator to 
bundle issues together in a preliminary agenda, which was then negotiated and finally 
agreed in the steering committee. Hence, the programme for die procedure was formulated 
as a compromise between the organisations most active in the steering committee accord­
ing to what ‘headings* they believed served their interests.
The five thematic blocks had the following headlines:
•  Maintenance of biodiversity
•  Potential for innovation and future scenarios of green gene technology
•  Benefits and risks for consumers and producers
• Preconditions, chances and consequences of the renunciation of green gene tech­
nology
•  Information, public participation and freedom of choice313
The Discourse Phase
Once the agenda had been settled the actual discursive part o f the procedure involving rep­
resentatives of all the participating organisations was initiated — on a tight schedule. It is 
well known among TA practitioners that discursive procedures often take longer than ex­
pected. This procedure lasted nine moths, but the actual discursive interaction was com­
pressed into just under three months and was allegedly under significant time pressure. The 
schedule was decided by the political system, as the procedure was placed temporally in the 
last year of the electoral period. This motivated the green minister to attempt some move­
ment in the policy arena on a topic paralysed due to the combined effects of BSE and the 
EU moratorium in order to show some political results before the oncoming election. Sec­
ondly, the electoral prospects were uncertain, and it was clear that the process had to be 
completed before the election, as it was uncertain that it would be carried through if a gov-
311 In distinction to the WZB procedure, here a (mainstream) scientific framing was not allowed to dominate 
the communication.
312 According to the moderator a majority o f the agreed theme-blocks were aligned with ‘conceptual prefer­
ences’ o f the GM sceptic environmental and consumer organisations than with industry’s interests, i.e. more 
oriented to considering potential problems from a large scale implementation o f GM crops. However, the 
industry side ‘got’ a thematic block about the potential for innovation and had a significant interest simply in 
demonstrating a willingness to participate in the dialogue (Hammerbacher 2003:19-20).
313 In addition to this, the steering committee also agreed on a number o f procedural rules for the process, 
including rules concerning press contact in order to avoid that mass medias would be used strategically during 
the course of the procedure.
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emment without participation o f  the Greens were elected. As a consequence the procedure 
could not be delayed or postponed.
Temporally, the procedure also coincided with a scandal in the organic food sector, with a 
consequence that representatives of the organic framing organisations could not devote any 
attention to the discursive procedure for some o f the central sessions. According to the 
moderator, the combined effect of these two temporal conditions was that the full poten­
tial for mediation was not reached.314
Part of fulfilling the requirement that the DGG should be based on ‘extensive factual 
knowledge’ was the consultation o f experts on the issues to be debated. In principle, the 
inclusion o f ‘external’ expertise meant that the substantive content of the discourse would 
be difficult for the participants to foresee and control. As significant strategic interests were 
involved, this uncertainty was difficult for some of the participating organisations to accept. 
As a consequence the selection o f experts to be invited proved to be a rather controversial 
aspect of the planning process. In a discursive procedure where there is no third party act­
ing as arbiter, all decisions must be carried through by consensus, or at least accepted, by all 
participants. In this case, ‘science’ was not perceived as a neutral resource and procedural 
mechanisms had to be devised for the selection o f experts. This was impeded by the differ­
ent assessments o f the existing knowledge base and quality o f research. As in the other 
cases the actors were divided along cultural bias-lines in their confidence in scientific 
knowledge and scientific organisations. O n the one hand were the GM proponents from 
mainstream science and industry, who in the words of the moderator “... aufgrund der aus 
ihrer Sicht langjährige abgesicherten Forscbungs- und Abwendungs-Ergebnisse grundlegende Kritik an der 
Technologie und ihrer Sicherheit faktisch nicht mehr akzeptiertes (ibid: 17). This represented a 
‘mainstream’ scientific perspective, which exhibits a preference for verified knowledge and 
tends in most cases to consider uncertainties as manageable by cognitive means. On the 
other hand were those whose focus lay on the uncertainty and predictive difficulties as well 
as the wider socio-cultural implications o f  the technology, and clearly favoured a less reduc­
tionist approach to scientific issues with more room for doubts and uncertainties. The GM 
sceptics demanded that all expert positions were filled according to a pro/ contra propor­
tional principle in order to create a platform for the articulation of ‘counter-expertise’ on all 
significant issues. In order for the procedure to be continued, the GM proponents accepted 
this demand. In effect, the problem o f ‘discursive risks’ arising from of incongruent cogni­
3U This was so because the organic farmers, unlike to the environmental organisations on the sceptical side 
had a more material interest in reaching an ‘understanding’ on the conditions for co-existence and hence had 
a less fundamentalist attitude. However, as the organic formers were prevented from devoting their full atten­
tion to the process, the less compromising line o f  the environmentalists prevailed among the GM sceptics 
(Interview, Hammerbacher).
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tive framings (and in reality also normative evaluations) was shifted to the social dimension, 
where it was settled on a simple numerical basis, i.e. an equal number of experts.
This opting for ‘proportional* expert representation had a number o f consequences. Firstly, 
it led to a process where it was the organisations with clearly articulated positions were able 
to select or ‘appoint* the experts, in effect ‘their* experts,315 which meant that the polarisa­
tion of the participating organisations was ‘reproduced’ among the invited experts. Sec­
ondly, it had the effect that experts holding no reputation with either of the polarised ac­
tors had hardly any trenchancy in the confrontations, nor did the organisations with less 
polarised positions on GM issues have much influence on die selection of expertise.316 
Formulated more abstracdy this can be seen as a sign that the assumption (or ideal) of ‘sci­
ence* — understood as a set of theories, methods and social mechanisms for arriving at 
shared cognitive evaluations — can function as a neutral, uncontested reference point for all 
in social conflicts was abandoned from the outset.317 318One implication o f this was that the 
process was no discursive procedure among experts. The invited experts gave presentations 
and in some cases exchanged viewpoints with each other and the participants, but they 
were not expected or encouraged to reach agreements. The experts were used as strategic, 
argumentative resources by the participating organisations.31*
In the substantive dimension, the procedure was marked by the fact that although all par­
ticipants were interested in a comprehensive procurement of information and knowledge, 
the use of expertise and scientific knowledge was framed differently by the participants, 
depending on whether they were in favour of or sceptical towards GMOs, which also in­
fluenced what the different participants expected the aims of the process to be.
For the advocates of GMOs the main aim was the acknowledgement of what they per­
ceived to be matters of fact established by scientific research as well as what they saw as the 
inevitability of the introduction of GMOs also into the German food chain, which required 
an internationally competitive regulatory framework. The organisations more oriented to­
wards precaution and the limitation of biotechnology were interested in breaking what they 
perceived to be the reductions tic hegemony of mainstream science (tinged with strong 
economic interests in the introduction o f GMOs) and point to uncertainties, ambivalences 
and shortcomings in the established knowledge, and to create the acceptance of a plurality
315 This meant that primarily scientists with known preferences on the respective topics were invited.
316 Interview, Hammerbacher
317 This was exactly the role ‘science’ was perceived to play in the WZB procedure.
318 In this respect the procedure appears as markedly less ‘policed’ in the cognitive dimension by the modera­
tor than, for instance, the WZB herbicide project Perhaps this is one of the reasons the procedure did not 
break down as the WZB discourse did.
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of theoretical and practical approaches, which could also help to ensure viable alternatives 
to GM agriculture.
As such, both proponents and sceptics made reference to science, but with different fo­
cuses on and interpretations o f  what constitutes reliable fact and relevant uncertainty. 
Therefore, the same information held different relevance for the different actors and a 
thorough rationalisation of the controversial topics on the more operational level was not 
achieved. This was visible in aspects o f  how the topics of the procedure were structured, as 
well as on more technical issues such as the acceptable level o f contamination o f non-GM 
crops with GM material.
The promoters of GM technology considered the fundamental question of Svhether’ GM 
agriculture should be accepted in German agriculture and food production as settled be­
yond dispute and only wanted to discuss how ’ issues, i.e. what regulatory frameworks 
needed to be put in place and according to which principles these should work. The scep­
tics on the other hand refused to ‘yield to the normative force o f the current state o f af­
fairs’ (Moldenhauer 2003: 250) and insisted that an exit option should be ensured. Given 
this state of affairs all participants I interviewed about the process expressed the opinion 
that next to no effect from the expert presentation ‘across the fronts’ was discemable. 
Hence, little mutual cognitive learning was occurring in the eyes o f the participants.519
Despite these differences among some o f the most prominent participants (i.e. longstand­
ing actors in the biotechnological arena in Germany) some ‘consensual’ results were 
reached and as such the BMVEL registered what it considered as a significant willingness 
among the participants to engage constructively with the issues,5"0 although it was also 
noted that the ‘fronts’ were hardened to a degree that made it very difficult to motivate any 
significant movement.319 2021 The achieved points o f agreement were located on a very abstract 
level, which did not immediately invite any consensual political or regulator)7 operationalisa­
tions. They served rather as ‘argumentative chocks’ that allowed the process to break off 
interminable disputes by elevating them to a more abstract level.
Among the consensual formulations was that the protection o f biodiversity should be a 
goal and a criterion for risk assessments of GM crops. It came as some surprise to the GM 
sceptics that industry representatives readily agreed to this. However, given the agreement 
that no reliable measurements or conceptual consensus existed for evaluating effects on 
biodiversity, this was interpreted as a symbolic gesture. It was also agreed that the freedom 
of choice for producers and consumers should be ensured, allowing them to consume both 
GM and non-GM products (co-existence in agriculture between GM, conventional and





organic crops). Furthermore, the participants agreed that reliable consumer protection was 
necessary, and that this can only be achieved through viable international regulatory 
frameworks. However, the participants disagreed over how these rather abstract principles 
should to be operationalised (Ergebnissbericht 2002).
The fact that the consensual points were located at a relatively abstract level meant that the 
discursive procedure did not deliver any direct conflict mediation: “Ein unmittelbarer beitrag 
derim Ergebnisbericht des Diskursesfestgehaltenen Arbeitsergebnisse tgtr Konfiktregelung und Problemlö­
sung lässt sich aufgrund des Abstraküonsgrades derformulierten Konsense und konsensuakn Dissense 
nicht außvigen” (Hammerbacher 2003: 36). Nonetheless, the procedure was observed to 
have brought some movement of ‘the fronts’ over the longstanding controversy: “So doku­
mentieren aber eine Reihe von Verschiebungen in den Schlüsselthemen der Gentechnikdebatte gegenüber 
früheren Diskussionsergebnissen epischen den gesellschaftUchen Akteuren und haben insofern fü r die anste­
henden rechtlichen Regulierung in Deutschland und der EU  politischen Spielraum aufgecfigtl' (ibid). 
However, as the moderator continues:
"Die Identifizierung neuer politischer Schlüsselthemen wie Wahlfreiheit und Koexistenz stellt aller­
dings noch keine Lösung der mit der Grünen Gentechnik verbundenen Interessen- und Wertkon- 
fik te  dar. Es entnickelt sich vielmehr innerhalb der Metathemen eine neue ThemenlandschafL A n ­
gesprochen werden darin die konkreten Reguäemngsaufgaben çwrpraktischen Gewährleistung ton 
Wahlfreiheit und Koexistenz ” (ibid: 37)
In other words, the controversy as a conglomeration o f communicative events evolved and 
took on new themes (leaving others behind, whether settled or not). This, however, did not 
mean that the controversy was solved or settled, nor that the basic divisive configuration of 
actors had been significantly modified.
That the issues the participants considered the most important in the controversy were not 
settled became particularly evident in the closing session where the outcomes produced 
were presented to the public and the responsible minister. The steering committee had 
formulated a consensual report about the discursive procedure, which basically docu­
mented that agreement could only be reached on some very general points, whereas their 
interpretation and operationalisation remained controversial.322 Only a ‘minimal consensus’ 
had been reached, mostly consisting in the agreement to disagree and the request that the 
political system took decisions in a manner that would deescalate the controversies (Ergeb­
nissbericht 2002: 31).
In addition to this, however, the participating organisations were given the opportunity to 
present their individual evaluations o f the process. The fact that the procedure had taken
322 One steering committee memb er described the consensual points as: “Gemeinplätze, Aussagen die zu 
nichts verpflichte f ’ (Interview, Kley)
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place was mostly praised, while its outputs received a more mixed assessment.323 Actors 
who had had a longstanding involvement with the debate about agricultural applications of 
biotechnology tended to consider the procedure a failure and took the opportunity to lay 
the blame for this and formulate or reiterate demands to the political system. In doing so 
they primarily framed the process as an example of the unwillingness or inability o f their 
opponents to learn, and their neglect o f  the interest of the public.
Effects of D isk u rs  G rim e G en tech n ik
In her speech addressing the participants in the closing session Kunast acknowledged that 
major disagreements persisted, but nonetheless declared the discursive procedure a success. 
In part simply because the procedure had ‘held together’ and the various knowledges and 
viewpoints had been explored ‘cooperatively’. But more significantly because the political 
goals o f the Government had more o r less found support in the consensual points agreed 
among the participants, namely that consumer protection, freedom of choice, labelling and 
traceability, and the coexistence of conventional, organic and GM agriculture should be 
ensured.324 The fact that these were principled agreements, about whose interpretation and 
operationalisation significant controversy and disagreement persisted, was not mentioned 
in the speech.325
It is hardly surprising that a minister in an ongoing electoral campaign is inclined to declare 
a procedure initiated by her ministry a success. However, as mentioned the participants 
were less inclined to share this assessment. This included a representative o f the BMVEL, 
who in retrospect expressed doubt about whether the process had been worth the effort 
and expenditure.326 When asked about the effects o f the discourse, representatives of both 
sides claim that little was achieved across the divide between the two camps. However, it is 
mentioned as a positive effect that cooperation between the organisations on the respective
323 This was considered by the BMVEL as a worthwhile result as well, as it had allegedly contributed a differ­
ent tone to the debate. A certain discursive tact had been developed in the process, and most participants 
mentioned that the procedure had provided a valuable platform for the provision of factual knowledge and 
information, but also for some actors an option to get to know the viewpoints and concerns o f the other 
better.
324 As an external observer it may be worth considering whether this outcome was an effect of political sig­
nals given prior to the procedures — i.e. that the participating organisations responded strategically to their 
observations o f  the expectations o f  the political system -  rather than an expression of a ‘genuine’ (whatever 
that would mean exactly) will to make concessions on the topics explored. However, an assessment o f  such 
causalities was no t possible on the basis o f the compiled material.
325 Instead the minister, to the dismay o f the GM O positive organisations, reiterated a number o f  program­
matic points made both before and during the discursive procedure by the sceptics about the search for alter­
natives, that the nutritional policy should be about wholesome diets, that a sustainable agriculture should be 




sides was strengthened. On the side of the GM promoters and the initially more neutral 
organisations representing food processing and retailers a collaboration was initiated on 
how to deal with practical issues concerning labelling, traceability and information for the 
public, allegedly on the background of a growing perception among the food industry and 
retailers that sooner or later they would have to deal with GM ingredients.327 On the side of 
the sceptics a collaboration and coordination effort was initiated between the environ­
mental, consumer and organic farming organisations, which had thus far worked separately 
in this area.328
To some extent it thus seems that the procedure managed to integrate the efforts of the 
respective sides, but not to mediate ‘across’ the controversy. The aim here is not an evalua­
tion of the procedure, but it seems worth noticing that these observations hardly -  or at 
least only partially — correspond with the initial aim of the political system, namely to en­
sure a certain degree of social integration across the divisive viewpoints.329
One representative of the pro side believed that the political climate under the Red/Green 
Government had been and continued to be unfavourable for agricultural biotechnology, 
and that it would take at least ten years before Germany produced GM crops and products 
on a significant scale. This, however, was not ascribed (only) to the DGG but also to a bi­
ased minister strongly influenced by environmental organisations, who were seen to suc­
cessfully continue to formulate new barriers for commercialisation 330 This assessment was 
‘shared’ by the environmental movements, who saw their fight as relatively successful as 
time had been won in which the struggle for stricter regulatory means could be continued 
and support of GM-free agriculture could be strengthened.331
Concerning impacts in the public sphere, the immediate effects of the DGG were quite 
modest. The moderator assessed that about 100 reports from the events appeared in the 
printed and electronic media. This was allegedly considered satisfactory for an event like 
DGG, which did not match the selection criteria of the mass (no rem, attempts at over­
coming differences rather than attenuating them, no spectacular images). A representative 
of the BMVEL expressed some disappointment at the low media effects and lack of reso­
nance achieved in the public sphere, but not substantial surprise.332 The publicity strategy 
for the procedure was aimed at ensuring transparency not at large media impact. During
327 Interview, Kley
328 Interview, Roscheisen
329 Unless one o f course takes the willingness to remain attached to the communicative process alone — de­
spite meagre substantive results — as a sign o f  successful social integration.
330 Interview, Kley
331 Interview', Roscheisen, assessment also expressed by the moderator (Interview, Hammerbacher)
332 Interview, Liickemeyer
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the process itself this was partly the result o f the demand o f the participants that all press 
related activities went through the steering committee, as a means of safeguarding the pro­
cedure against attempts to use public relations strategically during the procedure.
On this basis it must be concluded that the DGG had some effect on political communica­
tion and some in the organisational landscape, but little in the wider public sphere. The 
procedure had certain catalysing effects among the participants ‘within’ each camp. How­
ever, these can hardly be considered as mediating or de-polarising in respect of fundamen­
tally opposed evaluation of the technology.
As most of the regulatory framework for GMOs (deliberate release guidelines, principles 
for safety assessment, labelling and traceability) is shaped at the EU level (along with ap­
proval procedures), the scope for the German political system to shape its own policies in 
the domain are tightly circumscribed. But, of course it, should not be overlooked that Ger­
many is a major player in the EU, who can influence its policies significantly. In the nego­
tiations about the revision and drafting o f the directives meant to facilitate an end to the 
moratorium, the Red-Green government had pursued a rather restrictive course compared 
to other member states prior to the D G G  procedure. Subsequent to the procedure the 
Government was re-elected and the major thematic principles emerging from the proce­
dure (protection o f biodiversity, co-existence and consumer choice (labelling)) were in­
cluded in the coalition agreement as the policies to be pursued in regard to agricultural bio­
technology. The BMVEL remained under Kiinast and a very strict line — leaning towards 
the perspectives o f  the GM sceptics in the procedure — was followed both in the EU nego­
tiations and domestically.
After the passing o f the revised and new EU directives on deliberate release, food and feed 
and labelling and traceability, a revision o f GenTG in order to implement the directives was 
initiated. In this process too the BMVEL pursued a very restrictive policy, in particular on 
the issues o f co-existence and liability rules, which remained within the regulatory compe­
tence of the member states. At the time o f writing (December 2004) it seems that the Gov­
ernment — to the outspoken dismay o f  German GM protagonists — will pass a regulatory 
regime on co-existence and liability in the case of cross-fertilisation, which will be among 
the strictest in Europe and are considered by some observers to spell a defacto halt to GM 
commercialisation in Germany.333
In the legislative process -  which involved complicated negotiations and powerplay be­
tween the federal and the LattderAevel, as well as extensive consultations o f a more conven­
333 For instance Deutsche Bauemrband, which on the passing o f  the revised GenTG commented that .. mit 
dem Gesetz die Vorgabe Brüssels, eine Koexistenz zu ermöglichen, regelrecht konterkariert wird”, and that 
the law had the character o f 'Gentechmkverhinderungsgset^ (quoted from 
w'ww.hiosiche rheit.de /  aktuell/3 13.doku.html. 16.12.2004)
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tional character that cannot be recounted here — die discursive framings articulated in the 
DGG played a visible role. The points of ‘agreement* provided the guiding policy goals for 
the Government. However, there can be little doubt that in drafting specific regulatory acts 
the ‘consensual’ policy goals were interpreted in a manner, which did not find broad sup­
port among the participants in the procedure. Hence, as the Government was so to speak 
selectively reading the output, it seems difficult to assess counterfactually to what extent a 
different policy would have been pursued had the procedure not taken place.
Diskurs G rimer Gentechnik Analysed
In analytical respects the DGG procedure retraced in this chapter both shares certain fea­
tures with the other cases and distinguishes itself in a number of ways. Like the other cases, 
it can be seen as a specifically differentiated system of communication with the aim of miti­
gating social controversy over a particular technology via modes of communication, which 
the initiators understand as participatory and deliberative. In doing so, the procedure drew 
upon some of the discursive frames and semantic figures, which have been developed as a 
response to such controversies in a number of areas. However, the DGG procedure con­
stituted a particular operationalisation of this semantic, as its location in a context of pre­
dominantly corporatist policy setting resulted in a specific social and thematic configuration 
of the process. In the remainder of this chapter I shall analyse aspects of the procedure in 
order to bring out more clearly these particularities and render the procedure comparable 
to the other cases.
If one considers the DGG procedure as a relatively well-defined, temporary communica­
tive system, two initial observations can be made. It was initiated by the German political 
system and remained significantly conditioned by this, socially, temporally and substan­
tively. However, the procedure as a communicative system did also develop a certain 
autonomy and Eigenlogik, which clearly differentiated within the political system, so that the 
Government and the procedure as a temporary organisation (consisting of yet more organi­
sations) observed each other closely as relevant environments. The BMVEL initiated the 
process, but once the procedure was under way, the ministry chose a deliberate ‘hands off 
strategy in order to explore whether the participating organisations could settle (any of) 
their cognitive and normative differences themselves prior to a new political programming 
of the domain.334 The task in the following section will then be to analyse how this combi­
nation of a clear ‘directedness* o f the process towards politics, and the attempt to confront
334 The participating organisations were o f course aware o f this attention from the political system and were 
perhaps communicating as much to the political system as to other participating organisations. However, they 
were obliged to do this exactly by taking part in the procedure.
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a number of organisational interests in debates at the intersection of a number o f func­
tional subsystemic perspectives gave the procedure its specific character.
From the theoretical perspective o f this thesis one o f  the central features o f the observed 
procedures is the attempt to mitigate risk controversies by reconfiguring the interface be­
tween decision makers and those affected by means o f inclusionary mechanisms, which can 
proceduralise conflicts resonating in the wider public sphere. In this respect perhaps the 
most noticeable feature in the social dimension of the DGG procedure is the location of the 
principle of inclusion at the organisational level The political system met with difficulties in 
formulating a policy that would find broad support, and it acknowledged that it would be 
counterproductive to push through a solution against the wishes of most organisations. In 
systems theoretical terms; such a solution would be likely to create more complexity rather 
than less. The political perplexity and need for consultation, combined with the fact that 
the minister was from a party with an ideological preference for participatory forms of poli­
tics,335 36led to an approach which on the one hand can be characterised as ‘all-inclusive* (the 
selection criteria was to get ‘everyone* on board), but on the other hand was marked by 
‘virtual’ representation of ‘the public*, understood as ordinary people affected by future 
policies. An organisationally manageable and non-plebescitarian operationalisation had to 
be found.
In this case no lay participation was envisioned or wanted. ‘The public’ was more or less 
unproblematically considered to be adequately represented through the participating or­
ganisations. The responsible director in the BMVEL explained that the larger population 
was represented:
“.„in dem m r Vertretern der Bevölkerung in Form von 30 verschiedenen Gruppen ängeladen und 
in diesem Prozess eingebunden haben. Das haben »irganz offen gemacht und darüber informiert.
Es hat also nicht hinter verschlossenen Türen stattgefunden...Die Verbände waren viele und unter­
schiedliche und m r sind davon ausgegangen, dass wir eine Grossteil der Bevölkerung %umindest da­
durch repräsentiert bekommen haben... 30 sind schon einegan%e Menge, eine repräsentative Quer­
schnitt. ,Ä36
The participating organisations were selected pragmatically according to the questions Svho 
has stated an opinion, who has an interest, who is affected?’337 38
“Dann haben nir versucht vor allem die beiden Hauptlager einigermaßen gleicbgemchtig pii beset­
zen, weil nir wusstenja nenn das nicht passiert, dann gibt es von Anfang an Arger— dann wird 
man nicht über Gentechnik diskutieren, sondern nur über Procedere. ’s38,339
335 <cw ir wollen bei allen Probleme von gesamtgesellschaftlicher Bedeutung immer alle Beteiligten Akteurer og 





The considerations on the selection o f participants indicate that the political system took it 
for granted that a ‘representative' cross-section of the existing organisational landscape mir­
rored the (legitimate) concerns of ‘the public', and thus if ‘both sides’ were equally strongly 
represented, the proceedings would be considered fair.39 40 This would be shared by the 
wider public, which was ascribed the role of audience of a transparent procedure.
In short, being an organisation with some kind of constituency and a publicly stated atti­
tude towards GMOs, or an (assumed) stake in their development, meant being qualified for 
participation. In regard to the issue of representativity, the principle opted for in the DGG 
must therefore be characterised as sectorial rather than demographic. Once invited, no dis­
tinction was made between the types of invited organisations in the procedure, for instance 
whether they were special interest groups representing the biotechnological industry or 
public interest groups claiming to speak on behalf o f ‘the environment' (or more precisely 
certain sections of the population’s concerns about the environment) or on behalf o f  ‘con­
sumers’. All had — at least in principle — to obey the same procedural rules and state their 
case argumentatively. Furthermore, the sectorial principle was complemented with a quan­
titative concept of fairness, whereby ‘the positions’ (pro/contra) were to be ‘represented’ 
with equal strength, apparently independently of the distribution of pro/contra opinions in 
the wider population. Arguably, this may have contributed to a situation where the contro­
versy was in some respects reified rather than mitigated in the procedural design, but was 
considered a sine qua none for the procedure to get under way at all.
The fact that the organisational aspects of the procedure by their very nature had polarising 
rather than mitigating effects, was further attenuated by the use of expertise. The clear role 
differentiation between ‘experts’ and representatives of the participating organisations was 
another built-in organisational feature of the procedure. Yet, this was no simple functional 
differentiation — i.e. the safeguarding of cognitive competence through the involvement of 
‘science’ and scientists -  but a ‘strategic differentiation’, where scientists were used as stra­
tegic resources in addition to (or perhaps rather than) neutral arbiters clarifying matters of 
fact for the participants.
The choice to consider public concerns as adequately represented by the existing organisa­
tional landscape appears to be a well-established feature o f the German political culture. 
However, I interpret the fact that lay inclusion was considered but abandoned as an indica­
tion o f the political system’s belief that difficulties in establishing widely acceptable regula-
339 Perhaps characteristic o f the German corporatist political traditions, trade unions and the two churches 
were invited to participate in an almost automatic fashion, as ‘jobs' and ‘ethics’ was on the agenda.
340 This assumption was apparently shared among the representatives o f  the participating organisations with 
whom I spoke, as wyell as the moderator. They all expressed that the composition of participants was reason­
able and representative o f the controversy, which indicates how ingrained the thinking in terms of, on the one 
hand, existing controversy and opposed interests and, on the other, the practise of settling societal contro­
versy through organisations is in German political culture-
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tory principles originated with these organisations rather than these simply mirroring ‘the 
public’. Therefore, the solution was to establish an arena where the organisations could 
have it out rather than to seek an ‘expansion’ o f the locus o f the controversy by involving 
yet more (unorganised) participants. Implicitly, it indicates an assumption that if the estab­
lished organisations can be brought to compromise, their respective constituencies will 
likewise accept the .outcomes, whereas lay participation may simply complicate matters fur­
ther.341 342
Temporally the procedure was located at a time when the Government felt that a deadlock in 
policy formation had to be broken, primarily due to international developments and despite 
a domesic desire to avoid too much attention to food safety issues. This was also tied to the 
end of the electoral cycle, which provided the process with a definite endpoint. In this re­
spect the temporal logic of the procedure was determined by factors external to the discur­
sive interactions. Although the genuine openmindedness o f the Government with regard to 
the policies to be established was contested by several of the participating organisations, 
the procedure was fashioned as a consultative procedure preceding actual formulation of 
revised and expanded regulatory measures. The discursive process proceeded on the as­
sumption that the political system was still undecided at least about the details of future 
regulatory principles. This had the effect that the discussions unfolded, to some extent, in 
an ‘unsynchronised' manner, i.e. on different temporal assumptions about how a ‘be- 
fore/after’ distinction could be adequately applied. The GM proponents took it for granted 
that it was only a matter of (a relatively short) time before GM crops and products would 
arrive in Germany on some scale independently of what the GM sceptics thought o f it. 
Hence, the fundamental question of whether they should be allowed or not was framed as 
a past debate, an issue which was no longer at the discretion o f the political system. There­
fore, their intention was to discuss the terms on which this large(r) scale introduction 
should take place. The sceptics, on the other hand, were not willing to consider this as a 
foregone conclusion, insisting that the case in favour of GMOs had not been made con­
vincingly. They argued for a wait-and-see, precautionary regulatory approach, leaving open 
the question o f whether GMOs should be tolerated at all. In this respect temporal issues 
became a central bone of contention in the procedure,343 and no agreement could be 
reached on what the appropriate temporal perspective ought to be.
341 This contrasts rather sharply with the Danish and British cases where ‘the public', in their different ways, 
was framed as and appealed to as a moderating force, which could potentially mitigate the disputes between 
the organised interests and bring alternative rationalities in play.
342 Although the differences o f  opinion obviously were not only temporal but substantive, it was in the tem­
poral dimension that attempts by the moderator to make the participants agree on more concrete recommen­
dations failed. Participants agreed that coexistence would requite clear rules and regulations. The attempt to 
agree on an exact formulation stalled on whether this regulation should accompany or precede a decision to allow
the commercial application o f  GMOs (Ergebinssbericht 2002: 28-29)
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Another temporal aspect o f the procedure pertains to its ability to function as a temporal 
marker in the dynamic of the policy arena, i.e. to function as a point in time at which cer­
tain topics were either settled or ignored and new ones taken up, as was clearly the case for 
the Enqutte Kommission during the mid 1980s. In this respect the DGG appears to have per­
formed the function of a temporal landmark as new themes were placed on the agenda as 
the pertinent themes to be dealt with.343 As (abstract) points o f agreement were reached they 
were presented to the political system as previously contentious points that could now be 
considered settled, that is as points behind which subsequent policy making should not be 
allowed to fall. However, all participants indicated that it was the operationalisation into 
practise of the agreed principles that would really constitute the controversial issues, and 
these were delegated for future processing in other contexts and by other means.344 Never­
theless, this enabled the Government to communicate that some movement had been 
achieved, that it had been attentive to all viewpoints in the controversies and to equip itself 
with argumentative resources in its own operationalisations and specifications of the areas 
of alleged consensus.
As briefly mentioned above, the quite polarised configuration of the policy arena prior to 
the procedure was -  despite its deliberative and argumentative intentions and self­
description — by and large reproduced in the social characteristics of the procedure. This to 
some extent reified the controversy as a fundamental divide between two opposed camps. 
There were in fact a number of organisations involved in the procedure who were not 
strongly committed in advance to either promoting or rejecting GM agriculture. However, 
it seems that these organisations were less dominant in terms o f influencing the course of 
the events. The polarising tendencies were also evident in the substantive dimension. The set­
ting of the agenda of topics to be processed discursively, i.e. by means of arguments and 
evidence in a mode where non-discursive resources (economic strength, protest potential 
etc.) were to be considered illegitimate, evidently could not be clarified by discursive means. 
This was a clear-cut case o f bargaining involving tit-for-tat strategies and threats by central 
actors. The fact that the actors considered essential to the credibility and value of the pro­
cedure were those representing strongly articulated viewpoints presumably further contrib­
uted to the polarization of the procedure.
In the substantive dimension the strategic use of expertise also seems to have played a sig­
nificant role. N ot only were the topical foci selected in a non-discursive manner, so was the
345 One observer — with few expectations as to the effects o f the procedure — retrospectively assessed that the 
procedure had in fact moved the discursive landscape quite significantly (in the direction desired by Kiinast) 
(Interview, Gill)
344 Notably, it was unanimously demanded that the political system should provide a stable environment o f 
legal programming for the future conditions for commercial GM, conventional and organic operators (Er- 
gebnisbericht 2002: 31).
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selection o f expert knowledge claims in the communicative content of the procedure. The 
procedure had a relatively high input of expert knowledge, but this was obtained in a man­
ner quite distinct from the Danish and British cases. As they were used in a clearly divided 
expertise/counter-expertise format, expert inputs could not be used to mediate in the con­
troversies between the participants. Rather, ‘facts’ were used to communicate dissent, not 
to search for agreement.
Nonetheless, it seems that because all participants were aware of the political contexts in 
which the procedure was taking place — namely that some kind of regulation had to be put 
in place -they to some degree managed to set aside more fundamental differences about 
whether biotechnology actually constituted a viable and desirable developmental path for 
German agriculture and food production in order to focus on certain more practical issues. 
In doing so, however, the fundamental divides were reproduced or reiterated in more tech­
nical issues, for instance questions about coexistence, liability regimes and acceptable limit 
values. This led to the somewhat peculiar situation that while a number o f consensual 
points were in fact formulated and communicated, fundamental disagreement persisted 
nonetheless.345 In short form this can be described as mediation through abstraction — such 
abstract formulations are selected that they are virtually impossible to disagree with, but 
they have no well-defined operational meaning or practical consequences and in effect 
served to postpone a determination o f  regulatory practise.
345 In the final statements, for instance, the consumer organisation Verbraucherzentrale Bundesverband 
wams against an insidious contamination o f  all foodstuffs which will eliminate consumer choice, and the en­
vironmental organisation Deutsche Naturschutzring claims that for industry freedom o f  choice only means 
the choice between more or less contaminated foodstuffs, which is not a real choice. “Wer gentechnische 
Kontaminationen hinter Schwellenwerten verstecken will, zeigt damit klar, dass er nicht in der Lage oder 
nicht Willens ist, gentechnische veränderte Verunreinigungen aus der Nahrungskette herauszuhalten”.
Verband Deutscher Ölmühlen, on the other hand, claimed that “Auch die fur Wahlfreiheit notwendiger 
Kennzeichnung funktioniert nicht ohne Schwellenwerte. Wahlfreiheit hat immer auch praktische Grenzen.”
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A summary o f these observations is compiled in the following table:
R isk  controversy 
them atic:
Trust thematic: M ediation them atic:
Social Agenda negotiated among 
participating organisations.
Public concerns funneled 
through stakeholders and 
fed to political system by 
means o f sectorial repre­
sentation
\Xlllingness of Government 
to pay attention to all con­
cerns articulated through 
in c lu sio n  o f  all relevant 
stakeholders
Clearly diverging perspec­
tives and interests mediated 
though a combination o f  
arguing and bargaining 
among stakeholders in 
equal proportion
Tem poral Procedures initiated to 
break political deadlock 
when international pressure 
arose
Clear synchronisation with 
electoral cycle.
Procedures allegedly organ­
ised prior to policy com­
mitments being formed by 
Government to win support 
of organisational landscape
Consensual points framed 
as lasting’ agreements. 
Dissensual issues ‘post­
poned’ to be dealt with 
elsewhere by other means
Substantive Inclusive agenda.
Fundamental questions (if 
rather than boa) allowed on 
agenda
Participating stakeholders 
allowed to set the agenda 
and decide (advise on) perti­
nent issues for policy­
makers
Dominant cultural bias: 
Procedural (hierarchical)
Mediation pursued through 
abstraction, i.e. ‘principles’ 
general enough to be com­
patible with the mode o f 
observation o f most actors
The Problem of Mediation
Specialised procedures devised for communicating about and possibly mitigating contro­
versies about risky and controversial technologies are, following my argument, faced with a 
number of challenges before they fulfil their self-prescribed functions. As explored in the 
previous chapters, they need to devise mechanisms for achieving resonance for their com­
munication in their (relevant) environments, and criteria for regulating the inclusion and 
exclusion of legitimate participants. A further challenge, which arguably is particularly pro­
nounced in the German case (but certainly not absent in the other cases), has to do with 
what I will call the problem of mediation — how different modes o f observation can in some 
way be reconciled in the procedures. If by the problem of mediation we understand the 
ability to facilitate social processes that produce communications, which can find support 
among a wide spectrum of involved participants,346 the problem can be explored in differ­
ent ways. From the perspective of the participatory and deliberative ideals underpinning 
most public involvement procedures, the problem of mediation is concerned with prevent­












546 Either explicitly o r implicitly through the failure to raise objections.
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and strategic interest maintenance (see Chapter II). The ideal is to establish conditions 
where collective actors are willing to Virtualise’ their usual modes of observation and their 
accompanying validity claims and temporarily take on the perspectives of their adversaries 
in order to pursue collective problem solving.347
Here, however, I shall opt for a less normativistic perspective on this types of challenge. In 
Chapter III I argued that technological controversies should be understood against the 
background o f an understanding of modem societies as functionally differentiated, as well 
as how the asymmetries in modes of observations by organisations can be recounted in a 
parsimonious manner with inspiration from Cultural Theory. This, in my opinion, provides 
a fruitful starting point for analysing why such controversies appear to be so difficult to 
settle and why, when one topic has been abandoned either because it has been settled or 
simply because of a switch of focus, controversy tends to move into new fields.
Despite these theoretically convincing predictions that the reconciliation of perceptual dif­
ferences regarding technological risk and desirable technological trajectories is unlikely to 
occur, modem societies cannot, it seems, abandon the search for viable methods o f media­
tion. In the quest for social integration a certain level of shared references appears to be 
necessary (or are at least considered desirable). Hence the evolution of particular systems of 
communication as the procedures discussed here can be seen as attempts to find (argumen­
tative) means to deal with controversies. The perspective outlined here can, I contend, help 
in pointing to some of challenges faced by such procedures which are less evident in the 
advocating perspectives described in Chapter II. For instance, the German case recounted 
in this chapter shows that such procedures may in fact risk reifying controversies when ex­
isting differences of perspective are built into the procedural design. They will not neces­
sarily mitigate controversies simply because an ‘argumentative’ mode of communication 
has installed.
From different modes of sociological observation, the problem of mediation can be located at 
the intersection o f good arguments (or evidence), bargaining power, and the cultural biases 
of collective actors, which presumably are all important factors for the dynamic o f such 
procedures. In the systems theoretical approach the problem can be explored more ab­
stractly as a matter o f (collectively) selecting between and applying mutually exclusive codi­
fications of the subsystems of a functionally differentiated society7. When working from the 
assumption o f systems theory it must be made clear that ‘mediation’ cannot be taken to 
mean de-differentiation of the communication in the functional domains. It has instead to 
do with the fact that on the organisational level a multiplicity o f codes must be observed. 
However, different organisations observe in different manners, which is why ‘mediation’
(as a process where organisations mutually adjust to each others operations) must take
347 As discussed earlier this is arguably more likely to be facilitated in social situation involving the co­
presence of individuals (van den Daele 2001), as is often provided for in such procedures.
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place if the kind o f procedures investigated here are to fulfil their tasks. For analytical pur­
poses, I suggest the problem can be partitioned by considering how for any given issue the 
communication in the procedures select 1) what is or should be the appropriate code or 
framing in a given situation (‘discursive context’ of communication) and 2) how the code 
or frame is to be correctly applied (programmatic level of communication). This means de­
ciding for instance whether the acceptance of applying genetic engineering in agriculture 
should depend (solely) on whether it entails physical risks or (also) on the various expected 
socio-economic effects of applying the technology.348 Once this selection has been made, 
the next level emerges, with questions about what the ‘adequate* level of protection against 
physical risk should be and how this can be established, what should count as positive or 
negative socio-economic effects and who or what gets to decide this.349 O f course commu­
nication about such issues in reality proceeds in a manner significantly less ordered than 
this set of analytical distinctions suggests, as contributions pertaining to both levels are 
constantly intermingled. The present case shows quite vividly how difficult it is to align the 
modes of observation and selection o f different collective actors — in particular when the 
respective perspectives are rooted in longstanding organisational commitments and the ac­
tors see one another other as ‘opponents’ already prior to the initiation of the procedure.
Arguably, then, a decisive element in participator)' procedures is to determine and reach 
agreement on adequate framing(s) at the code-level as well as at the programtic level. The 
DGG procedures operated with a multiplicity of codes (scientific, legal, economic),350 
which allowed the controversy to span different discursive domains or modes o f observa­
tion. J lowcvcr, it seems that the whole procedure was permeated by a meta-code of for or 
against (see also Chapter 1) which made mediation particularly difficult as it circumvents 
and fuses the social mechanisms normally in place to select between code values.
In some formats ‘the public’ is brought in as a third-party mediator in order to ‘force’ the 
adversaries to communicate in an argumentative fashion (as seen in difterent ways in the 
Danish and British cases) when selecting codes and applying programmes. This was not the 
case in the DGG procedure, but arguably the political system served a similar function.
One perspective on the code level, which is often conferred a privileged status in such pro­
cedures, is scientific knowledge. Scientific expertise is deemed indispensable for managing 
technological risks, but is often also the discursive domain where frame clashes are most
348 Or stated differently whether it ought to be primarily a 'political’ or an ‘economic’ decision, i.e. whether it 
should be decided with reference to ‘the public’ understood as citizens or consumers.
349 More concretely in the present case the problem wras in the first instance to decide whether biodiversity' 
should be considered a value in itself and whether it should be a duty to inform consumers about the GM 
content o f products.
Once these issues were ‘agreed’ upon, it was discussed how such decisions should be operationalised. In this 
case agreement was communicated on the first level, but the second level — where operational principles o f 
regulation were to be formulated — remained unsettled.





prominent and most difficult to process. It is readily accepted that organisations have dif­
ferent ideological preferences and contradictory economic interests — and that these may be 
irreconcilable. However, it is often expected -  though mostly proves to be difficult -  that 
such proceduralisations of technological controversies should at minimum clarify ‘matters 
of fact’ as a first step towards mediation.351 This was also stated as an aim for the DGG 
procedures by the BMVEL. However, the procedural format selected, with its polarised use 
of expertise, arguably did not facilitate this aim, and it seems that confrontations among the 
participants regarding the scientific questions were as much about the value of different 
scientific approaches to settling the controversies, as they were about the specific cognitive 
knowledge claims (that is, making generally acceptable selections on the programmatic 
level).352 In sum, significant effort was made to ‘qualify* the debates through the inclusion 
of experts. However, as it was acknowledged from the outset that a unitary cognitive 
evaluation was unlikely to emerge or find broad acceptance in the communication, little 
actual mediation was achieved in this area.
Although the use of scientific expertise is o f course only one aspect of the problem o f me­
diation, its use is often seen as a particularly important prerequisite for mediation in such 
procedures. I t is also one of the areas, it seems, where ‘politicisation* is most difficult to 
deal with. I shall therefore focus in particular on this aspect in the comparative section, 
evaluating the different procedures with regard to how they strive to establish competence in 
different ways as a means of mediating in technological controversies.
351 In the German experience the perceived importance of the scientific perspective was particularly evident 
in the WZB procedure where scientific knowledge was pre-selected to perform the function of a privileged 
mode o f  argumentation.
352 Therefore, the selection o f expertise could proceed on a quantitative rather than a qualitative basis, as each 




account for their respective 
be gained from comparing
responses to challenges aris­
ing from tensions between the normative understandings of democratically governed, 
modem societies — which requires ‘inclusionary’ legitimatory mechanisms, and their func­
tionally differentiated structures as producing various kinds of risks — which require ‘exclu­
sionary’ expertise to be managed.353 As such, I contend, they can be seen as functionally 
equivalent social responses to ‘similar’ problems, namely a differentiation o f specialised 
communicative contexts in which controversies grounded in diverging modes of observa­
tion of agricultural biotechnology are hopefully mitigated through participatory' and delib­
erative mechanisms. In order to show that the procedures can in fact be seen as function­
ally equivalent and in order to render them comparable, I have characterised the proce­
dures according to three dimensions derived from the theoretical discussion undertaken 
earlier, namely how they seek 1) to reconfigure the decision-maker/affected divide (the risk 
controversy thematic), 2) to ensure a willingness to delegate decision-making competences 
(the trust thematic) and 3) to establish social mechanisms that can facilitate mediation be­
tween the diverging perspectives present in the controversies (the mediation thematic).
This characterisation has in my opinion demonstrated that the procedures can be consid­
ered sociologically comparable. Despite this common structural background, the proce­
dures exhibit noticeable differences, which must be attributed to a host of factors, includ­
ing their national contexts and more contingent circumstances, and I expect that despite 
numerous differences a comparison will further enhance the understanding of what is at 
stake in the individual cases.
However, the comparison ought also to contribute to the explanatory aim of the thesis, 
namely to develop a more general understanding of the background, dynamics and effects 
of such procedures. Hence, I shall seek to draw insights from the comparison that can help 
explain similarities and differences in the participatory formats observed and in the effects 
o f the procedures.
One highly notable, overall similarity is that in none of the cases studied have the proce­
dures been able to actually ‘do away’ with controversy in the sense that contentious com­
Having described the three cases separately and attempted to 
contexts and dynamics, I shall now explore what insights can 
them more systematically.
I have argued that the procedures investigated can be seen as
353 With Luhmann one could say a tension can be observed between the socialstructure -  the ingrown modes of 
operation of a functionally differentiated society — and a democratic semantic -  the expectation of increased 
inclusion — and that this induces the evolution o f  new ways o f  communicating about technology.
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munication about agricultural biotechnology has ceased in the respective public spheres.354 
In order to explore why that is the case in a more detailed manner, I have argued that the 
procedures investigated are faced with different ‘challenges’ to achieving their self- 
prescribed aims. My interest in these challenges is grounded in the assumption that some­
thing useful can be learned from exploring not only what can be immediately observed in 
regard to such procedures, but also where they do not perform as expected or desired (ac­
cording to their self-descriptions). The fact that the procedures investigated experienced 
different challenges -  compiled under the headings o f ‘resonance’, ‘inclusion’ and ‘media­
tion’ — is taken as an indication that because they are located in different contexts and ex­
hibit different organisational features, challenges are concentrated at different points. 
Nonetheless, I intented to show in this chapter that the challenges identified as particularly 
pronounced in one of the three cases point to issues, which are present in all cases and ar­
guably pose general questions for such procedures o f public involvement. I do not claim 
that these challenges are exhaustive for the difficulties such procedures may encounter, but 
as they seem theoretically relevant and are observable in the empirical material I take them 
to express something significant about the kind of procedures investigated.
In the following I shall seek to compare the cases along dimensions derived from the chal­
lenges identified during the case studies, although they will be given slightly different la­
bels.355 356The problem of inclusion discussed in relation to the British case will be taken up 
again here under the label of the ‘construction of representativeness’, the problem of me­
diation identified as particularly pronounced in the German case (where I argued that me­
diation seems particularly challenging in relation to the use o f science), will be taken as an 
occasion to discuss what I call the ‘construction of competence’ and finally the problem of 
resonance introduced in relation to the Danish case will be addressed here under the label 
o f ‘links to policy making’. Arguably, these thematics represent issues that all participatory 
and deliberative procedures must address in one way or another when ‘operationalising’ the 
public for involvement with policy making, and I shall seek to explicate and explain how 
different solutions to these issues were chosen in my cases and what effects this had.350
554 More abstractly a technological controversy can be said to have ceased when broadly accepted criteria for 
when the technology is ‘working’ and when it is not working have been adapted in society — or when the in­
volved actors simply turn their attention to something else.
355 This re-labelling is intended to indicate that although die problématiques are introduced in the context of 
the respective cases where they are most pronounced, they are in fact issues that all procedures have dealt 
with, and arguably that all participatory procedures need to deal with.
356 Arguably, these dimensions correspond (roughly) to the three types o f  challenges posed by ‘radical uncer­
tainty’ în PTA procedures as identified by Pellizioni (2003a) and discussed in Chapter II. These were incom­
mensurability, indeterminacy and complexity, which can be seen as requiring selections on (among other 
things) issues such as ‘who should be included?’, ‘what knowledge is required?’ and *how are procedures made 
efficacious?’, which is very much in line with the dimensions suggested here. As such, the results o f  compari­
son can also feed back into some o f  the theoretical discussions approached in earlier chapters. Similar issues 
are addressed in the comparative volume edited by Joss and Bellucci (2002).
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A few disclaimers are perhaps required to make the aim of the comparison clean the thesis 
does not operate with causal hypotheses of a propositional kind to be ‘tested* (Svhen par­
ticipation goes up, controversy goes down*) proceeding instead in a more interpretive man­
ner, as the investigation has sought to be as sensitive as possible to the details of the cases. 
Therefore, the explanatory mode will not lay down laws’, but explore more cautiously what 
can be learned in light of the research question from the comparison of the case studies 
according to the theoretical considerations outlined earlier. This somewhat modest ex­
planatory ambition is necessitated by the nature of the empirical material compiled (dense 
description o f a few cases). Arguably, the only really overarching explanatory variable avail­
able in the material is ‘national context*, as organisational features of the three cases vary on 
so many points and are so immersed in their respective contexts, that it seems difficult to 
draw unambiguous causal conclusions about the relationship between the procedural for­
mats, framings o f the substantive issues addressed and the subsequent effects of the proce­
dures.357 Although the three contexts included exhibit noticeable differences in institutional 
structure and political culture, this cannot in my opinion carry the explanatory load re­
quired to account for all the differences observed. Institutional and thematic path- 
dependencies o f  a more contingent kind must also be considered, as I sought to show in 
the descriptive sections of the case studies.
However, variations in the national contexts of the different cases have been observed, 
which could justify a cautious claim that comparatively speaking they lean towards, respec­
tively, ‘egalitarian* (Denmark), ‘individualist* (the UK) and ‘hierarchical’ (Germany) political 
cultures. However, in my opinion these cultural theoretical concepts are more applicable at 
the organisational (meso) level rather than at the societal (macro) level and are not expected 
to fully account for the variation observed. Therefore, the national contexts can be used to 
explore aspects o f the effects of the procedures, but not to explain in any strict sense how 
they developed their specific shapings.
In line with the theoretical explorations in Chapter III the interpretive strategy will be to 
apply a systems theoretical mode of observation to explore the ‘challenges* experienced by 
the procedures and a cultural theoretical ‘extension’ to explore the differences in the organ­
isational responses to these challenges expressed in the procedural designs.
Construction of Representativeness
The attempts to facilitate a larger involvement of ‘the public’ in technological policy mak­
ing considered in this thesis can be interpreted as means to remedy perceived shortcomings 
in the workings o f the institutional mechanisms of representative democracy, notably the 
apparently declining ability to ensure the broad acceptance of technological dynamics
557 Similar difficulties are encountered and discussed by the comparisons o f  van Eijndhoven and van Est 
(2002), Biitschi and Nentwich (2002) and Hennen (2002).
2 9 3
through ‘inclusion’. This, however, does not mean that such procedures are not confronted 
with questions about their representativeness, especially as they are often accompanied by a 
rhetoric of ‘enhanced’ democracy. This was particularly pronounced in the British case, 
where I discussed it in Luhmannian terms as a problem of regulating the inclusion and ex­
clusion from the procedure o f different kinds of actors. However, I propose that this is an 
issue all such procedures must find solutions to and can be defined as the need to construct 
a representativeness that can legitimise the procedures internally as well as externally (see 
also van Eijndhoven and van Est 2002). This was resolved differently across my cases, as I 
shall now seek to explicate.358
In the Danish consensus conference the core element, the lay panel, is a small and by na­
ture highly exclusive group. Only those few selected by the DBT may participate. Obviously a 
panel of fifteen people cannot be representative of the larger population in a statistical 
sense. Yet the driving ideal behind such conferences is that the lay panel are more authentic 
representatives of ‘the public’ or ‘ordinary people’ than can be achieve through interest 
group representation in other types o f consultations. This authenticity -  based on a sort of 
‘value representativity’ (the spectrum of values present in the wider population should be 
covered) — is allegedly achieved through the fact that the lay panel have no ‘interests’ in the 
topic to be evaluated.
The panel consists of citizens, who have volunteered individually, and to the extent they 
may be said to have a mandate this is only because the DBT has vested them with it. None­
theless, it seems that in Denmark the political system has by and large accepted consensus 
conferences as a valuable and reliable complement to other channels through which the 
political system can observe its environment (e.g. surveys, mass mediated debates, consulta­
tions with stakeholders etc.).359 Although the organisational format of the consensus con­
ference is inspired by participatory ideals o f an active citizenry (Andersen and Jaeger 1999: 
333), from the point of view o f the political system they serve only an advisory function 
and their outputs do not pre-empt political decision making.
Sociologically consensus conferences share certain traits with the focus group methodol­
ogy, the main difference being that the lay panel is provided with information before they 
are requested to deliberate, and that this deliberation entails dialogical interaction with ‘ex­
pertise’. Nonetheless, it appears that the conferences have been dignified as a political meth­
odology which is well suited to articulate concerns of ‘the public’, in a way that is incon­
ceivable for ordinary focus groups.
is« jn regard to the Danish case I shall focus primarily on the consensus conference explored because this 
procedure designates a bigger role for lay involvement and is arguably the procedural format of m ost interest 
to the topic at hand.
359 Which is certainly not the case in other national contexts where the consensus conference format has been 
sough1 ‘imported’ (van Eijndhoven and van E st 2002: 223-24).
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In the second Danish process discussed, the BioTIK. initiative, ‘the public’ was not initially 
activated. I would suggest instead that the process can be interpreted as an attempt to dig­
nify the concerns o f the public, which many experts considered cognitively unfounded, by 
providing them with an ‘ethical’ framing prior to the launch of a public debate.360 361The sub­
sequent initiative to stimulate public debate aimed at reaching out as broadly as possible, 
i.e. the ‘invitation’ from the political system to participate was non-exclusive. However, as no 
feed-back mechanisms were established to facilitate ‘direct’ uptake in the policy arena, the 
representativity o f the communicative contributions in the public sphere did not arise as an
• 361issue.
For both the Danish initiatives it can be noted that the level of communicated antagonism 
was relatively low. O f course there were differing evaluation of biotechnology by the expert 
panel o f the consensus conference, but the procedural function of the lay panel was exactly 
to act as a mediator following ‘common sense’, and not taking sides in the ongoing contro­
versy, Likewise, the public debate facilitated by the BioTIK. initiative aimed to raise ‘issues’ 
in a manner that was relatively independent of social positions and interests. The aim was a 
resonating public sphere where themes could be debated in way, which were not tied to the 
interests of specific social actors.
Representativeness need not only be concerned with the social composition of the proce­
dures. It can arguably also pertain to the thematic content of the communication, i.e. that 
the themes processed mirror the ‘actual’ concerns of the public and not the organisers. 
Therefore, it is worth comparing how the agendas of topics to be processed in the proce­
dures are set. In the Danish consensus conference the overall theme was selected by the 
organisers at the DBT, although the lay panel was allegedly given the freedom to address 
any issue it felt were important. Therefore the outputs could subsequently be communi­
cated as the ‘undistorted’ concerns and recommendations o f ‘the public’.
In contrast to the Danish consensus conference, the British GM Nation? event was em­
phatically non-exchisionaiy. The aim of the organisers was to facilitate and support a wide 
public debate where ‘everybody’ was given the opportunity to express their viewpoints and 
debate with other interested citizens — as individual citizens.362 The primary aim was to cre­
ate channels o f communication for those who felt they had not been heard, and not in the
360 The relevance o f an ethical approach was established via both ‘intrinsic’ arguments (biotechnologyperse 
requires ethical standards) and ‘extrinsic’ arguments (public confidence will arise only if biotechnology is 
checked against ethical standards).
361 This could be interpreted either (positively) as the assumption of an existence o f a vibrant civil society, 
which would by itself ensure the desired resonance in the political systems for issues of public concern, or 
(negatively) as a strategy to diffuse public concerns by a feigned willingness to listen but without any institu­
tional means to take notice of the articulated concerns. The compiled material does not allow me to assess if 
one interpretation is more adequate that the other.
362 It was, as I have shown, an explicit aim that organised interests be bypassed.
first instance to ensure demographic diversity. As described, this meant that the procedure 
was exposed to  suspicions of self-selection bias, which — especially in the eyes o f pro-GM 
organisations — practically invalidated the exercise as an articulation of ‘the public’s* con­
cerns.361 *63 The fact that a large number o f  people were willing to turn up at public meetings 
and express (at times very strong) opinions was seen to invalidate rather than strengthen 
the exercise in the eyes of some observers. The organisers were aware that self-selection 
issues could cause problems for the credibility of the exercise. As described, they therefore 
organised a series of reconvened focus groups to act as a control group. In effect, the pro­
cedure, which was envisioned to be non-exclusionary, depended on exclusionary mechanisms 
in order to establish its credibility as representative o f ‘the public* -  in a much more con­
trolled manner than in the Danish case.
In their report the steering board of the debate was keen to stress that there were in fact 
identical or at least parallel trends between the concerns expressed in the exclusionary and 
non-exclusionary debate forums. However, as some critics o f the procedure were quick to 
point out, although the focus groups were not self-selected, they were no more ‘democ­
ratic* or accountable than existing channels of policy advice, nor were they necessarily any 
wiser or more responsible. Again in contrast to the Danish case, neither the open meetings 
nor the focus groups were perceived as democratically dignified or vested with a mandate.
As communicative forums they were significantly more contested and the level o f antago­
nism in the organisation of the procedure and interpretation o f the outcomes was markedly 
higher than in the Danish case.
Another ambition of the British procedure was to address the concerns o f ‘the public’ from 
their own perspective and not — as had hitherto been the norm — through their translation 
into scientific, economic or regulatory questions. However, as it was not considered feasi­
ble to undertake agenda-setting during the large-scale public meetings, here again focus 
groups were organised in order to identify concerns and framings recognised by the par­
ticipants.
In the separate scientific review-strand o f the exercise, ‘representative’ mechanisms were 
also activated to support the credibility o f science in the eyes of the public. An apparendy 
widespread assumption that scientists did not fully understand the causalities of GM agri­
culture was countered through social rather than cognitive mechanisms, by selecting a 
panel to perform a review on the basis o f both attitudes to GM commercialisation and the 
organisational affiliations of the experts.364 Here, however, the aim was not a statistical rep­
361 Arguably, then, the public meetings were no t very different from the mass mediated public debate; only
people with strong opinions shift from an audience to a speaker role — just as people with preconceived 
strong opinions turned up at the meetings. O f  course more speakers were allowed or enabled to speak (albeit
to a much smaller audience) than in the mass mediated public sphere.
364 This o f  course was grounded in the assumption that at least part o f the public distrust in expertise had to 
do with the suspicion that some experts were not independent o f  economic interests rather than an assess­
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resentation of the distribution of evaluations present in die ‘scientific public’. Rather, the 
aim was to span the full variety of viewpoints on GMOs that had been expressed in scien­
tific form. The intention, it seems, was as much to strengthen the acceptability of the out­
come as it was to strengthen the cognitive quality of the review.365 This approach can be 
claimed to conform to diagnoses o f ‘post normal science’ and ‘socially robust knowledge 
production’ in which the validity (or rather acceptance) of knowledge claims depend as 
much on die social circumstances o f its production as on their cognitive content (see Chap­
ter II).3*5
The German DGG procedure was organised as a stakeholder-based technology assessment 
exercise. Therefore, the mechanisms o f inclusion and exclusion were ordered differently 
from procedures with lay involvement and the issues concerning representativeness are dif­
ferent. From my investigation it seems that the issue o f representativity -  which usually 
forms an important part o f the credibility of such an exercise in the eyes of public observ­
ers -  was given little explicit consideration in the organisation of the procedure. As far as I 
have been able to establish, it was taken for granted that if or when concerns of whatever 
kind were present in civil society or ‘the public’, these would ‘naturally’ be articulated 
through organisations. Therefore, no lay involvement as such was perceived as necessary 
from the viewpoint of the organisers in the political system, in fact it was considered a po­
tential liability to the procedure since ordinary people did not possess adequate knowl­
edge.367 Based on these assumptions organisations were considered as the most convenient 
access point for the political system to probe into such concerns and explore socially viable 
policy options. The procedure was only open to specifically invited organisations, the rele­
vance of which was decided by the responsible ministry. In practical terms this does not 
seem to have caused any controversy and, to my knowledge, no organisations who wished 
to participate were denied access. Arguably, the procedure was indeed more ‘open’ than 
usual corporatist policy making, in terms of both participants and transparency for outsid-
ment o f  their cognitive competence per se. To argue as I do here that the attitudes expressed by (some of) the 
scientists worked as selection criterion is not to say that scientific competences were neglected. 1 only wish to 
draw attention to the fact that scientific credentials were notin fact the sole selection criteria.
365 1 have no means to assess the scientific quality o f the work o f the panel, but the use o f the scientific 
evaluation in the British procedure seems to conform quite well with Luhmann’s general point that more 
research on risk issues is usually as likely to produce more uncertainty as more certainty — and unlikely to 
make political decision making any less complicated (Luhmann 1991).
366 That it should not be seen as an instance o f  de-differentiation is visible in the fact that what was changed 
compared to other advisory committees was the social composition (e.g. regulation of membership rule at the 
organisational level) not the feet that communication proceeded in a scientific mode.
361 Nor was any lay involvement (to my knowledge) advocated by the participating organisations, who sought 
to present themselves as representing either the true concerns o f the population (GM sceptic organisations) 
o r what was really in the public interest, namely a responsible application o f  GM technology (GM advocates).
2 9 7
ers. This, combined with its discursive mode of operation, was sufficient to make the pro­
cedure seem rather ‘alternative* in the German context.
It was clearly the intention of the ministry to establish the legitimacy of the exercise by in­
cluding ‘everyone’ with a view or a stake in the issues to be considered. However, com­
pared to the procedures involving lay people, where questions about representativeness are 
concerned with the ability of either selected lay groups, or the composition of those turning 
up voluntarily to mirror the attitudes o f the general population, the criteria for entitlement 
to participate in the stakeholder discourse were more varied and, it seems, the qualities, 
quantities and justifications o f the different ‘stakes’ were not weighed in a uniform manner. 
The organisations invited ranged from business interest organisations (biotech, agriculture, 
food retailers) to unions and churches, to consumer and environmental organisations. In 
that respect I have argued that representativity was based on sectorial rather than demo­
graphic criteria. Here an interesting difference to the Danish consensus conference can be 
noted. In the Danish case the ‘representativeness* of the lay panel was ensured by selecting 
people with no interests (i.e. ‘neutral’ citizens as arbiters), whilst in the German procedure 
this was achieved by bringing in the actors with most interest (i.e. stakeholders confronting 
each other directly instead of directing their demands to the political system).
In the activities of the steering committee ‘representativity’ was not established according 
to any external social criteria, but was derived from the issue to be debated, as fairness in 
representation was equated with a quantitative balance between advocates and sceptics of 
the technology. This procedural design was presumably necessary to ensure the participa­
tion o f those considered important for the external legitimacy o f the exercise, but it clearly 
contributed to the rather adversarial modes of interaction and communication, which 
meant that the level of antagonism was high throughout the procedure.
As the DDG event was supposed to ‘discursive*, i.e. based on the exchange of arguments 
removed from everyday politics, neither the number of members, nor economic impor­
tance or the intensity o f preferences o f  the participating organisations were in principle ac­
cepted as legitimate criteria on which to base the selections. At the rhetorical level this 
meant that once included, all had to abide by argumentative rules and procedures. In prac­
tice, however, veto-powers combined with exit-threats from central actors became decisive 
for communication in the procedure. The arrangement of a discursive procedure did not 
do away with power-struggles, (at best) it simply moved them into the preparatory phases. 
This meant that the agenda setting was a matter of bargaining, not particularly ‘discursive’. 
This was to some degree evident in all the procedures, but was particularly pronounced in
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the German case, where the already polarised fronts were reified in the organisation o f the 
procedure when the different sides coordinated their strategies.368
The comparisons made so far in this section are summarised in the following table:
DK UK D
Ideal of represen ta­
tion and  selection 
criteria of partic i­
pants
Small, exclusive group 
digpified through 
demographic diversity 
(expected to ensure 
value diversity) delib­






Inclusion of all those 
who turn up to offer 
an opinion and debate 
with fellow citizens — 
‘Interested* citizens 
articulating opinions
Representation of a 
spectrum of societal 
concerns by sectorial 
rather than demo­





Level o f an tago­
nism  in procedure
Low Medium to higjh High
Agenda se tting  for 
them es to be  proc­
essed
Issues framed by the 
DBT and steering 
committee, specific 
agenda set by lay 
panel
Agenda set by steering 
board through consul­
tation with ‘represen­
tative’ focus groups to 
mirror concerns of 
the public
Agenda negotiated be­
tween participants to 
accommodate special 
concerns
Focus of leg iti­
macy of procedure
External -  political 
system (and wider 
public)
External -  wider pub­




As the confrontation of these three different modes o f constructing representativeness 
shows, the regulation of inclusion and exclusion in the social dimension, i.e. deciding who 
the relevant actors and audiences are and who should be allowed to participate and how, 
can be solved in a number of different ways in procedures that are all advertised as partici­
patory and/or deliberative ways of mitigating technological controversies.
From the cases considered here it can be argued that in procedures involving lay people — 
committed or non-committed — the legitimacy of the procedure seems to hinge upon the 
ability to establish a composition that is in some respect, be it numerical or thematic, mir­
rors the concerns of ‘ordinary people'. Hence, even in cases where procedures are meant to 
function as (allegedly creative) alternatives or supplements to the standard operations o f 
representative democracies, the representativity-issue cannot be ignored. Furthermore,
368 In the Danish and British cases a significant number of issues pertaining to procedural aspects as well as 
substantive framings were also negotiated (bargained) in the respective steering committees prior to the ‘ac­
tual', public deliberative procedures.
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when lay people (ordinary citizens) are involved, legitimacy is primarily assessed by external 
observers, be they the decision-makers to whom the outputs are addressed, mass media 
observers and commentators, or the stakeholders that are affected by the outcomes of such 
procedures. The organisers of this type o f public participation seem very aware o f this. In 
the theoretical language suggested in this thesis it means that they are aware that they are 
observed not only by particular actors within their environment and with whom they are in 
a strategic relationship, but also by non-localised public opinion that can resonate either 
favourably or not to both the procedural form and its substantive output.
In stakeholder-based procedures it seems that legitimacy is much more of an internal issue. 
The acceptance of the participants weighs more heavily in the first instance, i.e. acceptance 
among the participants of the procedure is a prerequisite for the procedure to function at 
all. Obviously, exit threats from central actors who feel that their interests are under pres­
sure weigh more heavily than those from individual, non-organised lay people. In the Dan­
ish consensus conference format exit threats by members o f the lay panel does not seem a 
likely scenario. In the British procedure where there were no restrictions on participation, 
distrust in the procedures could be articulated (and resonate) in the meetings but exit- 
threats would have had little practical consequence.369 370One could also say that in the Ger­
man case the active participation of stakeholders throughout the procedure -  although the 
substantive agreements reached were meagre — itself lent some legitimacy to the process. 
This is not necessarily the case for the British event, where the large turnout of people was 
perceived as more ambiguous in terms of legitimacy. In the German case exit threats from 
central actors were very real and could have invalidated the whole exercise,3'0 which gave 
‘important* actors significant leeway for non-argumentative bargaining.
It was argued in Chapters II and III that the kinds o f procedures considered share intellec­
tual underpinnings and socio-structural roots. One may therefore wonder why they were 
carried out in such different ways on the points suggested here. As the controversies in 
which they were meant to intervene were latgely similar, these differences cannot be ex­
plained with reference to the technologies in question. The selections of those designing 
the procedures are presumably contingent to some extent. However, they also seem to 
adapt to the political-cultural contexts they are embedded in. For instance the Danish pro­
cedures are seen as rooted in and contributing to a specific Danish political culture, and 
they were received with much less reservation from both the political system and stake­
holders than the British one — as would be expected from a political culture with more
369.. .in regard to the open meetings component. Both the steering board o f die public debate, which in­
cluded stake-holder representatives, and the scientific review panel experienced exit threats and actual with­
drawal.
370 As was to some extent the case in the earlier discursive procedure at the WZB.
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egalitarian traits.371 Although the British political system has arguably embarked on reform­
ing the way science, politics and the public interact, the British organisers had a much 
harder time persuading the political system that the necessary public inputs could not be 
derived from surveys of individual opinions and market decisions, but required (at least as a 
supplement) an elaborate deliberative procedure. Likewise, the German stakeholder based 
procedure with a more sectorial approach to representativeness seemed more convenient in 
a corporatist political culture, where the inclusion and acceptance of major stakeholders is a 
central criteria for successful policy making and plebescitarian forms of politics are consid­
ered with some suspicion.372
Construction of Competence
I have argued that one significant challenge to participatory/deliberative procedures is to 
mediate between the various modes o f observation present in the technological controver­
sies in which they intervene. This was particularly evident in the German case where the 
incommensurabilities seemed particularly hardened, but it was also an issue in the other 
cases. I suggested that this problem could be theoretically reconstructed as pertaining to 
selections on two levels, namely controversies over the choice o f the appropriate (dominant) 
codes or discursive framings to guide policy, and over the application of those codes or 
framings (which is where a cultural theoretical extension of systems theory1 seems desirable 
in order to account for patterns of variation). The procedures considered here are charac­
terised by being (temporary) organisations, which must operate with a multiplicity o f func­
tional perspectives. In fact, it is part and parcel of their raison d’etre that they are able op­
erate in a poly-perspectivistic manner and seek to facilitate mediation.
Nonetheless, one discursive domain, science (or ‘matters of fact*), is often considered of 
particular importance in technological controversies. Most actors see science as indispensa­
ble when regulating technologies, but disagreements about the appropriate application o f 
the ‘truth-code’ seem endless. This thesis does not ascribe to the widespread assumption 
that technological controversies are uniquely (or mainly) rooted in ‘scientific uncertainty’,373 
but cognitive disagreement certainty plays a significant role in such controversies. Hence, I 
consider it to particularly relevant to compare how the procedures in my investigation in­
cluded communication on matters o f fact or, more broadly, how they sought to construct 
competence.
371 However, it should not be overlooked that the Danish procedures achieved significantly less public and 
political resonance, which may simply have made it less relevant for political actors and stakeholders to dis­
agree with the outputs.
373 This said, it should not be overlooked that different procedural formats -  also pertaining to other techno­
logical as well as non-technological topics — are being explored in all three countries. Therefore not too much 
weight should be gjven to this ‘explanation*. Reliable results would require more extensive investigations.
371 See Schwarz and Thompson (1990) for a criticism of this ‘mainstream* view.
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The question of competence is particularly pertinent for procedures involving lay people, 
as they must compete for the attention o f policy makers with more traditional, expert- 
based forms o f policy advice. If lay people in such procedures only deliver ‘attitudes’ 
(which diverge from expert evaluations) they are less interesting for decision makers. This 
may change, however, if it can be proved that they in some way represent ‘qualified’ opin­
ions or people with an elevated measure o f competence, be it o f a cognitive or normative 
nature.
An important motive in the organisation o f the Danish consensus conferences is, it seems, 
that they articulate what the wider population would think o f a given topic, i f  they were ade­
quately enlightened (and were encouraged to deliberate with each other on the basis of this 
knowledge). This is what distinguishes them from surveys, and particularly from focus 
groups, where people merely articulate opinions. Therefore, the lay panel is confronted with 
a relatively broad spectrum of expertise to assist them in deliberating on the complicated 
topics concerned. It seems that this enlightened mini-public is one o f the reasons consensus 
conferences have found wide acceptance in Denmark and have generated international at­
tention. Although there is a clear role differentiation between experts and lay people, it can 
almost be argued that the consensus conference entails a deliberate blurring of the 
fact/value distinction other policy advice typically claims to uphold, since what is sought 
here is precisely such value-based policy advice, not neutral expert assessments to be 
passed on to decision makers.
Looking back to the perspectives of the theoretical considerations in the sociology of risk, 
it can be argued that the consensus conferences allow the affected parties — those that are 
excluded from decision making but must live with their consequences — to articulate their 
concerns (to the extent that it is accepted that the deliberations o f a lay panel of 15 persons 
can represent such concerns) in ways that are allegedly more qualified and hence more dig­
nified than would otherwise be the case.
Although the consensus conference’s aim was to cognitively qualify the evaluations of the 
lay panel, it is noticeable that, in comparison to the other cases (which admittedly were on 
grander scales), the inflow of cognitive knowledge was relatively modest. It was part of the 
background o f the conference that political uncertainties had in part arisen from cognitive 
uncertainties and lingering disagreements among stakeholders and regulators about what 
‘the facts’ were. However, no expert studies were commissioned for the procedure as in the 
other cases. The knowledge carried by the invited experts was considered adequate for 
enlightening the lay panel sufficiently, perhaps because in reality no specific policy initia­
tives were expected to be based on the outcomes (alone). Instead, cognitive uncertainties 
were bridged through social mechanisms, i.e. by the appointment of a balanced number of 
experts that were known to be rather pro-GM or GM-sceptics, much as in the German 
procedure.
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In the British case significant effort went into closing some o f the alleged gaps in the 
knowledge about the effects of biotechnology in both ecological and economical terms, as 
a substantial elucidation and systematisation of existing knowledge and non-knowledge was 
commissioned. As such, the British procedure as a whole may definitely claim to involve 
more ‘competence* than the Danish consensus conference. However, as I have shown this 
information was kept more or less completely separate from the public debate strand of the 
exercise. Compared to the Danish procedure this organisational structure was the product 
of very different political motives. Rhetorically, both the scientific and the economic study 
were claimed to feed into and qualify the public debate strand. In reality, however, they 
were primarily conceived to bolster the political system against the possible outcomes o f 
the public debates. The Government was clearly concerned that the resonance created by 
the public debate strand -  which the Government had not really wanted- would threaten 
to further complicate its policy intentions in the area.
As I have shown, this strategy back-fired on the British Government. This can be seen as 
an example that with a loosening of the couplings between the different functional do­
mains, intersystemic contingency increases. When the willingness of ‘the public* to accept 
decisions made by policy makers and scientists/tcchnologists decline, this also impinges on 
the demands the political and scientific systems make of each other. Because the two addi­
tional studies were not conducted as ‘traditionar policy inquiries, but were carried out in 
affiliation with the public debate, they were exposed to different demands of public credi­
bility. This gave more leverage to the GM sceptics to foster uncertainties that otherwise 
might not have found their way into the public domain with the same force and authority'. 
On the one hand, it seems, that the lay people participating in the procedure did not get 
any chance to evaluate the quality, reliability and relevance o f the scientific review.374 This 
was in the end a matter for the panellists alone. On the other hand, the fact that the inquiry' 
was carried out under significant publicity' appears to have had an impact on the conclu­
sions drawn and on the basis on which political communication had to continue.
With regard to the ‘enlightenment’ o f the participating lay people the information material 
disseminated in the British case also exhibited the tendency7 to reproduce social controver­
sies in cognitive guises. The credibility o f the information material was perceived to depend 
on the involvement of a broad spectrum of stakeholders. However, these clearly did not 
just disagree about the interpretation and importance of cognitive uncertainties, but more 
fundamentally about the nature of the issues to be explored at all (the question of selecting 
the appropriate framing). In the end this led to an information pack where divisive knowl­
edge claims were stated without source, and which some of the lay participants, expecting 
unbiased information to be available in a government-run public debate, found rather frus­
374 As might be expected from the arguments about an ‘extended peer review’ (see Chapter II).
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trating. Overall, the British procedures resulted in a lot o f ‘competent1 communication, but 
a less ‘holistic’ assessment than the organisers had set as their goal.
In the Danish case the education o f the lay people was seen as the central task o f the ex­
perts. In the British case expertise played the role o f a ‘rational’ force countervailing the 
‘emotional’ standpoints of the public, which can at best be seen as a very indirect educa­
tional function. In the German case significant resources also went into the acquisition and 
clarification o f cognitive and factual knowledge. However, as the stakeholders were as­
sumed to be already ‘knowledgeable’, here the function of the knowledge component was 
an attempt to explore what cognitive claims could be accepted by the various stakeholders 
as the basis of policy, as well as serve to clarify how and where issue-framings diverged.
The DGG event can be contrasted to the WZB procedure o f in the early 1990s, which was 
organised as a participatory technology assessment exercise with a primary emphasis on 
cognitive expertise. In this procedure an attempt was made to separate cognitive and nor­
mative assessments of GM agriculture and bridge diverging cognitive assessments via discur­
sive procedures. In the normative or political dimension this had not been a particularly 
successful approach, as the procedure broke down and the environmentalists chose to exit 
rather than to lend legitimacy to the output.375
In the DGG a different approach was opted for. It was accepted from the outset that 
communication in a scientific mode was unable to deliver unambiguous assessments, which 
all participants would be willing to agree as a shared basis for the exploration of policy 
tasks. The GM sceptics did not accept mainstream science, which they saw as too wedded 
to commercial interests and ideologically blind to long-term risks. (The different framings 
communicated march almost perfectly with the ideal-typical cultural biases outlined in 
Chapter II). Therefore, the function o f  the procedure was to explore -  with the assistance 
of various types o f expertise — where ‘common ground’ could be reached. In order to glue 
the procedure together socially, it was accepted that the respective ‘sides’ would bring in 
‘their own’ expertise. One could say that the procedure put a greater emphasis on ensuring 
that all participants were given the opportunity to articulate their concerns in a scientific 
language, than on assuring the quality o f the knowledge claims communicated.376 The ex­
perts brought in by the respective ‘sides’ did not engage in shared clarifications o f matters 
of fact in a scientific mode o f communication (as in the British case), but laid out different
375 Although this perhaps does not as such support the diagnosis that facts and values are inherently inter­
mingled in an analytical sense (there was undoubtedly political strategy involved as well), this does seem to be 
the practical implication on the procedural level.
376 Especially compared to the WZB procedures where chains o f  argumentation were structured and policed 
quite strictly by the moderators.
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scenarios and evaluations, the credibility o f  which were then the object of dialogue (or per­
haps rather ‘positioning’) among the involved stakeholders.377
For the sponsor, the BMVEL, this was not problematic. This was so for two reasons. First, 
the ministry did not see itself as lacking the scientific knowledge required to make its poli­
cies reliable (nor was it under the same public pressure as the British government to display 
competence on the issue). From the point of view of the political system, this was not an 
attempt to get more (scientific) knowledge. It was in the end not so much concerned with 
the physical risks and uncertainties affiliated with agricultural biotechnology as with the po­
litical risks entailed in choosing between supporting or rejecting GM agriculture, which 
were only partly coupled to the question about physical risks. Hence, secondly, the task for 
the ministry was to explore the room for political manoeuvre, and if possible to mediate 
between the groups involved (in short: to run decision blockades). In this process it seems 
that cognitive consensus was of minor importance. Giving space to the various actors to 
articulate their concerns as best they could was more important.
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577 This could be interpreted as an example o f  an ‘extended peer review’, where experts have to justify their 
knowledge claims in front o f a wider audience. However, it seems more adequate to me to consider it as one 
where expertise and scientific knowledge were applied as a political resource, i. e. the procedure was ad­
dressed at the political process rather than at knowledge production. O f course it is then a matter of defini­
tion (or ‘taste") o f the observer whether this merits the label ‘knowledge production’.
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The cases compared here can be seen as different responses to the challenge facing all at­
tempts at the governance of advanced technological complexes believed to entail risks. So­
phisticated scientific knowledge — though exclusionary and contested -  is indispensable, 
but clearly not sufficient to ensure a broadly acceptable policy. However, the need for 
knowledge in the procedures — as well as the social mechanisms for certifying this knowl­
edge — found different solutions in each o f the cases.
All the three cases constitute hybrid forums where political and scientific types o f argu­
ments intermingle and are constituted as mutually dependent. On the one hand the quality 
and completeness of cognitive assessments given by experts are seen as dependent on ‘sci- 
ence-extemar criteria, i.e. that the involved expertise is ‘representative’ of a broad spectrum 
of viewpoints and interests related to GMOs. On the other hand, the viewpoints and inter­
ests must be supported with scientific knowledge claims (statements on matters o f fact) of 
different kinds.
In this intermingling it can be argued that some procedures placed a greater weight on the 
‘scientific’ component (understood as the clarification of causal/factual issues) compared 
to the ‘political* component (understood as the search of collectively acceptable solutions 
in the regulation o f technology).
The Danish consensus conference places more emphasis on the ‘political’. In the cognitive 
dimension the aim of the conference was of course to educate the lay panel, but experts 
and stakeholders were encouraged to justify their knowledge claims to ‘ordinary people’. 
The knowledge claims the lay people found reliable were the ones that found their way into 
their recommendations to the parliamentarians. As such the central cognitive product of 
the conferences was an assessment o f how lay representatives (‘the affected’ in the sociol­
ogy of risk terminology) evaluated the spectrum of knowledge claims present in the policy 
arena. One could call it a ‘popular filter’ o f elitist expertise and counter-expertise before 
these are passed on to legislators.
The British case emerges as having the strongest emphasis on ‘purified’ or certified scien­
tific input into policy-making alongside popular assessments. The social organisation of 
knowledge production was in this case fashioned to explore whether a broadly constituted 
expert panel could produce a shared evaluation and recommendation on questions ‘asked’ 
by the public (in contrast to the Danish consensus conference where the lay panel pro­
duced consensual evaluations on the basis of divisive expert assessments). As the scientific 
review was presented as state-of-the art scientific knowledge certified by an inclusive panel 
of experts, the cognitive product (of the scientific strand) in the British case was an attempt 
to establish what the British policy arena as a whole could count as knowledge claims on 
which to process disagreements about policy decisions.
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The German procedure, finally, was the most hybridised case. In the cognitive dimension it 
-  at least in effect if not in initial intention — served as an exploration o f where cognitive 
agreement could be established among the various stakeholders. However, equally impor­
tant was the task o f exposing and explicating where diverging knowledge claims existed and 
how they were affiliated with normative positions. The cognitive product of the procedure 
was then to show the spectrum of reasonable knowledge claims on which the various posi­
tions were based.378
Again, I will not propose that the different solutions to the challenge of constructing com­
petence are strictly defined by a unitary political culture. It should be recalled that these 
procedures are meant to mediate in controversies, and therefore must give some place to 
actors dominated by different cultural biases. Nonetheless, tendencies can be observed that 
the respective cases align themselves with the dominant cultural patterns of their national 
contexts. The Danish consensus conference, where ordinary people are invited to deliver 
holistic assessments of different types of knowledge was noticeably more egalitarian than 
the British procedure, where different types of knowledge are separated into distinct social 
contexts and lay people are not invited to evaluate the cognitive contributions of experts. 
Comparatively speaking, this leans towards an individualist culture, with its emphasis of 
substantial rationality, but with certain hierarchical elements (e.g. assumed trust in scien­
tists). The British case distinguishes itself from the German procedure, where the adversar­
ial use o f expertise is embedded in a strong proceduralised mode of interaction (rules o f 
argumentation must be fixed in advance and independently o f the substantial content to be 
processed), while the British procedure was, to a larger extent, made up as it went along. As 
argued earlier this pattern should not be understood as a relationship of causal determina­
tion but rather as a sign that the procedures adjust to their respective contexts in order to 
ensure a certain responsiveness to their communications.
Links to Policy Making
The procedures explored in this thesis all exhibit some ambition to devise ‘alternative* ways 
o f governing agricultural biotechnology.379 1 have argued that theoretically they can be 
characterised as attempts to establish forums where ‘traditional’, strict, couplings between 
organisations with primary roots in particular functional systems are loosened with the in­
tention o f facilitating mediation between such perspectives. This is typically achieved 
through the physical co-presence of individuals. Furthermore, they can be seen as attempts 
to absorb protest potential by including representatives of, or simply members of, constitu­
encies who are not traditionally involved in policy making, but are in one way or another
378 Reasonable in the sense o f being supported by reasons and evidence.
379 Or at least alternative ways to produce policy advice for decision-makers.
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affected by it. In order to achieve this, they are ‘removed’ some distance from the routine 
operations of the political system — as indeed they must be if they are to produce some­
thing other than just ordinary politics.380 This, however, presents the the challenge of how 
their products are channelled back into policy-making and make a difference there.381 To 
investigate this the Luhmannian concept o f resonance seems a useful mode of observation, 
as it directs our attention to how communication moves across organisational borders 
without making claims about strict causalities in the transfer of discursive framings. In 
other words, this way of viewing things allows the researcher to devote attention to both 
structural or organisational features, and more contingent, immediate states of the involved 
systems of communication without preconceived assumptions about the dominance of one 
over the other in specific instances.382 The task will then be to explore and contrast how the 
cases are configured with regard to the potential resonance o f their communicative outputs 
in their respective environments.383
Two conditions are presumed to be required for resonance to be achieved. That channels 
of communication are available and that the messages communicated are perceived as rele­
vant by the receiver. In the case of the Danish consensus conference, arguably, the prob­
lem of resonance was quite evident, the second condition seems to have posed the biggest 
challenge. Consensus conferences are organised by the Danish Board of Technology, 
which is a parliamentary institution. As such, its recommendations and assessments are in 
principle ensured direct access to the legislative, where the DBT has a good reputation. 
However, whether the outputs will receive any attention depends on the perceived rele­
vance of both the topic, the exact framings and the timing, as there is no obligation for par­
liamentarians to process the outputs. In the case investigated it seems that the timing was
380 Stakeholder based procedures particularly need to create ‘protected’ spaces if participants are to engage in 
seeking creative solutions rather than pursuing influence in ‘conventional’ strategic ways (van Eijndhoven and 
van Est 2002: 226).
381 The impacts o f  such procedures can be located at a number o f  societal levels and they are difficult to 
measure in a reliable way (cf. e.g. Hennen 2002). To make a difference (and be worth the effort for the in­
volved) procedures therefore need to be related in some way to the institutional contexts where technologies 
are shaped. Arguably, technologies are shaped in the interaction o f  a number of elements such as scientific 
knowledge production, economic forces, legal regulation and political priorities. Ideally, then, the relationship 
o f  the procedures to all o f these domains ought to be assessed. This, however, is not possible within the cur­
rent investigation, and I shall focus on the links with policy making.
382 Although, as mentioned in the beginning o f  chapter III, the thesis is based on the assumption that there is 
a systematic relation between the structural features o f modem societies and the proliferation o f risk contro­
versies. This, however, does not lead to the assumption that a structural determination works in all aspects o f  
such controversies. How they expand and contract is considered a contingent matter that requires specific 
empirical investigation.
383 It should be noted that whereas the other dimensions considered can be considered as design criteria more 
or less at the disposal o f  the organisers (of course they require acceptance by participants and perhaps spon­
sors), this is not the case in the relationship between die procedures and their communicative environments, 
notably the arenas where policies are formulated, as this includes the institutional location o f  the organising 
bodies themselves.
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particularly problematic, as there were no ongoing legislative initiatives that the results 
could feed into, and the conference had not produced any significant new framings o f  the 
issues, which could allow either politicians or stakeholders to (re)articulate concerns. These 
observations sit quite well with autopoeitic systems theoretical claims that the political sys­
tem is operatively closed. It hence only takes up communications from its environment if 
they can contribute to the continuation of political communication. The consensus confer­
ence apparently did not produce framings of significant relevance for political communica­
tion. If  anything, it was subsequently used to communicate an alleged correspondence be­
tween public attitudes and policy-guiding considerations.384
Problems in achieving resonance are not, however, only or primarily to do with temporal 
features. They may also be provoked by the substantive framings of the topics, as the ef­
fects of the BioTIK initiative indicate. Here the aim was to ensure that ‘ethical’ considera­
tions were always ‘co-processed’ when legislation was prepared and administrative deci­
sions were made. The need for ‘ethics* was reiterated both in political communication and 
in the public sphere, but it has been difficult to establish that anything but ornamental 
functions have been served by this. It seems that the preparation of an ethical ‘check-list’ 
had next to no effect on the operative level of regulatory principles and organisations.
In contrast to the Danish case, the British procedure achieved significant resonance both in 
the public sphere and in the political system. The initiative for the debate came from the 
periphery of the political system, and the Government was not particularly keen on the 
suggestion. However, it seems that the Government’s commitment to biotechnology and 
the particularly articulate opposition o f a large segment of the population, proved good 
news material, and the debate received significant attention even before it took off. The 
Government therefore judged it unwise to reject the call for a debate, although it sought to 
apply a number o f immunising strategies (temporally, socially and substantially), which would 
protect it from any strong commitment to the outcomes. This means that the political sys­
tem sought to defend itself against (a certain type of) resonance by setting temporal restric­
tions on the procedures, by reiterating EU level commitments, and by seeking alternative 
argumentative resources.
One o f the ways in which the organisation charged with arranging the debate nonetheless 
sought to ensure resonance in the political system was by ‘forcing’ the Government to 
commit itself in advance to responding to the outcome,385 a strategy that was obviously 
only possible due to a high level of public attention. This response was expected to be
384 The investigation undertaken in Chapter V indicates that at the time there was in fact a — comparatively — 
high degree o f congruency between the policies pursued by the political system and the concerns and prefer­
ences o f ‘the public’ as articulated through the conference and measured by surveys.
385 This was achieved through an exit-threat (a collective resignation), in a way that the Danish Board o f  
Technology could never do.
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communicated shortly after the end o f  the debate, but was delayed by about half a year. 
This can be taken as an indication o f a certain amount of perplexity within the Govern­
ment about what to do with an output exhibiting clear incongruence between the articu­
lated wish o f (mobilised parts of) ‘the public’ and the envisioned policies of the Govern­
ment. However, perhaps it also indicates that once the temporary steering board was dis­
solved, the organisationally focused pressure on the Government was lifted, and only the 
more disembedded observations o f the public sphere exerted pressure on the Government 
to make its position clear.386 Hence a continuous organisational locus clearly seems to influ­
ence the amount o f resonance that is achieved from such procedures.
As the GM Nation? event is relatively recent, it is still difficult to assess the more long-term 
effects of the procedure, and whether this procedural innovation will be used more widely 
in the British policy context.387 From the point of view of the organisers the procedure was 
considered as quite successful, especially given its novelty, because it achieved much reso­
nance. However, from the point of view of the political system it was perhaps less of a suc­
cess, especially as the procedure did not seem to fulfil the politically important function of 
absorbing protest potential. The public climate in Britain was not de-polarised as a result of 
the procedure.388
O f the three cases in the study, the German one displays the most direct coupling between 
the discursive procedure and the political system, as the procedure was instigated by the 
ministry charged with (re)formulating the policy on agricultural biotechnology. It is notably 
different, especially from the British case, where the process was more or less forced upon 
the Government. This in a sense inverts the issue o f resonance, as here it was the political 
system that sought to induce resonance in an organisational landscape locked into polarised 
positions that were characterised by incommensurable problem framings. Hence, while the 
British political system experienced the participatory procedure as an event that created 
rather than reduced complexity,389 the German government deliberatively induced a com­
386 However, as I explained in Chapter VI, the delay may also be related to the fact that the focus o f  public 
attention was on the run up to the war in Iraq.
387 Along with its substantive response to the debate, the Government published a note with the title ‘The 
GM public debate — Lessons learned from the process’ (DEFRA 2002b). This kind of learning would hardly 
be worth engaging in if the debate was expected to be a singular event. However, although significantly more 
resonance was achieved than in the Danish case, the British government will likely be hesitant to embark on a 
similar exercise on such a confrontational topic again.
ass O f course it is difficult to assess counterfactually how public opinion (in whatever understanding) would 
hare developed had the procedure not taken place, but it does seem that the procedure attracted more (con­
tentious) attention to the topic.
389 And the Danish political system apparendy observed very litde. However, the director o f  the DBT sees a 
further function o f  consensus conferences to  induce a greater understanding o f the ‘public’ in expert com­
munities and among stakeholders (somewhat similar to the German case) (Interview, Klüver, see also Joss 
and Klüver 2001). Whether this happened and to what extent has not been explored in this study.
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municative dynamic to remove decision blockades. The aim was not to promote the socie­
tal acceptance o f biotechnology, but to prevent further erosion in public confidence in the 
food sector following the discovery o f BSE in Germany in the course of adjusting national 
laws according to revised EU regulation. In doing so the Green minister in charge o f the 
policy domain appeared to wish to test (and prepare) the grounds for a German law stress­
ing the precautionary elements and circumventing the less restrictive elements o f the re­
vised EU directives, as her primary constituencies considered desirable.
This of course generated an intense interest from the political system in the communication 
in the procedure. However, the outputs seem to have been taken up by the political system 
in a selective manner where the arguments of one ‘side’ in the procedure had significantly 
more trenchancy in the political system than the other, its framings finding more resonance 
with the agenda o f the political system.390 Such uptake is of course inevitably ‘selective*.
The point here is that the alleged attempt to apply an alternative and creative means of 
conflict resolution by organising a ‘discourse*, was subsequently perceived by the GM ad­
vocates as hypocritical. In their experience the Government was never willing to give any 
concessions and did not assume the role of a mediator in the polarised organisational land­
scape, but ‘chose sides’. The abstract consensual points reached in the procedures were 
subsequently interpreted selectively to fit the restrictive agenda of the political system, 
which for the GM promoters made their participation in the DGG procedure more or less 
futile.391




Informative link with 
legislative
Antagonistic link with 
executive
Procedure initiated 
(and partly managed) 
by executive
C haracter of reso ­
nance in  political 
process
Little explicit reso­
nance, used to display 
correspondence be­




it will not let its poli­
cies be dictated by 
expressions o f  public 
debate, though was 
forced to modify 
standpoints and post­
pone decision-making
Selective uptake o f  
abstract formulations, 
specified to fit politi­
cal programme o f  
government
390 Or, at least this was the impression conveyed by my interviewees (from both sides), o f which some 
claimed to have found policy makers attentive to their interventions (the GM sceptics) and others that the 




The ability to achieve resonance is o f critical import for procedures of the kind considered 
here. However, for the social scientific observer it is also one of the most difficult aspects 
to confront, as impacts or resonance can manifest themselves in many ways and in many 
contexts. As the discussion of the Danish case indicated, the effects of such procedures can 
be both socially and temporally diffuse, which makes their empirical assessment particularly 
difficult (while impacts that are difficult to detect are from unimportant).
In regard to the two previous dimensions of comparison I suggested a (cautious) cultural 
theoretical interpretation of some o f the differences in procedural design. In short, the as­
sumptions underlying the procedural selections showed a certain affinity with the (rela­
tively) accentuated political cultural patterns observed in the respective national contexts.392 
As the observed variety the procedural design was partly explained with reference to such 
political cultures, there is a risk of co-founding when also seeking to explore the effects of 
the procedures with reference to political culture. Nevertheless, I believe a case can be 
made for considering the susceptibility of policy making bodies to the output o f such pro­
cedures as conditioned by political culture, even if they are to some degree designed to fit 
their respective contexts.
The three cases explored here suggest that the effects depend on a host of factors which 
cannot possibly be controlled in a systematic fashion here. The size of the event,393 level of 
antagonism, political pertinence of the topics, attention of the wider public sphere and 
various sub-publics, control of the agenda, the use o f scientific and other expertise, to men­
tion just some of the more obvious factors that vary and interact — and significantly so in 
the cases recounted — makes it difficult to paint a clear picture o f the effects of the opera­
tionalisation o f ‘the public* on the basis of my three cases.394 Nonetheless, I shall make 
some tentative observations, although it is difficult to discern any generalisable traits in the 
patterns o f resonance of the analysed procedures.
One issue, that on immediate inspection seems paradoxical, is the fact that the British pro­
cedure, where the political system seemed the least receptive, was also the case where the 
procedure had the biggest transformative capacity in relation to the policy arena. In the 
Danish case the political system would be expected to be the most receptive, and yet it 
seems that the procedures had quite limited effects on the policy arena. There arc, how­
ever, multiple differences that could account for this. These include the initial configuration
m  ‘Relatively’ in the sense that the cases are not seen as clear-cut examples of, respectively, ‘egalitarian’, ‘indi­
vidualist’ and ‘hierarchical’ cultures. These labels only make sense when the cases are seen in relation to each 
other, as matters o f  degree rather than absolute scales.
m  E.g. ranging from 14 people on the lay panel o f the Danish consensus conference over 30 organisations in 
the German D GG procedure to some 20.000 participants in the British public meetings.
394 Compare Biitschi and Nentwich (2002) and Hennen (2002) for discussions of the normative, epistemo­
logical and methodological difficulties affiliated with assessing impacts from such procedures.
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of the policy arenas (in Denmark a latent public opposition to GM agriculture but not 
fierce antagonistic positions, compared in the UK to the aftermath o f the BSE experience 
combined with a more organised resistance building up), the size o f the event (14 lay per­
sons and as many experts debating vs. approximately 20.000 participants in public meet­
ings), and the previous experiences with such procedures (consensus conferences are con­
sidered ‘business-as-usual’ in Denmark whereas this kind of public debate was entirely 
novel for Britain). One factor, however, that I would like to consider in particular is the 
configuration o f external advocates and observers beyond the organisers, seeking to ‘profit’ 
from the procedures. In the Danish case there were no such parties, as the GM sceptics 
ascribed little importance to the consensus conference which they thought rather unimpor­
tant in articulating opposition to GM agriculture due to its consensus-seeking nature. As 
the outcomes nonetheless articulated a rather sceptical attitude towards the technology, the 
GM advocates were not interested in directing too much attention to them. In the British 
case, on the other hand, the anti-GM community seemed sceptical at the outset, but even­
tually saw the procedures as a means to mobilise public attention and raise pressure on the 
political system. This interpretation indicates that the level of resonance has a lot to do with 
whether the procedure facilitates, or addresses external (pre-existing) actors for, mobilisa­
tion.
The German procedure was characterised by the fact that all the major stakeholders were 
tied into the process. However, the procedural ground rules stated that ‘the public* (i.e. the 
media) should not be used to influence the procedures (the participants agreed on restrict­
ing publicity work during the procedure). Therefore, the participating organisations were 
more focused on establishing internal alliances and ‘convincing’ the political system (whose 
attention they already had) through arguments than on mobilising the broader public 
sphere. This, combined with the fact that German GM advocates in general had a harder 
time than the British GM sceptics in mobilising public opinion to, respectively, advocate 
and restrict the ambitions of the Government, meant that the German government found 
itself in a better position than the British government to control the effects o f the proce­
dure in subsequent policy formulations.
In neither case did this result in the settlement of the controversies, but politically they de­
veloped different foci as the British government was observed as (predominantly) support­
ing science and industry to the dismay o f large sections of the UK population, whereas the 
German government (predominantly) sided with environmentalists and organic farmers, 
but attracted severe criticism from the GM advocates.
All in all, I suggest that these observations indicate that the effects of such procedures can 
never be assessed independently of the specific context in which they are embedded. It 
seems that independently of their procedural design and the political culture surrounding 
them, their effects in bringing policy making into closer contact with ‘public concerns’ de­
3 1 3
pends critically on the presence o f ‘external’ actors to facilitate the observation of the out­
comes in the relevant policy arenas.
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Conclusion
The aim o f this thesis has been to investigate the use of participatory and deliberative pro­
cedures in the regulation of controversial technologies. The selection of this topic is due to 
a sympathetic interest in this way of addressing disputed choices in the regulation of risky 
technology. However, this interest was mixed with some sociological reservations about the 
ability o f such procedures to actually achieve the effects envisioned in their organisational 
self-descriptions, and the more abstract discourses of their sympathisers. If guided solely by 
the proliferation of claims by advocates of public involvement regarding the normative and 
pragmatic advantages of such procedures, one could be led to believe that such procedures 
would be widely adapted in the standard repertoires o f the governance of technology. This 
does not seem to be the case. Nevertheless, there are indications that more inclusionary 
and argumentative modes of policy-making are on the rise in a number of contexts, which 
arguably warrants a sociological interest in understanding in more detail how such proce­
dures actually operate.
This led to the attempt in the thesis to understand and explain 1) why such procedures 
have emerged and presumably are increasing in number and importance, as well as 2) how 
and why they take particular social forms in different contexts. This was based on the de­
scription and analysis of typical cases, i.e. cases somehow ‘representative’ of their respective 
contexts.
The exploration o f these questions has been undertaken within a framework inspired by 
autopoietic systems theory, as this theory delivers what I consider to be one of the most 
penetrating analyses of the dynamics o f risk controversies as rooted in the structural fea­
tures of modem societies. Modem societies are here understood as functionally differenti­
ated, and risk controversies are seen as the product of confrontations between mutually 
incongruent modes of observation and a declining ability of the functional systems to con­
dition each other’s operations in ways that are convincing to ‘the public*. This public is 
seen not as a social entity, but as a particular mode of communication that is carried by a 
number of actors and resonates across the various functional domains that influence tech­
nological trajectories. This has led to a proliferation of communication about all sorts of 
risk, which can be understood as an increasing awareness in social systems that decisions 
made in the present may have adverse effects in the future, but this cannot be known with 
certainty. Such decision-making under uncertainty tends to have socially divisive effects as 
the potential for adverse effects are assessed differently by decision-makers and those af­
fected by decisions but with no influence on them. As no specific functional system has 
evolved to deal with the problem of the uncertainty o f future events, they tend to be 
‘pushed around’ (resonate) across different systemic contexts to release social tension, in­
cluding the kind o f technological controversies discussed here. Within this framework the
315
emergence o f participatory and deliberative procedures can be interpreted as an attempt to 
establish specially differentiated, organisational forums in which technological controver­
sies can be formalised by creating ‘argumentative spaces’, where individuals and groups not 
traditionally involved with policy-making can be included in ‘poly-perspectivistic’ commu­
nication in order to formulate (recommendations for) policy-making on a more holistic ba­
sis than is possible for individuals and organisations operating primarily with a single sys­
temic perspective.
In short, the function of such forums is to produce legitimacy, understood in the descrip­
tive sense as the willingness o f non-decision-makers (those affected) to accept the decisions 
of policy makers, and to make these decisions the basis of their own future operations 
(rather than seek to block or revoke decision-making). Allegedly, such procedures do this 
by allowing more perspectives and ‘knowledges’ to be taken into consideration, and incon­
gruencies in interests, values and cognitive assessments to be bridged with various social 
mechanisms (inclusion/argumentation). As such, the procedures — if or when successful -  
can be seen as contributing to the integration o f modem societies.
I have argued that in the scholarly debates on these issues a certain semantic on participa­
tion and deliberation has developed, which has inspired the search for solutions to legiti­
macy-problems regarding the social management of technology. This semantic, with vari­
ous nuances, has also (to varying degrees) functioned as a self-description and self­
prescription for such procedures, that is, it has inspired what I have called the ‘operationali­
sation’ o f ‘the public’ for involvement and it has influenced the expectations at such proce­
dures from different observers.
In spite o f the common features of such procedures, both in respect to their socio- 
structural basis and their intellectual underpinnings, their empirical instances exhibit signifi­
cant variation on a number of points. Arguably, the discussions on the intellectual under­
pinnings illustrate a high degree of international cross fertilisation in social scientific com­
munication, but they are appropriated differently in different policy contexts. I have argued 
that while systems theory is a useful tool for theorising the background and much of the 
dynamic of technological controversies, it is less well equipped to explore the specificities 
of cross-national variation in the ‘operationalisation’ o f the ideals of increased public in­
volvement. Nonetheless, I have sought to consider the procedures investigated as ‘func­
tionally equivalent’, and have tried to characterise how they express different choices on 
theoretically similar issues, which are central to the functions such procedures are designed 
to carry out. These were what I called, respectively, a ‘risk controversy thematic’, a ‘trust 
thematic’ and a ‘mediation thematic’.
The risk controversy thematic has to do with how procedures seek to reconfigure the deci- 
sion-maker/affected interface, which according to the systems theoretical analysis is central 
to risk controversies, and how they establish ways for (representatives of) concerned or
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affected members o f ‘the public’ to address decision makers and perhaps influence policy 
choices.
The trust thematic concerns the mechanisms devised to facilitate the acceptance by ‘the 
public’ or the affected of decisions made by policy makers and regulators, and ensure that 
they feel confident that their safety and wider interests are adequately looked after.
Finally, the mediation thematic looks at the ways the procedures facilitate modes of com­
munication through which the participants can get better acquainted with each other’s per­
spectives on the technological and regulatory issues of and possibly establish common 
frames of reference.
The procedures analysed all made more or less conscious selections on these dimensions 
(i.e. design choices were the object of decision-making in the organisations arranging the 
procedures), but these differed quite significantly across the cases. These differences were 
difficult to explore and make sense of using systems theory alone. Therefore, I opted for an 
‘extension’ of systems theory with cultural theoretical distinctions to explore the diversity 
of organisational commitments and national variance. ‘Cultures’ were in this context under­
stood as patterns o f preferences (biases) creating asymmetries in the selectivity o f organisa­
tional decision-making. The comparison indicated that the operationalisation o f mitigation 
through some kind o f public involvement was in fact aligned with what could be consid­
ered the dominant pattern of political culture in the individual cases. This should not be 
understood to mean that procedural froms were in some sense ‘determined’ by their na­
tional contexts, but it indicates that -  at least in the investigated cases -  the organising bod­
ies are knowledgeable about the environment in which the operate and attempt to fashion 
the procedures to achieve effects. It should not be overlooked that all cases were the results 
of specific trajectories of controversy, which were rooted in complex patterns o f interac­
tion in the respective policy arenas intermingling several ‘cultures’. This meant that the 
procedures did not adhere in an unambiguous manner to ideal typical political cultures.
From a systems theoretical perspective a number of difficulties for this kind o f procedure 
can be predicted (as compared to their idealised self-descriptions and aims). However, in­
stead of discussing such potential difficulties in an abstract mode, I opted for an approach 
which identified a number of concrete ‘challenges’ as actually observed in the cases. Argua­
bly, these challenges to fulfilling the self-prescribed aims of the procedures were concen­
trated at different points in the cases investigated -  presumably due to the variation in the 
design-criteria of the procedures. I then identified three major types of challenges to such 
procedures. Each was particularly pronounced in one of the cases, but represented issues 
all such procedures must address. These challenges I labelled ‘resonance’, ‘inclusion’ and 
‘mediation’.
The problem of resonance pertains to the ability of procedures to actually influence the 
regulation o f technology through the transferral of the observations and concerns articu­
317
lated into other communicative contexts, as well as make a difference in these other con­
texts. The problem of inclusion is about deciding who should participate and who should 
not, as well as what themes are appropriate to be processed in such procedures. A particu­
larly pertinent topic in this respect is that although the participator)7 and deliberative proce­
dures considered here are often envisioned to function as supplements or even alternatives 
to the mechanisms of representative democracy and existing modes of governance, they 
are, it seems, inevitably faced with questions about ‘representa tiven es s’ in one form or an­
other. Finally, the problem of mediation has to do with what social mechanisms are devised 
to facilitate common points of reference across the different framings of biotechnology. 
Here scientific communication (on ‘matters o f fact’) is often invested with specific expecta­
tions because the procedures concern technology, the material core of which is seen as dif­
ferent from other policy domains where ‘science’ plays no role.395 Often, expectations are 
communicated that a scientific rationalisation of such controversies is possible (and desir­
able), and the use o f ‘expertise’ in such procedures is often closely intertwined with modes 
of activating and involving ‘the public’. This tripartition o f challenges is not claimed to be 
an exhaustive list, participatory procedures of the kind discussed here may encounter diffi­
culties that do not fit into either of these categories. However, I will argue that their theo­
retical grounding combined with the empirical relevance these categories exhibit allow me 
to conclude that they are both generic and essential — and must be expected to be of relevance 
for the observation of all such procedures. Even where these issues do not prove problem­
atic, the characterisation of procedures pertaining to how these (potential) challenges are 
addressed will hold important information.396
Based on the assumption that these ‘challenges’ are particularly interesting and telling about 
the social dynamics o f such procedures, I focused the comparison of the cases on how they 
provided different solutions to these challenges and how the solutions opted for could be 
interpreted on the background of the respective contexts and histories of the procedures.
395 This should be seen in relation to the diagnostic claim referred in the introduction that science as an insti­
tution has increasing difficulty in abdicating responsibility for the effects o f  the technological applications of 
new scientific knowledge,
396 That the three types o f  challenges are generic and essential does not mean that they are necessarily wholly 
independent o f each other in practise. Inclusion (especially the willingness to participate) may depend on ex­
pected resonance, just as resonance may depend on perceived legitimacy in terms of inclusion (e.g. represen­
tativeness) and ability to mediate. Likewise the potential for mediation (taking an argumentative attitude) may 
be a product o f perceived closeness to policy making.
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In order to avoid repeating the details o f die individual studies and their comparison, I 
summarise the findings of the comparison in the following table:
DK (Consensus 
Conference)




Exclusive -  but dignified 
-  panel o f ‘ordinary peo­
ple’
All-indusive — but con­
tested -public meeting? 
combined with exclusive 
‘control-groups’
Delegated to stake­




Procedurally embedded — 
expert disagreements me­
diated through lay people
Procedurally isolated — 
inclusive and consensus­
seeking







‘Off the street’ -  provided 
with information material
(No lay involvement) 
Wider public seen as 
audience o f procedure
Links to policy 
m aking
Independently run proce­
dure, with permanent 
institutional link to Par­
liament No commitment 
from legislative to process 
outcomes
Independent procedure 
run by temporary organi­
sation. Government 
‘forced’ to respond to 
outcomes
Procedure initiated by 





Qaims that policy is rela­
tively well adjusted to 
articulated concerns
Rejection!
‘Hypocrisy* — must re­
spond but does not fun­
damentally alter policy 
commitment
Selectivity!
Adherence to one ‘side* 
of articulated concerns
Effects? Relatively high corre­
spondence between public 
concerns and pursued 
policies (within EU 
framework) (Possibly the 
result of longstanding 
public debate rather than 
investigated procedures)
Continued dissonance 
between public concerns 
and pursued policies
Correspondence between 
public concerns and pur­
sued policies, but open 
conflict with organised 
interests and internal 
tensions in political sys­
tem
Now what can be learned from all this? In my research question I set out to explore “how 
the conceptions o f ‘the public’, their concerns and their role in policy-making (in participa­
tory and deliberative procedures) mediate the effects of public controversy on policy for­
mation in this area.”
First of all, the roots o f controversies over biotechnology are found in structural features o f 
modem societies, which are arguably more or less identical across most of Europe, and a 
number o f ideas (or semantics) about the advantages of mitigating controversies through 
inclusion and argumentation are arguably common to (or at least were commonly available 
to) the procedures. Despite the fact that the initial assumptions — that varying ‘assumptions 
are made and discursive framings propagated concerning (the nature of) ‘the public’, the 
issues actually at stake in the controversies, the distribution o f competences among differ­
ent actors in the policy arenas and what the relevant (and legitimate) inputs into policy
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making from the public’ are (see Introduction) -  proved to be correct, it is no straight for­
ward task to draw unambiguous conclusions from the investigation.
On the one hand I believe I have identified and discussed a number of issues of relevance 
to the understanding of such procedures as a particular type of communication when ana­
lysed against the background their structural location and organisational embedding and 
their effects on policy arenas. I contend that the systems theoretical observation of such 
procedures as product of problems emerging when various uncertainties resonate across 
systemic borders under public scrutiny has provided some fruitful tools for observing the 
communicative structure and dynamic of such processes. The empirical cases have pro­
vided a series of observations about what actually happens when participatory and delibera­
tive ideals are taken up by different actors, embodied in specific institutional settings and 
operationalised in actual procedures, with varying claims on including ‘the public’ (whether 
as lay citizens or as stakeholders) closer into policy formulation.
On the other hand, it strikes me as difficult to derive any strong généralisable conclusions 
from the study with regard to the effects o f such operationalisations. It is difficult to read 
any general pattern from the cases investigated in the sense o f some operationalisations 
being clearly more efficient than others in terms of mitigating controversies,
(reestablishing public trust in technologists or decision makers, influencing regulatory de­
cision making or ‘democratising’ the factors influencing technological trajectories, as the 
advocates of such procedures at times claim that such procedures can or ought to do.
The limited capacity for generalisation emerging from the case studies can of course be as­
cribed to the design of the study. Three cases considered in relation to a number o f vari­
ables does not invite clear-cut generalising assertions. However, I suspect that it also has to 
do with the substantive nature of the cases. Arguably, technological controversies carried 
out in public are exposed to a number of contingent influences, which makes it difficult to 
make more general inferences with regard to their internal dynamics and external effects. 
The question o f whether they can in fact fulfil their envisioned functions — whether these 
are to provide better knowledge, absorb protest potential or ‘democratise’ technological 
decision-making — depends not only on the procedural design and the institutional and po­
litical cultural context, but also on factors that appear to be more difficult to summarise in 
neat ‘variables’. In short, there is a lot o f contingency in play here.
In a strict interpretation this means that the research question cannot be provided with a 
simple and exhaustive answer. What can be said is that I have mapped how the ‘operation­
alisations’ o f ‘the public’ has impinged on the policy arenas in the three cases investigated, 
and have empirically identified a number o f ‘challenges’, which can cause difficulties for 
such procedures in reaching some o f the goals expected of them by their advocates. This 
does not mean that such challenges will impinge on the workings of all such procedures, 
but I contend that they are issues that all such procedures must address in one way or an­
other, even if only implicitly.
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In spite of these reservations about the generalisability of the findings I w:î) pr' p  i fr* 
more general conclusions, which I believe can be drawn from the combination of the rvi 
cal reflections and empirical investigations undertaken, and brictlv rake s t^ l < f the c'-r.rn- 
bution of this work to the sociological understanding of the participatory/deliberative rr.:t:- 
gation of technological controversies.
One feature, which strikes me as particular noticeable, is the fact that none of the pr ne- 
dures actually managed to settle the controversies, nor significantly alter the divine stand 
points of the various stakeholders and members of the public in the respective public 
spheres. I argued initially that under ‘controversy* one can abstractly understand the cm  
munication of dissent (see Chapter I). Drawing on the discussions in Gi.ipter III this un 
derstanding can now be specified into the claim that technological controversies - .it Ir.ot 
from the systems theoretical perspective -  can be defined as dissensu.il communication 
about the criteria determining when a technology' is Vorking’ (i.c. can reduce causal o an 
plexity) and when it is not working (i.e. surprises arc expected or observed). ’Hits means 
that technological controversies principally can be ended in two ways, bather (suffuum 
consensus is reached on such criteria. This means that all actors make agreed principles of 
governance the basis of their own operations rather than contesting them, dins is the idr.il 
solution according to the participatory/deliberative semantic. Alternatively - which ts 
probably the more common outcome in reality -  the controversies understood as the on 
going communication of dissent may simply ebb out because the actors run out of uietyy 
or new themes arrive on the horizon of public attention. Neither seems so far to Ik- the 
case regarding GMOs in the three countries included in this study- Ihere were arguably 
displacements in the themes being processed, the framings used and the constellations ot 
actors (e.g. the German stakeholders interacting more intensely with each other on e.uh 
‘side* of the controversy). However, nowhere were the controversies abandoned < >r nnitr.il 
ised in consensus. In the cases where ‘ordinary' people’ were activated to assess trclm' ■!< yi 
cal and regulatory' options on the basis of their ‘common sense’, their evaluations c.iwi* Ik 
said to have had particularly significant or observable effects in following political commu 
nication (in Denmark relatively little resonance was achieved by the procedures, m the 1 K 
the Government carried out immunising measures to maintain its envisioned p< heu-s. de 
spite the rather sceptical attitudes articulated in a consultation it had irselt frtluctantly : ap­
proved and sponsored).
For the advocates o f participatory' and deliberative procedures these findings must .ipfx ar 
disappointing.397 Compared to the normative principles discussed m Chapter II, a number
397 This statement obviously calls for the qualification that it cannot l>c known coumcrt*.tiunv *fcit » 
have happened if the procedures had not taken place. In a banal sense this is of enure il* ‘ m*. U;i m
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of shortcomings in the design and execution of the procedures can be made out, and the 
observations made in this thesis do not justify an argument that ‘such procedures will never 
work*, that the search for the right operationalisations might as well be called off. In fact, 
much indicates that modem societies cannot give up the search for ways to ‘democratically’ 
handle such controversies.398 But the study does perhaps indicate that expectations in the 
mitigating capacities of participation/deliberation may need to be tempered, and contro­
versies be tolerated as an integral part o f the social management of technology — even if 
this does not adhere to normatively based theories o f social rationality.399 From the view­
point of autopoietic systems theory the fact that controversies are not ‘settled’ simply 
means that communication continues. Therefore, technological controversies carried out in 
the public sphere, in sub-publics and in markets in less proceduralised manners can argua­
bly be observed as constantly ongoing social assessments o f technologies, albeit in more 
antagonistic manners that the more formalised procedures discussed here (Wynne 2002).
The fact that relatively modest impacts were discemable in regard to policy making should 
however not obscure the fact that such procedures may have other, more long term effects, 
which may be quite significant. The Danish case seems rather paradoxical in the sense that 
although it was difficult to trace any immediate effects from the procedures, there seemed 
— comparatively — to be a better correspondence between the concerns articulated by ‘the 
public’ and the subsequent policies pursued than in the British case, where the procedure 
drew a lot more attention. One explanation offered for this (but not ‘proved’) was that this 
type of public involvement in (formalised) debates about technologies has a much longer 
history in Denmark that it does in Britain, where the political system has only just em­
barked on a self-proclaimed process o f  sensitising itself to input from ‘the public’ in regard 
to science and technology. In this perspective, the GM Nation? procedure may have consti­
tuted a significant piece of institutional learning, although any lasting effects remain to be 
seen. Likewise, the German case, although it did not directly involve lay people in discus­
sions, can also be interpreted as an expression of a mode of policy making in transition to­
terms o f research methodology and design this problem can be countered by seeking comparable cases where 
the presence and absence of specially differentiated participatory procedures as a policy tool is included as a 
variable. This, however, would have been a different thesis.
398 "Democratic1 is arguably a concept that constandy evolves, as the still stronger resonance of participatory 
and deliberative ideals in itself indicates.
399 This assessment can be seen as an empirical counterpart to the normative critique by Chan tal Mouffe of 
deliberative ideals that democratic politics inevitably entails an element o f  conflict, which no argumentative 
procedures can do away with completely without excluding in advance either certain participants or certain 
thematics from political strife (Mouffe 2000).
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wards more open and democratic forms.400 Hence, it seems that future research could 
benefit from a more extended temporal perspective than that used here.401
This means that such procedures in fact hold the potential to mediate the concerns of ‘the 
public* in regard to the governance o f  technologies, in the sense that they may slowly re­
configure policy arenas — what in systems theoretical terms could be labelled a ‘structural 
drift* (Luhmann 1997:862). Although they do not in the short term provide the kind le­
gitimacy gains or corridors of popular empowerment that some observers hope for, they 
may in other respects facilitate the uptake of a broader spectrum of interests, values and 
concerns in the social management of technologies. However, they do so in ‘competition’ 
with a number of other social forces and I consider it unlikely that they will eventually do 
away with technological controversies in the sense of creating unitary assessments of when 
technologies Svork’ in acceptable ways.
One final feature of the cases studied worth noticing, is the obvious ‘mismatch’ between 
the location o f the procedures of public involvement and the location of central elements 
of policy formation. In regard to agricultural biotechnology most of the major regulatory 
principles and procedures are drawn up at the EU level, but practically all procedures 
aimed at a more substantial involvement of ‘the public’ are located in national or sub- 
national contexts. O f course the governments of the member states are significant actors in 
shaping EU regulation (and as such the concerns of the populations of the member states 
do not necessarily go unnoticed). However, given the lingering theme of the ‘democratic 
deficit’ associated with the EU institutions it is likely that participatory and deliberative se­
mantics will increasingly be directed at the EU institutions. Attention to the problematics 
of public involvement are beginning to emerge in discussions at the EU level — see for ex­
ample the white paper on the ‘Governance of Expertise’ (Liberatore 2001) where increased 
public involvement and processes o f civic dialogue are explicitly encouraged. This indicates 
that such modes of acquiring policy advice and producing legitimacy is already and pre­
sumably will increasingly find its way into supra-national institutions such as those of the 
EU. This raises not only institutional challenges, but also challenges for social scientific ob­
servers about how such procedures should be conceptualised and analysed. These will in­
evitably add difficulties to the challenges encountered in this thesis.
One problem facing research in this domain is, in my experience, the often large divide be­
tween the sociological-theoretical reconstruction of technological controversies and par- 
ticipatory/deliberative procedures on the one hand, and the empirical analyses and assess­
ments of specific procedures on the other. I hope, however, to have shown that worth­
400 However, an alternative interpretation could be that this was a clever strategic move by the Green minister 
to create leeway for her envisioned policies by committing stakeholders to the articulation o f some principles, 
which could then later be interpreted selectively to the advantage of the restrictive course o f the ministry.
401 This would o f course entail a number o f methodological challenges that I cannot enter into here.
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while knowledge can be acquired in a reasonably reliable manner by means of a deliberate 
attempt at combining relatively sophisticated social theorising with detailed, comparative 
empirical inquiries. Hopefully this thesis has thus contributed to the general sociological 
understanding o f technological controversies and how they are and can be addressed by 
modern societies. As such, it is my hope that the approach taken in this thesis can provide 
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